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**TO HIS HOLINESS
PANNYAS SRI BHADRANKARVIJAYAJI GANIVARA**

WHOSE unselfish sympathy and active kindness to me were really unbounded.

But for WHOSE all-round encouragement and support, the publication of this book was well-nigh impossible,

And WHO gladly took the trouble of going through it, and made valuable suggestions.

This humble work of English Translation and Commentary prepared by me IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

Har *Howrah*

Harl Satya Bhattacharya
M A B L, Ph D

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The number of Jainas in India, even including those who have settled elsewhere, is very small, a little more than two millions. Still the religion professed by them, Jaina-dharma or Jainism, is looked upon as one of the Living Faiths of the world. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Jaina dignitaries, during the last three thousand years and more, have made rich contributions to the Indian heritage in its various branches such as art, architecture, literature and moral ideology. Jaina monks have not only preached great ethical ideals but have also exerted their maximum to put them into practice. In many parts of India, they have exerted pious and healthy influence on the society around them. Jaina contributions to literature positively extend beyond the sphere of their religion, and the Jainas "have memorable achievements", as observed by M. Winternitz (*A History of Indian Literature*, Vol II, pp 594-5, Calcutta 1933), "in the secular sciences to their credit, in philosophy, grammar, lexicography, poetics, mathematics, astronomy and astrology, and even in the science of politics". Further, the Jaina saints and authors have enriched Indian languages, both classical and modern and in the South as well as in the North. If Tamil and Kannada could vie with Sanskrit in their classical period, the major credit goes to the Jaina authors in those regions. It is through their sustained efforts in cultivating Prākṛits, Apabhraṃśa, Rājasthānī, Old-Gujarātī and Old-Hindi that rich linguistic material is available for the study of the growth of these languages. It is on account of these contributions that eminent oriental scholars were attracted to the study of Jainism.

If Jaina doctrines caught the eye of the scholars outside India, it is because certain significant Jaina texts were rendered into some European languages, especially English. H. Jacobi's translations² of the four Jaina works of the Ardha-Māgadhī Canon (*Ācārāṅga* and *Kaṭṭhāvatthana*, *Uttarādhyāyana* and *Sūtrakīrti*) published in the Sacred Books of the East (S. B. E., vols 22 & 45) and his edition of the *Tattvārthasūtra* with German translation (*Line Jaina-Dogmatik* ZDMG Band LX, Leipzig 1906) have been works

of pioneer character. His introductions to the former have gone a long way to place Jainism in its proper perspective in the history of Indian religious ideas. W. SCHUBRING has rendered into German certain sections from the *Ardha-Māgadhī canon* (*Worte Mahāvīras*, Göttingen 1926, also *Dasareyāhya Sutta*, Ahmedabad 1932). There have been other stray efforts in France and Italy, but one need not go into smaller details. The English translations of Prathamānaya yoga texts, which also contain philosophical matter, are not taken into account here.

In India very laudable efforts have been made by a small group of scholars whose works were published in The Sacred Books of the Jains (S. B. J.). The learned labours of J. L. JAINI especially on the *Tattvārthasūtra* and *Gommatasūtra* (S. B. J., Vols. II, V-VI & X) etc. are praiseworthy, though very few subsequent scholars have taken note of them. His *Jaina Gem Dictionary* (Arrah 1918) is a unique reference book for translating Jaina texts into English. Among these publications S. C. GHOSHAL's translation of the *Davvasaṃgaha* and A. CHAKRAVARTI's exposition of the *Pañcāstikāyasūtra* (S. B. J., Vols. I & III) have supplied useful material to the volumes on Indian Philosophy by DASGUPTA, RADHAKRISHNAN and others.

If Jaina metaphysics and epistemology, in fine Jaina doctrines as a whole, are to be correctly understood and appreciated outside India, we need standard translations of Jaina philosophical works into English and other languages. Lately, some efforts are made in this direction. We have the English translation of the *Pravacanasūtra* by A. N. UPADHYE (Bombay 1935, 2nd ed. Agas 1964) and by B. FADDLON (Cambridge 1935). The latter's translation of Amṛtacandra's Commentary is indeed a difficult task so worthily achieved, in view of the intricate and florid style of Amṛtacandra. The *Sanmati Tarka* is translated into English by A. S. GOPANI (Ahmedabad 1939).

For understanding Jaina tenets in comparison and contrast with other Darśanas, or systems of Indian thought, it is urgent that important Jaina Nyāya works are rendered into English. The Vedānta is better understood in the West, and the credit of this has to go basically to G. THEBAUT's translations of the Vedānta Sūtras published in the S. B. E. In later years, some useful efforts

are made to present Jaina Nyāya works in English garb. S C VIDYABHUSHAN gave us an English Translation of the *Nyāyavātāra* of Siddhasena (Calcutta 1909). Then we have S C GHOSHAL'S translation (with commentary) of the *Parīkṣāmukhaṃ* of Māṇikyānandi in S B J series, Vol XI (Lucknow 1940). The *Pramāna-mīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra is fluently translated into English along with critical notes by S MOOKERJEE and N TATIA (*A Critique of Organ of Knowledge*, Calcutta 1946). Though we had an excellent exposition of the contents of the *Syādhādamañjari* by A B DHURVA (Poona 1933), a full English translation was an urgent need. This has been so ably fulfilled by a distinguished Indologist, F W THOMAS, by *The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine* (Akademie-Verlag Berlin 1960). This translation is really a landmark in the study of Jaina Nyāya, because it is sure to influence all subsequent expositions of Jainism in English in the manner of THIBAUT'S translations for Vedānta noted above. S A JAIN has attempted an English translation of the *Sarvārthasiddhi* in his *Reality* (Calcutta 1960).

The *Pramāna-naya-tattvālokālamkāra* of (Vādi-) Devasūri is an important treatise on Jaina categories of Pramāna and Naya. The author is an eminent logician well-versed in different Darśanas and fully steeped in the earlier Jaina Nyāya treatises. He has himself written an exhaustive commentary on it, *Syādhādamañjari* by name (Poona 1926-30). Some other commentaries too are available on it, for instance, the *Ratnākarāvatārikā* of Ratnaprabha, a *Pañjikā* of Rājasekhara and a *Tippana* of Jñānacandra.

It was quite natural that a devoted scholar of Jainism like Shri HARISATYA BHATTACHARYA was attracted by the *Pramāna-naya-tattvālokālamkāra* of Devasūri. He prepared an English translation of it with a Commentary (mainly following the *Ratnākarāvatārikā*, which was published in the Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamālā, Nos 21-22, Benares Vira Samvat 2437, (and of which we have the latest edition, part I, accompanied by Rājasekhara's *Pañjikā*, Jñānacandra's *Tippanaka* and Malayavijayaji's Gujarātī Anuvāda, brought out by D. MALAVANIYA, in the L D Series, Ahmedabad 1965), and all this was published, part by part, in the Jaina Gazette (English) from 1921 (Vol 17, Nos 9-10) to 1926 (Vol 22, No 6). It was announced in the last number that

Dr H JACOBI promised to write an Introduction to it. In the September number of 1927 Śrī BHATTACHARYA wrote an article of Vādi Devasūri.

It is very kind of Dr HARISATYA BHATTACHARYA that he placed at our disposal his English translation (with Commentary) of Devasūri's learned treatise, duly revising it for publication in a book form; and we are happy to have it published under the auspices of the Jaina Sāhitya Vikāsa Mandala, Bombay.

In publishing this volume in its present form I have received much help from various quarters which I like to acknowledge with pleasure. Muni Śrī JAMBUVĪJAYAJI MAHARAJ gave us a neat copy of the Sūtras in Nāgarī as well as in transliteration with necessary diacritical points. My friend Dr. A. N. UPADHYE, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Shriyaji University, Kolhapur, though laden with tremendous obligations as General President of the 23rd Session of All-India Oriental Conference at Aligarh in October 1966, rendered valuable assistance in giving this work its present shape especially by seeing it through the press. His erudition and his knowledge of the editorial technique coupled with the speed with which he works are the things, very rare and most covetable. In the present staggering and indifferent health of the author it would have been well nigh impossible for us to publish this work without the unstinted help of Dr. UPADHYE. The Manager, Sharada Press, Mangalore, deserves our thanks for his willing co-operation.

Bombay
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A. K. DOSHI
Chairman,
Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

PREFACE

The author of this book, the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāmkāra*, was the reputed Devasūri, otherwise known as Vādi Devasūri. He was born in the year 1143 V S at Muddahrīta, a village in Gujaraṭ. He came of the lineage of Prāgvāta. Śreṣṭhu Vīraṇāga was his father, and his mother's name was Jainādevī. His parents gave him the name, Pūrnacandra. From his childhood, Pūrnacandra was of retiring nature. When he was barely of the age of nine years, i.e., in V S 1152, he was initiated into the religious order by Sūri Mūnicandra who then gave him the name Rāmacandra. Soon the young man mastered all the Śāstras, and became well-known as an able debator. He travelled in many places, and many of the renowned debating disputants of the time were significantly defeated by him in open debate, of whom mention may be made of Bandha of Dhavalaka town, a Brāhmana who asserted that God Śiva was the only reality, Kāśmīra Sāgara of Satyapura, the Digambara saint Gunacandra of Nāgapura, Śivabhūti of the Bhāgavata school in Chitrakūta, Gangādhara of Gopagiri, Dharanīdhara of Dhārā, Brāhmana Padmakara of Puskarīnī, and a well-known Brāhmana of the name Kṛṣṇa in Bhīgu Kṣetra. For all these victories in debates, Rāmacandra's Guru gave him the name Devasūri in 1174 V S.

But the greatest victory seems to have been that achieved by him at Anahillpura Pattan. King Siddharāja Jayasinha was ruling there at that time, and Kumudacandra, a Digambara saint, was an ornament of his court. A debate, however, was arranged between Kumudacandra and Devasūri on the subject of Female's capacity for attaining final Emancipation (*mokṣa*). Devasūri defeated Kumudacandra and established the Śvetāmbara doctrine that the females are capable of attaining salvation.

In his life time Devasūri was recognised as a redoubtable Debater not only by the great Hemacandra but by the leaders of the other Śvetāmbara Gacchas also. After his death many Jaina philosophical writers, e.g., Ratnaprabha, Maheśvara, Somaprabha, Udayadeva, Pradyumna, Munideva, Somacandra, Merutunga Mumbhadra, Gunaratna, Munisundara have praised Devasūri in

their writings Devasūri is the author of many philosophical treatises Besides the *Piṃāna-naya-tattvālokālamkāra*, the *Syādvāda Ratnākara* is another of his reputed writings

Ratnaprabha was the foremost disciple of Devasūri He is the commentator on the *Piṃāna-naya-tattvālokālamkāra* Besides this commentary, Ratnaprabha's other works are *Nemināthacarita*, *Upadeśamālāsikā*, *Mataparīksā-pañcūṣat* Devasūri himself, in his *Syādvāda Ratnākara*, has highly praised Ratnaprabha

The *Piṃāna-naya-tattvālokālamkāra* is a standard work on the Jaina mediaeval logic, psychology and epistemology It is naturally a stiff treatise, and its commentary is stiffer still The book and particularly the commentary contain and develop at first the views of the opponent schools and then set them aside and finally establish the theories of the Jaina Śvetāmbara school The language of the commentary is ornate Sanskrit At places the commentator writes in verses which must have been greatly relished by lovers of Sanskrit poetical literature

In Vikrama year 2437, under the patronage of the Śāstra-viśārada Jainācārya Śrī Vijaya Dharma Sūri, an authoritative edition of the *Piṃāna-naya-tattvālokālamkāra* with Ratnaprabha's commentary thereon, the *Ratnākara-vatārikā*, was published by Pandit HARA GOVIND DAS and Pandit BECHAR DAS I have followed this publication

The present translation has a history of its own About 50 years ago, i e., just after passing the M A Examination of the Calcutta University, I was attracted to the study of Jaina Philosophy on reading a small pamphlet on Jainism I was supplied with a copy of Umāsvāti's celebrated book, *Tattvārthadharmasūtra* (with Pūjyapāda's commentary thereon) by KUMAR DEVENDRA PRASAD of Arrah But the book appeared to me to be very difficult I sought the help of two Sanskrit Adhyāpakas, but unfortunately, they, not being versed in Jaina philosophy, were of very little help to me Thereupon I made a determined effort to understand the principles of Umāsvāti's book and made some progress I was much helped in this by the late Śāstra-viśārada Jainācārya Vṛjayadharmasūri and others I wrote and published some essays on Jaina philosophical matters in English, which attracted the attention of many Jaina scholars In the late C R JAIN I was

then requested by some Jaina friends to translate Devasūri's *Pramāna-nāya-tattvāloka-lamkāra* with Ratnaprabha's commentary thereon. It was a long and arduous task, and when the translation was ready, KUMAR DEVENDRA PRASAD proposed to print and publish it. Unfortunately KUMAR died just when arrangements for its publication were complete. Mr C R JAIN, however, was eager for its early publication and he arranged for the publication, parts by parts, in the *Jama Gazette* which was then being published from Madras. The publication in the *Jama Gazette*, when finished, attracted the attention of the famous scholar, H JACOBI, who kindly wrote a Foreword to it (which unfortunately has now been lost). The translation with H JACOBI's Foreword was published in the *Jaina Gazette* (?)

My thanks are thus primarily due to KUMAR DEVENDRA PRASAD and Mr CHAMPAT RAI JAIN. Thereafter many Jaina scholars began to take considerable interest in my translation of the book, and I felt the need for further elaborating the translation, which was done.

His Holiness, Muni Mahārāja BHADRANKAR VUAYAJI by this time came to know of my translation. His Holiness went through it several times and decided to have it printed and published. His kind decision was promptly acted upon by his devoted admirers, Rai Bahadur JIVAT LAL PURTAPSHI and Śrī TAJ MAL BOTHRA of Calcutta. I am grateful to these Jaina stalwarts, and I have no hesitation in saying that the printing and publication of the present book would have been impossible without their high-mindedness and active help.

Śrī AMRITLAL KALIDAS DOSHI, the well-known business magnate of Bombay, is not only an erudite scholar himself but takes also a keen interest in all cultural matters. The Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, as an organisation of cultural activities, flourishes under his patronage. A firm believer in the truths of Jainism, Śrī DOSHI nevertheless entertains commendable liberal views towards non-Jaina scholars and cultures as well. I fully remember the pleasant days, when I was a guest in his house in Bombay. I am thankful to Śrī DOSHI for all his kindly feelings for me. I am very glad to see that through his above-mentioned organisation he has borne the costs of printing and publishing the book.

Lastly, a word or two may be added regarding the book Devasūri's Sūtras and Ratnaprabha's commentary, as already said, give a complete account of the Jaina logic, psychology and epistemology. Incidentally, the arguments of the rival Indian schools are developed and refuted. The language of the commentary is highly ornamental, classical Sanskrit. All these make the book very stiff to people who are not well-versed in Sanskrit and the details of the various Indian philosophical doctrines. A literal English translation would have been worse than useless, and I have avoided it. Nevertheless I have tried my utmost to keep as closely as possible to the original and spared no pains to make it intelligible to scholars who are interested in the study of Jaina philosophy and who may have the patience to go through it, not hastily, but slowly and steadily.

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HARISATYA BHATTACHARYA

PRAMĀNA - NAYA - TATTVĀLOKĀLAMKĀRA SŪTRA - PĀTHA

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CHAPTER VII

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PRAMĀNA-NAYA-TATTVĀLOKALAMKĀRA

॥ अहं ॥

॥ श्रीशंखेश्वरपाद्वनाथाय नमः ॥

प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकाङ्कुरः

PRAMĀNA-NAYA-TATTVĀLOKĀLĀNKĀRAḤ

TRANSLATION: The Ornament of the Light of the true nature of the Pramāna and the Naya.

NOTE: The Pramāna is knowledge which is free from doubt etc The Naya is knowledge about a partial aspect of a thing which has been determined by Sruta Pramāna or knowledge from authority.

CHAPTER I

रागद्वेषविजेतारं ज्ञातारं विश्ववस्तुनः ।

शक्रपूज्यं गिरामीशं तीर्थेशं स्मृतिमानये ॥

raḡa-dveṣa-vijetāram jñatāram viśva-vastunab

Śakra-pūjyaṃ giṃ ām īśam Tīṃ thēśam smṛtum anaye ॥

TRANSLATION: I call to my mind the Lord of the Holy Order, who is the conqueror of attachment and envy, knower of all the things of the universe, the object of Śakra's veneration and the Lord of words

NOTE: In this book the Jaina philosophy of the Svetāmbara School is described and upheld. It is customary with the writers of such treatises to refer in the opening passages to (1) persons whose theories are to be respected and to (2) persons whose views are to be criticised. In such lines, it is also customary to incidentally refer to (1) the attitude which is proper for the authorship of such books and also to refer to (2) the attitude which is improper.

The translation of the opening stanza, which we have given above, refers to the persons whose views are to be upheld in this treatise. Let us examine the descriptions. The person referred to is the Tirthēśa, otherwise called the Tirthaṅkara, meaning the Lord of the Holy Order. The Holy Order presided over by the Lord, consists of four sections, viz., the monks, the nuns, the male-house-holders and the female-house-holders. The Lord is absolutely free from all feelings of attachment and envy. He is omniscient, i.e., knows all the things of the universe, past, present and future with all their qualities, modes or aspects. Sakra, the king of the gods, worships the Lord at the time of his birth etc. He is described as the Lord of words, which means that the words uttered by him correctly express the true nature of the objects. These four adjectives of the Lord refer to the four Infinities, inherent in Him, viz., infinite freedom, infinite knowledge, infinite exaltedness and infinite power of (correct) speech.

The above descriptions are meant to apply also to the Ganadharas etc., chief disciples of the Lord. It is also said that the descriptions apply to the author's own teacher also, who may not be as great as the Tirthaṅkara or the Ganadhara but who is certainly

a cultured person, well-versed in the philosophical doctrines propounded by the Lord.

In the above manner the opening passages are shown to refer to persons whose theories are to be respected

On a different conjunction and disjunction of the component words of the stanza, it may be shown that it refers to persons whose views are criticised in this book. The word *Tirthēśa* is composed of the words *Tirtha* and *Īśa*. The former means the Holy Order of the Jainas. *Īśa* is taken to mean 'he who criticises or calumniates'. Thus the word *Tirthēśa* means a person who is opposed to the Holy Order and for the matter of that, to the principle of the Jaina philosophy. The word *śakra-pūjya* is taken to mean 'One to whom Śakra is venerable', i.e., 'One who venerates Śakra'. The adjective *śakra-pūjya* attached to *Tirthēśa* thus refers to the philosophers of the Vedic School, viz., the Bhatta, the Prabhākara, the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya philosophers who follow the sacrificial cult of the Vedas and inculcate on the worship of Śakra (Indra), the Lord of the gods, by the offer of oblations etc. Next, the word *gīṛaṃ īśaṃ* is shown to refer to Vācaspati (Bṛhaspati) who is the reputed author of the materialistic Cārvāka system. It is also said that the proper function of a word is to express a real object. The Buddhist thinkers, however, contend that a word does not express a positive object but gives rise only to a negative apprehension. Thus they deprive the word of its beauty, so to say, by denying its acknowledged function. The expression *gīṛaṃ īśaṃ* may be construed to refer to these Buddhist thinkers also. The word *gīṛaṃ īśaṃ* may be analysed into (1) *gīṛaṃ* (2) *ī* and

(3) *Sam*. The first syllable means 'of the words', the second, 'beauty' and the third, 'he who destroys'. In the next place, the words *jñātaram viśva-vastunab*, are interpreted in a different way. They are analysed as (1) *jñātaram*, (2) *viśva-vastu*, and (3) *nab*. The first syllable means 'one who knows', the second, 'all the reals', and the third, 'admitted by us'. The words *jñātaram viśva-vastunab* thus refer to the philosophers of the Jaina Digambara School who admit the real (Tattvas) of the Śvetāmbara sect but differ from the latter in some other respects. Lastly, the word *rāga-dvesavijetaram*, is differently analysed into the syllables, (1) *rāga-dvesa* (2) *vija* (3) *itam* and (4) *aram*. The first means 'owing to attachment and envy', the second, 'on account of differentiation' the third, 'One who gets' and the fourth, 'enemies'. Thus the expressions are taken to refer to thinkers like Caraka etc., who, although they are acquainted with the principles of the Jaina Philosophy admit Sambhava (inclusion, Aitihiya (hearsay) etc. as additional sources of knowledge (not recognised by the Jainas) on account of their attachment and aversion towards mundane things and who by thus differentiating their doctrines from those propounded by the Tirthamkara, come in contact with enemies, i.e., the various pains of the worldly existence.

Thus the opening stanza may be shown to refer to thinkers whose views are not accepted by the author.

As regards the proper and the improper mentalities for the authorship of this book, it is said that the two expressions, *rāga-dvesa-vijetaram* and *jñātaram viśva-vastunab* refer to them. It is in this way: The first expression is analysed into (1) *rāga-dvesa-vijeta*,

meaning (1) 'who have conquered attachment and aversion' and (2) *aram*, meaning, 'to a considerable extent' The second expression analysed into (2) *jñāta* i.e., (1) 'who know' (2) *aram* i.e., 'to a great extent' and (3) *viśva-vastumah*, meaning, 'of all the reals in the Universe'. The two expressions thus state 'I have conquered the feelings of attachment and envy to a great extent and I am intimately acquainted with the reals of the Universe' These are of course due to the author's deep study of the Jaina philosophy. These two expressions thus instead of referring to the Tirthamkara or other teachers are made to refer to the author himself, whose competency is thereby accounted for. Incidentally these two expressions indicate that one who is subject to the feelings of attachment and aversion cannot be the author of such a book and that one must be well acquainted with the nature of reals, as established in the Jaina philosophy, in order that he may be competent for the authorship of the present book

प्रमाणनयतत्त्वव्यवस्थापनार्थमिदमुपक्रम्यते ॥ १ ॥

pramāṇa-naya-tattva-vyavasthāpanārtham
idam upakramyate । १ ।

TRANSLATION In order to determine the nature of the Pramāṇa and the Naya, it is hereby begun.

NOTE In every undertaking, including the writing of book, the following three things should be remembered. Firstly, the work should not be impossible. Śeṣa is the legendary serpent, the jewel at whose head

is supposed to have miraculous powers. If a man advises his neighbour who is suffering from fever to procure that jewel telling him that it would allay his fever, his advice is obviously impossible for one to follow. The object of every undertaking should be a possible one. Secondly, the object should be something desirable and not undesirable like one's marriage with one's own mother. Lastly, the object of the undertaking should be consistent with the instructions about it. Incoherent words cannot indicate any object.

This first Sūtra of the book is meant to indicate the purpose or the object of the book. It is the determination of the nature of the *Pramāṇa* and the *Naya*. This undertaking, the description of the nature of the *Pramāṇa* and the *Naya*, is certainly not impracticable. It is neither undesirable; for, both the author and the learner are interested in it. Lastly, it should be noted that the contents or the subject-matters of the treatise are present in the mind of the author; his business is to give expression to his ideas; and he expresses those ideas, inasmuch as words and the object signified by them are related to one another.

The followers of Dharmottara object here as follows: you cannot say that the object of the books can be indicated in the opening passage. For, is the object related to the passage or not? If it is not related to the passage, yet indicated by it,—why, then, it is possible for the entire book itself with all its details to be indicated by the opening passage and the book need not be written in extenso. Now, if you say that the object of the book is related to the passage, we shall show that it is not possible. There cannot be any relation between a word and the object (alleged to be

signified by it). For, what is the relation between the two? The relation between a word and an object cannot be one of Identity (*tādātmya*). A word is a sound, so that if a word and an object were essentially the same, all objects would have consisted only in sounds or all sounds would have been embodied in concrete objects; in other words, the world would have been full of sounds only and there would have been no objects there; or the word, Horse, for instance, would itself be a running creature. As a matter of fact no one can seriously think that a word which consists in a sound is identical in essence with a thing which has a real existence on the surface of the earth.

Are we then to suppose that the relation between a word and its object is one of Production (*tadutpatti*)? This is obviously an absurd view. If a word were sufficient to produce its corresponding object, no one in the world would ever have been in want of anything. It is also a matter of perception that a word is not produced by its corresponding object but is due to the efforts of the vocal organ

Next, the relation between a word and an object cannot be said to be one between the Signifier and the Signified (*vācya-vācaka*). For, it may be questioned: What is this relationship? Is it identical with the nature of the Signifier and the Signified? If so, we have Signifier and the Signified and not the alleged relationship. Or is the relationship different from the Signifier and the Signified? If so, is the relation different from the related totally or only in some respects? If it be said that the relation between the Signifier (Word) and the Signified (Object) is totally different from the nature of the related (i.e., the word and the object) we ask:

Is this relation eternal or non-eternal or both eternal and non-eternal? You cannot say that the relation is eternal, for, in that case, the related also would be eternal. If, the relationship be held to be non-eternal, it must either be one and the same between every pair of words and objects or be different in different pairs. You cannot say that the nature of the relation between all pairs of words and objects is the self-same; for, in that case, one word would have signified all the objects of the world. If the relationship be different in each pair of words and objects, the question is: Does the relation really subsist between the word and the object or does it not? In the case of the relationship not really subsisting, one can as well understand cloth by the word pitcher and vice versa. If however the relationship be supposed to really subsist, we are required to explain this real subsistence.

Is the relationship of the Signifier and the Signified identical in nature with either the former or the latter? This is impossible, as relation has already been premised to be different from the related. Does then the relationship arise from them? This also is impossible. For, the question is When does it arise? At the time when the signified (Object) arises? Or, at the time, when signifier (Word) arises? Or, at the time, when both of them arise together? Or, at the time, when one of them arises some time after the other has arisen?

The first two of the above four alternatives cannot be maintained on the ground that the relationship between the Signifier and the Signified relates to and is consequently dependent on the presence of both the Signifier and the Signified; as such, it is impossible

for it to arise when only one of them arises. The third alternative also is unsupportable. A word and its corresponding object are seldom found to arise simultaneously. So, if it be held that a relationship of the Signifier and the Signified can arise only when they arise together,—words would not signify the objects and the objects would remain unsigned by them.

In the case of the fourth alternative, it may be asked: Does the relationship arise from the Word and the Object? If it does, then a man who is unacquainted with the significance or meaning of a word would nevertheless understand the object on hearing the word. Secondly, it may be contended that the relationship arises from the word and the object but becomes explicit or manifest to one, to whom, Saṅketa or 'the sense applied to a word' is known. In that case the relationship cannot be said to arise from the word and the object exclusively. Thirdly, if you contend that the relationship does arise from the word and the object but that in its genesis, Saṅketa or 'the sense applied to a word' is an accompanying or attendant cause, your position will not be reasonable. Let us examine Saṅketa. Do you apply the name when its corresponding object is known or when the object is unknown? You cannot give a particular name to a particular object, unless and until the latter is just perceived; otherwise any name would signify any object. If, however, you say that you fix a name to an object after you have seen it, we say naming cannot be done in this manner. For, a thing is momentary; as soon as you perceive it, it is destroyed and there remains nothing of it to which you can apply a name. It may be said that although a thing is lost as soon as it is perceived,

in the moments following, there may be similar things, so that it may be possible to apply the name to the thing of the first perception. The contention is wrong. Naming of a thing is not possible if it remains unperceived, though present. How then can you name the thing of the first moment which is not only not perceived but even not present at the time of naming? The very same difficulties arise, if we put the matter the other way and ask: Do you apply the name to an Object, after knowing the name or not knowing the name? It is thus that naming a thing is impossible and if naming is not possible, there cannot be a relationship of the Signified and the Signifier.

Even if for arguments sake, it be admitted that naming of a particular thing is possible, it cannot be said that such naming is of any practical use. In naming, we name a particular thing of a particular moment; we are not justified in applying the name to another thing of another moment. Each thing of each moment is to have a name of its own. One name cannot be used for more than once. Thus the number of names becomes infinite which makes language and speaking practically useless.

It may be contended that the *general nature* (Sāmānya) of a thing, i.e., its class-essence and not the particular aspect of the thing is what is signified by a name. This class-essence is eternal and not an impermanent phenomena like the particular aspects; it permeates the particular modes of the thing, so that a word standing for the class-essence is applicable to the particular modes. It is said that if the Saiketa or word be taken to refer to the Sāmānya or Class-essence, the relationship of the Signifier and the Signified becomes explain-

ed The Buddhists answer to this contention by saying that there is nothing real called *Sāmānya* or the Class-essence. In our perception, what we come across is the particular, we may say that we perceive a cow but on analysis we find that the object of our perception is not the general nature Cow-hood but always a particular cow. The fact is that in our perception we come across the particular and never the class-essence. It is further evident from this that a word makes us do or make efforts. A class-essence is only an idea. One wants to have the particular which is above the real. A thirsty man goes to have not the class-essence but a particular quantity of water. The word, water, thus refers to the particular amount and not to the general nature of water.

If you say that a word signifies neither the general nature alone nor the particular aspect alone but both the *Sāmānya* (class-essence) and the *Vīśeṣa* (the particular mode), our objection still remains valid the *Sāmānya* is neither real nor an object of perception. Besides, how can one and the same word signify two such contradictory aspects as the *Sāmānya* and the *Vīśeṣa*?

In the foregoing paragraphs, we have shown how the relationship between the Signifier and the Signified can neither be looked upon as eternal nor as non-eternal. Can we say that the said relation is both eternal and non-eternal? It cannot be, for the reasons similar to those stated in the last paragraph.

Thus it is that it is impossible for an author to state the object or the purpose of his book in its opening passage. A word is the naming of a concept and conception is ideation and does not touch the real; the ideation in conception also involves naming.

Words and conception are thus mutually dependent on each other and words never touch the real object. As it is said:

“Words originate from Vikalpa or conception, and concepts originate from words. Words and concepts cause each other. Words do not even touch the real object (*artha*)”.

The Jainas object to the above contentions of the Buddhist School of Dharmottara in the following manner. In the opening passage, the object or the purpose of the book is indicated. Why do you object to it? The opening objection of yours too has some purpose. You may say that your objections have nothing to do with the object of the book directly, but are meant to raise doubts about the object in order that persons interested in that object may be actively inclined towards it. This contention is not sound. Doubts exist in one's mind even before the opening passage is heard and need not be specifically raised in the opening passage. Besides, if your theory is that words are unconnected with objects, why do you use them with the object, as you say, of raising doubts?

Arcaṭa, on the contrary, points out that one is drawn towards a matter if it is of use. If a matter is of no use, e.g., the examination of the teeth of a crow, one feels no interest in the matter. Hence the opening passage in a book should show how the contention that the subject-matter of the book is of no use, is fallacious. The Jainas point out that this view of Arcaṭa is untenable. A book begins with a statement and not full-fledged syllogism. The opening statement being thus no argument can in no case be competent to prove the special utility of the subject matter of the book.

Rāmata says that although the opening passage being not a full-fledged argument is not competent to set aside the charge of uselessness of the subject matter of the book, it should at least raise a doubt regarding the subject matter. The Jamas reply that doubt is already present and need not be specifically raised. For persons who are otherwise convinced about the usefulness of the subject matter of a book or who do not take the opening passage as conclusive and finally established, the opening passage need not be argumentative at all. For other persons, it may be necessary for the opening passage to be argumentative. It will be shown hereafter how the subject matter of the book is useful. It will also be shown: (1) words do impart knowledge about objects; (2) words are related to objects as Signifiers and Signified, (3) objects are of a dual nature viz , general and particular; (4) the relation between words and objects is in some respects different from the nature of the words and the objects; (5) the relation is in some respects eternal and in some respects non-eternal; (6) the relation is generated at the time when the words and the objects are generated; and (7) the relation becomes explicit to one who knows the Sāṅketa or 'the sense, applied to the words'

स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ॥ २ ॥

sva-para-vyavasāyi jñānam pramāṇam । 2 ।

TRANSLATION. The Pramāṇa is valid knowledge about the self and the not-self.

NOTE: The self and knowledge are identical in nature. The not-self means object of knowledge. The Jaina definition of the Pramāṇa implies that a valid knowledge of both the self and the not-self is possible. According to some, the Pramāṇa consists in a perception of pure existence (*saṃmātra*), while according to the Naiyāyikas etc. it includes even the unconscious contact (*saṃnikāśa*) of the sense organ with the object. By describing the Pramāṇa as a 'knowledge' the Jaina thinkers reject both the above views. Again, the definition of the Pramāṇa as valid or certain knowledge is intended for criticising the position of the Buddhists who recognise Nirvikalpa or pure undetermined sensation as a form of the Pramāṇa. By defining the Pramāṇa as valid knowledge, the Jainas mean to show also that it is to be distinguished from Saṃśaya (doubt), Viparīyaya (illusion) and Anadhyavasāya (inattention). The recognition of the not-self in the above definition distinguishes the Jaina position from absolute idealism (Jñānādvaita), while that of the self distinguishes it (i) from the Mīmāṃsaka system according to which Buddhi or consciousness is always directed outwards extraspception, (ii) from the Yauga positon according to which direct knowledge of the self is impossible but introspection through retrospection only, is possible, and finally (iii) from the doctrine of Kāpila, according to whom, knowledge is modification of the unconscious principle.

The Jaina definition of the Pramāṇa, taken in its entirety is a criticism of the other definition of the Pramāṇa, viz., that it is, "The cause or Hetu of the knowledge of objects." If the Pramāṇa be described as the Hetu of knowledge, it may be asked: what kind of Hetu

is it? If it is simply an antecedent condition, it is clear that not only the senses but every phenomenon would be *Pramāna* or means of knowledge. Hence the *Pramāna* is not merely an antecedent condition but the unconditional immediate antecedent of knowledge, and the opponents, i.e., the upholders of this description of the *Pramāna* contend that in this sense, the senses i.e., the *Indriyas* may be called the *Pramāṇas*. The Jainas however ask. In what sense can an *Indriya* be said to be *Pramāna*? An *Indriya* has two aspects, viz., the *Dravyendriya* and the *Bhāvendriya*. The *Dravyendriya* is the material sense-organ and is either the *Upakarana* or the *Nirvṛtti*. The latter is the actual organ of sensing, while the former is what protects and helps it. The *Upakarana* is thus no *Pramāna*. The *Nirvṛtti* also cannot be looked upon as the *Pramāna*. It is not the immediate and unconditional antecedent of cognition inasmuch as the *Nirvṛtti* cannot give rise to it without the *Bhāvendriya* or the psychical functioning. The *Bhāvendriya*, again, is either *Labdhi*, which consists in the annihilation etc., of the knowledge-obscuring obstacles and thus makes the soul fit to have knowledge, or *Upayoga* which is an active tendency on the part of the soul to attend to the object of its knowledge. It is to be observed, as knowledge is impossible without the *Upayoga*, the Jainas point out that cognition arises only when the soul actually operates towards it. If the *Indriya* is to be regarded as the *Pramāna*, it must be understood to be in its aspects of *Upayoga*, a psychical operation and not the gross material sense-organ. To admit the *Indriya* in the sense of *Upayoga* to be the *Pramāna* is, however, to accept the Jaina definition of the *Pramāna* in different words.

The opponent may urge that there is no Indriya in the sense of Upayoga and contend that the Indriya is always material in essence and this material sense-organ is the immediately antecedent cause of cognition. The Jainas on the contrary, point out that no knowledge is possible without active functioning on the part of the soul. At the time of deep-sleep there is no perception, although the material sense-organs are there. And why? Because the soul is inactive then. Hence the opponents try to improve their position by contending that the Indriya cannot generate knowledge by its mere existence. In order that knowledge may arise, the Indriya must be attached to the object of knowledge as well as to the Manas or the Mind. The Jainas meet their opponents by saying that at the time of the deep-sleep, the Indriya may be attached to the Object of knowledge and as the Manas is coextensive with the body, the Indriya is surely attached to the Manas; and yet we have no knowledge at the time of the deep-sleep. The opponents contend that Manas is atomic in extent, and not co-extensive with the body and in support of their theory urge that had the Manas been co-extensive with the body, we could have a number of perceptions simultaneously. The Jainas point out that this contention is not at all sound. The Manas is admittedly a sense and as such, like the Eye, cannot be atomic. The fact that our perceptions are always successive and not simultaneous need not prove that the Manas is atomic; it rather shows the way in which the knowledge-enveloping obstacles subside.

The Jaina definition of the Pramāṇa is opposed again to that given by the Mīmāṃsakas. According to them, the Pramāṇa is "what makes us know what

was previously unknown". If, however, we accept this Mīmāṃsaka definition, Recognition (*pratyabhi-
mā*) would be no Pramāṇa as its matter is admittedly
an already known phenomenon. The Mīmāṃsakas,
of course, try to avoid the difficulty by saying that
Recognition may be included in their list of the Pra-
māṇas. inasmuch as when we say that we recognise a
thing, the object of recognition has a mode of existence
which is different from what it had when it was previ-
ously cognised. The Jainas point out that if the Mi-
māṃsakas take the position that an Object cannot be
cognised more than once in its selfsame mode, their
definition of the Pramāṇa becomes identical with the
definition, 'the Pramāṇa is what makes us know an
object' and their adjective, 'what was previously un-
known (*anadhigata*)' is clearly superfluous.

The Jaina definition is free from all defects. It
includes both the Pratyaksa (direct) and the Parokṣa
(indirect) forms of knowledge, and the charge of non-
inclusion (*avyāpaka*) cannot be laid against it. It is
on the other hand, not over-inclusive (*ati-vyāpaka*) in-
asmuch as it clearly excludes all invalid forms of know-
ledge, viz, Doubt etc. Nor finally can it be said that
the Jaina definition makes the Pramāṇa consist in some-
thing impossible; it is manifest to all that the very func-
tion of all knowledge is to illuminate either the self or
the not-self. The Pramāṇa is thus quite competent to
yield valid knowledge about the self and the not-self.

The Jaina definition of the Pramāṇa can stand the
test of a valid syllogism. It is in this way. "The Pra-
māṇa is valid knowledge, regarding the self and the
not-self; because Pramāṇa-hood cannot be met with
otherwise (i. e., because Pramāṇa-hood and valid

knowledge regarding the self and the not-self are invariably found together). In this syllogism, it is to be noted that 'Pramāna' is the Paksa, i.e., that about which something is predicated, 'valid knowledge' (is the Sādhya, i.e., that which is predicated, and 'Pramāna-hood' is the Hetu or the reason which is invariably connected with the Sādhya.

It cannot be said that the Paksa in the above syllogism is fallacious. (1) It cannot be said that the existence of the Sādhya in the Paksa here is 'already known (*pratīta*)' as in the case of the statement, 'Water is liquid'; for, there is a real difference of opinion among the logicians about the nature of the Pramāna. (2) Nor can it be said that the argument here is an undesired one (*anabhīpsita*), as in the case of the Buddhist, the argument, 'Sound is eternal'; in the present case, the Jainas intend to establish that the Pramāna is valid knowledge (3) Nor is the proposition an 'already rejected one (*mrakīta*)'. (i) The Jaina definition like the statement, Fire is cool, does not go against any facts of perception (ii) The statement, there is no omniscient being, goes against the facts of inference. The Jaina definition of the Pramāna, however, does not contradict any thing established by inference (iii) Lastly, the Jaina definition does not go against any of the authoritative scriptural saying. It does not, for instances, lay down 'A Jaina should eat at night'. Thus it is that in the syllogism under consideration, the Paksa is not bad.

Secondly, it cannot be contended that the Hetu in the reasoning embodying the Jaina definition of the Pramāna is fallacious. You cannot say that it is 'unproved' (*asiddha*). Is it 'unproved to one side' or

is it 'unproved to both sides'? If it is 'unproved to one side', is it unproved to the disputant (*vādi*) or to the opponent (*prativādi*)? If it is unproved to the disputant, how is the Hetu unproved, (i) because its 'nature' is unproved or (ii) because its 'abode' is unproved or (iii) because something different from it is proved or (iv) because it does not pervade the whole of the Pakṣa or (v) because it partly consists in what is to be proved? The first (i) of the above objections is of no substance. A Hetu proves a proposition: This is its nature. A disputant, wanting to prove a proposition, must use a Hetu, otherwise his argument would be valueless. He cannot use a Hetu if he does not know the nature of Hetu or has a doubt about it. In all argumentations, a disputant is presumed to be aware of the general nature of a Hetu and supposed not to have any doubt that the function of a Hetu is to prove the conclusion. As regards the next (ii) objection, the Jainas maintain that a Hetu need not be invalid, if its abode is unproved at the outset. Let us take the syllogism: 'Omniscience is (possible)', because the arguments against it are successfully set aside. Here the reasoning is perfectly sound, although the Abode where the Sādhya and the Hetu exist is not specifically shown in it. The Jainas do not admit the validity of the third (iii) of the above objections also. The perception of the Hetu may be in a quite different abode but all the same the Hetu may be competent to prove the Sādhya. We have an instance of real Hetu in the following argument. 'The constellation Bharanī will next arise: because the constellation, Aśvini, is presently seen'. It is thus that according to the Jainas the validity of a Hetu is not dependent on the existence of an Abode.

Even if the above two objections concerning the Abode be held to be valid the Jainas point out that there is no difficulty in the case of the syllogism, embodying their definition of the Pramāṇa, for, in it there is the admitted Abode, viz., the Pramāṇa, and the Hetu 'Pramāṇa-hood' is connected with it. The fourth (iv) objection relates to such arguments as 'Trees are conscious, because they have sleep'. Here the Hetu, 'sleep', is not competent because it cannot be attributed to all the Trees, the Pakṣa. So far, however, as the Hetu, Pramāṇa-hood and the Pakṣa, Pramāṇa are concerned, the objection does not obviously apply. The fifth (v) objection above relates to such arguments as 'sound is non-eternal because it is non-eternal'. This objection cannot apply to the case of Jaina definition of the Pramāṇa, where Pramāṇa-hood and valid knowledge are stated to be invariably connected. Thus it is that the Hetu in the above definition cannot be said to be 'unproved' (*asiddha*) to the disputant (*vādi*). Almost the same argument may be adduced to refute the contention that the Hetu is 'Unproved' (*asiddha*) to the opponent (*prativādi*), and if the Hetu is not unproved either to the disputant or to the opponent, it cannot be said that it is 'unproved' (*asiddha*) to both sides (*ubhaya*).

Nor can the Hetu in the Jaina definition of Pramāṇa be said to be 'contradictory' (*viruddha*). For, it is not connected with the Vipakṣa, i.e., matters which are opposed to the Sādhya and do not contain it. Thirdly the Hetu in the Jaina definition under consideration, is not doubtful (*anāikāntika*). (a) A Hetu becomes doubtful when it is known to be connected with the Vipakṣa. An example of such a Hetu is the Hetu, 'knowability', in the syllogism 'sound is non-eternal: because

it is knowable' Knowability can be ascribed to eternal things also. In the definition under consideration, Doubt etc. as well as pitcher etc are the Vipaksa of 'valid knowledge'. The Hetu, Pramāṇa-hood, is known to have no connection with the Vipaksa. Nobody looks upon Doubt etc or upon pitcher etc as valid forms of knowledge. (b) A Hetu may be doubtful, when it is suspected to be connected with the Vipaksa. An example of such a doubtful Hetu is the Hetu, Oratorship, in the reasoning: 'That man is not omniscient because he is an orator (i. e., because he speaks or instructs)'. It is quite conceivable that an omniscient being may be an orator and an instructor of men. In the definition under consideration, the Hetu, 'Pramāṇa-hood', is not a doubtful one, it is never suspected to be connected with the Vipaksa of valid knowledge

Lastly, one would not be justified in finding fault with the Jaina definition of the Pramāṇa on the ground that the connection between the Sādhya and the Hetu is not established by 'the method of difference' (*vyatireka*). The Jains point out that in all instances, e. g., a pitcher etc where there is absence of the Sādhya, viz., valid knowledge there is also the absence of the Hetu, Pramāṇa-hood. This goes to show that in the Jaina definition you cannot say that (i) the necessary relationship with 'the absence of the Sādhya' is unproved that (ii) the necessary relationship with 'the absence of the Hetu' is unproved that (iii) the necessary relationship between 'the absence of the two' is unproved that (iv) the necessary relationship with 'the absence of Sādhya' is doubtful (v) that the necessary relationship with 'the

absence of the Hetu' is doubtful or that (vi) the necessary relationship between 'the absence of the two' is doubtful. The observation of those instances establishes the Vyāpti, that 'the absence of the Sādhya' is necessarily connected with the absence of the Hetu. Hence you cannot say (vii) that there is no necessary connection between the absence of the Sādhya and that of the Hetu here, or (viii) that the said necessary connection between the two absences is not shown, or (ix) that the absence of the Sādhya is opposed to 'the absence of the Hetu.'

Accordingly, the syllogism embodying the Jaina definition of the Prāmāna is perfectly faultless.

अभिमतानभिमतवस्तुस्वीकारतिरस्कारक्षमं हि प्रमाणम्,
अतो ज्ञानमेवेदम् ॥ ३ ॥

*abhimatānabhimata-vastu-svīkāra-tiraskāra-ksamam hi
pramāṇam ato jñānam evedam ॥ 3 ॥*

TRANSLATION. The Pramāna is capable of making us accept the agreeable things and discard the disagreeable ones, hence it is but knowledge.

NOTES. The things which are agreeable are of two sorts, viz., those that are directly agreeable such as the mental feeling of pleasure and those that cause them and are indirectly agreeable, e. g., flowers etc. In the same way, mental feelings of pain are directly disagreeable phenomena while poisons, thorns, etc., which cause disagreeable feelings in us are indirectly disagreeable. It is to be noted that there is a third class of feelings and a corresponding third class of objects,

which are not meant to be left out of consideration here. The feelings of indifferences are different from the feelings of pleasure on the one hand and from the feelings of pain on the other. This third class of feelings, viz., the feelings of indifference are caused by the experience of such negligible objects as a blade of grass etc. The function of the *Pramāṇa* is thus three-fold (1) It makes us accept the agreeable things, (2) it makes us discard the disagreeable things; and (3) it makes us indifferent towards negligible objects. The *Pramāṇa* is thus a cognitive process and cannot be an unconscious phenomenon like Proximity (*samnīkaīsa*).

न वै संनिकषदिरज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपन्नम्, तस्यार्थान्ति-
रस्येव स्वार्थव्यवसितौ साधकतमत्वानुपपत्तेः ॥ ४ ॥

*na vai samnīkaīśadeḥ ajñānasya prāmāṇyam upapannam,
tasyārthāntarasyeva svārtha-vyavasitau sādhakatamat-
vānupapatteḥ* ॥ 4 ॥

TRANSLATION: The *Pramāṇa*-hood of the unconscious phenomena, like, Proximity, etc., is not established, for, like any other (unconscious) thing, they also do not appear to be instrumental in the production of valid knowledge about the self and the not-self.

NOTE The philosophers of the Nyāya School point out that *Pratyakṣa* or our direct apprehension of objects arises when our senses and the objects are in proximate relation (*samnīkaīsa*) In the case of perception of a gross material object, the sense-organs do actually come in contact (*samyoga*) with it. In the case of the perception of a quality or attribute (*guṇa*) of the

object the Samnikarsa is not 'contact' but some sort of proximity nevertheless. The Naiyāyikas conceive of six modes of Samnikarsa, which they call 'Pramānas' meaning that these proximities are instrumental in the generation of knowledge.

The Jainas are opposed to this view of the Nyāya School. A cloth (*pata*) is an unconscious object, admittedly, it is no Pramāṇa, because it is not instrumental in the generation of valid knowledge. Samnikarsa or the modes of Proximity, the Jainas point out, are after all unconscious phenomena or relationships and as such, like cloth, cannot be instrumental in the generation of valid knowledge.

न खल्वस्य स्वनिर्णीतौ करणत्वं स्तम्भादेरिवाचेतनत्वात्;
नाप्यर्थनिश्चितौ स्वनिश्चितावकरणस्य कुम्भादेरिव तत्राप्य-
करणत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

*na khalv asya svanirṇītau karanatvam stambhādei
ivācetanatvāt; nāpyartha-niścītau svaniścītāv akāraṇasya
kumbhādei iva tatrapy akāranatvāt । 5 ।*

TRANSLATION It is not the instrument of determining the self, as it is unconscious like a pillar, nor for determining the object as that which is incapable, like a pitcher, of determining the self is incapable of that also.

NOTES According to the Jainas any unconscious phenomena like Proximity cannot be instrumental in the generation of valid knowledge regarding the self and the not-self. Some thinkers of the Yauga (Nyāya) school object to the theory of the Jainas on the

ground that Samñikarsa may be instrumental in the generation of knowledge of other objects, although it may not generate the knowledge of the self. A lamp-light is not self-conscious but is never-the-less instrumental in revealing other objects.

The Jainas criticise the Yauga position in the following way. Samñikarsa cannot be an instrument of knowledge, even of objects as distinguished from the self or the knowing subjects. For, what is an instrument? That is the instrument with regard to an act which being used by the Agent, that act is unfailingly accomplished and otherwise, that act is never accomplished, for instance, the cutting weapon is an Instrument with regard to cutting. Proximity would have been a Pramāna, if it could produce valid knowledge invariably and if without it, knowledge would have been impossible. Experience, however, shows that these are not the cases always.

For instance, we may fix our Eyes on the sky (there is *samñikarsa* of the *samyoga* type pore) but no definite knowledge or perception results therefrom. If it be said that there being no Form (*rūpa*) attached to the sky a definite knowledge of it becomes impossible, it may be asked: How does the Rūpa produce the definite knowledge? You cannot say that the Rūpa in the parts of an object accounts for the Rūpa of the whole. A Triad (*trīyamuka*) i. e., a combination of three Dvyanukas (of Dyads) has no doubt a Rūpa, but this Rūpa in the Triad admittedly does not inhere in its constituents, the three dyads. Nor can it be said that the parts which have Rūpa but whose Rūpa is imperceptible produce explicit Rūpa in the whole. In that case, we should have

experienced actual and explicit Fire in a quantity of hot water; for, it is said that in the particles of a quantity of hot water, there is Fire of an inexplicit kind. Next if the existence of Rūpa in a object be the cause of its definite perception, how is it that a man of diseased eyes has no perception of the Object? You cannot say that perception results only when there is Proximity; that Proximity is proper relationship and not complete and total contact; that in the case of the diseased eyes, such a relationship is wanting; that Proximity is approachment with a difference. In reply to this argument, we may ask. Does such a Proximity relate to the Soul; if so, how is the perception of a particular object possible? For, according to the Nyāya thinkers themselves, the soul pervades all the things of the universe at all times; it is in contact with all things; how then can the perception of an object be possible for it? Nor can you say that the Proximity relates to the Body. A small fruit on the palm of one's hand is in complete contact with it; if for the perception of the fruit, the Proximity must be with a difference, then it is clear that the object must remain unperceived. Thirdly you cannot say that the Proximity relates to visual perceptions only. According to the Naiyāyika, the organ of vision is *prapyakari*, i. e., it generates visual perception by coming in contact with the object seen. It is said that light-rays shoot from the eyes and come in contact with the object of vision. Now, in criticism of the third contention of the Nyāya School, we may say that it makes the visual perception of an object impossible. For, the organ of vision is in contact with its object through the light-rays. Lastly, it cannot be said that

the Proximity relates to the location of the visual sense-organ, in other words you cannot say that in order that a visual perception of one object can arise, the object should remain separated from the eye-balls. A small thing may be in contact with an eye-ball. and yet it is perceived. Further, it may be asked. Why does not a man who turns towards the North, see the Golden Mountain of the North Pole? You cannot say that the Polar mountain is not seen because it is very distant, for, distance does not prevent the eyes from seeing the moon. If you say that one sees the moon, because the light-rays from his eyes are helped by the rays of the moon in their movement towards the moon, one may say that the brilliant rays of the sun help the light-rays of the eyes in their movement towards the Polar mountain: why then, it may be asked, is the Polar mountain not seen in the bright sun-lit day? You cannot say that the light-rays of the sun instead of helping the light-rays of the eyes, rather overwhelm or obstruct them; for, in that case brilliantly-lit objects would remain unseen. Hence it is not an invariable rule that Samnikarsa generates Cognition. Nor is it an invariable rule that cognition is impossible when there is no Samnikarsa. In what is called the Pratibhā we have a curious apprehension of future things & events; the sages have a faculty called the Āsa-samvedana, through which they directly know things which are not present before their senses. In this case there is no Samnikarsa, yet there is cognition of objects.

Accordingly, Samnikarsa cannot be said to be instrumental in the generation of knowledge of objects. The example of lamp-light does not prove the Naiyāyika contention. The objects are revealed, not to

the lamp-light itself but to the eyes helped by the lamp-light. Hence it is that in the matter of revelation of objects, the lamp-light is not the direct means or instrument but is called so, only by transference of epithet. Such transference of epithet, the lamp-light may be called the instrument not only of object-knowledge but of self-knowledge too; for, for the purpose of perceiving the lamp-light, another lamp-light is not necessary; the lamp-light while revealing the objects around it, reveals itself too. Thus the Naiyāyika example of the lamp-light goes against their own propositions. It rather proves the Jaina contention that the other-revealer must be the self-revealer; that what is not the self-revealer cannot be the other-revealer. If the lamp-light be figuratively called the other-revealer, it is in the same way, self-revealer too.

Samnikarṣa is an unconscious phenomenon; it cannot reveal the self nor can it reveal the objects. The Naiyāyika contention that Samnikarṣa, although not the self-revealer, can nevertheless be the revealer of object, the contention based on the example of lamp-light is not well-founded.

तद् व्यवसायस्वभावं समारोपपरिपन्थित्वात्

प्रमाणत्वाद् वा ॥ ६ ॥

*tad vyavasāya-svabhavam samāropa-paripanthitvāt
pramāṇatvād vā ॥ 6 ॥*

TRANSLATION That is essentially valid (or certain) as it is opposed to Samāropa or Superimposition, or, as it is Pramāṇa.

NOTES 'That' refers to knowledge which is identical with the Pramāna. The Pramāna determines the nature of a thing as it really is and is opposed to the three forms of Samāropa or false apprehension, to be described later on, viz., Samśaya or Doubt, Viparyaya or Illusion and Anadhyavasāya or Inattention. Hence the Pramāna is valid or certain knowledge. The author says that Pramāna is certain knowledge, because it is opposed to all modes of false apprehension or because it is Pramāna.

The Buddhists object to the above Jaina description of the Pramāna. They say that when all sorts of perceptions, ideation and affections are removed from the mind, we have the Pratyaksa. It is the Nirvikalpa or pure sensation. The Pratyaksa is a Pramāna, according to the Buddhists, although it does not come under the category of certain knowledge (*vyavasāya*), because at the time when we have the Nirvikalpa, we do not have the feeling that it is 'certain knowledge', also. The Jainas criticise the Buddhist contention in the following way. How do you feel that the Pratyaksa is Nirvikalpa, a pure sensation which is devoid of the determination about its validity? It is a matter of introspection and as such, the sensuous perception (*atīndriya pratyaksa*) does not give the feeling. The mental perception (*mānasa pratyaksa*) also cannot give the feeling inasmuch as it has for its matter, the matter of the sensuous perception in its immediately next moment. If it be said that in the (supernatural) perception of a sage (*yogi-pratyaksa*) one has the feeling it may well be said that as all persons are not sages, the feeling is not available to ordinary mortals. Accordingly, the Buddhists must admit that is *sva-samvedana*

or direct self-consciousness., i. e., the consciousness of the Nirvikalpa itself we have the feeling that it has nothing to do with its certainty or otherwise. But how is Sva-samvedana a Pramāṇa? To say that the direct self-consciousness is a Pramāṇa, because it presents itself as direct self-consciousness, is unreasonable. Nor can it be said that the Pramāṇa-hood of Sva-samvedana is established by the Modified perceptions (*vikalpas*) that are similar to and are produced by it. Because, as the Jainas point out, either the Vikalpas are not similar to the Nirvikalpa or they do not prove the Pramāṇa-hood of the latter. What follows the pure sensation of the Nirvikalpa is generally a modified perception. e. g., of the form, that is a blue object. Obviously, such a preception is different from the Nirvikalpa which has no definite object in its purview. Where, however, the Vikalpa that follows the Nirvikalpa is subjective in character and is of the form. 'I have the knowledge of a blue object'. there also the Vikalpa does not prove the Pramāṇa-hood of the Nirvikalpa. The Vikalpa or the perception of the modified form in such a case can prove only its own validity. In criticism of the Buddhist contention that the Pramāṇa-hood of the Nirvikalpa is proved by the Vikalpa that is produced by it, the further question is: How is the Pramāṇa-hood of the Vikalpa itself established? You cannot say that the Vikalpa is the Pramāṇa, because of Svasamvedana or direct self-consciousness, because such a position is unreasonable. Nor can it be said that the Pramāṇa-hood of a Vikalpa is established by the Vikalpa that is produced by it, for such a position would lead to Anavasthā or Infinite Regression. It is thus that the Pramāṇa-hood of the Svasamvedana itself, which according to the Buddhists, establishes

the Pramāṇa-hood of the Nirvikalpa or pure sensation is not established

Failing to prove the Pramāṇa-hood of the Nirvikalpa, by means of Sva-samvedana or direct self-consciousness, the Buddhists attempt to show that Anumāna or inference establishes it in this way. A cow was the object of perception or Nirvikalpa, subsequently, (when the cow is not before us) the idea of the cow (the *vikalpa*) is revived. This Vikalpa or the idea of the cow proves that previously there was the Nirvikalpa perception of the cow. The Buddhists contend that Recollection or mental Reproduction thus proves Pramāṇa-hood of the Nirvikalpa. The Jainas criticise this view of the Buddhists by pointing out that the Nirvikalpa cannot account for the revived idea. According to the Jainas, it is only a Vikalpa, attended with Vyavasāya, i. e., only a valid or certain piece of cognition that can give rise to the certain subsequent Vikalpa which is the reproduced idea. The absolutely colourless Nirvikalpa which is strictly unconnected with all Vikalpas previous or subsequent to it, cannot account for the Vikalpa or the revived idea. A true and valid percept only can be remembered and not the Nirvikalpa. The Buddhists attempt to show that the Nirvikalpa can give rise to the Vikalpa (the revised idea) on account of (i) Abhyāsa (ii) Buddhī and (iii) Arthitva. The Jainas set aside this theory of the Buddhists, in the following way: (i) Abhyāsa may mean *bhūyo-darśana* or repeated experience. The Buddhists contend that the Nirvikalpa, repeatedly experienced, may be remembered. The Jainas point out that Nirvikalpa is strictly separate and individual. And as such any number of Nirvikalpas is incompe-

tent to create a Saṃskāra (Trace or tendency for revival). If, however, Abhyāsa be supposed to mean that the Nirvikalpa goes on producing Vikalpas one after the other, the Jainas answer that this is begging the question; for, the power of Nirvikalpa to give rise to Vikalpas is just the point of dispute here (ii) The Buddhists contend that Buddhi or the principle of consciousness which perceives the Nirvikalpa being the self-same gives rise to the Vikalpa corresponding to the Nirvikalpa. The Jainas point out that Buddhi being the self-same, how is it that subsequent to Nirvikalpa, only A, (A Vikalpa or the idea corresponding to Nirvikalpa) at a given time, is revived and not be B, or C? (iii) As regards Arthitva, it may mean *jijñāsitatva*, i. e., being an object of enquiry. The Buddhists contend that the Nirvikalpa which is an object of enquiry, is remembered. The Jainas point out that all cognitions involve a spirit of enquiry or inquisitiveness to know. It being so, there is no reason why the Nirvikalpa A should be particularly remembered and not Nirvikalpas B, C or D. If however, Arthitva be taken to mean, 'to be an object of desire'—then, the Nirvikalpa may not be Pramāṇa at all. As will be shown presently, the Nirvikalpa is Pramāṇa according to the Buddhists, not because it is itself valid knowledge but because it leads to or produces (*janaka*) valid knowledge. An object of desire may not truly exist, an object may be true though it may not be desired. Accordingly if it be contended (as done by the Buddhists) that the Nirvikalpa, having for its object an object of desire, is remembered, it must be admitted that the Nirvikalpa will not in all cases lead to or produce valid knowledge

and as such like Fancy or pure imagination, the object of which is remembered on account of its being desired, it will not be a Pramāṇa. The Jaina^s thus show that the Nirvikalpa cannot produce the Vikalpa (i. e., the reproduced idea) and account for memory or the power of reproduction. According to them, not the Nirvikalpa but a Vikalpa, i. e., a percept which is determined to be true and valid is remembered.

The Buddhist thinkers maintain that so far as Anumāna or inference is concerned it is essentially opposed to all forms of Samāropa (Superimposition or Fallacy) and is essentially valid and certain (*vyavasāya*). Anumāna is Pramāṇa on that account. Pratyakṣa or direct apprehension which is identified with Nirvikalpa or undetermined perception, i. e., pure sensation by the Buddhists, is, however, not essentially certain knowledge like Anumāna. Pratyakṣa, or the Nirvikalpa reveal (*upadarśaka*) the object to the percipient. This primary apprehension which is absolutely undetermined by any form of ideation whatsoever makes him attend to (*pravartaka*) the object. Attention yields (*prāpaka*) the object to the percipient. When the object is in this way fully grasped, we have what is called Avisamvādaka or consistent knowledge, which is the Pramāṇa. The Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa, according to the Buddhists, is a Pramāṇa not because it is consistent valid or certain knowledge (*avisamvāda* or *vyavasāya*) in itself but because it leads to or produces (*janaka*) it. Thus a Pramāṇa (as in the case of the Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa) may not consist in valid or certain knowledge (*vyavasāya*) it leads to or generates (*janaka*) it. This is the contention of the Buddhists.

The above theory of the Buddhist is criticised by the Jainas in the following way. Does the Darśana, i. e., the Nirvikalpa reveal the object when the Vyavasāya or the feeling of the validity of knowledge is generated, or does the Darśana reveal the object as soon as there is the Darśana? In the first case, i. e., in the case that Darśana does not immediately reveal the object, it is impossible for it to reveal the object. All sensations, according to the Buddhists are momentary. A *darśana* dies as soon as it is generated, so that if it does not reveal the object when it is generated it is impossible for it to reveal the object at any time. Let us then consider the second alternative. Darśana reveals the object as soon as it is generated and Vyavasāya or sense of its validity comes afterwards. Now if Darśana consists in a pure sensing of the object it has nothing to do with Vyavasāya or the sense of the certainty of the knowledge. The Buddhists contend that the Darśana works out (*vyāpāra*) the Vyavasāya and hence Darśana may be said to lead to and be connected with Vyavasāya. The Jainas point out that the Vyavasāya being an effect of the Darśana must be subsequent to it, so that an essential relation between them is impossible. Then again supposing the Vyavasāya to be Vyāpāra of the Darśana, the question is Has the Vyavasāya, the object of the Darśana for its object or has it not? If the Vyavasāya has that object for its object then it is what makes the percipient attend to is (*pravartaka*) and yields it (*prāpaka*) and as such, the Vyavasāya is the consistent (*saṁvādaka*) knowledge and the Pramāṇa, there is no meaning in looking upon the cause of the Vyavasāya, the Darśana, as a Pramāṇa. If, on the contrary,

Vyavasāya has not the object of the Darśana for its object, how can it be said that Darśana reveals its objects? For Vyavasāya is the product of the Darśana so that what is absent in the effect cannot be present in the cause. The Buddhists may contend that Vikalpa makes definite and certain (*vyavasāya*) the object of the Darśana which is but the abstract generality; in this sense, the object of the Nirvikalpa and Vikalpa are identical and the Darśana which produces the Vyavasāya may be said to reveal an object. The Jainas point out that the objects of the Darśana and the Vyavasāya cannot be the same. The vaguest generality which is the object of the Darśana consists according to the Buddhists, in Anyāpoha, i.e., an elimination of all matters other than the object of the Darśana. Darśana thus is essentially a negative apprehension, pure and simple, and its object an Avastu or unsubstantial nothing. The object of Vyavasāya or certain knowledge, on the contrary, is a positive, definite and certain something. Accordingly, the object of Vyavasāya cannot be the same as that of the Darśana.

It may be contended by the Buddhists that the Vyavasāya is the revealer of the object only in this sense that it unifies the object of the primary sensation (*dr̥śya*) and the object of the succeeding developed perception (*vikalpa*). The Jainas ask: What is meant of this unification? If unification means the actual blending of substances, then Vyavasāya must be held to be a substance in order that it may blend the substances of the objects of sensation and perception. If, however, Vyavasāya means only a mental state in which the object of sensation and perception appear

as one and the same the alleged unification is only figurative (*upacārita*) and not real; and in that case, how can Vyavasāya be called a revealer of the (true) object? In this connection, the further questions are, How is this mental unification of the objects of sensation and perception, which is involved in Vyavasāya, effected? Is it effected by Darśana, i. e., sensation? This is impossible; for a pure sensation cannot have anything either with determination (*adhyavasāya*). Is then the mental unification effected by Vikalpa or perception? This also is impossible, for perception cannot have the object of sensation before it; when perception holds the field, sensation has already vanished. Can it be said, then, that a form of cognition which is different from both sensation and perception effects the union of the objects of sensation and perception? This also is impossible. Because a cognition which is different from sensation and perception cannot have for its object either the object of sensation or the object of perception and as such, it is impossible for it to unify the objects of sensation and perception, both of which are beyond its purview.

Hence it cannot be said that the Pratyakṣa (Nirvikalpa or Darśana) is a Pramāṇa, because it leads to or generates Vyavasāya (certain knowledge).

In this connection the next question is: How is it that a sensation sometimes does not tally with facts of reality? The Buddhists contend that a sensation reveals its object truly; but because of the force of Vāsanā (a preexisting tendency to perceive otherwise) elements of Samāropa (wrong perception) mix up with the matter of sensation. But the contention of

the Buddhists is weak; for, the Jainas point out, in that case it becomes inexplicable why in other cases matters of sensation do not become tainted with *Samāropa*. Sensation is one homogeneous unit of consciousness, how can it be that in some cases it is modified by *Samāropa* and in other cases, it is not modified.

The Jainas thus maintain that the *Pratyakṣa* is a *Pramāṇa* because it is essentially certain knowledge and not something which leads to certain knowledge. To isolate the *Pratyakṣa* from the *Vyavasāya*, as is done by the Buddhists, gives rise to insuperable difficulties as are pointed out above

अतस्मिँस्तदध्यवसायः समारोपः ॥ ७ ॥

atasmims tad-adhyavasāyah samāropah | 7 |

TRANSLATION *Samāropa* or Superimposition consists in determining a matter to be what it is not

NOTES Fallacious knowledge is misunderstanding the nature of a thing it sees a thing where it is not.

स विपर्ययसंशयानध्यवसायभेदात् त्रेधा ॥ ८ ॥

sa viparyaya-saṁśāyanadhyavasāya-bhedat

treḍhā | 8 |

TRANSLATION It is of three kinds, viz, *viparyaya* or Illusion, *saṁśāya* or Doubt and *anadhyavasāya* or Inattention

NOTES These are described and illustrated below

विपरीतैककोटिनिष्ठं विपर्ययः ॥ ९ ॥

viparītaika-koti-nisthānam viparyayaḥ 191

TRANSLATION: Viparyaya or illusion consists in determining (a thing from) one aspect which is different (from the thing in its entirety).

NOTES. A thing has various parts and aspects. If you judge it from one only of these parts or aspects, losing sight of the others, your knowledge of the thing will be Viparyaya or Illusion.

This is illustrated below.

यथा शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमिति ॥ १० ॥

yathā śukṭikāyām idam rajatam iti 1101

TRANSLATION: As for instance: (To determine) that it is silver (on looking) at an oyster-shell.

NOTES: An oyster-shell though white is not silver. To mistake an oyster-shell for silver would be Viparyaya, otherwise called Viparīta-khyāti. Another instance of illusory perception is to perceive a conch-shell to be yellow. The inferential knowledge again which is vitiated by fallacies (e. g., *hetvābhāsa* etc.) is also Viparyaya or illusory inasmuch as the subject-matter of such inference is not true to the thing as it is.

Here the thinkers who are upholders of the theory of the Vivekakhyāti raise objections to the above Jaina theory of Viparyaya. According to the Jainas, as we have seen above, Viparyaya or illusion consists in Viparīta-khyāti, i. e., Khyāti or (Positive) apprehension of Viparīta or something different (from the thing

under observation) The objectors who belong to the Prabhākara School, on the contrary, urge that Illusion is not positive perception of a different thing but is really *Vivekākhyāti* or *Bhedākhyāti*, i. e., *Akhyāti* or non-apprehension of *Viveka* or *Bheda* or difference. The objectors ask. In what does the difference (*vaiparītya*) consist in an illusory perception? You cannot say that the object of Illusion is different, (from the real object) because it has no 'practical efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*)' The thing itself the Oyster-shell has admittedly a practical efficiency no matter whether our apprehension of it be a true perception or an illusion. It can neither be said that the object of illusion has not the particular practical efficiency which is denoted by the object of illusion; that is, Silver which is apprehended by Illusion will not work as real Silver, because it may be asked: When is this practical efficiency of silver is absent in the object of illusion? You cannot say that the practical efficiency of silver is absent at the moment of the illusory apprehension; because the practical efficiency of silver is not felt even at the moment when there is real percept of real silver. How can it be said that the object of illusion is different from the real object because the practical efficiency of the real object is found to be absent in it, some time after the Illusion. Reality of a thing does not always depend on its practical efficiency. Take for instance, a bubble in water, it is destroyed as soon as wind blows upon it. The bubble has no practical efficiency at the moment when it is perceived; the wind destroys it so that no practical efficiency is felt in it, sometime after its perception. No practical efficiency is thus

seen in a bubble but all the same the bubble is real. Accordingly no argument about the reality of an object can be built upon the experience or the non-experience of practical efficiency in it.

The Prabhākara thinkers next point out that the object of Illusion cannot be said to be different because our apprehension presents it as such. For, it may be asked. How, i. e., in what apprehension, does the object of Illusion appear to be different from the real object? Not certainly in the illusory apprehension itself: Illusion, for the matter of that, every apprehension presents its object as real. Nor can it be said that Illusion is falsified by previous knowledge. Previous knowledge, as knowledge previous to Illusion cannot falsify the latter, because the latter did not arise when the former held the mind. It can neither be said that previous knowledge as co-existent with Illusion falsifies it, for, co-existence of two forms of knowledge is admittedly impossible. Can it be said then that Illusion is falsified by knowledge subsequent to it? If after we have the illusive apprehension of silver, we have again that same apprehension, it is clear that such subsequent knowledge which has a different matter for its object falsifies the previous Illusion, then it may be said that all subsequent knowledge proves the illusive character of all previous knowledge. It may be said that not all subsequent knowledge proves the falsity of previous knowledge but that a subsequent apprehension which is opposed to (*badhaka*) a previous apprehension proves the illusive nature of the latter. But the question is What is this opposition? If by opposition is meant mere otherness, then a subsequent

false knowledge would have been opposed to and would have proved the illusive nature of the previous illusion, because the subsequent false knowledge is certainly other than, i e., different from the previous Illusion, but a subsequent Illusion cannot be said to be opposed to and to falsify a previous Illusion. If again by opposition is meant removal (*upamaṇḍa*), then the subsequent apprehension of pitcher is to be said to be opposed to the previous apprehension of a cloth, because when the subsequent apprehension of the cloth is certainly removed, but the subsequent apprehension of the pitcher is by none looked upon as an apprehension which is opposed to and which thereby falsifies the previous apprehension of the cloth. Thirdly the relation of opposition cannot be said to subsist between a subsequent apprehension which checks the active effort (*pravṛtti*) towards the object of the previous apprehension and the previous apprehension; for, the active effort, tendency or inclination towards the object of an apprehension is simultaneous with the apprehension itself, subsequent apprehension has nothing to do with the active effort connected with the previous apprehension and as such, cannot be related to it by way of opposition. For the same reason, a subsequent apprehension cannot be said to be opposed to previous apprehension, by preventing the fruition of active effort connected with that previous apprehension. The active effort (*pravṛtti*) for appropriation or rejection, towards the object of an apprehension as well as the fruition or result of that effect (the consciousness of actually getting or not getting it) are all connected with that apprehension and are all finished before a subsequent apprehension

arises. Accordingly, a subsequent apprehension cannot be said to check the active effort connected with a previous apprehension or the fruition of that effort and as such, cannot be said to be related to the previous apprehension by way of opposition. It is thus impossible for a subsequent apprehension to falsify a previous Illusion by being opposed to it.

In support of their position the Prabhākara thinkers ask: As the matter of Illusion which according to you is a Viparīta Pratyaya (i. e., a positive perception of a positive object different from the real), is the apprehended silver non-existent or existent? If the silver is non-existent, then Illusion is not Viparīta-khyāti, as maintained by you, but is, Asat-khyāti, i. e., apprehension of something non-existent. If, on the contrary you maintain that the subject-matter of Illusion, viz, the Silver is nevertheless an existent object then we ask. In what place is the silver existent? If the silver is existent in the oyster-shell then the apprehension is not Illusion but is Tathya-Padārtha-Khyāti or a perception of a real object. If, however, you maintain that the silver apprehended in Illusion, does not exist in the oyster-shell but exists elsewhere, then you are to explain how the silver is apprehended in the oyster-shell. You cannot say that it is due to some defect (*dosa*) in the organ of vision; for, a defect in a sense-organ only weakens its power of perception but does not produce an altogether different (*viparīta*) matter as its object.

The thinkers of the Prabhākara School contend that a careful consideration thus shows that Illusion cannot consist in a positive perception of some

positive object, different from the actual. According to them, there are two elements in Illusion. both of which are correct. The first of the elements is the apprehension of 'This', a correct perception having a real matter for its object. The second element is the recollection of silver a correct cognition after all, having a real matter for its matter. Both the cognitive elements involved in Illusion are thus correct. Illusion, however, results from and consists in Bhedakhyāti, i. e., failing to recognise the Bheda between the operations of the processes of preception and recollection as well as that between their respective objects. Viparyaya or Illusion is thus not a Khyāti or apprehension (of Viparīta or different object) but is really an Akhyāti or non-apprehension (of Bheda or difference between perception and recollection as well as between their objects).

To the above contentions of the thinkers of the Prabhākara School the Jainas reply as follows. As regards the question. In what does the difference (*vaiparītya*) consist in a illusory perception? The Jainas point out that the difference consists in an apprehension different from the apprehension of a thing as it is. An oyster-shell is something; silver, again, is something different from it. in Illusion, the oyster-shell is not perceived as an oyster-shell but is apprehended in a different manner, i. e., apprehended as silver, that is to say, as something different from the thing as it is.

As regards the question, 'how', i. e., in what apprehension does the object of Illusion appear to be different (from the real object)? the Jainas answer as follows. A subsequent knowledge which opposes

(*badhaka*) the illusory apprehension by removing, (*upamarda*), it tells us that the previous apprehension was illusory. 'Removal' (or *upamarda*) here does not mean 'destruction (*pradhvamsa*,)' it means rather correction, e g, coming to know, so to say that what I previously apprehended as silver was not really silver. Removal (*upamarda*) thus consists in a knowledge of the unreality of the matter of Illusion. The Jainas further point out that all the objections raised by the Prabhākaras may be turned against them by asking them, 'how', i e, in what apprehension do you find that in the previous (illusory) apprehension, there was a failure to recognise the difference between the elements of perception and recollection?

The Jainas point out that in Viparyaya or illusion, the object of the apprehension is really the oyster-shell, (i) with its real form concealed and (ii) with a different form assumed. In the illusory apprehension, the peculiarities in the form of the oyster-shell on the one hand are not apprehended and on the other some characteristics, e g, brilliance etc which the oyster-shell has in common with silver are perceived, which perception awakens up the idea of silver, which again, in its turn casts upon the object of apprehension, the form of silver.

The Jainas maintain that Illusion is due to Dosas or defects of the instruments of our cognition. It is not correct to say, as the Prabhākaras do, that defects only weaken the organ and do not produce or hold up a different object before cognition. It is a matter of common experience that defective sense-organs often present an object in an altogether different manner. As a matter of fact, this is in a way admitted

by the Prabhākaras themselves. According to them, in illusion, there is only an idea of silver present, but this idea is found to produce an effect which is different from that of an idea, for, this idea of silver actually leads a man, say, to extend his hand to get the silver, the effect of having a perception of silver. The Prabhākaras, of course, contend that this (different) effect is due not simply to the idea of silver but to the idea of silver, coupled with the failure to differentiate the elements of perception and recollection. The Jainas, on the contrary, maintain that it is more reasonable to hold that the different effects, in such cases, are due to organs of cognition vitiated by Dosas or defects.

The Jaina thinkers point out how by Pratyabhijñā, i.e., comparison and assimilation-cum-differentiation, which is a source of valid knowledge, the previous Illusion is found out to be illusory. It is in this way. The object of my previous knowledge which appeared to be silver then is now known to be an oyster-shell. Inference (*anumāna*) also shows that in Illusion, we have an apprehension of some thing which is different from the real object. The form of the inference would be The (illusory) apprehension of silver reveals (ultimately) the oyster-shell, because it guides the knowers' activities (*pravartaka*) to that, that which does so, does so; as for instance, perception of real silver reveals silver. The plain meaning is that although at the inception we have an apprehension of silver, later on we find that the object of our apprehension attracts us only as an oyster-shell and not as silver and hence we infer that our previous apprehension was illusory and that its object was different from the real thing as it is.

Finally, as regards the Prabhākara contention that Illusion results from a non-realisation of the differences in the operations and the objects of preception and recollection, the Jainas ask. Is this non-realisation only a negative apprehension or a positive apprehension of identity (of the operations of Perception and Recollection) The first, of course, cannot be the case, because according to the followers of Prabhākara, there cannot be any apprehension of negation. They cannot accept the second position also because it involves practically the admission of the doctrine of *Viparita-khyāti*, that is to say, the admission that the objects of Illusion and valid perception are really different but that in Illusion these different objects are apprehended as identical. The philosophers of the Prabhākara School contend that *Bheda* or difference points to distinguishing marks and that the non-realisation of the *Bheda* means an apprehension of common characteristics (of silver and oyster-shell), only. The Jainas point out that this contention will not help the Prabhākaras, because the apprehension of common characteristics is present in our valid perceptions; for instance, in our perception of an Oyster-shell as an Oyster-shell we apprehend also general characteristics, i. e., the characteristics of brightness etc. which are common to both Silver and an Oyster-shell. The Prabhākaras point out that in a correct perception of an Oyster-shell we have the apprehension of its peculiarities along with that of its general characteristics. The Jainas answer that this shows that an apprehension of general characteristics alone never takes place and that in all apprehension there is an apprehension of some peculiar features of the

object along with that of its general features, so that when an Oyster-shell is before us, we have not only an apprehension of its general features but also that of some of its special characteristics; how, then can there be an Illusion, which according to the Prabhākaras arises from one's apprehension of the general features only?

The Jainas point out that according to the Prabhākaras both the processes of apprehension and recollection, are self-conscious processes. Now, if the direct apprehension is felt to be the direct apprehension and recollection, to be recollection, how can there be an Illusion at all? If it be said that Illusion arises when the element of apprehension appears as the element of recollection or when the element of recollection appears as the element of apprehension, this theory of Illusion, the Jainas urge, is practically the theory of Viparīta-khyāti or apprehension of something different stated in a round-about way

साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावादनवस्थितानेककोटिसंस्पर्शि

ज्ञानं संशयः ॥ ११ ॥

sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāṇābhāva-d anavasthūtāneka-
koti-samsparsi jñānam saṁśayaḥ ॥ 11 ॥

TRANSLATION. Saṁśaya or Doubt consists in knowledge touching the many aspects which remain undetermined owing to our not having the supporting and opposing reasons (in connection with those aspects)

NOTES. When two or more possibilities crop up and we are not in a position to decide one way or the

other, we are said to be in a doubting mood This is illustrated below.

यथायं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ॥ १२ ॥

yathāyam sthānur vā puruṣo veti | 12 |

TRANSLATION For instance: What is that, a statue or a man?

NOTES: The example given is of Doubt with regard to a matter of Perception An example of Doubt regarding a matter of Indirect knowledge would be the questioning attitude (what is that, a Cow or a Gavaya?) of a man who saw in a forest an animal with horns.

किमित्यालोचनमात्रमनध्यवसायः ॥ १३ ॥

kim ity ālocana-matram anadhyavasāyah | 13 |

TRANSLATION: Anadhavasāya or Inattention consists just in mentally noticing, what is it?

NOTES: Inattention is the attitude towards a thing which is just sensed, and particulars about which are unperceived. Strictly speaking it is not a mode of Samāropa or super-imposition, as it does not present a thing differently from what it is.

यथा गच्छतस्तृणस्पर्शज्ञानम् ॥ १४ ॥

yathā gacchataś tṛṇa-sparśa-jñānam | 14 |

TRANSLATION: For instance The mental state of a man, treading upon a blade of grass while going on

NOTES: A man, while going on, treads upon a blade of grass. Being engaged in thoughts of other things, he does not understand at the time what kind of a thing or of what name it is. He simply perceives that something has come in contact with his foot. Inattention consists in this form of bare apprehension.

The example given above is of Inattention regarding a matter of Perception. Inattention with regard to a matter of Indirect knowledge may be illustrated in this way. A man does not know what a cow is; while travelling in a forest he comes across an animal with horns and wonders for a moment: 'What! is there an animal here?' This is *Adhyavasāya* or Inattentive Mood with regard to a matter of *Paroksa* knowledge.

ज्ञानादन्योऽर्थः परः ॥ १५ ॥

jñānad anyo' rthah paraḥ । 15 ।

TRANSLATION: The Not-self is the object and is other than knowledge.

NOTES. *Jñāna* or knowledge is what cognises, i. e., the knowing subject, while *Para* or the not-self is what is cognised, i. e., the object of knowledge. This *Para* is also called *Artha* because it is 'sought after' (*arthyamāna*) by an active knower. The not-self may be a conscious or an unconscious being.

Here the *Sūnyavādins* or the *Nihilists* come in and urge that there is no real not-self and no real self or knowledge. There can be no reality in this so-called universe, no real object and no real subject. As regards the not-self these *Nihilists* urge: Is it an atom or a gross thing or of the nature of both or of the nature of neither?

If it be an atom, they ask: how do you know an atom, by perception or by inference? If by the former, they ask, by means of the transcendental perception of the sages or by the ordinary perception like that of ours? In the first case, nothing is proved (as we are not sages). In the second case it is impossible, as we cannot have perceptions of atoms even in a dream, our perception being always of gross things, e. g., a pillar or a pitcher. If, however, the knowledge of atoms is said to be derived from inference, the Nihilists ask: Is the inference based on the knowledge of a relationship between the Proven (*sādhya*) and the Mark (*hetu*) or is it drawn otherwise? The second case is impossible, as there can be no valid inference in such a case. In the first case, the question is: Is the relationship known by inference or through perception? Not certainly through perception. For, the atoms themselves being supersensuous, an invariable relation of a Mark with them is necessarily unknowable through perception. If it be said that the said relationship is known through the very same Inference by which the atom is known, there arises the fallacy of mutual dependence, the knowledge of the atom being dependent on the knowledge of the relationship and the knowledge of the relationship depending on the knowledge of the atom. If it be said that the relationship is known through another inference, we commit the fallacy of 'infinite regression'. Hence it is that inference cannot give us the knowledge of atoms. In the next place, it may be asked: Are the atoms eternal or non-eternal? In case they are eternal, are they 'potent' (i. e., capable of doing something) or 'impotent'? The second alternative is weak,

as impotent things like a tree in the sky are non-existent. If they are potent, do they produce effects gradually or simultaneously? If gradually, do they change nature from time to time or do they remain unchanged? If they do not change natures, do they produce a later effect with the same nature in them with which they produced a former effect or do they produce the former with the same nature in them with which they produce the later effect? In both these cases the former and the later effects would be simultaneously produced. Similarly, if it be held that the eternal atoms change their nature, every time they produce an effect, they would be non-eternal, as change is the mark of impermanence. If it be held that the atoms produce all their effects simultaneously, they would be non-existent after the first moment, as nothing remains for them to effect. Hence atoms are not eternal. Now, if they are non-eternal are they momentary or persistent (for some time)? If they are momentary, is their genesis accountable or non-accountable? If it is non-accountable, are we to understand that the atoms have no cause or that they have no genesis or that they themselves are their cause or that they come out of the void? In the first case, the atoms would be either eternally existent or eternally non-existent because of the philosophical principle, 'any thing which is not dependent upon a cause is either eternally existent or eternally non-existent' In the second case, they may be held not to come into existence at all, at any time. In the third case, the position becomes inscrutable, as anything which is itself non-existent cannot be the cause of its existence. The fourth case implies that the

atoms have some form of existence even before their genesis, in which case they become eternal. If on the contrary, the genesis of the atoms is held to be accountable what is their cause, Gross things or Atoms? Not certainly, the gross things, as the atoms have been admitted to be the ultimate-reals. If the atoms are the cause, do they produce them, being themselves existent or non-existent or both existent and non-existent or neither existent nor non-existent? If these be held to be existent do they exist only for the moment when they come into existence or do they persist for some more moments? In the first case they cannot produce anything. If it be contended that their existence means their productive activity (i. e. existence and productivity mean the same thing) then the light-atoms may as well be the cause of the water-atoms and vice versa, as in both the cases, we have one and the same existence. The second alternative is unacceptable as that would be rejecting the hypothesis of momentariness. If it be held that these atoms produce their effects, though they themselves are non-existent, it may be argued that, in that case, those effects should always be produced. Next, they cannot be held to be both existent and non-existent, as the position involves the contradiction, (1) If they are existent how can they be non-existent? (2) If they are non-existent how can they be existent? Similarly, the position that they are neither existent nor non-existent is not good as the principle is that of the two contradictory alternatives if one is denied, the other is affirmed and that both cannot be denied. Hence it is that you cannot hold the atoms to be momentary. Nor can you hold that they persist for some time

owing to the difficulties, already considered. Besides, if the atoms be held to persist for some time, do they remain impotent or potent for the while? In the first case, they are non-existent like the scent of the sky-lotus. In the second case, is their effect something non-existent or existent or both or neither? In the first case, there is no reason why impossible things and things non-existent in the world should not be produced. In the second case, i. e., if the effect is existent even from before its production, how can we talk of its production? And if an existent effect requires the process of production, how and why is this process of production stopped? The third and the fourth hypotheses are involved in difficulties, already considered. Hence the theory that the not-self or the objective reality consists in atoms cannot be maintained.

Neither can it be said that the not-self is a gross thing. For, the question arises. Is such a gross thing eternal or non-eternal? It cannot be eternal for the reasons for which an atom could not be held to be eternal. Nor is it non-eternal, for in that case, what would be its cause, a gross thing or the atoms? A gross thing is explained by being referred to elements finer and subtler than it and hence to say that a gross thing comes out of a gross thing gives no explanation. If, however, the atoms be said to be the cause of gross things, it is practically maintaining that the objective reality is of two natures, viz., that it is both atomic and gross.

Even this third position is not reasonable. Are the atoms composing a gross thing interrelated or unrelated? If they be supposed to form things, though unrelated, there would be no reason why the

atoms of the three worlds would not be continually making up gross things. On the other hand, if the atoms composing a thing are to have some sort of relationship with each other, the question is, what is this relationship? Is it enough that they should exist in the same locality? If so, then the atoms of this world should produce one big gross thing, as all have the same locality. If it be contended that by the term same locality, it is meant the locality where some atoms by their co-existence produce a gross thing, then we may answer that you commit the fallacy of 'mutual dependence', in as much as you define same locality as the place where a gross thing is produced and you say that a gross thing is produced where the atoms have the same locality. Are we then to suppose that the atoms composing a thing have 'contact or Samyoga' with each other? If so, we ask Is this contact eternal or non-eternal? In the first case, the atoms would be eternally producing the given gross thing. If the contact is non-eternal, where does it arise? Does it come from outside? This is inconceivable. Is then the contact due to the atoms themselves? This being supposed, the question is: Do the atoms come into relationship with each other to produce the contact or do they not? If they do not, there arises the difficulty already referred to. In the other case, the fallacy of 'infinite regression' is committed in as much as one sort of relationship is attempted to be explained by another and that, by another and so on. Further, the question is: What is contact? Is it something identical in essence with the atoms? In that case we have an atom only and we should not talk of contact between atoms. Or is

contact a different phenomenon from the atoms? This being supposed, we ask, is it altogether different or different-only in some respects? To say that contact is different from the atoms in some respects is to point out to contradiction. If, however, contact is altogether different from the atoms, the question is: Does it really subsist between the atoms or does it not? In case it does not, you cannot speak of a relationship between the atoms. If it really subsists, does it subsist by means of 'contact' or 'Samavāya (intimate connection)' or 'identity'—or 'casualty' or 'essential relationship'? Not certainly by means of 'contact' as contact being itself an attribute cannot have itself as its attribute. Not also by means of 'Samavāya' as it is quite possible to have simultaneously many facts of contact, made to subsist between atoms. It is also not reasonable to say that contact subsists between atoms, because it is 'identical' with them as the difference between contact and atoms is already admitted. It is also not reasonable to say that contact subsists between atoms, as it is 'generated' therefrom: because this position has already been criticised. It is also not correct to say that contact subsists between atoms by means of an 'essential relationship', because essential relationship presupposes some sort of essential identity. Besides, what is the extent of atomic contact? Does it mean that the whole of an atom mixes itself up with the whole of another? In that case a gross thing would mean a single atom. Or do the parts of an atom mix with the parts of another? This means that an atom has parts, which is inadmissible. Hence it is that the relationship between atoms cannot be expressed in terms of 'contact'. In the same way, it

may be shown that the relationship cannot also be expressed in terms of 'activity or Kriyā'. Then again, it may be asked: Has the gross substance limbs which support it or is it unsupported? Obviously, it is not unsupported but has limbs supporting it. Has it only one limb or more than one? Admittedly a gross thing has more than one limb. Are these limbs 'non-opposed' or are they 'opposed to each other'? The first alternative is not acceptable, as differences among the limbs are but apparent. On the other hand, if you say that the limbs in a gross thing are opposed to each other, then you cannot talk of one gross thing. Further, does the (gross) thing exist wholly in one of its limbs? Obviously not, for, in that case, the other limbs cannot be called its limbs. If, on the other hand, you say that only a part of the thing exists in one limb, then you cannot treat the thing as a unity or a whole. Then again, even if we admit that a gross thing has parts, the question arises: Are these parts different from the thing? If so, there is the danger of 'infinite regression'; for, the question crops up again whether the gross thing exists wholly in one of those parts or only a part of it does so. If on the contrary, it be held that the parts are not different from the thing, then they are no parts at all. Hence it is that the position that reality is both atomic and gross is not maintainable.

Lastly, the position that not-self is neither atomic nor gross is not reasonable. For, of the two alternatives, if one is denied the other must be admitted. You cannot deny both if your position is to mean anything.

Hence it is that there cannot be any object or notself.

Now, if there is no object there cannot be any Subject, which knows it. Besides, the question is—Does not Subject know the object being contemporaneous with it or being not contemporaneous with it? In the first case, all the objects of the three worlds would be simultaneously known without exception, by the Subject, because the Subject is contemporaneous with those Objects. In the second case, we ask, is the subject formless or has it any form? In the first case, the Subject would be unable to determine the Objects which have forms. If, however, the Subject be supposed to have a form the question is. Is this form different from knowledge or is it the same? In the second case, there is really no form, as knowledge or the Subject and the form are held to be identical. If the form of the Subject is different from knowledge, it may be asked, Does this form consist in consciousness or does it consist in unconsciousness? If the Subject's form is consciousness, then this form like knowledge or the Subject is also a knower and we may ask—How does this conscious form know the Object? And at once the old questions crop up, is the form which is conscious of the Object formless? or has it a form? and so the 'infinite regression'. If, however, the form of the Subject be supposed to be unconscious, the questions are—Is this unconscious form cognised or not cognised? If the form is not cognised by the unknowing Subject, then it may be one and the same in all knowers, i.e., one and the same form may serve as the form of knowledge in all the different individuals. If, on the contrary, the form is said to be

cognised, the question arises. Does the knowledge that knows this form has a form or has it not? and so the 'infinite regression'.

Hence it is that there is no such thing as real knowledge or the Subject.

The ultimate conclusion of the Nihilists accordingly is, Nothing really is! All is void!

To the position of nihilism the Jainas object in this way: Is your reasoning based on the *Pramāṇas* or not? If not, then your reasoning is admittedly unreasonable. If it is based on the *Pramāṇas*, what is their nature? Do they consist in 'objects' or do they consist in 'knowledge'? In any case, Nihilism becomes untenable. If it is held that the *Pramāṇas* are themselves unreal, then Nihilism based upon them becomes unreal also. If it be argued that the debate (already given) leads to no consistent position and that Nihilism is accordingly the unavoidable position, it may be said that the very debate shows that the position of Nihilism is refuted. For the principle is —

"If a debate has any substantiality, how do you prove absolute Nihilism? If a debate has no substantiality how do you prove absolute Nihilism?"

The Jaina position is that the object has a dual nature. It is not an absolute rule that a substance must always be the product of atoms. Threads which are gross, produce gross cloth. Soul and Space, on the other hand, are substances which are not the effects of material atoms. Where, however, an Object is the product of atoms, it is to be noted that it is produced by an activity, dependent on proper time and other conditions. The relationship of 'contact' is to be understood, as a phenomenon, 'separate'

(different) from the atoms *in some respects*. There is no contradiction in such a position. A phenomenon in its one and the same aspect cannot be both identical with and separate from another. But it may be different from the other as a mode, yet identical with it in *substance*. Then, again, the fact that one atom joins with another need not prove that an atom has parts. For the matter of this, it is sufficient if by 'parts' we mean a power or capacity in atoms to join with one another. As regards the question, whether the limbs of a thing are varied the Jaina theory is that they are so, not *absolutely*, but only *in some respects*. If it be contended that the variedness of the supporting limbs in a thing destroys its unitary character, the Jainas reply that a thing which has many parts must be supposed to be, in some sense, a many-in-one. Similarly, with regard to the problem whether the Object fully exists in each of its parts or does so only partially, the Jaina position is that in some respects, the Object may be said to exist wholly in each of its parts and *in some respects* again it exists only partially in a part. To the question, Is the Subject or knowledge contemporaneous with the Object or not? The Jaina answer would be that the Pratyaksa or direct perception is certainly contemporaneous with its object while Recollection cognises what was past and Scriptural knowledge and Inference let us know Objects of the three times, viz., past, present and future. So, here also, the Jaina position acknowledges the truth of both the seemingly contradictory theories. Then, again, with regard to the question, whether knowledge is formless or has a form, the Jainas point out that knowledge is essentially formless but that it may be said to have

forms, if by forms is meant a modification in its nature whereby it is enabled to grasp the Objects and which modification is brought about by a peculiar 'destruction-mitigation' of the Karmas which obscure knowledge and obstruct the cognising power of the Self.

It is in this way that the Jainas establish that the extreme nihilistic position denying the reality of the Self and of the Not-self is untenable.

The Vedāntins join the Jainas in their above criticism of the Nihilistic position but contend that Brahma is the only one Real, besides which, all things are unreal. Their argument put in a syllogistic form is this: 'Things of our experience (*prapañca*) are unreal, because theirs is an apparent reality; that which is so is so, as for instance: Silver in an oyster-shell, they are so, hence they are so. The Jainas criticise the above Vedānta contention in the following ways: What do you mean by 'the unreality of things'? Does 'unreality mean absolute non-existence' or 'false appearance' or 'indescribability'? In the first two cases you are led to deny yourself. In the third case the question is: Why is a thing indescribable? Is it so, because there is no expression for it in language? or is it so, because there is nothing to give birth to an expression for it in language? Or thirdly, is it so because it has no nature of its own? The first is not the case, as everything has a corresponding expression for it in language. The second hypothesis also is untenable: for, what gives birth to an expression in language is either a piece of knowledge or an object. We have knowledge of everything that has a name so that it cannot be said that the cause of an expression

in language, if knowledge be it, is wanting. If it be said that it is the object that gives birth to a word and that things are indescribable in words as objects which cause corresponding words do not exist, the Jainas ask: What do you mean by the non-existence of objects? Do you mean that objects do not exist as reals? Or, do you mean that they do not exist as unrels? In the first case, you are led to the position that an unreal thing can nevertheless be perceived (*Asatkhyāti*). In the second case, you admit the reality of what are perceived (*Sat-khyāti*). Nor is the position maintainable that the objects do not exist either as reals or as unrels. The Jainas point out that if by objects are meant objects which are beyond our experience, it does not matter if such meta-empirical objects do not exist; their non-existence does not mean the non-existence of the things of our experience. As regards a thing of our experience it is meaningless to deny both the alternatives (reality and unreality) to it; only one of them can be denied regarding a thing; it is either not real or not unreal. Hence it is that things are not indescribable because they are wanting in causes that produce words corresponding to them. Thirdly, things cannot be said to be indescribable, because they have no nature of their own. If by 'the nature of a thing' is meant either reality or unreality, all the difficulties just considered crop up. Nor can you say that a thing is wanting in a nature of its own, because it is 'unknowable'. For, the very argument, that a thing is unsubstantial because it is unknowable, shows that the thing is not absolutely unknowable. If it be said that a thing is not really as it appears in our perception of it, then it can be

argued that you cannot look upon it as unknowable on that account: you can only say that a thing is known differently from what it is (*Viparīta-khyāti*). As a matter of fact the doctrine of the absolute indescribability of things is set aside by our direct apprehension itself. Perceptions, such as 'this is a Sarala tree' etc., consist in apprehensions of definite, individual objects, e.g., the Sarala-tree and so on and as such, prove the reality of the *Prapañca* (i. e. the variety or multiplicity of the things of our experience). The word, *Prapañca*, itself refers to distinct and varied reals. It may be contended by the Vedāntist: Perception has for its object the positive real: hence in the varied objects of the world, it posits the *Brahma*; it does not prove the reality of the varied objects in an individual by themselves: perception would have proved the reality of an individual object, if it had presented it as distinguished from another object: perception, however, has no element of negation in it and therefore it does not present its object as distinguished from other objects. The Jainas point out that this Vedāntist contention is not correct. For, what do you mean by '*Vidhāyaka*' or determiner of the positive character? If you say that by *Vidhāyaka* it is meant that perception grasps only the positive nature of its object and does not negative (in it) the nature of other things, your position is wrong; for without negating the nature of other things in it, an apprehension of the positive nature of a thing is impossible. A blue object is perceived as distinguished from yellow ones etc. and not otherwise. Ignorance or Nescience also is a positive fact. When one perceives an object he feels at the same time that his ignor-

ance about the object is being removed. The matter of perception is thus not simply positive; perception has always an element of negation in it. It is thus that perception proves the reality of the objects of our experience. Inference also leads to the same truth in this way "Prapañca is not false; because it is different from a non-existent thing, that which is so, is so; as for instance the soul; it is so; hence it is so." The Jāmas point out that the soul or self according to the Vedāntist himself appears as a reality in our apprehensions, then, how can the Vedāntist argue that although the soul is a reality, other things, appearing as real in our apprehensions etc. nevertheless unreal? The Vedāntist argues that the Prapañca has no nature of its own just like Silver apprehended in an oyster-shell and the Vedāntist reason, as already pointed out, is that the nature of the Prapañca is indescribable. The Jāmas contend that the example in the Vedāntist argument does not support the Vedāntist conclusion, for, it is yet to be proved how Silver apprehended in any oyster-shell, is indescribable. The Jāmas next ask the Vedāntist, Is your argument for the unreality of the Prapañca, different from the Prapañca or not different from it? If it be different, is it true? If it be true, then we might say that like it, the Prapañca or the experiential manifold may also be true and real. If it be untrue, is it void, i.e., unsubstantial? Or, has it been stated incorrectly? Or, is its nature indescribable? In the first two cases, your argument does not prove your theory. The third position also is unsupportable inasmuch as your argument stated in words as done by you, cannot be said to be indescribable. The Vedāntist may contend that his argument

does prove his theory, inasmuch as it has a practical validity and as such, is not untrue. To this contention, the Jainas are opposed, and they ask: What is this practical validity of an argument? If it be said that it means that the argument serves well as a working theory, then it may be pointed out that the argument is a real one, which goes against the fundamental position of the Vedāntist that nothing besides Brahma is real. If, on the contrary, the Vedāntist means words by practical validity, if that is to say the Vedāntist contends that his argument is valid so far as the words are concerned, then the Jainas ask. Do words consist in truth? If so, you admit the reality of some things which are other than Brahma. If, on the contrary, words are essentially untruths, how can you say that they establish at least the practical validity of something? The Vedāntist may point out: Counterfeit coins serve the purposes of purchase and sale as effectively as good coins; in the same manner an argument although essentially unreal may, for practical purposes, be treated as real. To this, the Jainas reply that in that case, the argument is admittedly invalid and all the above mentioned difficulties connected with an unreal argument completely weaken it. For all these reasons the Vedāntist cannot consistently maintain that his argument is different from the Prapañca or the experiential manifold. Nor can he contend that his argument is identical in nature with the Prapañca, for, in that case, it would be unreal like the Prapañca and as such, it would be incompetent to prove the Vedāntist's theory.

The Jainas thus show that the Vedāntist has failed to prove that the Prapañca or the experiential

manifold is unreal. Accordingly, how can the Vedāntist contend that the Brahma is the only reality and there is no object outside of and external to it?

स्वस्य व्यवसायः स्वामिमुख्येन प्रकाशनं बाह्यस्येव
तदामिमुख्येन, करिकलभकमहमात्मना जानामि ॥ १६ ॥

*svasya vyavasāyah svābhimukhyena prakāśanam
bāhyasyeva tad ābhimukhyena, karikalabhakam aham
ātmanā jānāmi* | 16 |

TRANSLATION: The certain knowledge of the Self consists in the clear illumination of the Self, just as that of the outside thing, in that of the outside thing I know the young elephant along with myself.

NOTES: This Sūtra indicates that the Self is knowable just as any outside object. The Self, knowledge or the knowing process is as much knowable as any outside object, e g, a young elephant which is before the knower as an outside object of his knowledge.

कः खलु ज्ञानस्यालम्बनं बाह्यं प्रतिभातमभिमन्यमान-
स्तदपि तत्प्रकारं नाभिमन्येत मिहिरालोकवत् ॥ १७ ॥

*kaḥ khalu jñānasyālambanam bāhyam pratibhātam
ābhimanyamānas tad api tat-prakāraṁ nābhimanyeta
mihir alokavat* | 17 |

TRANSLATION. Admitting that the outside (object) as the object of knowledge is knowable, who will not admit that like the sun-light—knowledge itself as knowable too?

NOTES: The sun-light which reveals mountains, cities and forests etc. is admittedly self-revealing. In

the same manner it is to be admitted that knowledge which reveals all objects, e. g., a pitcher etc. is itself self-revealing. The knowing process is an operation, of which the knower is conscious, knowledge is self-conscious

The thinkers of the Bhatta school, however, refuse to admit that knowledge is directly self-conscious. They argue that if knowledge were conscious of itself, then that would mean that the knowing process while serving as a means of knowing the outside objects presents itself also as an object to it: this presenting itself on the part of the knowing process as an object involves conflict in its operation (*kriyā-virodha*); hence it is reasonable to suppose that the knowledge of the knowing process itself is not direct but indirect (*Parokṣa*).

The Jaina philosophers criticise the above Mīmāṃsā view in the following way. They ask. what is the conflict in the knowing process in the case of its direct self-consciousness? Do you mean to say that there would be conflict in the knowing process if it is held to generate its consciousness of itself? Well, we do not say that the knowing process generates its self-consciousness. Or do you mean to say that the self-consciousness of knowledge involves a conflict within the knowledge itself? This cannot be, for, just as the light in a lamp when generated is generated with the characteristic of illumination, knowledge also, when generated, is generated along with its nature of self-consciousness. The Mīmāṃsakas contend that light may be admitted to be generated with the characteristic of illuminating the things outside it but that this does not necessarily mean that it illuminates itself. The Jainas expose the hollowness of the Mīmāṃsā

contention by asking, what then is the case? Is light which reveals other things to remain unrevealed? Or does light require another light to reveal itself? The first case is negatived by our experience. The second also is so, besides, in the second case there is the danger of infinite regression (every other-revealing light requiring another light for revealing itself). The Mīmāṃsākas point out that light is generated with its nature of illuminating brightness (*prakāśa*) and hence it appears to be bright by itself; it does not do the act of brightening it (illuminating itself), it is bright by its nature, accordingly it is never wrong to say that light does not reveal itself. The Jainas answer: We also never say that knowledge does the act of revealing itself; the knowing process is self-conscious by its nature. The Mīmāṃsākas may point out. The light (in the lamp) as a whole (*avayavi*) has parts (*avayava*) which illuminate it, the lamp-light is thus not self-illuminating. But then the question is: How are those parts illuminated? If it be said that the light as a whole illuminates the parts, then it turns out that illumination is assistance rendered by the light-whole and the light-parts in generating the knowledge of each other. Now, if illumination thus consists in such assistance the question arises. Do the light-whole and the light-parts render the said assistance, being themselves known (by the perceiver) or being themselves unknown? The latter cannot be the case, for in that case, a light which is itself unknown and unperceived would illuminate the things round about it. In the former case, there is the fallacy of mutual dependence, for it comes to this that the light-parts being themselves perceived, make the perception of the

light-whole possible and the light-whole being itself perceived makes the perception of the light-parts possible. The Mīmāṃsakas may try to avoid this fallacy by contending that each of these light-parts is itself a light-whole having its own minuter parts, which minuter parts make the perception of their light-whole possible; but, obviously, this Mīmāṃsaka contention involves 'infinite regression' (for, the minuter light-parts are to be held to be perceptible through their still minuter parts and so on). To avoid this Anavasthā or 'infinite regression', if the Mīmāṃsakas admit that the most ultimate light-parts are themselves self-revealing, the Jainas ask. Why then do you not admit that like those ultimate light-parts, knowledge is directly self-revealing?

The Jainas next ask: How does knowledge know itself indirectly (*parokṣa*)? To this, the Mīmāṃsaka reply is: By Arthāpatti or 'necessary implication', which is in this way, it is found that the Artha or the object of knowledge is made clear to the knower by the knowing process; now, this 'clarification-of-the-object' (*arthapratīkātya*) is impossible unless the knowing process is supposed to be cognisable by the knower. The Jainas criticise this Mīmāṃsaka theory in this way: What is this 'clarification of the object'? Is it a function of the soul? or, of cognition? Or, of the object? The first of the alternatives is against the fundamental principle of Prabhākara philosophy. The second alternative also cannot be pressed by the Mīmāṃsaka. Jñāna or knowledge, according to them, is momentary and is lost as soon as it originates. The clarification-of-the-object is a later event so that it cannot be connected with the previous knowing

process. The third alternative is also unacceptable; if clarification-of-the-object is due to the object, then an object which is clear to Caitra would have been clear to Maitra as well at the same time. Besides, the question is: Is the clarification-of-the-object, which has been premised to be the function of the object, an unconscious (*jada*) function or a conscious (*cidiṅpa*) one? If it is an unconscious process, how is the object apprehended? The clarification-of-the-object certainly involves a conscious apprehension of the object but how is it possible if the clarification itself is an unconscious process? Pramāṇa again is clear knowledge about an object but how would the Pramāṇa clarify it if clarification be held to be an unconscious process? If, again, the clarification of the object (which has been premised to be the function of the object) be a conscious process, the question is. Is it self-conscious, i. e., conscious by itself or is it cognised by another mode of cognition? The Mīmāṃsakas, we have seen, could not hold knowledge to be self-conscious, on the ground that it would mean conflict within the process of cognition; accordingly, it is impossible for them to maintain that the clarification is a self-conscious process, as in that case their own contention about the conflict (within the process of clarification) would stare them in the face. Nor can they say that clarification is cognised by another cognition. For, how would this second cognition know the clarifying process? How long does the clarification last, so that it may be known by another cognition? You cannot say that the clarification or the clear knowledge of the object lasts as long as the object is there. One sees an object and then shuts

the eyes. When he saw the object, the object, let us suppose, was clear to him. But when he shuts his eyes, the object is still there, yet it is no longer clear to him. Nor can it be said that the clear knowledge lasts so long as there is the operation of the sense-organ in connection with object. The operation of the sense-organ gives us only an apprehension of the object; it has nothing to do with the clear knowledge about it. If, lastly, it be maintained that the clear knowledge about a thing lasts only for a moment, then it goes without saying that such an evanescent cognition cannot be cognised by any succeeding cognition. Hence it is that the process of the clarification-of-the-object is unknowable on Mīmāṃsaka premises and presuppositions

Accordingly, the Mīmāṃsā contention that cognition is cognisable not directly but by the 'necessary implication' of the process of the clarification-of-the-object falls to the ground

The philosophers of the Yauga School also contend that knowledge is not self-revealing. Their argument put in a syllogistic form is as follows. A mode of knowledge is revealed by some (mode), other than itself; because it being other than God's knowledge, is an 'object to-be-known or determined (*prameya*)', that which is so, is so, as for instance, a pitcher; it is so, hence it is so. A mode of knowledge is never cognised in and by itself; it is cognised by the mental perception (*manasa-pratyakṣa*) which follows it immediately and which belongs to the same cognising subject. Cognition in itself is concerned with the object of knowledge, its business is solely to acquaint the knower with the object. The cognition of cognition,

however, arises only where the nature of the objective cognition is enquired into.

The Jainas on the contrary, put forward the argument: "Our cognition is a directly self-conscious process; because it is cognition like God's knowledge." It cannot be said that the Jainas deny the existence of God and as such are not justified in calling to their aid the instance of God's knowledge. What the Jainas deny is the existence of a world-creating God. They, however, admit the existence of an all-knowing, supremely-perfect being, whom they look upon as God

The Jainas next criticise the argument of the Yauga School in the following way. First of all, they point out that according to the thinkers of the Yauga School, the divine knowledge being directly self-conscious and self-revealing is never an object-to-be-known; it is thus not an object-to-be-determined (*aprameya*) Further, according to these philosophers, besides the divine knowledge, there is no other self-conscious knowledge which is *Aprameya*. This being the case, for the purposes of the argument of the Yauga School it is enough to state the reason (*hetu*) as 'because it is other than God's knowledge'. That part of the reason (*hetu*) in the Yauga argument which states 'because it is *Prameya*' is clearly useless (*vyartha viśeṣya*).

The Jainas next point out how the reason (*hetu*) in the Yauga argument is unconnected (*apiyojaka*) with what is to be proved by it. To prove that something is never self-revealing but is revealed by something other than it—it is not relevant to state the reason (*hetu*) as 'because it, being other than God's know-

ledge, is a Prameya". The Hetu which is competent for the purposes of the conclusion here is "because it is characterised by unconsciousness". Only unconscious object cannot be self-revealing, and it is always revealed by something other than it.

The implication of the Jaina criticism is that although our knowledge is different from God's knowledge, it is directly self-conscious. An unconscious object is dependent on something other than it for its revelation. Knowledge, on the contrary, is self-revealing. The contention of the Yauga School,—Knowledge is revealed not by itself but by something other than it,—would have been proved if knowledge were an unconscious process. But as the Yauga thinkers, to prove their theory,—'knowledge is revealed not by itself but by something other than it,—state their 'reason' (*hetu*) not as "because it is unconscious" (which, as shown above, is the only competent Hetu) but as "because it being other than God's knowledge is a Prameya",—their reason (*hetu*) is unconnected (*aprayojaka*) with what they want to prove.

It has been stated above that according to the Yauga philosophers, we have at first the cognition of objects and thereafter, when we reflect about this cognition we have a cognition of this cognition. The Jainas, however, point out that we never feel such an interval between a cognition and the cognition of this cognition. The Yauga thinkers contend that there is of course the interval but that owing to its extreme shortness it may not be felt. The Jainas point out that if an enquiry (*jijñāsa*) about the nature of a cognition stood between the cognition and the cognition of that cognition,—as contended by the Yauga

thinkers,—the interval between them cannot be so short as to be incapable of being felt. As a matter of fact, it is not the *Jijñāsa* that causes the cognition of a cognition. In many cases, on proper occasions, a cognition is immediately cognised without the intervention of the *Jijñāsa*. The *Yauga* philosophers contend that there is no harm in supposing that an introspective knowledge is always the result of retrospective reflection. The *Jainas* refute this contention by pointing out that in that case there would be no further cognition of objects for a self-conscious man; for after he has the first cognition of an object he cognises this cognition and in the next moment he cognises that cognition of cognition and in the next moment he cognises that cognition of cognition and so on,—having no opportunity for cognising the outside objects.

ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयाव्यभिचारित्वं प्रामाण्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

jñānasya prameyāvyabhicāritvam prāmāṇyam | 18 |

TRANSLATION· The validity of knowledge consists in its agreement with the knowable (i. e., the object which is to be determined).

NOTES· To represent the exact nature of its object is the nature of knowledge when it is *Pramāṇa*, i. e., valid knowledge.

तदितरत्त्वाप्रामाण्यम् ॥ १९ ॥

tad-itarat tvāprāmāṇyam | 19 |

TRANSLATION: The invalidity of knowledge consists in the opposite of that (i. e., difference with the object of knowledge).

NOTES: What makes a thing appear differently from what it really is, is not a Pramāṇa or valid knowledge. It should be noted here that the object of invalid knowledge must always be an external object. Because one's own Self cannot be said to be apprehended differently from what it is, to himself. Hence it may be safely said that all knowledge with regard to the self is valid and never fallacious; but with regard to an external object, some modes of cognition are correct and some fallacious.

तदुभयमुत्पत्तौ परत एव, ज्ञप्तौ तु स्वतः

परतश्च ॥ २० ॥

tad ubhayam utpattau parata eva, jñaptau tu svataḥ paratas ca । 20 ।

TRANSLATION: With respect to their origination, both of them (i. e., the validity and the invalidity of knowledge) are due to the other (i. e., something other than itself) while their consciousness is due to itself and the other.

NOTES: There are Gunas and Dosas, i. e., clarifying and mystifying attributes or aspects in the factors that cause the origin of a mode of knowledge. Where the knowledge-causing factors are good, we have the Pramāṇa or valid knowledge. Where however, these factors are faulty, we have the Apramāṇa or invalid

knowledge The validity and the invalidity of knowledge are thus dependent on the other, i. e., something other than the knowledge itself, viz., on the goodness or the badness of the factors that cause knowledge

But the consciousness that we have valid knowledge or otherwise is sometimes due to the knowledge itself and sometimes to factors, other than it Where from the observation of the same phenomenon, the same knowledge arises too often we have an intuitive consciousness, i. e., a self-consciousness that we have the *Pramāna* or valid knowledge But where the same phenomenon is observed and at each time, the knowledge is varying, we come to have an intuitive consciousness that we have *Apramāna* or invalid knowledge It is thus that where the observation of a phenomenon is repeated many times (*abhyāsa-daśā*) the consciousness comes of itself whether we have the *Pramāna* or the *Apramāna*. In such cases, the *Pramāna*-hood or otherwise is forced on our consciousness as it were, and we have not to examine the grounds on which the *Pramāna*-hood or otherwise might be based But in the case where the observation of a matter cannot be repeated (*anabhyāsa-daśā*) we have to examine the evidence and the aspects of the phenomenon under observation and other relevant things before we can have the consciousness that we have the valid knowledge or otherwise; here such consciousness is not intuitive but is dependent on factors other than the knowledge itself.

The *Mīmāṃsā* School of thinkers, on the contrary, contend that it is the knowledge itself which is responsible for its *Pramāna*-hood or validity They criticise the above Jaina view by asking. How are we

to know the Gunas in the factors (which are other than the self) that generate valid knowledge? If you say that these Gunas are known by Pratyaksa or direct apprehension, then the question is Is this direct perception sensuous or supersensuous? Let us examine the first position. The sense-organs are admittedly the main factors (other than the self) which cause the genesis of knowledge so that according to you, when there are Gunas in the sense-organs, there arises the valid knowledge. But the sense-organs themselves are supersensuous; so that the Gunas located in them must be supersensuous also and hence the alleged Gunas in the knowledge-originating factors cannot be perceived by our sensuous apprehension. To say, on the other hand, that the Gunas are known by supersensuous perception is assertion only; it is not proving it and as such, it cannot be accepted by reasoning people. If it be said that the Gunas are known by Anumāna or inference, then the question is: How is the Niyama or the general proposition connecting the Gunas which are the proven here with the observed facts, i.e., the Hetu or the reason, known? For, without the knowledge of this Niyama or the general proposition an inference is impossible. Now, a knowledge of the Niyama or the invariable relationship between two facts is impossible unless the two related facts are first known. It has already been shown that one part of the related facts, viz., the Gunas are not perceivable by the senses. It follows therefore that the Niyama or the invariable relationship cannot be a matter of the Pratyaksa or direct perception. It can neither be said that the Niyama is known by Anumāna or inference. For, if it be held

that the very same inference which yields the knowledge of the Gunas yields thereby the knowledge of the Niyama, there arises the fallacy of the mutual dependence; and if, on the contrary, it be held that some other inference establishes the Niyama, then there arises the fallacy of the 'infinite regression'. It is thus that there are no Gunas and that valid knowledge arising from the knowledge-generating factors in their natural state is never dependent on anything other than itself

As regards the Jainā theory that the consciousness of the validity of knowledge is sometimes due to Para or some factors different from the knowledge itself, the Mīmāṃsā thinkers criticise it by asking: To what is this consciousness due: a knowledge of the Gunas or good qualities in the factors that cause the knowledge or a knowledge that there is nothing contradicting the knowledge, or a knowledge of something which is consistent with the knowledge? The first position, Kāraṇa-guna-jñāna, cannot be maintained, because it has been already shown that Gunas in knowledge-causing factors cannot be known. As regards the second position, Bādhakabhāva-jñāna, the question is: What is this Bādhaka or matter contradicting the knowledge in question, a cognition of the want of which, gives rise to the consciousness that the knowledge in question is valid? If the Bādhaka be a matter contemporaneous with the knowledge in question, then, the distinction between false knowledge and valid knowledge practically vanishes; for, in all mistaken apprehensions there is for the time being the consciousness that we have right knowledge i.e., the consciousness that there is nothing which

contradicts it. If, on the contrary, the Bādhaka is to mean matters of all times which contradict the knowledge in question, then a knowledge of the want of such Bādhakas is clearly impossible, for, no one can have a knowledge of all things present, past and future, which contradict or which may contradict a particular given knowledge. The Mīmāṃsā thinkers refute the third position, Saṃvādi-vedanā, also by asking: Does the allied and consistent knowledge, co-operate (*sahakarī*) with the knowledge in question or does it grasp (*grāhaka*) the latter? The first alternative is impossible because the knowledge that is consistent with the given knowledge is different from the latter in time and as such, cannot co-operate with it. With respect to the second alternative, three problems arise, each of which is absurd. The first of the questions is: Does 'the consistent knowledge' know or grasp the knowledge in question? This cannot be because the latter knowledge vanishes before it can be known by any knowledge consistent with it. Does 'the consistent knowledge' then know the object of the knowledge in question? It is well known how one and the same object is often apprehended differently in different moments or series of cognition, so that it is never safe to hold that two cognitions have the self-same matter as their object. Thirdly, does, then, 'the consistent knowledge' consist in a knowledge of 'the practical efficiency' (*artha-kriyā-jñāna*) or in some other forms of knowledge? The first position is unacceptable. The original knowledge, i.e., the knowledge in question must first be known to be valid before the knowledge about the practical utility of its object can arise, because unless we first know

that we have correct knowledge, we cannot have an urge (*pravṛtti*) for knowing the practical utility of the object of our knowledge. The position thus involves the following 'circular reasoning'. From 'the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge' arises 'the urge (*pravṛtti*)', from 'the urge' arises 'the knowledge of the practical efficiency (*artha-kriyājñāna*)'; from 'the knowledge of the 'practical efficiency' arises the knowledge of 'the validity of the knowledge' (*pramāṇa-mūlca*). Further, how is the validity of the knowledge of the practical efficiency known? If it be said that it is known from another knowledge of the practical efficiency, then the position leads to 'infinite regression'; if it be said that it is known from the given original knowledge itself, then the position involves 'mutual dependence'. If it be said that the validity of the knowledge of the practical efficiency is known from the knowledge of the practical efficiency itself, why then do you not admit that the validity of a given knowledge is known from the knowledge itself? If, lastly, it be contended that 'the consistent knowledge' consists in some forms of cognition other than the knowledge of the practical efficiency, it may be pointed out that in that case the 'consistent knowledge' is either similar to or different from the given original knowledge. In the case of the first alternative, it should be noted that an experience of a similar need not always show that another experience is valid. Observation of water in a river does not prove that one's experience of water in a desert mirage was an experience of truth. If, on the other hand, 'the consistent knowledge' be different from the given knowledge, the former cannot be said to be

consistent with the latter. It is thus that the Mīmāṃsā thinkers establish that 'the validity of knowledge' is known from the knowledge itself and that this knowledge of the validity of a knowledge is never due to any factor outside the given knowledge.

As regards 'the invalidity of knowledge', the Mīmāṃsaakas maintain, it is due to Dosa or fault in the generating factors. They hold also that 'the knowledge of the invalidity of a knowledge' is dependent on a cognition of the Bādhaka. According to the followers of Jaimini, 'the invalidity of knowledge' as well as 'the knowledge of the invalidity of a knowledge' are both dependent on Para, i. e., facts and factors other than the given knowledge itself.

To the above criticism, the Jainas reply as follows: If, as the Mīmāṃsakas admit, the Dosas are real and can be known, there is no reason why the Gunas should not be real and cognisable in a like manner. If it be said that the Dosas or defects located in the sense-organs are sense-perceived as real, it may be said that the Gunas also so located may be sense-perceived as real. If it be objected that Gunas are not real but are only the absence of the Dosas and as such are not perceivable by the senses,—there is the danger of the same line of argument being turned against the contention; it may be urged that the Dosas are but the unreal absences of the Gunas. Even if the Gunas be held to be absence of the Dosas, they are not wholly unsubstantial and unreal; for Bhaṭṭa, the great Mīmāṃsā thinker, has clearly admitted that Abhāva or absence is not Tuccha or totally unreal. If, then it be admitted that the Gunas are not unreal the theory of the Jainas that 'the validity of knowledge

is dependent on the Para (i. e., the Guṇas in the knowledge generating factors) is practically accepted. The Mīmāṃsakas next contend that supposing the Guṇas to be real, they cannot be directly perceived, as the senses in which they inhere being supersensuous, the Guṇas also are supersensuous. The Mīmāṃsā thinkers point out that when we say that some Guṇas in the senses are perceived, we are to understand that only some superficial Guṇas in the peripheral part of a sense-organ are perceived. But a real sense is supersensuous; it is not the gross periphery. Accordingly, the real Guṇas inhering in the real sense-organs are imperceptible. The Jainas set aside this argument of the Mīmāṃsā School by urging that a similar line of argument would show that the real Dosas inhering in the real sense-organs are imperceptible—which is against the Mīmāṃsā contention. The thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā School next put forward the following argument for the inference that it is the Dosas that are real and operative in the matter of the genesis of an invalid knowledge. The factors that operate in the genesis of cognition are only sufficient for the genesis of bare cognition, they do not explain why a cognition can be invalid; for the purposes of the genesis of an invalid knowledge some factors over and above the factors which generate mere cognition must be supposed to operate; these additional factors are the Dosas which are thus real. The Jainas point out that an exactly similar line of argument would show that in the matter of the genesis of valid knowledge, Guṇas must be supposed to be real and operative. The Jainas in this way set aside the Mīmāṃsā contention that valid knowledge is due to the generating factors

of knowledge only and establish that it is due to the Para, i e., Gunas or good attributes inherent in those factors.

The Jainas next answer the Mīmāṃsā criticism that 'the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge' is never due to Para or factors other than the knowledge itself, in the following way. The Jaina philosophers maintain that 'the knowledge of the validity of a given knowledge' arises from Samvādi Vedanā or knowledge of something which is consistent with the given knowledge. They hold that Kāraṇa-guṇa-jñāna, i. e., the knowledge of the Gunas or good qualities inherent in the knowledge-causing factors and Bādhakābhāva-jñāna or the knowledge that there is nothing contradicting the given knowledge are included in Samvādi-Vedanā. The Samvādi-Vedanā or consistent knowledge consists in a knowledge of the form: 'The object of the present knowledge is apprehended to be similar to that of the (given) previous knowledge. Such Samvādi-Vedanā gives us the knowledge that the given previous knowledge is valid. The Kāraṇa-guṇa-jñāna is possible, because, as shown already, Gunas like Dosas are real and knowable. Such Kāraṇa-guṇa-jñāna gives us the knowledge that our given knowledge is valid. The Mīmāṃsā contention about the impossibility of the Bādhakābhāva-jñāna is also unsound. When a knowledge arises, there cannot be any other knowledge along with it, contradicting it. Two modes of knowledge, a given knowledge and the knowledge of the Bādhaka or the contradictory, cannot be simultaneous. It is true accordingly that the Bādhakābhāva-jñāna does not refer to any Bādhaka, contemporaneous with the given knowledge. It refers

to the future Bādhaka. In other words, the doctrine of the Bādhakābhāva-jñāna implies that when we come to know that there would be nothing in future which would contradict our present knowledge, we feel that our given knowledge is valid. It is true that we cannot directly perceive future things. But this need not invalidate our inferences about the future. We see, for instance, the rise of the constellation, Kṛttikā, and we infer that the constellation Śakata will rise next: this inference is quite sound. In the same manner, when we come to know the implications of all the circumstances attending a given knowledge and infer that in future there will be nothing contradicting it, we feel that our given knowledge is valid. The next Jaina reply is that the Samvādi-Vedanā or 'the knowledge consistent with the given knowledge' gives us the consciousness of the validity of the given knowledge by grasping either the object of the given knowledge or another matter. A pitcher, for instance, is perceived in a dim light, later on, when the same object is brought into clear and brilliant light, the later perception tells us that our earlier perception of a pitcher was valid. The Mīmāṃsā criticism based on the contention that the same object appears differently in different perceptions is misconceived. Two perceptions of the same object cannot be different; if they appear to be different, closer examination will show that one of them at least was illusory. Then again a determination of a matter different from the object of the given knowledge may sometimes show that the given knowledge was valid. Artha-kriyā-jñāna or 'a knowledge of the practical efficiency' for instance, gives us the knowledge of the validity of a given know-

ledge. The Jainas contend that there is no 'circular reasoning (*cakraka*)' here. For the generation of 'the urge' (*pravṛtti*) the original given knowledge need not be known to be valid at the very beginning. The 'urge' arises from 'the doubt' about the validity of the given knowledge and a consequent desire to determine the validity or otherwise. The Artha-kriyā-jñāna determines it and gives us the knowledge of the validity of a given knowledge. The Jainas point out that the Arthakriyājñāna involves repeated observations (*abhyāsa-daśā*) and is confirmatory of itself. The knowledge of the validity of 'the knowledge of the practical efficiency' arises thus in and from itself. The Mīmāṃsā charge on this point, "let then the knowledge of the validity of the given knowledge be due to the given knowledge itself, like that of the Arthakriyājñāna" is groundless; for, as shown above, the character or an undetermined given knowledge is different from 'the knowledge of the practical efficiency'. The Jainas next point out that the observation of an object different from the object of the given knowledge, when both the objects belong to the same class, sometimes gives us the knowledge that our given knowledge is valid. Even if the two phenomena do not belong to the same class, the experience of one of them may sometimes confirm the knowledge about the other phenomenon. Take, for instance, the following case. We see the form of the colour of a fruit and perceive it to be an orange. Then at night we taste its juice. This taste of the juice,—although an experience of a different phenomenon,—gives us the knowledge that our former Judgment in connection with the experience of the form of the colour, was valid. The

Mīmāṃsā criticism based on the instances of the observations of river-water and water in desert-mirage or on the contention that the experience of different phenomena cannot confirm one another are wrong. For, it is not the Jaina position that every later experience confirms the earlier. The Jainas maintain that when two connected phenomena do not contradict each other, the later experience of one of them is a Samvādaka or confirmatory of the earlier experience of the other. The experience of river-water is not Samvādi-Vedanā in connection with the experience of water in a desert-mirage, because in the later experience there was no experience of water at all. In the same manner, the later experience of a pitcher is not confirmatory of the earlier experience of water; because, as the Jainas point out, the two experiences are wholly unconnected. The Jaina theory is that when two phenomena belong to the same series or context and do not contradict each other, the experience of the later phenomenon is a Samvādi-Vedanā and as such gives us the knowledge that our earlier experience about the other phenomenon was a valid one.

Finally, the Jainas proceed to examine the Mīmāṃsā contention that 'the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge' is also due to itself (*sva*). They ask. What do you mean by '*sva*' or itself? You cannot say that it means the given knowledge, for, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, knowledge is never directly self-conscious, which necessarily implies that it is impossible for knowledge to know its validity, validity being only the Dharma of the knowledge itself. The Jainas point out that the Mīmāṃsā philo-

sophers are thus bound to mean by 'sva', the knowledge which grasps or has for its object something, related to the 'given knowledge'. In other words, the Mīmāṃsaka contention that 'the knowledge of the validity of knowledge' is due to the given knowledge itself can mean only that the knowledge which is consistent with the given knowledge can give rise to the consciousness of the validity of the knowledge, which is exactly the Jaina position. To this interpretation of their theory, the Mīmāṃsakas demur by contending that their theory of 'the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge' being due to the given knowledge itself, means that the validity of a knowledge is known in the same way, in which the given knowledge is known. In criticism of this contention of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jainas remind them that according to the Mīmāṃsā School of thinkers, the process of cognition becomes self-conscious not directly but is indirectly held to be a conscious process, because of the Arthāpatti or implicative reasoning that Artha-prākāṣya or the clarification of the object of cognition would otherwise be inexplicable. Now, the question is: What is this 'clarification of the object'? If it means the revelation of the true nature of the object, we ask: How is this true nature of the object known? You cannot say that the true nature of the object becomes clear when the knowledge of the object is known to be valid; for, this would involve 'mutual dependence' thus; 'the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge' arises from the clarification of the true nature of the object' and from 'the clarification of the true nature of the object' arises 'the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge'. Nor

can it be said that the true nature of the object becomes clear owing to some other valid knowledge; for, this would involve 'infinite regression'. The Mīmāṃsakas may contend that the knowledge of the true nature of the object of cognition arises from the knowledge itself, that the knowledge of the true nature of the object gives rise to the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge, and that in this way the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge is due to the given knowledge itself. The Jainas, however, point out that a similar line of argument would show that the knowledge of the invalidity of a knowledge also is due to the given knowledge itself, which is against the Mīmāṃsā theory. If it be said by the Mīmāṃsakas that the knowledge of the invalidity of a knowledge is due to the knowledge of the Bādhaka and not to the knowledge itself, it may be urged against them that the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge is due to the knowledge of the Sāmhādaka. If, lastly, by Artha-prākāṣya is meant (not the apprehension of the true nature but) simply the apprehension of the true nature of the object of cognition then it is clear that such Artha-prākāṣya need not give us the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge only but also the knowledge of its invalidity which is against the Mīmāṃsā position.

The Mīmāṃsā theories are thus beset with difficulties; and the Jaina theories, as indicated in the Sūtra under comment, are perfectly sound.

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालङ्कारे प्रमाणस्वरूपनिर्णयो

नाम प्रथमःपरिच्छेदः ॥ १ ॥

*iti pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāre pramāṇa-sva-
rūpa-nirṇayo nāma prathamah paricchedah* ।

TRANSLATION: Here ends the first Chapter of the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, entitled: The Determination of the Nature of the *Pramāṇa* (or the Complete Valid Knowledge). '

CHAPTER II

तद् द्विभेदं प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च ॥ १ ॥

tad dvi-bhedam pratyaksam ca paroksam ca ॥ १ ॥

TRANSLATION: That is of two kinds. Direct (lit. Sensuous) and Indirect (lit. Unsensuous)1.

COMMENTARY: The sensuous cognition is the Pratyaksa. The word Pratyaksa may be derived either from the word, *aksī* which means the Eye or from the word *aksa* which means the sense. Those who derive the word Pratyaksa from *aksī*, point out that although in that case the Pratyaksa would primarily mean only the visual perception, it would by implication include all sensuous perceptions which are *spṛṣṭa* or clear. They contend that we must widen the scope of the Pratyaksa, even if we derive the word from *aksa*, i.e., a sense-organ; for, the Pratyaksa means not only all sensuous perceptions but includes also the *anīndriya pratyaksa*, i.e., apprehensions which are mental. The Jainas, however, prefer to derive the word Pratyaksa from *aksa*.

The Paroksa is cognition which is not dependent on the active functioning of any peripheral sense-organ but which arises only from the operation of the Manas or the mind

Both the Pramānas, the Pratyaksa and the Paroksa, are equally potent to lead us to truth. It is not proper to look upon the former a better and a more reliable source of valid knowledge.

The above Jaina division of the Pramānas into two only is objected to by various Schools of thinkers. According to the Cārvākas, for example, there is only one source of correct knowledge and that is the Pratyakṣa or the sensuous perception. On the other hand, the thinkers of the orthodox Schools variously lay down nine Pramānas which are: The Pratyakṣa, the Anumāna, the Āgama, the Upamāna, the Arthāpatti, the Abhāva, the Sambhava, the Aitiḥya and the Prātibha. The Jainas point out that the Anumāna or Inference will, in the proper place, be defended as a mode of valid knowledge, so that the Cārvāka position is not maintainable. As regards the alleged other sources of valid knowledge, the Jainas contend that in the two broad classes, viz., the Pratyakṣa and the Parokṣa, such of those as are really valid sources of knowledge will be found to be included.

It will be shown how the Anumāna or Inference and the Āgama or Authoritative knowledge are the Parokṣa, i.e., indirect and unsensuous knowledge

Upamāna is thus characterised by the thinkers of the Nyāya School. A servant was told by his master, 'Bring a Gavaya'. He did not know which object was signified by the word, 'Gavaya'. Accordingly he asked a forester 'What-like is a Gavaya?' 'A Gavaya is similar to a Cow', replied the forester. This instruction enabled the servant to recognise a Gavaya in the forest. Now, Upamāna is knowledge about the similarity of an object to another object which results from the recollection of the meaning of instructive words from a competent person and which brings about such forms of cognition as, 'That is the object signified by the word, Gavaya', The Mīmāṃsā account

of Upamāna is slightly different. According to this School it is such: A certain man knew what a Cow was but not what a Gavaya was. Moreover, he had not the information, 'A Gavaya is like a Cow'. Now, when he was roaming in a dense forest he saw for the first time a Gavaya. At the sight of this, there arises in him a knowledge of similarity with regard to the cow which is not present before him at the time, of the form: 'That cow is similar to this or that there is similarity of that cow to this'. Such knowledge is Upamāna, which thus consists in a cognition, either of a recollected object qualified with the fact of similarity or of the fact of similarity attributed to that object. It will be shown hereafter that Upamāna comes under Pratyabhijñā, a mode of the Paroksa Pramāṇa.

The Pramāṇa called the Arthāpatti is, according to the Jainas, included in the Anumāna or Inference. They ask: Does the fact raising 'the necessary presumption' (*arthāpatti-utthāpaka-artha*, viz., the fact of Devadatta's fatness coupled with the fact of his not eating during the day-time) imply 'the fact presumed' (*adrstārtha*, viz., the fact of Devadatta's eating at night) by being known or determined as 'otherwise-inexplicable' (i.e., without the presumption of Devadatta's fatness) or does it do so without being so known or determined? The latter cannot be the case; for, if the former fact (i.e., Devadatta's fatness) be not known as 'otherwise-inexplicable' (i.e., without the fact of Devadatta's eating at night), the necessary presumption cannot arise. Now, if the former fact be known to be as 'otherwise inexplicable', the question is: How is this 'inexplicability-otherwise' (Any *arthanupapādyā-*

mānatva) determined? If you say that by Arthāpatti or necessary presumption this 'inexplicability—otherwise' is known, there arises the fallacy of 'mutual dependence' in this way: A fact known to be 'otherwise inexplicable', raises 'the necessary presumption', 'the necessary presumption' again determines or makes to us known the fact that the given fact is 'otherwise-inexplicable'. If, on the contrary, it be said that this 'inexplicability—otherwise' is known through other sources of knowledge the Jainas ask, what are these sources? If it be said that 'repeated observation' (*bhūyodarśana*) gives this knowledge, then the question is: What is actually the matter of your observation? If you say that in 'the abode of the proven' (*sādhya-dharmī*, i.e., Devadatta himself), you had the experience of this 'inexplicability—otherwise', then obviously the Arthāpatti or the necessary presumption is useless; because your actual experience had already the matter of the presumption as its matter (that is to say, the question of any presumption does not arise as it was already your experience that Devadatta eats at night); if, on the contrary, it be held, that one has this experience of 'the inexplicability otherwise' in 'the instances' (*distanta-dharmī*, i. e., instances where fatness, coupled with not eating at the day time and eating at night are found) the question may be asked: Is 'the repeated observation' of these instances competent to establish 'the inexplicability—otherwise' in 'the abode of the proven' or is it not? (That is to say does observation of instances establish that Devadatta must have been eating at night?). If it does not, then such 'repeated observation' is obviously useless, so far as the 'necessary presump-

tion' is concerned. If it does, then it is clear that there is no difference between the fact, raising 'the necessary presumption' and 'the reason' or 'the mark' (Linga or Hetu) in an Inference (In other words, Arthāpatti becomes identical with Anumāna). The opponent (i e., the Mīmāṃsā philosopher) may urge here that not 'the repeated observation' but 'non-experience in the opposite' (*vipakṣānupalambha*) gives us this knowledge of 'the inexplicability otherwise' (That is to say, it may be contended that our knowledge of the fact that fatness coupled with the fact of his not eating at the day time cannot be explained without the fact of his eating at night is due to our negative experience that one who does not eat at night is not fat without eating at the day time). The Jainas examine this contention by asking: Does this negative experience (i e., no eating at night and so fatness for a person who does not eat at the day time) necessarily give rise to the knowledge of the 'inexplicability-otherwise'? If it does not, then Arthāpatti is not always a safe and reliable source of valid knowledge. If it does, Arthāpatti becomes a mode of Anumāna which is based on a sure knowledge (*niscita*) of 'the impossibility otherwise' (*anyathānupapatti*). It cannot be said that the difference between an Anumāna and an Arthāpatti lies in the fact that whereas in an Anumāna e g., 'The Hill is fiery because it smokes', you have always 'a mark' (e. g. 'smoke') which abides in 'the abode' (e. g. hill), an Arthāpatti is devoid of such 'a mark'. For, there may be an Anumāna in which 'the mark' may not abide in 'the abode'. This is admitted by Bhatta himself when he said. "The Inference about the Brāhmaṇa-hood of a son from

the Brāhmaṇa-hood of his father is admitted to be valid by all, although it does not depend on 'mark' abiding in 'an abode'".

The Pramāṇa called the Abhāva, i.e., the cognition of non-existence consists in non-genesis (*anutpatti*) of perception etc. We have it when the self (*ātma*) ceases to be modified as a knower of things (*aparivṛtā*) or when we have the cognition of the non-existence of a thing. According to the Jainas, the Abhāva is not an independent source of knowledge but is included in the other recognised Pramāṇas such as the Pratyakṣa. On analysis, it will be found that when we have the positive apprehension of thing (e. g., a spot of land) and we recollect another thing (e. g., a pitcher) which is not there but was connected with it some time ago, there arises in us a cognition of non-existence, a cognition which is internal (*mānasa*) and independent of the senses. Such being the data from which the Abhāva-Pramāṇa arises, the Jainas ask. When we have the positive perception of the spot of land, is it perceived as related to the pitcher or as unrelated to it in order that a cognition of non-existence may arise? The first cannot be the case; for, if the spot is perceived as something related to the pitcher, the Abhāva-Pramāṇa which has for its object the non-existence of the pitcher and which is thus opposed to the positive perception cannot then have any occasion or tendency to arise, even if it be supposed to have a tendency to arise it is no Pramāṇa then, because at that time there is the positive idea of the pitcher, and the Abhāva-Pramāṇa instead of representing it, has for its object something different. If, on the contrary, it be supposed that when we have the positive per-

ception of the spot of land, it is, for the purposes of the Abhāva-Pramāṇa, perceived as unrelated to the pitcher then the so-called Abhāva-Pramāṇa is redundant, for, the positive perception itself tells us that there is no pitcher there. Some may contend that perception cannot give us the cognition of non-existence, because its object is only the thing itself (e. g., the spot of land) and not the thing either as related to some other thing which is non-existent there at the time (e. g., the pitcher) or as unrelated to it, and therefore, for the purpose of cognising the non-existence of a thing some other Pramāṇa, viz., the Abhāva-Pramāṇa, is necessary. The Jainas point out that the basis of these thinkers' contention is unwarranted. When you perceive a thing, you must perceive it either as related to another thing or as unrelated to it, and it has been shown how in either case the supposition of the Abhāva, as an independent Pramāṇa, is uncalled for. The Jainas maintain that a thing is existent (in some respects) and non-existent (in some respects) and that perception grasps it in both its aspects, so that non-existence is within the scope and purview of perception. We need not admit the Abhāva as an independent source of knowledge. Perception can give us the knowledge of non-existence, as shown above by the Jainas. They contend further that it is recollection (*smarana*) which sometimes gives us the cognition of non-existence of the form, 'that spot of land had no pitcher in it'. Where again we say 'this is that self-same spot of land which had no pitcher in it', our assertion is based on a cognition of non-existence by assimilation (*pratyabhijñā*). Our statement, 'whatever has no fire in it,

has no smoke in it' is based on a cognition of non-existence by induction (*tarka*). An instance of the cognition of non-existence by inference (*anumāna*) is the reasoning, 'here there is no smoke because there is no fire here'. The realisation of non-existence is due to an authoritative instruction (*āgama*) when one is told 'Garga is not at home'. It is thus the recognised sources of valid knowledge variously yield the cognition of non-existence and the Abhāva as an independent Pramāna need not consequently be admitted

The alleged Pramāna called the Sambhava is a knowledge of a part from the knowledge of the whole such as 'in Khārī (a greater measure), there is Drona (a lesser measure)'. The Jainas contend that the Sambhava is not different from Anumāna. The foregoing instance of the Sambhava may be recast into a syllogism like this, 'Khārī has Drona; because it is Khārī; like the Khārīs which were experienced before'.

The alleged Pramāna, called the Aitiḥya, consists in persistent traditions, such as 'in this banian tree, there lives a Yakṣa'. The Jainas say that the Aitiḥya, such as traditional information, is Apramāna or invalid knowledge. We do not know who started the story and that, for what reason. Accordingly, a tradition is often of doubtful validity. Where, however, the source of a tradition is an infallible person, the tradition is certainly reliable, but in that case, the Aitiḥya loses its character as an independent Pramāna and becomes identical with Āpta or authoritative knowledge.

The Prātibha is a source of valid knowledge which does not depend on sense-perceptions or reasoning or

any authoritative information It consists in such sudden and unaccountable pre-sentiments as 'to-day I shall be a favourite of the king'. The Jainas point out that such pre-sentiments, where clear, are certainly due to the operation of the mind, i e., the internal sense and as such, come within the *Mānasa* or internal perception, a mode of the *Pratyaksa*. Where again a person gets some of his desired or undesired objects and out of the gladness or the grief consequent thereon, the pre-sentiments arise, the pre-sentiments are not wholly unaccountable and need not be classed as an independent source of knowledge, viz., the *Prātibha*. Such pre-sentiments are, as a matter of fact, indistinct *Anumānas* or hazy inferences. We have instances of such unclear reasoning in many cases, e. g., from seeing the movements of a series of ants, one predicts that there would be a shower of rain.

It is thus that the *Pramānas* are two and two only, viz., the *Pratyaksa* and the *Paroksa*.

स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ २ ॥

spastam pratyaksam ॥ 2 ॥

TRANSLATION: The Direct is clear.

COMMENTARY: The *Pratyaksa* is characterised by clearness (*spastata* or *vaśadya*), it arises when the *Karmas* called the *Jñānāvaraṇa* (i. e., knowledge-covering) and the *Vīryāntarāya* (i e., power-obstructing) are destroyed

अनुमानाद्याधिक्येन विशेषप्रकाशनं स्पष्टत्वम् ॥ ३ ॥

anumānādy adhikyena viśeṣa-prakāśanam

spastatvam ॥ 3 ॥

TRANSLATION: 'Clearness' consists in revealing the details in a greater degree than that done by Inference etc.

COMMENTARY: The details in an object are colour, form etc., attached to it; and these are known by cognition. The clearness of the Pratyakṣa or direct cognition consists in this that it reveals these details in a greater degree than that done by the Parokṣa or indirect modes of cognition.

तद् द्विप्रकारं सांख्यवहारिकं पारमार्थिकं च ॥ ४ ॥

tad dviprakāraṁ sāṃkhyavahārikam pāramārthi-
kaṁ ca । 4 ।

TRANSLATION: That is of two modes viz., the practical (*sāṃkhyavahārika*) and the transcendental (*pāramārthika*).

COMMENTARY: The Sāṃkhyavahārika or the practical are the ordinary perceptions of ours which are dependent on such non-psychical organs as the peripheral senses etc. They are so called because they are connected with Sāṃkhyavahāra or our inclinations and disinclinations. The Pāramārthika or the Transcendental perceptions on the contrary emerge from the knowing self only and consist in such super-normal apprehensions as the Avadhi or clairvoyance etc.

तत्राद्यं द्विविधमिन्द्रियनिबन्धनमनिन्द्रियनिबन्धनं

च ॥ ५ ॥

tatī adyam dvividham indriya-nibandhanam
anindriya-nibandhanam ca | 5 |

TRANSLATION· The first of them is of two kinds, viz., the Sensuous and the Unsensuous (i e., the Mental or the Internal).

COMMENTARY: The sensuous perception is so called because in its production the peripheral sense organs, e. g., the eye etc., are operative. It may be objected that the sensuous perception is a misnomer inasmuch as in its production not only a peripheral sense organ but also the mind is operative. The Jainas defend the expression, 'sensuous', by pointing out that 'mind' functions in the production of the 'sensuous perceptions' as well as of the 'internal perceptions' and as such, mind is a common factor. In the production of the sense-perceptions the operation of the peripheral sense-organs is the additional and the distinguishing factor and accordingly it is right to call the sensuous perception after that determining element. It is the practice to characterise a thing in reference to the peculiar fact and the uncommon factor. A shoot, for instance, is generated by the application of water, air, heat etc.; still it is customary to say that it is a paddy-shoot, it is a barley-shoot, and so on, characterisation being always with reference to the peculiar factor. The Internal or Mental perceptions are independent of sense-operations and are due to the functioning of the Anindriya or the Manas, i. e., the mind.

In this connection, the question may be discussed whether the sense-organs are Prāpyakāri, i e., whether

they come in contact with the objects in producing perceptions of those objects. The philosophers of the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya Schools maintain that all the five sense-organs are Prāpyakāri. The Tāthāgatas, i. e., the Budhists, on the contrary contend that the sense-organs of vision and of hearing are not Prāpyakāri. The Jaina view is that, save and except the sense of vision, all the other sense-organs come in contact with the objects of perception.

Now, the first theory, i. e., that all the five sense-organs are Prāpyakāri is thus developed. Admittedly the three peripheral sense-organs of smell, touch and taste come in contact with the objects of perception. As regards the visual sense-organ, the orthodox thinkers contend that like the sense-organs of taste, it also generates perception by actually coming in contact with the object of vision. It may be pointed out in objection to this theory that it cannot explain the facts of our visual perceptions of two or many objects at one and the same moment. We may see, for example, a mountain and the moon at one and the same moment. The orthodox thinkers try to explain such senses by saying that here our eyes touch the mountain first and then the moon but that they move so quickly from one object to the other that the perceptions of the two objects seem to be simultaneous. The Jainas criticise this doctrine by asking.-What is the nature of the organ or sight which so comes in contact with its object? The visual sense-organ cannot be the flesh and the gross round eyeball; for, the question is: How is vision effected? Do the eyes go out and touch the objects or do the

objects come in and touch the eyes? Obviously, neither of these alternatives is maintainable. If, on the contrary, the visual sense-organ be supposed to be minute, they must be either formless or very small in extent. If it be formless it must be all-pervading like ether, in which case all the objects of the universe would be simultaneously visible. If, however, the sense of sight be supposed to be very small in its dimension, big objects like buildings, forests etc., would be invisible. To explain away these difficulties, the thinkers of the orthodox Schools contend that the sense of sight is constituted of light and that superfine light-rays shooting forth from the eyes and coming in contact with the objects of vision effect their perception. The Jainas refute this contention by pointing out that nobody has ever seen such light-rays shooting from the eyes. It cannot be said that there are such light-rays but that they are invisible on account of their visibility being inexplicit; for, if as a matter of fact, these rays are invisible, how can it be said that they are light-rays at all? Besides, if the rays are not visible and brilliant, how will the objects be revealed by them? Nor, can it be said that these visual rays become effective by revealing the objects, when there is light outside like the surrounding sunlight. Many creatures like owls etc., roam at night in darkness; yet, no light rays have ever been seen to shoot forth from their eyes; the example of animals like owls who move and pick up worms in darkness, shows also that the functioning of the eyes (i. e., visual perception) is possible in darkness. The orthodox thinkers try to support their theory by referring to the fact that a cat's eyes are found to be bright in darkness, which

means that a cat finds out the rats at night with the help of the light-rays issuing from its eyes. The Jainas admit that a cat's eyes look bright at night but contend that this brightness does not prove that light-rays shoot forth from the eyes. Observation does not show that any rat is illuminated by a cat's eyes. The opponents may argue that the light-rays from the cat's eyes are so subtle that they do not make the rat visible to us. The Jainas meet this argument by saying that in that case these light-rays would be useless to a cat also, so far as the visibility of a rat with their help is concerned. The fact is, as the Jaina thinkers point out, that our visual perception is not due to any light-rays coming out of the eyes and touching the object of our vision but is due to a 'peculiar capacity' (*sva-yogyata*) in the eyes which enables them to see it even in darkness. And if there are no light-rays effecting a contact between the eyes and their object, the visual sense-organ cannot be said to be *Prāpyakāri*. The thinkers of the orthodox School infer that the eyes are *Prāpyakāri*, because they are outer sense-organs (*bāhyendriya*). The Jainas criticise this contention by asking. What do you mean by outer sense-organs? You cannot say that outer organs mean a sense by which outside objects are apprehended. Mind may have very distant things for its objects, yet it is not an outer sense nor *Prāpyakāri*. Neither can it be said that an outer sense is the organ which is generated by causes external to the soul, for, mind is made of *Pudgala* (matter) which is foreign to the self and yet, it is not an outer sense on that account. Lastly, it cannot be contended that an outer sense is the sense which is located outside. For,

what does location outside mean? It cannot mean inherence in the object of perception: for the Jainas do not admit that a sense-organ, e g., the tongue, inheres in, i. e., is essentially dependent on the object, e. g., the object tasted. Nor can inherence in the object mean the tendency towards the object (of perception); for, the tendency towards the object can mean either that the sense-organ moves towards the object of perception, or that the sense-organ produces perception regarding outside object. The Jainas who deny any light-rays shooting forth from the eyes and moving towards the object of vision, do not obviously admit that a sense-organ moves towards the object of perception; they urge also that nobody has ever seen any sense-organ, e g., the tongue moves towards the object, nor can it be contended that an outer sense is the organ which inheres in the object in the sense that it 'produces perception of an outside object', for, *mud* also apprehends outside objects. The thinkers of the orthodox School contend that 'location outside' means 'location in the periphery of the body' and argue that because the organ of vision is located in the periphery of the body, it must perceive its object by actually coming in contact with it. The Jainas reply that the mere fact that a sense-organ is peripheral is no reason why it must perceive its object by coming in contact with it. The Jaina commentator concludes: 'The fact of being an outer sense (which is put forward as the reason by the orthodox philosophers for their inference that the sense-organ of vision is *Prāpyakāri*) is weak (literally, impure) and is incapable of pleasing the logicians:

'The play of eye-brows of ugly ladies does not attract the heart of the Wise'.

Another argument of the thinkers of the orthodox School is put as: The sense-organ of vision is *Prāpyakāri*, because it is 'a generating pre-condition, (*karaka*). It implies that it would be impossible for the organ of sight to do the act of visualising, unless it comes in actual contact with its object. The Jainas meet this contention by urging that an act is possible without contact. They point to the power of the Mantras or mystic syllables, by the mental contemplation of which one can attract, say, a beautiful woman from any part of the universe and put her before any one. Here there is the act of attracting and putting the lady but there is no contact. You cannot say that the Mantra is in contact with the lady, for, the question would arise: Is the contact direct or is it mediate? According to the orthodox thinkers themselves, a sound and for the matter of that, a Mantra is after all but an attribute or quality of *Ākāśa*, so that a contact between such an abstract attribute and a concrete being like the lady of the example is unthinkable, even according to them. Nor can the alleged contact be said to be a mediate one. It is of course urged by some of the thinkers of the orthodox School that the Mantra has its contact with its presiding deity; that this deity brings the lady before us, and that in this way, the Mantra is in mediate or indirect contact with the lady when it produces her before us. The Jainas point out that this contention is fundamentally wrong, for as pointed out above, a Mantra according to the orthodox thinkers themselves is but an attribute of *Ākāśa*, how can the

Mantra have any contact with a deity? If it be said that the Mantra is in contact with the deity through its abode, viz , Ākāśa, a contradiction in the orthodox position becomes manifest, for, both Ākāśa and the deity are pervasive beings and according to the orthodox thinkers themselves, there cannot be any contact between two pervasive substances. Hence the inference that the sense-organ of vision is Prāpyakāri cannot be based on the reason that it is a Kāraka or a generating pre-condition.

The Jainas maintain that the organ of vision generates vision without coming in contact with its object. This is the reason why sometimes a thing is visible, although something or a screen intervenes between it and the eyes. A thing may not be visible when substances like a tree screen it off from our view; but it is well-known how a thing can be seen through such gross and compact substances as glass and water. This shows that vision is effected not by an actual contact between the seeing organ and the object seen but that it is due to a peculiar capacity, inherent in the eyes.

The Buddhists contend that the organ of hearing is not Prāpyakāri; in other words, there is no contact between the sense of hearing and the matter of sound-perception. They point out that in every perception of sound there is a *digdeśa-vyapadeśa*, or an apprehension of the direction (e. g. ,—the east) and the place (e. g. , the forest) from which the sound comes. Our sense of hearing does not come in actual contact with the direction or the place from which the sound comes, when it has the perception of a sound. Hence the Buddhists maintain that the sense of hearing

which brings about the perception of a sound does so without being *Prāpyakāri*.

The Jainas criticise the above Buddhist view by pointing out that the fact that there is an apprehension of the direction and of the place in a perception does not justify us in holding that the corresponding sense-organ is not *Prāpyakāri*. In a perception of smell we often feel that it comes from a certain direction (e. g., the south) and from a certain place (e. g., the *Mādhavī*-bower). In tactual perceptions also, we often feel, for example, that a certain pleasant breeze is of the garden. With all these apprehensions of the direction and of the place inherent in olfactory and tactile perceptions, the sense-organs of smell and touch are admitted as *Prāpyakāri*. The Buddhists contend that the apprehension of the direction and the place present in olfactory and tactual perceptions are not perceptions but results of inference mingled up with the actual perceptions; and hence, the sense-organs of touch and smell are *Prāpyakāri*. The Jainas meet the Buddhist contention by applying the same thing to the case of the auricular sense. They urge that the apprehensions of the direction and of the place, present in a sound-perception may be said to be due to inferences. As a matter of fact, on hearing a certain sound, we say (i. e., infer) that this sound is of a conch-shell or that it comes from a distant place in the east. Hence the presence of an apprehension of the direction and of the place in a perception does not show that the corresponding sense-organ is not *Prāpyakāri*. The Buddhists ask: How can the sense-organ of hearing be *Prāpyakāri*, seeing that it can hear from the outside a sound originating inside

the room when the doors of the room are closely shut? The Jainas retort by asking: How can the sense-organ of smell be *Prāpyakāri*, seeing that it can grasp from the outside, a smell originating inside the room when the doors of the room are closely shut? The fact is that the perception of a sound is due to the sense of hearing coming in actual contact with the basis of sound which is too subtle to be obstructed by such gross things as doors, just as the perception of a smell is due to the sense of smelling coming in actual contact with the basis of smell which is too subtle to be obstructed by such gross things as doors. Accordingly the sense-organ of hearing is *Prāpyakāri* like that of smell.

The Jainas point out that the intensity of a sound varies according to the distance between the source of sound and our organ of hearing. This also proves that our perception of a sound is dependent on a contact of the sound-waves with the organ of hearing.

एतद् द्वितीयमवग्रेहावायधारणाभेदादेकशत्रुर्विकल्प-

कम् ॥ ६ ॥

etad dvitīyam avagrahehāvāya-dhāraṇa-bhedād

ekasas catur vikalpakam | 6 |

TRANSLATION. Each of these two has four modes viz, 'Grasp', 'Attention' (literally, a thirst or desire) 'Determination' and 'Retention'.

COMMENTARY. Each of the two perceptions, the Sensuous and the Unsensuous, involves four mental processes.

विषयविषयिसंनिपातानन्तरसमुद्भूतसत्तामात्रगोचरदर्शना-
 ज्जातमाद्यमवान्तरसामान्याकारविशिष्टवस्तुग्रहण-
 मवग्रहः ॥ ७ ॥

*visaya-visayi-samnipātanantara-samudbhūta-satta-
 mātra-gocara-darśanaḥ jātam ādyam avāntara-sāmānya-
 kāra-viśiṣṭa-vastu-grahanam avagrahaḥ* ॥ ७ ॥

TRANSLATION: 'Grasp' (*avagraha*) consists in the perception of a thing in its lesser general aspect, which immediately follows or arises from the apprehension of the thing in its aspect of mere existence (i e., the vaguest general aspect) which apprehension again results as soon as the object of knowledge and the organ of perceiving are placed in fit positions.

COMMENTARY: Visaya or an object of perception has two aspects, viz., general and particular. Avagraha or Grasp is the first stage in its perception. It arises in this way. When an object and a sense-organ (*visayī*) are so placed that a correct perception is possible, the very first impression that we get is that something exists outside us. We do not know what that thing is or what is its shape and so on, as yet. The impression is that 'Something Is'. This is the stage of Darśana, in which details of every form are unapprehended. Avagraha is the very next stage to this crudest impression. When we have grasp, we come to understand not simply that 'Something Is' but to some extent 'What That Something Is': a man, a beast or some other object. Thus although in Grasp we have nothing more than the impression of a thing in its general aspect it is nevertheless the first stage in the perception of details.

अवग्रहीतार्थविशेषाकाङ्क्षणमीहा ॥ ८ ॥

avagrhitārtha-viśēṣākamksanam īhā । 8 ।

TRANSLATION. Attention or Inquisitiveness consists in the impulse to enquire into the details of the object grasped.

COMMENTARY: Let us suppose that through Grasp, we have come to apprehend the general aspect of the object of our perception: We apprehend, let us suppose, that the object belongs to the human species. The psychological state that follows this first apprehension is an impulse to find out details about the man, e. g., to know whether he is a man of the Karpāta or the Lāta country. *īhā*, i. e., Attention or Inquisitiveness consists in such an impulse to discover the details.

ईहितविशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः ॥ ९ ॥

īhita-viśēṣa-nirṇayo 'avayaḥ । 9 ।

TRANSLATION: 'Determination' (*avaya*) is determining the details attended to.

COMMENTARY Attention leads us to enquire about the details. When we have discovered them and found them out for certain, we are said to have Determined them (*avaya*).

स एव दृढतमावस्थापन्नो धारणा ॥ १० ॥

sa eva drdhatamāvasthāpanno dharaṇā । 10 ।

TRANSLATION: That being firm-fixed is 'retention' (*dhāraṇā*).

COMMENTARY: When one instead of forgetting the details determined in the above manner, persists in keeping them before his mind's eye for some time he is said to 'Retain' them (*dhāraṇā*). Perception is complete when the stage of Retention is reached. Retention generates what is called *Samskāra*, i. e., a stable impression, whereby a recollection of what is perceived is made possible.

संशयपूर्वकत्वादीहाया : संशयाद् भेदः ॥ ११ ॥

samsaya-pūrvakatvād īhāyah samsayaḥ

bhedah ॥ 11 ॥

TRANSLATION: Inquisitiveness (*īhā*) is to be distinguished from Doubt (*samsaya*) which precedes it.

COMMENTARY. Let us suppose that through 'Grasp' we have come to apprehend that the object of our perception is a man. After the 'Grasp' of manhood, there arises the 'Doubt' which in its essence is many-sided: 'is he a southerner or a northerner'? Then, because the knower wants to find out the details, 'Attention' or 'Inquisitiveness' arises in him, of the form of (a tendency to think that) 'he may be a southerner': Thus because of their being related as Ground and Consequent, their distinction is apparent like that of thread and cloth.

कथंचिदभेदेऽपि परिणामविशेषादेर्वा व्यपदेशभेदः ॥ १२ ॥

kathamcid abhede'pi parināma-viśeṣād eṣam

vyapadeśa-bhedah ॥ 12 ॥

TRANSLATION: Though these are in some respects one and the same, yet they are to be distinguished owing to the peculiarity in modifications.

COMMENTARY: The above psychological processes are processes in one and the same knowing self or Jīva. Hence they are ultimately one, in so far as their essence or substratum is concerned. But as the knowing self is differently manifested in these processes, they are to be distinguished from one another.

असामस्त्येनाप्युत्पद्यमानत्वेनासंकीर्णस्वभावतयानुभूय-
मानत्वादपूर्वापूर्ववस्तुपर्यायप्रकाशकत्वात् क्रमभावि-
त्वाच्चैते व्यतिरिच्यन्ते ॥ १३ ॥

*asāmastyenāpy utpadyamānatvenāsamkīṇa-
svabhāvatayānubhūyamānatvād apūrvāpūrvavastu-
paryāya-prakāśakatvāt kramabhāvitvāc caite*

vyatiricyante | 13 |

TRANSLATION: As they are perceived to be separate from one another owing to their not arising simultaneously, and as each of them reveals a new aspect of things, and as they come up one after the other; they are to be distinguished.

COMMENTARY: The above psychological processes of Sensation, Grasp, Doubt, Inquisitiveness, Determination and Retention are to be distinguished from each other. In accordance with the peculiar nature of the subsidence or quiescence of the obstacles to cognition in a perceiver, sometimes Sensation only, sometimes Sensation and Grasp, sometimes Sensation

Grasp and Doubt (and so on) arise in order of succession. Hence it is that these processes are perceived to be separate from one another. Every percipient feels also that each of these processes reveals a new aspect of the thing under observation and that each evolves from its preceding process. Hence these psychological processes are clearly distinguishable from one another.

क्रमोऽप्यमीषामयमेव तथैव संवेदनादेवं क्रमाविरभूतनिज-

कर्मक्षयोपशमजन्यत्वाच्च ॥ १४ ॥

*kramo'py amīsam ayam eva tathaiṣa samvedanāt
evam-kramāvirbhūta-nija-karma-ksayopasama-
janya tvāc ca ॥ 14 ॥*

TRANSLATION: Their order is such, because they are perceived (to come up) in such an order and because their origination is due to (gradual) destruction and abatement of one's own Karma

COMMENTARY: First of all, we 'feel' that there is Something existing outside us; then we 'Grasp' its shape, colour etc., then owing to a want of our definite knowledge in regard to it, we have a state of *Dubitation*; then, we 'Want' to determine it in one definite way; then we 'Determine' it; and lastly we 'Retain' the idea in our mind in order that it may be reproduced afterwards. This is the order of development of a percept and it is observed by all. We should also remember that perception becomes possible only when its hindrances in the shape of Karma are removed from the soul. Now, this removal is a

gradual process and the corresponding process of perception must consequently be of gradual growth.

अन्यथा प्रमेयानवगतिप्रसंगः ॥ १५ ॥

anyathā prameyānavagati-prasamgaḥ । 15 ।

TRANSLATION: Otherwise the object of knowledge would remain unknown.

COMMENTARY: Perception of an object is felt to be gradually developed in the above order, so that if the above order be not admitted to subsist between the elements of perception, the object of perception would be in danger of being unperceived.

तथा हि न खल्वदृष्टमवगृह्यते, न चानवगृहीतं संदिह्यते
न चासंदिग्धमीह्यते, न चानीहितमवेयते नाप्यनवेतं
धार्यते ॥ १६ ॥

tathā hi na khalv adṛṣṭam avagṛhyate na cānavagṛhītam sandihyate na cāsamdiḡdham īhyate na cānīhitam aveyate nāpy anavetaṁ dhāryate । 16 ।

TRANSLATION: What is not 'Sensed' is never 'Grasped', the Un-grasped is not 'Doubted', the Non-doubted is not 'Attended to', the Non-attended to is not 'Determined', and the Undetermined is not 'Retained'

COMMENTARY. The aphorism shows in a negative way that the various stages of perception must develop one after the other.

क्वचित् क्रमस्यानुपलक्षणमेषामाशूत्पादाद्,

उत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेदक्रमवत् ॥ १७ ॥

kvacit kramasyānupalakṣaṇam eṣām aśūtpadād

utpala-patra-śata-vyatibheda-kramavat | 17 |

TRANSLATION. Sometimes this order is not apparent; this is due to the immediate succession (literally, origination) of those processes, this is like the imperceptibility of the order in which are pierced the hundred petals of a lotus.

COMMENTARY. In perceptions of objects which we repeatedly and habitually come across, the above processes are not explicitly felt

पारमार्थिकं पुनरुत्पत्तावात्ममात्रापेक्षम् ॥ १८ ॥

pāramārthikam punar-utpattau ātma-

mātrāpekṣam | 18 |

TRANSLATION. The Transcendental (perception) on the other hand is dependent on the soul alone for its genesis

COMMENTARY: The Transcendental (*pāramārthika*) Perception arises when its peculiar hindrances are removed or mitigated. Its origination is due to the soul only. The soul, of course, develops the Practical (*sāmvyavahārika*) perception also but in the case of the Practical perception, the soul generates it with the help of the senses etc, whereas the Transcendental perception arises direct from the soul.

तद् विकलं सकलं च ॥ १९ ॥

tad vikalam sakalam ca । 19 ।

TRANSLATION That is either Partial or Complete.

COMMENTARY The Partial (*vikala*) form of the Transcendental perception has for its matter incomplete things, while things in their complete forms and aspects are the objects of the Complete (*sakala*) Transcendental cognition

तत्र विकलमवधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानरूपतया द्वेधा ॥ २० ॥

*tatka vikalam avadhi-manah-pariyāya-jñāna-
rūpatayā dvedhā* । 20 ।

TRANSLATION The Partial is of two kinds, Clairvoyance (*avadhi*) and Telepathy (*manahpariyāya*).

COMMENTARY These are defined below.

अवधिज्ञानावरणविलयविशेषसमुद्भवं भवगुणप्रत्ययं

रूपिद्रव्यगोचरमवधिज्ञानम् ॥ २१ ॥

*avadhi-jñānavarāṇa-vilaya-viśeṣa-samudbhavam
bhava-guṇa-pratyayam rūpi-dravya-gocaram avadhi-
jñānam* । 21 ।

TRANSLATION: 'Clairvoyance' is knowledge which arises when its enveloping hindrance subsides in a particular way, which is connate with some and in others acquired by means of righteousness, and which has for its objects things having a form.

COMMENTARY: Avadhi-jñāna is generally translated as 'Clairvoyance'. it consists in a clear perception of material objects and those aspects of material objects which are not perceptible by the senses.

Like all the forms of knowledge, Clairvoyance arises in a being when its hindrances are removed. With the residents of heavens and denizens of hells, this form of knowledge is connatural, while men and the lower animals can attain it only by Right Faith etc. Clairvoyance relates to things which have a form. Thus Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Darkness, Shadow etc. can be the matter for Clairvoyance.

The thinkers of the Nyāya school refuse to regard Darkness and Shade as substances having form or magnitude as described above by the Jainas. According to them they are non-existences or Abhāvas, i. e., contradictions of Light. They argue that had they been real substances one would feel some obstruction in passing through Darkness and Shade. When the Light of the sun and the moon is prevented from spreading on the face of the earth, we have Darkness, when the Light in a small place is obstructed by a cover like an umbrella etc., we have Shade; when these obstacles to Light are removed, it reappears as a substance. If Darkness and Shade, which are thus absence of Light, were on the contrary supposed to be real things or substances, they would have, like a concrete body like the earth, appeared as things having separable parts.

The Jainas in criticising the above view begin by asking: Is this negative nature of Darkness or Shade a matter of Perception or of Inference?

You cannot say that Darkness is perceived as a non-existence. The non-existence of a thing, e.g., of a pitcher is said to be perceived, when some other positive thing other than the pitcher is perceived in its place. When there is total Darkness, no positive thing, not even one's own palm is perceived; how then, can it be said that Darkness as negation of Light is perceivable? Then again, the visibility of a thing depends on there being light there. We cannot speak of the non-existence of a thing in a place unless there is light there. We can see, for instance, the non-existence of a pitcher in a place, only if light is there. The position that Darkness as non-existence of Light is a matter of perception leads to the absurdity that Darkness is visible only when there is Light. The Nyāya thinkers may contend that the perception of the non-existence of a thing is dependent on the existence of the totality (*samagrya*) of those conditions on which its perception is dependent and not on the existence of that thing itself. Let us take the example of a particular lighted lamp, say A. The perception of this lighted lamp A is dependent on certain conditions. When A is removed and another Lighted lamp B is placed there, the perception of B, which is the non-existence of A, does not require the presence of A there, but is dependent on the presence of those conditions on which the perception of A was dependent. The perception of the non-existence of a thing does not thus require the presence of the thing there; it may be said in the same way, that the perception of Darkness, as a non-existence of Light, does not require the existence of Light there. The Jainas point out that this Nyāya contention practically

involves the admission that Darkness is no mere negation but a positive substance which can be perceived like the positive substance, Light. Light is visible by coming in contact with the eyes (according to the Naryāyikas). Now, if you say that Darkness also is perceptible (i.e., visible) you must admit that Darkness, also comes in actual contact with the eyes. This leads to the position that Darkness must be a positive substance, otherwise, how can it be said to come in contact with the eyes? The Nyāya thinkers cannot avoid this position by saying that Darkness is perceived although it does not come in actual contact with the eyes. For, as the Jainas point out, this Nyāya contention would involve the repudiation by the Naryāyikas themselves of their two theories, viz, (1) the perception of the non-existence of a thing is dependent on the presence of those conditions on which its perception is dependent and (2) the organ of vision is Prāpyakāri, i.e., all phenomena, in order to be visible must have contact with the eyes. The last contention of the Nyāya thinkers in this connection is that Darkness need not be a positive substance in order to be perceived; it is enough if it be supposed to be an adjunct (*viśesana*) to some substance (*viśesya*), so that with the perception of the latter the former is perceived. The Jainas refute this contention by asking: To what substance is Darkness an adjunct? It cannot be supposed to be an adjunct to the perceiver's body (*śarīra*); for, it is perceived in other places only. Nor, can it be supposed to be attached to lands, articles, house-enclosures etc., for, Darkness is perceivable in all places besides these. Nor, lastly, can Darkness be said to be an adjunct to

Ākāśa, the subtlest pervasive substance, for, this relation of an adjunct and a substantive thing is never known or perceived to subsist between Ākāśa and Darkness. Hence it is inconsistent to hold that Darkness is a pure negation and that yet it can be perceived.

The Jainas refute also the contention that the negative character of Darkness is established by Inference. They ask: What would be the reason (Hetu) of such an Inference? Eight reasons are conceivable: (1) Darkness is perceived as something different from a positive substance. (2) Darkness is produced by the totality (*sāmagrī*) of conditions which are different from a positive substance. (3) Darkness is perceived only when Light is absent. (4) Darkness is perceived when the totality (*sāmagrī*) of conditions which are requisite for the perception of Light is present. (5) Causes for the production of Darkness are non-existent. (6) Darkness is an effect which is other than a substance (*Dravya*), an attribute (*guṇa*) and an activity (*karma*). (7) Darkness is opposed to Light. (8) Reasons or evidences which indicate the positive character of a phenomena are wanting in the case of Darkness. The Jainas set aside the foregoing eight reasons, one by one, in the following way.

They point out that the first of the above reasons, 'Darkness is perceived as something different from a positive substance' is wrong. For, just as in 'that is a pitcher,' 'that is a pillar' we have positive perceptions of the things under observation, we have positive perception of Darkness in our experience of Darkness. If Darkness were nothing but a negation we should have but a negative experience of it, just as in the

case of the absence of a pitcher in a place, we apprehend and say 'there is no pitcher here'. It may be argued: Negations may be positively perceived, this is evidenced by our expression, e.g., 'destruction' etc., which express positive facts; thus there is no difference in our perceptions of positive and negative facts; so that Darkness, as a negative phenomenon may be perceived in the same manner as Light, which is a positive substance. The Jainas point out that the contention is not sound. Experience of negation is different from the experience of a positive fact. It is wrong to hold that words like 'destruction' etc., express a positive fact. They express the negation of a positive fact. It is for this reason that while using the word, 'destruction', we always say 'the destruction of, e. g., a pitcher', just to indicate the positive substance, a negation of which it is the function of negative expressions like 'destruction' to express. The word Darkness however does not express negation. If the word, Darkness were to stand for negation, we would have used the expression, 'the darkness of light', to indicate the fact of the absence of Light. The Naiyāyikas may urge that the expression Darkness does not stand for negation in general and that hence the expression, 'the darkness of light' is not used to indicate the absence of Light; the expression Darkness stands for negation (not in general but) of Light. The Jainas point out that even this contention of the Nyāya thinker is not maintainable; for, if he says that although Darkness is nothing more than negation, it can nevertheless be perceived as a positive fact, his original proposition, 'Darkness is perceived as something different from a positive substance' becomes

meaningless and as such, fails to serve as valid 'reason' for his theory about the negative character of Darkness.

The Jainas take up the second contention of the Nyāya thinkers, 'Darkness is produced by the totality (*samagrī*) of conditions which are different from a positive substance' and point out that this also cannot serve as a valid 'reason' for the negative theory of Darkness. The philosophers of the Nyāya School maintain that a positive substance is produced by the operation of 'Intimate (*samavāyi*)', 'Non-intimate (*asamavāyi*)' and 'Attendant (*nimitta*)' cause, none of which is found to be operative in the case of production of Darkness. In criticising this position of the Naiyāyikas, the Jainas begin by asking. What do you mean by an 'Intimate cause' or 'Samavāyi kāraṇa?' It is said that the Intimate cause is that in which the effect is linked up (*samaveta*). Yarn is said to be the Intimate cause of cloth. The Jainas point out that the above description of the Intimate cause does not help us in any way. Nobody ever perceives that Cloth is immanent in the yarn. We rather say that yarn is present in the Cloth. Hence it is impossible to determine the Intimate cause. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that it is possible to trace in some cases the effect as 'intimately' connected with a cause, we cannot say that our perception is always a perception of the relation between two positive facts. In the case of our perception of non-existence, e.g., 'There is no pitcher in this place,' it is said that we have a perception of Samavāya or Intimate relationship, but here the phenomenon, 'the non-existence of the pitcher' is no positive fact and cannot be said to

be 'inherent' or 'immanent' in 'the place'. Hence to say that the Intimate cause is perceived to be that in which the effect is immanent is wrong. Then again, it cannot be said that Intimate relationship is inferred from any relationship, because Intimate relationship is premised to be but an essential relationship. Again if Samavāya be supposed to be immutably self-identical in its nature, there is no reason why all the things of the universe should not have Samavāya relationship among them as soon as there is Samavāya between any two and why Samavāya relationship between all other things should not be dissolved as soon as the Samavāya ceases to subsist between two things. If it be said that these are prevented by the peculiar circumstances and conditions, then this is admitting that the Samavāya is in some respect different in each case. Besides if Samavāya be supposed to be something indestructible, eternal and immutable, then it would inhere only in such things as Ākāśa and the Universals etc, and not subsist between things which emerge in time and are effect-phenomena. If it be said that owing to the influence of attendant causes, the Samavāya relationship comes to subsist between emergent and non-eternal things, then the constant presence of these attendant causes is the main requisite and there is no necessity for speaking of an Intimate cause. Now, if there is no such thing as an Intimate cause, what are we to understand by the Non-intimate (*asamavāyi*) cause? To describe it as a condition which is proximate to the Intimate cause is meaningless, if there is no such thing as the Intimate cause. In the absence of the Intimate cause, there would be no meaning in the

so-called Attendant (*numitta*) cause also. The Jaina philosophers next point out how there would be no difficulty even if it be admitted that a real and positive thing only is produced by causes, Intimate, Non-intimate and Attendant. If it be asked; 'What would be the producing causes of Darkness, if Darkness is a positive substance?' the Jainas would insinuate the answer by asking 'What are the producing causes of Light?' If to this question, the Nyāya reply is that the atoms of Light produce Light the Jainas would say that it is the atoms of Darkness that produce Darkness. If the Nyāya thinkers contend that the existence of the Light-atoms is admitted by both the Schools, disputant, (i e, the Nyāya) and the opponent (i e, the Jaina), the latter would urge the similar acceptance of the doctrine of the reality of the Darkness-atoms also. It is thus that the second 'reason' that a real thing has a real cause advanced by the Nyāya School fails to establish their theory that Darkness is a mere negation.

The third 'reason' of the thinkers of the Nyāya School for their proposition regarding the negative character of Darkness, viz, 'Darkness is perceived only when there is no Light' is also weak. The Jainas urge that it is not correct to say that what appears when something is absent is nothing more than the negation of the latter. Something may intervene between our eyes and the things like a pitcher etc, when this intervening thing is removed we get a sight of the pitcher etc. Here then, the pitcher etc, are perceived only when there is no intervening thing; but are the pitcher etc, mere, non-existences on that account? Light also is perceived only when obstruc-

tions to it are absent but Light is admittedly no mere negation. The Nyāya philosophers urge here that Light is no negation because our factual perception finds a positive character (i.e., heat) in it and because this capacity to burn is impossible in a non-existent thing. The Jainas meet this contention by pointing out that Darkness is similarly perceived to have the positive characteristic of coolness, which shows that Darkness also is a real positive substance.

The fourth 'reason' of the Nyāya philosophers for their theory that Darkness is only negation of Light is thus put by Saṃkara and Nyāyabhūṣana: 'The negation of a thing is perceived through the self-same totality of conditions through which the thing is perceived; hence Darkness which is perceived through the totality of conditions through which Light is perceived is the negation of it'.*

* *Note* The meaning is that one group of conditions can give perception of one real thing, the self-same group cannot give perception of another real thing. Hence the self-same group of conditions yields the perception of one real thing and that of nothing else. The self-same group of conditions which generate the perception of Light can thus yield the perception of Light and of nothing else. Accordingly if Darkness is perceived through the self-same conditions through which Light is perceived, Darkness must be held to be nothing. This argument is extremely weak. For, it may be argued in a similar manner that Light is mere negation because it is perceived through the self-same totality of conditions through which Darkness is perceived. As a matter of fact, a pitcher is perceived through the self-same totality of conditions of perception, through which a cloth is perceived, but the pitcher and the cloth are no mere unsubstantial negations of each other on that account.

The Jainas next take up for consideration the fifth 'reason' of the Nyāya School, viz., 'Causes for the production of Darkness as a real substance are wanting' for their negative theory about Darkness. The Nyāya philosopher, Śrīdhara, developed his contention in this way: Are the Darkness-atoms (the alleged causes of Darkness) capable of developing the sensation of touch or are they not so? They are not capable of developing the sensation of touch, because their effect (i. e., Darkness) is not capable of being touched. If it be contended that the effect which they produce (i. e., Darkness) is incapable of being touched, because of the non-operation of *Adṛṣṭa* (the fundamental law determining causes and their effects), then, one may argue that the Air-atoms also have the attribute of colour and form but that owing to a peculiar modification in the operation of *Adṛṣṭa*, the effect which they produce (i. e., Air) is devoid of colour and form. If *Adṛṣṭa* be supposed to modify effectuation in this way, it may as well be maintained that all atoms are of one kind only and that the effects (i. e., the elements arising from them) are of four classes (i. e., Earth, Water, Air and Fire) because of the four different modes of operation of *Adṛṣṭa*. It may be said that the difference in the nature of the effects (i. e., the elements of Air, Water, Earth and Fire) proves that the constituent atoms of each are also essentially different from those of another the nature of the atoms is determined by the nature of the effect (i. e., the element). In that case, it is to be admitted that the Darkness-atoms are incapable of developing the sensation of touch (because their effect, Darkness is not capable of being touched). Again, if the

Darkness-atoms are incapable of developing the sense of touch, they cannot be supposed to be capable of producing Darkness; for, anything which is so unsubstantial as not to be capable of *developing touch sensations* is incapable of producing anything. If it be contended that from the fact of an effect it is always right to suppose the existence of a cause, consistent with it but that from the disorder or something wrong in the cause, it is never right to deny the effect which is manifest. To this Śrīdhara's reply is that he does not deny the phenomena of Darkness, but that from the fact of its emergence from a competent cause being not apparent as well as from the fact of Darkness being perceived to be nothing more than a sensation of Darkness, he denies that it is a positive substance. The Jainas criticise the contentions of Śrīdhara by asserting and proving their own position that the atoms of Darkness have the capacity of generating tactile sensation. These atoms produce Darkness as their effect, which coming in contact with our body gives rise to a feeling of coolness or cold. If it be asked: What is the evidence of Darkness generating a tactile sensation? The counter-question may be: What is the evidence that Darkness does not generate a tactual sensation? It may be observed that the Nyāya philosopher is bound to prove by evidence that Darkness does not generate any tactual feeling before he can argue that a cause which has not the capacity to develop a tactile sensation cannot give rise to an effect. The Jainas on their part adduce evidence that Darkness does generate a tactual sensation. Wayfarers passing through the scorching rays of the sun are found to be happy in coming in contact with the

dark Shade This feeling of happiness is due to a positive sensation of coolness in their bodies and not to a mere negative sensation of the want of heat In fact the Jainas point out the positive character of this feeling of coolness in Shade is so marked that one may be tempted to think that Darkness is a real substance and Light, but its negation It may be objected that if Darkness is characterised by coolness, one thrown into the Darkness of a prison, the doors of which are closely shut would feel cold. The Jainas turn the line of this argument against the objector and point out that such a person does neither feel absence of heat in the Darkness of the said prison, which goes to show that the objection does not establish the theory that Darkness is only the negation of Light The Jainas explain why the prisoner does not feel cold in the Darkness of the prison in this way: Darkness like Water has the property of coolness. But, just as in the case of Water, in order that its coolness may be felt, there must be Air blowing there so in the case of Darkness also. One does not feel the coolness of the Darkness of the prison-house, because there are no waves of Air blowing there. The Jainas next point out how inference also establishes the tactual character of Darkness. They put their argument in the following syllogistic form: 'Darkness has tactual property, because it has form like Earth'. The fact that Darkness has a form is not unproved We perceive that the Darkness in a given place has a black form which goes to show that Darkness has a form The objectors may argue that if Darkness be supposed to have a form, it would require Light to be visible, because all black things

like a black lotus, a cuckoo etc., are visible in Light only. The Jainas reply that Light is not essential to visibility; creatures like owls etc. see things in Darkness. It may be said that in the case of animals like man, Light is indispensable to the visibility of a thing. The Jainas point out, however, that although black things like a black lotus etc., are invisible unless there is Light, Darkness is visible where there is no Light. This is due to the peculiar nature of brilliant things like pearls, lamp-lights, the moon etc., to be visible, although there be no Light to reveal them. Hence it may be safely said that Light is not essential to the visibility of a thing. Darkness may thus have a black form and yet be visible without Light. Another syllogistic form in which the Jainas put their argument is: 'Darkness has a form; because it is perceived to be possessed of blackness; like a black lotus. They point out that a formless negation like the non-existence of a pitcher cannot be said to be perceived as of a black form etc. Accordingly the perception of Darkness as something black goes to show that Darkness has a form. If then, Darkness has a form, it has also the tactile perceptibility. And if the effect of Darkness has the tactile perceptibility, it cannot be said that the constituent atoms of Darkness because of their incapability to develop tactile perceptibility, are incapable of producing the effect, i.e., Darkness

The Jaina philosophers next take up the criticism of the Nyāya contention that 'Darkness is an effect which is other than the Dravya or the Guna and the Karma' the sixth reason for the negative theory of Darkness. They point out that 'the reason' is 'partially unproved' (*ekadeśa-siddha*) inasmuch as it is never proved that

Darkness as an effect is something other than a Substance. They ask: How do you know that Darkness as an effect is something other than a Substance? Do you know it to be so, because Darkness is essentially a negation? If you urge this, you commit the fallacy of 'mutual dependence'. For, you contend on the one hand that Darkness is a negation, because it is something other than a Substance and on the other hand you maintain that Darkness is something other than a Substance because it is a negation. Or, do you know that Darkness is something other than a Substance, not because it is a negation but for some other reasons? This contention is immaterial, inasmuch as this gives a go-bye to the negative theory of Darkness.

The seventh 'reason' of the Naiyāyikas for their negative theory of Darkness is 'Darkness is opposed to Light'. In criticising this contention, the Jainas point out that it is not an absolute rule that whatever opposes a fact must be a negation of it. Water and Fire, for example are mutually opposed to each other but are not mere negations of each other on that account. The thinkers of the Nyāya school contend, however, that Opposition (*virodha*) may be of two kinds. One kind of Opposition between two things or phenomena is 'non-staying together' (*sahanavasthana*). The opposition that subsists between Light and Darkness is said to be of this kind, inasmuch as Light and Darkness cannot stay together. Such an opposition cannot subsist between two substances. It can subsist only between a substance and its negation. Darkness and Light cannot stay together; we have Darkness only were Light disappears. Hence from

the fact that Light and Darkness like pitcher and its non-existence cannot stay together, we are justified in concluding that Darkness is but the negation of Light, just as the non-existence of the pitcher is that of the pitcher. There is another kind of Opposition. It consists in the relationship between the 'Annihilator' and the 'one being annihilated' (*vadhya-ghataka-bhava*). Such an Opposition may subsist between two substances, one of which is annihilating the other and the other is being annihilated by the former. The Naiyāyikas contend that this kind of Opposition does not subsist between Light and Darkness and hence as Light is admittedly a Substance, Darkness must be supposed to be a negation of it. The Jainas set aside the negative theory of Darkness by pointing out that between Light and Darkness there is the latter kind of Opposition. A man walking out in a dark night takes a lamp, as the man advances in this way the Light from his lamp progressively destroys the Darkness of the way. Here, clearly, the 'Light of the lamp is the Annihilator and the Darkness is being Annihilated'. The Opposition is one of *vadhya-ghataka-bhava* and as such, Darkness is as much a Substance as Light.

The eighth and the last 'reason' of the Naiyāyikas for their negative theory about Darkness is. 'Evidences indicating a positive nature are wanting in the case of Darkness'. The Jainas on the other hand contend that there are evidences which lead one to infer that Darkness is a real substance. They point to such expressions as 'deep Darkness', 'Waves of Darkness' 'sprouting Darkness' and urge that these expressions indicate the positive reality and substantiality of

Darkness. The Nyāya thinkers contend that these expressions are but figurative and do not prove the substantiality of Darkness. The Jainas point out that these expressions have always a directly positive meaning and never imply any negative idea. Use of figurative expressions is based on a perception of similarity. There can be no similarity between a thing and its negation, between, for example, a pitcher and its non-existence. The expressions which are applicable to a real thing cannot thus be figuratively applied to its negation. Accordingly, if expressions implying a positive sense are used in connection with Darkness, it is because Darkness is a positive reality and not an unsubstantial negation. The second contention of the Jainas in this connection is: Darkness is not a negation (i.e., a non-existent unsubstantiality), because it has not the nature of 'prior non-existence' etc., like Vyoma (or Ākāśa, which is the subtlest matter according to the thinkers of the Vedic School but which is no material substance at all according to the Jainas). The Jainas prove the truth of the reason in their foregoing argument in the following way. Non-existence according to the Naiyāyikas is of four kinds, viz., 'prior non-existence'; 'posterior non-existence', 'mutual non-existence', and 'absolute non-existence'.

Now, Darkness is not 'the prior non-existence' of Light. For, it cannot be said that it is the prior non-existence of one particular Light. Darkness is destroyed by the sun-light, in the same way as by the lamp-light; 'The prior non-existence' of a particular thing is destroyed by the appearance of that thing alone and not by the appearance of any

other thing. 'Darkness which is destroyed by any Light cannot thus be said to be 'the prior non-existence' of any particular Light. Neither can Darkness be said to be 'the prior non-existence of any light'; for any one Light destroys the Darkness of any place. Nor can it be argued: Darkness cannot be said to be capable of destruction by one Light only: Darkness is of many sorts; one mode of it may be destroyed by, say, lamp-light, another mode of Darkness is to be destroyed by, say, sun-light. When the former is destroyed by lamp-light, the latter mode of Darkness, on account of the absence of sun-light there at that time, remains still there, to be removed by sun-light, sometime thereafter, accordingly it is not correct to maintain that Darkness is removable by any one Light. The Jainas stick to their position that Darkness is always removable by any light whatsoever and refute the foregoing contention of their opponents by pointing out that different modes of Darkness removable by different modes of Light are never experienced. They urge that when Darkness in a place is removed by lamp-light, nobody perceives there any other mode of Darkness to be removed by sun-light thereafter, which goes to show that Darkness is always of one mode, removable by any one Light. The Jainas refute finally their opponent's contention that Darkness is 'the prior non-existence of Light' by pointing out that when Darkness is destroyed by, say, lamp-light, it is not destroyed for ever but that it reappears. 'The prior non-existence' of a thing is admittedly beginningless; how, then, is this re-appearance or beginning of Darkness, premised to be 'the prior non-existence of Light' possible, seeing that 'the

prior non-existence' is beginning-less? The Jainas next argue that Darkness cannot be the mere 'posterior non-existence' of Light, on the ground that it is capable of being destroyed, just as Darkness conceived as 'the Prior non-existence' of Light. Neither can Darkness be looked upon as 'the mutual non-existence' of Light, because even in the most brilliantly sun-lit day, Darkness is perceived to exist as a real substance. The last possible contention of the opponent, that Darkness is 'the absolute non-existence' of Light, is also not maintainable, because Darkness is generated only when its peculiar causes are present.

Hence it is that none of the eight 'reasons' put forward by the Naryāyikas is competent to support their contention that the negative theory of Darkness is established by Inference

All the above arguments are applicable in the case of Shade also which the Nyāya thinkers look upon as a mere negation of Light and which the Jainas hold to be a real substance

Lastly, the Jainas take up the Nyāya contention that Darkness cannot be a real substance, because one passing through it does not feel any obstruction or resistance. The Jainas point out that this contention is untenable because if we apply the same line of argument in the case of Light, Light, which is a real substance according to the Naryāyikas, would appear to be nothing more than unsubstantial negation.

The Jaina theory that Darkness and Shade are real positive substances is thus conclusively proved.

संयमविशुद्धिनिबन्धनाद् विशिष्टावरणविच्छेदाज्जातं

मनोद्रव्यपर्यायालम्बनं मनःपर्यायज्ञानम् ॥ २२ ॥

saṁyama-viśuddhi-nibandhanād viśiṣṭa-varaṇa-vicchedāḥ jātam mano-dravya-paryāyālambanam manah-paryāya-jñānam । 22 ।

TRANSLATION: Telepathy, which has for its object the mental substance and its modes, arises from the subsidence of its peculiar cover (i. e., obstacles which suppress it), the subsidence being due to self-control and purity.

COMMENTARY: Manah-paryāya-jñāna is generally translated as Telepathy. The object known by Telepathy is Manas or mind and its various modes. Mind is possessed only by human beings who are five-sensed animals having Saṁjñā or a faculty of discrimination, reasoning etc. Human beings inhabit only a limited part of the universe. Not all five-sensed animals have Manas. Even not all human beings have the telepathic knowledge. On account of the practice of the prescribed modes of self-control and special purity in conduct, a man can have the obstacles to his telepathic knowledge partially destroyed or mitigated, whereupon he comes to attain this direct knowledge of other's minds and their modes of operation.

सकलं तु सामग्रीविशेषतः समुद्भूतसमस्तावरणक्षयपेक्षं
निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारिस्वरूपं केवलज्ञानम् ॥ २३ ॥

sakalam tu sāmagrī-viśeṣataḥ samudbhūta-samastā-varaṇa-ksayāpekṣam nikhila-dravya-paryāya-sākṣātkāri-svarūpam kevala-jñānam । 23 ।

TRANSLATION. The Complete is pure knowledge consisting in a direct cognition of all substances and their modes, which arises when owing to a peculiar group of conditions all the (knowledge-) covering hindrances are annihilated.

COMMENTARY. The Complete or Pure knowledge is Omniscience. The causes of Omniscience are said to be two-fold, internal and external. Internal causes are Right Faith etc., and the external causes are that the would-be possessors of Omniscience should have their births as human beings within the time specified for the flourishing of the Jinās. It arises from a destruction of all the Karmas which are described as the Ghāti and which envelop Omniscience. In the Complete or Pure knowledge, the nature of all things is directly known.

It is to be observed that the Jaina thinkers in admitting the Kevala-jñāna obviously go against the view of the Mimāṃsā school, according to which Omniscience is impossible. Why, ask the Jainas, must Omniscience be held to be impossible? Is it because there are proofs which contradict it (*bādhaka-bhāva*)? Or, is it because proofs in support of it are wanting (*sādhakābhāva*)? In the first case, are the proofs contradicting Omniscience (*bādhakas*) matters of direct knowledge or are they not so? If you say, these Bādhakas are matters of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), you must state whether they are matters of the transcendental (*pāramārthika*) knowledge or of the practical (*sāmvyavahārika*). If it be said that the Bādhakas are matters of transcendental perception, you are to state whether this transcendental cognition is partial (*vikala*)

or complete (*sakala*). Now the partial form of the transcendental knowledge is either clairvoyance (*Avadhī*) or telepathy (*Manah-paryāya*). The former, as shown before, consists in a supersensuous perception of things having a form and the latter, in a cognition of the mental substance and its modes. None of these opposes the possibility of Omniscience in any way. And it goes without saying that the complete form of the transcendental knowledge which is Omniscience itself cannot be held to be opposed to Omniscience. Coming to the practical cognition, we find it is either Sensuous or unsensuous. The unsensuous, internal or mental, perception is either *Prātibha* or unaccountable presentiment or non-*Prātibha*. The *Prātibha* is never felt to be opposed to the possibility of Omniscience. The other modes of the internal perception consist in pleasurable or painful feelings and as such, they can never oppose Omniscience. If it be said that our sensuous perception opposes the possibility of Omniscience we ask, whose perception is it, your (i e., the opponent's) own or other person's? If your own perception opposes it, there may be two alternatives. You may say that your perception at the present moment is opposed to Omniscience, this position is, however, not contested (but this does not afford any conclusive proof about the impossibility of Omniscience). If, on the other hand, you say that your perception is at all times and in all places, to be opposed to Omniscience, we ask, do you say it after having experiences of all times and of all places or do you say it without having them? In the first case, you yourself are an Omniscient Being and thus contradict your own position. In the latter case, your assertion is dogmatic. If, however, it be

argued that other persons' perception opposes Omniscience, all the difficulties, just discussed, crop up. It may be urged, moreover, that as no person can make you feel his own perception, you must be dependent on his *ipse dixit*, that Omniscience is impossible. In that case, why should you not believe in our assertion regarding the possibility of Omniscience? The opponent may urge here that other persons' experience (regarding the impossibility of Omniscience) is reliable because that is consistent with facts as they are. To this, the Jainas answer by asking: Is this fact of consistency a matter of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or is it unperceived? The Jainas point out that the difficulties discussed above again crop up in this connection. Besides, it should be noted that cognition is not knowable by sensuous perception; accordingly, it is impossible for sensuous perception to determine whether one's cognition is all-knowing or not. It should also be noted that Abhāva or non-existence can never be a matter for direct perception, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, accordingly the Abhāva-pramāṇa i.e., the alleged knowledge by which Abhāva or non-existence (i.e., the non-existence of Omniscience) can be known becomes devoid of all perceptible contents. For all these reasons, the Pratyakṣa or direct perception cannot be said to oppose the possibility of Omniscience.

Nor can it be said that non-perception (*apratyakṣa*, i.e., a source or mode of knowledge which is not perception) opposes the possibility of Omniscience. For, it may be asked: In what does this non-perception consist? You cannot say that non-perception consisting in absence of perception shows the impossibility of

Omniscience (The meaning of the opponent's position is that when we are not in a state of perceiving, we do not perceive any Omniscient Being; non-perception consisting in the absence of perception, thus opposes Omniscience) The Jainas contend that this position is wrong. When we are in the state of sleep (a mode of non-perception in the sense of absence of perception) we do not perceive any water, pillar, pitcher, lotus, cloud etc., but these cannot be said to be non-existent then on that account. The Jainas further point out how non-perception in the sense of cognition which is different from perception does not oppose the reality of Omniscience. Such non-perception is either of a positive nature or of a negative nature. Let us take first the case of positive non-perception. A non-perception (i.e., a mode of knowledge which is not perception) of a positive nature is either Inference (*anumāna*) or Authoritative knowledge (*śabda*) or necessary Implication (*anvāpatti*) or Analogical Argument (*upamāna*). The Jainas point out how none of these modes of valid knowledge is opposed to Omniscience. In all Inference, there must be a subject (*dharma*), about which or whom something is to be predicated, with which a Reason or Mark (*hetu*) is inseparately connected. Now, in the alleged Inference about the impossibility of Omniscience, what is this Subject? The subject is either Omniscience or a Person. Now, if you put forward the argument, 'Omniscience is impossible', your Inference will be fallacious; for, you do not admit the reality of Omniscience, so that any Hetu connected with it must be *Āśrayāsiddha*, i.e., the Abode of the Hetu will be unproved. Nor can you build up an Inference by putting forward a Person as

the Dharmī or the subject of the Inference. For, two alternative questions crop up, is the Person Omniscient or is he something else? Now, if you say that the subject of the Inference is an omniscient Person, we may ask: Is the Person known to be omniscient by you or is he judged by others to be omniscient? If you hold the first alternative view and say that you have known the person who is the Subject of your Inference, to be omniscient, then you cannot develop any Inference about the inomniscience of that person, for, your previous knowledge about the Omniscience of the person will be a bar to your further Inference about his inomniscience. If, on the other hand, you say that the Subject or the Dharmī of your Inference is the person (e.g., Vardhamāna etc.), who is accepted by others (e.g., by the Jinas) as an omniscient Being, what is your Proven (i.e., the Sādhya or that which you want to prove about him)? It can be either non-existence (i.e., Vardhamāna did never exist as a real person) or inomniscience (i.e., Vardhamāna was never Omniscient). You cannot maintain the first view, for, the historic existence of Vardhamāna is not disputed by you. You can only hold the second view and say that Vardhamāna was not Omniscient. But what is your 'reason'? Is it 'experience' (*upalabdhi*) or is it 'non-experience' (*anupalabdhi*)? Experience (*upalabdhi*) is either the experience of something which is 'not opposed' (*avivuddha*) to the Proven (i.e., something which is to be proved, i.e., Omniscience) or something which is 'opposed' (*vivuddha*) to the Proven. The first mode of experience cannot serve your purpose. you cannot deny Omniscience in Vardhamāna, if you put forward the ground that facts have been experienced which do

not oppose Omniscience in him. The Viruddha-upalabdhi or the experience of something which is opposed to the Proven (i.e., omniscience in the present case), on the other hand, is either the experience of something *directly* (*sāksāt*) contradicting the Proven; or the experience of something, *inseparably connected with* (*vyāpta*) what contradicts the Proven; or the experience of something which is the *effect* (*kārya*) of what contradicts the Proven; or the experience of something which is the *cause* (*kāraṇa*) of what contradicts the Proven, or the experience of phenomena which accompany etc. (*sahacara* etc.) what contradicts the Proven. The first of these is not applicable, because nothing has been experienced which can prove in-omniscience (*which directly contradicts omniscience*) in Vardhamāna. As regards the other four modes of the Viruddha-upalabdhi, it should be premised that the Proven in the present case being Omniscience, what is Opposed to the Proven (*viruddha*) is in-omniscience or limited knowledge; what is *inseparately connected* (*vyāpta*) with this in-omniscience (i. e., what is opposed to the Proven) is the knowledge of a limited number of things only, what is the *effect* (*kārya*) of the in-omniscience is the teacher-ship of a limited number of things only, what is the *cause* (*kāraṇa*) of this in-omniscience is the partial subsidence of the knowledge enveloping Karma; and what are the *accompaniments* (*sahacara*) etc., of this in-omniscience are the feelings of attachment and envy etc. Now there is no evidence of the existence in Vardhamāna of any of these in order to make possible the experience in him of any of these viz., 'the knowledge of a limited number of things only', 'the teachership of a limited number of things only',

'the partial subsidence from his soul of the knowledge-enveloping Karmas' and 'the feelings of attachment and envy' etc. Here the opponents may argue that Speaker-ship (i.e., the fact that Vardhamāna used to speak or lecture to his listeners) is found in him; one, having omniscience, does not speak; it is only an inomniscient person that lectures, speaker-ship is thus the effect of inomniscience, (i.e., what contradicts the Proven or omniscience), and this speakership being found in him (*viruddha-kārya-uplabdhi*), omniscience (i.e., the Proven) cannot be predicated of him. The Jaina reply to this contention is as follows. What sort of speakership is it which is 'the effect of what is opposed to Omniscience'? Does such speaker-ship consist in 'speaking about things which are opposed to the things of valid knowledge'? Vardhamāna did not speak about such false things and so such a speakership, as a 'reason' (*hetu*) for the conclusion about Vardhamāna's inomniscience is 'unproved' (*asiddha*). Or, does such speaker-ship consist in 'speaking about things which are not opposed to the things of valid knowledge'? Now, if you put forward this kind of speakership as the 'reason' for your conclusion about Vardhamāna's inomniscience, then your 'reason' (*hetu*) is *Viruddha* or opposed to what you want to prove; for, the fact that Vardhamāna used to speak about things which are not opposed to the things of valid knowledge is a competent *Hetu* for the *Sādhya*, i.e., his Omniscience and not his inomniscience (which you want to prove). Thirdly, if you contend that speakership itself, i.e., the very fact that Vardhamāna speaks at all is the *Hetu* for the conclusion about his inomniscience, your *Hetu* is 'doubtful' (*anekānta*); for, while speakership is found

with inomniscience, it is also found to be not opposed to the effect of Omniscience. It is thus that the Jains show how Experience (*upalabdhi*) does not prove that a Person like Vardhamāna is inomniscient.

Does Non-experience (*anupalabdhi*) establish the inomniscience of Vardhamāna? Non-experience is either 'the non-experience of the opposite of the Proven' (*viruddha-anupalabdhi*) or 'the non-experience of what is not opposed to the Proven' (*aviruddha-anupalabdhi*). The former establishes a positive fact; an instance of it is the argument: A thing has many aspects; for, the fact of its having one and the same aspect 'is not perceived'. It is obvious that the *Viruddha-anupalabdhi* can establish only a positive conclusion, e.g., that Vardhamāna is Omniscient; it does not establish a negative fact, Vardhamāna is not Omniscient. The *Aviruddha-anupalabdhi*, again, may be either *Svabhāva-anupalabdhi* (i.e., 'the non-perception of the nature of the Proven') or *Vyāpaka-anupalabdhi* (i.e., 'the non-perception of that which pervades the Proven') or *Kārya-anupalabdhi* (i.e., 'the non-perception of the effect of the Proven'), or *Kāraṇa-anupalabdhi* (i.e., 'the non-perception of the cause of the Proven'), or *Sahacara-ādī-anupalabdhi* (i.e., 'the non-perception of the accompaniments etc. of the Proven'). The first of these, viz., the *Svabhāva-anupalabdhi* may be either 'pure non-perception' or 'non-perception having a conscious positive content'. The 'pure non-perception', however, does not prove the impossibility of Omniscience. As regards 'the non-perception having a positive conscious content' as a *Hetu* or 'reason' for Vardhamāna's inomniscience, it is *Asiddha* (i.e., 'unproved') Omniscience, is a subtle attribute and as such it is not a

matter for sense-perception; the non-perception of Omniscience through the sense-organs, however, does not prove its non-existence in Vardhamāna. The other modes of the Aviruddha-anupalabdhi also do not establish the impossibility of Omniscience. What 'pervades' (*vyāpaka*) Omniscience is the direct cognition of all objects, the effect (*kārya*) of Omniscience is to impart instructions regarding super-sensuous matters; the cause (*kāraṇa*) of omniscience is the subsidence of all knowledge-enveloping Karmas, the accompaniments etc (*sahacāra-ādi*) of Omniscience are spotless Right Conduct etc. Now, it cannot be proved that these (i.e., the direct cognition of all objects, the teachership about supersensuous matters etc. were not found in Vardhamāna. Hence it is that the Vyāpaka anupalabdhi etc., also are Asiddha Hetus, so far as Vardhamāna's in omniscience is concerned.

The above are the difficulties in the way of the opponent who tries to prove the impossibility of Omniscience by putting forward an Omniscient Person as the Dharmī or the subject of the Inference. Nor would he fare better, if the Dharmī or the subject of the Inference be put forward as a person, different from an Omniscient Being. For, in that case, the reasoning would establish only that an in omniscient person is in omniscient, a fact which is not disputed but which is irrelevant for the matter of the present dispute regarding the possibility of Omniscience.

For all these reasons, Anumāna or Inference cannot be said to be opposed (*bādhaka*) to the possibility of Omniscience.

The Jainas next point out how the Sabda or Scriptural or authoritative knowledge does not contradict

Omniscience. For, if it be said that the Scriptural Authority opposes the possibility of Omniscience (The Mīmāṃsā thinkers contend that as in the Vedas we never come across such expressions as Omniscience, it must be held to be impossible), the question is: Is such Scripture man-made or not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*)? A Scripture which consists in words, cannot be held to be not-man-made: in other words, there cannot be any Apauruṣeya Scripture. All Scriptures are man-made. Now, the authors of the Scriptures were either Omniscient or inomniscient. If you say that the author of your Scripture was an Omniscient person, how can you say that the Scriptural authority opposes the possibility of Omniscience? If on the other hand, the author of your Scripture be held not to be omniscient, it may be asked: Did he see the nature of all persons before he made his Scripture? If he did, then he himself is an Omniscient person and as such, his Scripture cannot be opposed to Omniscience. If he did not, then his Scripture is no authority.

Nor can it be said that Arthāpatti or Necessary Implication as a source of valid knowledge is opposed to Omniscience. There is nothing which is true, being established by the six Pramāṇas but which becomes impossible unless Omniscience be held to be not possible.

Nor is Upamāna a Bādhaka to Omniscience; the matter of Upamāna being the points of similarity between two or more things.

Hence it is that the Pramāṇas which consist in positive knowledge, are not opposed to the possibility of Omniscience.

It cannot be said further that the Pramāṇa which is called Abhāva and which consists in negative know-

ledge opposes Omniscience. The negative knowledge, i.e., the knowledge about the non-existence of a thing or phenomena is possible only when the five modes of the proof about its existence are wanting. In the case of Omniscience, however, it may be said that its possibility and reality are established by Anumāna or inferential proof. Accordingly, it can never be the business of the Pramāna called the Abhāva to negate the possibility and reality of Omniscience.

Hence it cannot be contended that Omniscience is impossible because there are Bādhakas to it

Nor can it be said that Sādhakas or proofs in support of Omniscience are wanting. It has been shown how Anumāna or Inference establishes the fact of its possibility and reality.

The Jama position is thus vindicated (against the Mīmāṃsā theory) that Omniscience is possible and real

तद्वानर्हन् निर्दोषत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

tadvān arhan nirdosatvāt ॥ 24 ॥

TRANSLATION: Arhat is possessed of that, as he has no faults.

COMMENTARY. The Arhat is possessed of Omniscience as He is devoid of the 'faults' of attachment, envy and ignorance. The commentator puts the matter of the aphorism in a syllogistic form thus:- 'The Arhat is omniscient; as he is devoid of the faults: one who is not so, is not so; as for instance, a man in the street; the Arhat is so, hence he is Omniscient.

निर्दोषोऽसौ प्रमाणाविरोधिवाक्यत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

nir-doso'sau pramāṇāvirōdhi-vākya-tvāt | 25 |

TRANSLATION: He is devoid of faults, as His words are unopposed to the Pramāṇa.

COMMENTARY: The commentator puts the matter of the aphorism in a syllogistic form thus.- 'The Arhat is devoid of faults, as His words are unopposed to the Pramāṇa: One who is not devoid of faults has not his words unopposed to the Pramāṇa, as for instance, a man in the street; the Arhat has his words unopposed to the Pramāṇa, hence He is devoid of faults'.

तदिष्टस्य प्रमाणेनाबाध्यमानत्वात् तद्वाचस्तेनावि-

रोधसिद्धिः ॥ २६ ॥

*tadiṣṭasya pramāṇenābadhyamānatvāt tadvacas
tenāvirodhasiddhiḥ* | 26 |

TRANSLATION: As his doctrine is not contradicted by the Pramāṇa the non-opposition of his words to it is established.

COMMENTARY: The doctrine of the Arhat is the theory of the Anekānta or manifold predication. The commentator puts the matter of the aphorism in a syllogistic form thus:- 'The Arhat has always His words unopposed to the Pramāṇa; as His doctrines are not contradicted by the Pramāṇa; one whose doctrine is not contradicted by the Pramāṇa on an occasion has his words unopposed to the Pramāṇa so

far as that occasion is concerned; as for instance., a physician in a case of disease; the doctrines of the Arhat, e g., the theory of the manifold predication etc., are not contradicted by the Pramāna, hence he has his words unopposed to the Pramāna'. It is in this way established that it is the Arhat who is Omniscient.

To the above theory of the Jainas about the Omniscience of the Arhat, the philosophers of the Nyāya school object and contend that it is not proper to attribute Omniscience to the Arhat, because Omniscience can be possible only in the Divine Architect (Śiva) who has formed the earth, the mountain and the other things of the world. Their argument is. 'The things in question, e.g., the earth, the mountain etc. must have been designed by an Intelligent being; because their origin is due to causes; Whatever has its origin due to causes, is designed by an intelligent being; as for instance, a temple, they have such (origin); hence they must be so! The Nyāya thinkers substantiate the above Hetu or reason of theirs in the following way:- The 'reason', i. e., 'having origin due to causes' is not 'unknown' (*apratīta*), either to the disputant or to the opponent, for, 'every finite being having his birth in this world knows that every thing, e g., the earth, the mountain, is brought about or comes out from its own peculiar causes. Nor is the 'reason' a 'doubtful' (*samśigdha*) one; for, the things of the world are definitely known to be different from such self-existent and eternal elements as Ether (*Ākāśa*) etc., which shows that the former are not self-existent but that they have their origin due to causes. For the very same reason (i.e., their difference from the self-existent reals) the 'reason' is not 'opposed' (*viuddha*).

Perception, Inference and the reliable sources of valid knowledge do not go against (*abādhitā*) the theory propounded here; nor is the theory an 'undesirable' (*anabhipreta*) one. The Nyāya philosophers show also how an argument contradicting theirs is not maintainable. An argument is sometimes put forward like this: 'The Lord presiding over the things of the world cannot be the Maker of the earth, the mountain etc., for, he is devoid of a body: just like the abstract or transcendental soul'. The thinkers of the Nyāya School set aside the argument by asking: Is the said Lord established (i. e., capable of being understood) by intelligence or is he not so established? In the latter case, the very subject of the argument being unknown and unknowable, the argument would fail in establishing a sure and intelligible conclusion. If on the other hand it be conceded that the Lord is intelligible through reason, then the very argument which makes him so intelligible would also present him as the wise and intelligent Architect who knows how to form and arrange the reals of the universe; and such being the case, the fact that he is devoid of a body cannot establish any theory which is opposed to that of Nyāya thinkers. It is thus that they contend that their argument, 'things, e.g., the mountains etc., must have been made by an Intelligent being, because their origin is due to causes' is quite sound.

The Jainas begin their criticism of the above Nyāya theory by challenging its basis, i. e., the contention, 'things have their origin due to causes'. They ask: Does this origin refer to the substance (*dravya*) underlying the things or does it refer to them as modes (*paryāya*).

If it be said that the origination of things is with reference to their substance, the proposition becomes inadmissible (*apratīta*): for, according to the Jāmas, things, e. g., the earth, the mountain etc. are eternal, (i. e., have no origin) so far their underlying substances are concerned. The Nyāya thinkers contend: 'Things, e. g., the earth, the mountain etc. have their origin, because they are composite or conglomerate (*avayavi*); whatever is so, has origin, as for instance, a lotus; things are composite, hence they have their origin (i. e., are not self-existent and eternal)'. The Jaina philosophers criticise this contention by asking: What is meant by the 'composite character' of a thing? Does it mean that its component parts (i. e., atoms) bring it into existence or that parts (atoms) exist in it? The first of these positions is not admitted by the Jāmas; it is not admitted by them that the given things, e. g., the earth, the mountain etc. are the first things which come out of the parts (atoms). As regards the second position, we have the fact of a number of parts (atoms) only before us (discovered by reasoning) and the question of the origin of things does not arise, the atoms being admitted to be eternal. The Naiyāyikas point out that there is no use in such subtle reasoning; things do unquestionably appear to be composite. The Jāmas argue the perception of a thing as composite does not prove that it must have an Origin; the soul, for instance, is found to have different phases in it but is never held to have an origin, on that account.

If it be contended that 'things having modifications (*pariyāya*) from time to time have their origin due to causes; then, a soul which is sometimes a god,

sometimes a man and so on must also be supposed to have been made by an Intelligent Being. The Naiyāyikas meet this difficulty by pointing out that a soul is never made nor is ever destroyed; in the case of a god or a man etc., what is made is the body which is the seat of various sensations and feelings and which is brought about by the Dharma and the Adharma, peculiar forces generated by the actions of conscious beings. The Nyāya thinkers urge that if the soul be held to be capable of being generated and destroyed then the position, because of its denial of an immutable soul underlying the series of preceding and succeeding births, becomes identical with rank materialism, according to which, only the material elements are real. The Jaina philosophers criticise this Nyāya contention by pointing out the difficulties in the theory of an absolutely unchanging Soul. They urge that if a soul be held not to change with the change of surroundings and circumstances, it would only hold the impressions and ideas of its first incarnation and would be, on account of its absolutely unadaptable and immutable nature, unable to have the impressions and ideas of the next incarnations. But a Soul has admittedly different ideas and experiences in its different incarnations and the Jainas urge that from this point of view, a Soul may be said to have genesis from time to time. At the same time, the Jainas take care in differentiating this their genetic theory of the soul from the materialistic position. They point out that consciousness continues to be inseparably and permanently attached to the soul, persisting through its successive incarnations; this shows that the substance of the soul is eternal. According to

the materialists, however, there is no constant consciousness attaching to the substance of the soul; they maintain that consciousness is but a property of matter.

The Jama philosophers next point out how the 'subject' of the Naiyāyika inference (i. e., the Intelligent Divine Architect) is contradicted by our sensuous experience, just like Sound, if it be said to be visible like colour or form. The subject of their inference, according to the Naiyāyikas is, as we have already seen, the things of the world, e. g., the earth, the mountain etc ; which are said to have been formed by an Intelligent Being. But at no time up till now has any Divine Architect been experienced or seen to have been forming them. Hence the Nyāya theory of the Divine Maker is opposed to experience. The Naiyāyikas try to escape this difficulty by urging that the Divine Maker being supersensuous cannot be the object of the sensuous experience; and thus the fact of his not being sensuously perceived does not invalidate the theory of the real existence of the Divine Maker.

The Jamas point out that an Inference is based on the Vyāpti-jñāna or knowledge about the invariable and inseparable relation between the Mark and the Proven. this Vyāpti-jñāna is impossible unless the Mark and the Proven be objects of experience; when the Mark and the Proven are not sensuously perceived, a knowledge of any inseparable relationship is impossible and the inference cannot be made. Thus, if the subject of the inference (e. g., the Intelligent Divine Maker) be held to be supersensuous, as is done by the Naiyāyikas, the inference about his real existence

becomes impossible and unreliable, as not being founded on a valid Vyāptijñāna. The Naiyāyikas however, contend that not unoften do we infer about things not actually seen. From 'smoke' in the hill we infer the existence of 'fire' in it, although fire is not actually seen there. The Jains point out that although fire is not actually perceived in the hill, the inference about it is quite correct, as fire is not something essentially invisible but is imperceptible for the time being, on account of some thing intervening and screening it from our view. When the screening thing is removed or when a man goes up the hill, fire is visible. Hence the inference about the fire in the hill although not actually seen there is valid. But in the case of the things of the world, e. g., the earth, the mountain etc. no amount of effort on any one's part would give an actual sight of their alleged Intelligent Maker; he is said to be essentially supersensuous. Hence an inference about him is always opposed by the faculty of sensuous perception. Lastly, the Jaina thinkers urge that the theory of the existence of the Intelligent world-maker based on analogical reasoning is shaky.

A house for instance, is a thing which has origin, due to a cause, viz., a man. The things of the world, e. g., the earth, the mountain etc., have, let us suppose, 'an origin due to a cause', if analogical reasoning is applied in the latter case, as is done by the Naiyāyikas, the conclusion would be, 'the things of the world were made by man'. The Naiyāyikas try to avoid this difficulty by saying that in the case of a house, it is held to be made by man, because we have experiences of other similar houses having been

made by man. But we have no previous experience of, say, a mountain having been made by man and hence the inference about the natural things of the world having been made by man would be unwarranted. The Jaina philosophers use this line of argument against the Naiyāyikas themselves and ask: We have no previous experience of any natural thing having ever been made by any Intelligent world-maker; how then can you say that the things of the world were made by an Intelligent Divine Architect. Here the Nyāya thinkers may urge that just as a house has an intelligent maker, the things of the world have also an Intelligent maker. The Jainas reiterate that analogy which is sought to be applied here may as well show that just as a house has man as its maker, the things of the world also have man as their maker. The Naiyāyikas here point out that a house is different from the natural things, and accordingly, although man may be the maker of a house, he cannot be said to be the maker of the natural things of the world. The Jainas once more turn this Naiyāyika line of argument against the Naiyāyika contention and say: A house is different from a natural thing, e. g., a mountain, a house although not actually found in the process of being made by an intelligent being, is nevertheless held to be made by an intelligent being, now as a house is different from a natural thing, what is said of a house cannot be said of a natural thing; in other words, although a house may be said to have been made by an intelligent being, you cannot say that a natural thing was also made by an intelligent being.

It is thus that the Jainas prove that the simple fact that 'a thing has its origin due to a cause' does not necessarily go to show how that cause must be an intelligent being. The things of the world do not thus show that they were made by an Intelligent Divine Demiurgus. The creation of the things of the world by God being un-established, the question of omniscience in the Creator-God does not arise

न च कवलाहारवत्त्वेन तस्यासर्वज्ञत्वम्, कवलाहार-
सर्वज्ञत्वयोरविरोधात् ॥ २७ ॥

*na ca kavalāhāravattvena tasyāsarvajñatvaṃ
kavalāhāra-sarvajñatvayor avirodhāt ॥ 27 ॥*

TRANSLATION: The fact of His taking morsels of food does not prove in omniscience in Him; because taking morsels of food and omniscience are not opposed to each other.

COMMENTARY. This aphorism is meant to refute the contention otherwise of the Digambara sect of the Jainas. The Sūtrakāra who belongs to the Śvetāmbara school of the Jainas supports his position by asking: Are these (i e, eating and Omniscience) directly opposed to each other? Or, are they indirectly so?

Obviously these are not directly opposed. The Antarāya or the Obstructive Karma as well as the Karma which envelopes omniscience being completely uprooted in an Omniscient Being, it cannot be said that his Omniscience prevents Him from getting morsels of food or that He is unable to eat them even

if He gets them, or that even if He is able to eat them, He does not eat them lest "the pure light of omniscience flies away"

If it be contended that eating and Omniscience are indirectly (i e, medately) opposed to each other, the possible alternative questions are. Is 'what pervades' (*vyāpaka*) the eating of morsels opposed to Omniscience? Or is the 'cause' (*kāraṇa*) of eating opposed to Omniscience? Or, is the 'effect' (*kārya*) of eating opposed to Omniscience? Or, are the 'accompanying circumstances' (*sahacara etc*) of eating opposed to Omniscience?

In taking up the consideration of these questions, it may be further asked, whether these (i e., the Vyāpaka, the Kāraṇa, the Kārya and the Sahacara etc. of eating) oppose Omniscience by excluding (*parihāra*) it or by not co-existing with (*anavasthāna*) it

The first of the two alternatives is untenable, for it implies that opposition-by-exclusion subsists only between the Vyāpaka etc. of eating and omniscience but between the Vyāpaka etc of eating and all forms of knowledge, which leads to the awkward position that eating becomes impossible for a cognising man

Let us now consider the second of the above alternatives, viz, that the Vyāpaka etc. of eating opposes omniscience by not co-existing with it

The Vyāpaka of eating is throwing something into the stomach by means of some peculiar power This is quite possible in a person who attains omniscience; for when Omniscience is attained, all Antarāya or obstructive Karmas which obstruct '*Vñya*' or power in a person are radically up-rooted, so that the

power or capacity to throw food into the stomach is certainly there in an omniscient being.

The Kāraṇa or cause or condition of eating is either external or internal. The external condition is either the food or the pot in which the food is kept or the gross physical body of the consumer. The food cannot be said to be opposed to Omniscience. Food has got nothing to do with the nature or the extent of our knowledge. If food were opposed to knowledge, it would have been impossible for human beings like us to have knowledge. Besides, if food and knowledge were opposed to each other we must have a consciousness of such opposition; the fact that we have no consciousness of such opposition between food and knowledge goes to show that food does not oppose Omniscience. As regards the food-Pot being opposed to omniscience the question does not arise in the case of the Lord Arhat; for, the Lord does not use any pot but holds the food and eats it from the palms of His hands. Omniscient Beings other than the Arhat no doubt use food-pots but in Their case also, the pots do not oppose their omniscience. The nature of the food-pot can have nothing to do with one's Omniscience. Besides, an Omniscient Being is absolutely free from all feelings of attachment; He can have no feeling of attachment for a food-pot, so that a food-pot cannot be said to oppose His Omniscience in anyway. Nor can it be said that if there be a food-pot for an Omniscient Being, He must have some feeling of attachment towards it and thereby lose His Omniscience. The contention is refuted by the fact that although an Omniscient Being has a body he has no feeling of attachment to it. Finally, it cannot be con-

tended that the gross physical body of the Omniscient Being, if it consumes food, would oppose His Omniscience. A physical body has got nothing to do with one's Omniscience, which is proved by the admitted fact that a saint attains Omniscience, while still encased in a body

The internal cause or condition of eating also does not oppose Omniscience. The internal condition of eating is either the (subtle) body or the Karma. The former is not opposed to Omniscience, because it is an admitted fact that the *Tajjasa* or the brilliant (subtle) body which underlies the operation of eating (*bhukti-hetu*) exists with a Being even when He has attained Omniscience. If, on the other hand, the internal condition of eating be said to be Karma, it may be asked: Is it *Ghāti* (destructive) or *Aghāti* (non-destructive)? If it be *Ghāti*, does it consist in *Moha* (stupefaction) or does it consist in something other? If the *Ghāti* Karma which is said to be the internal condition of eating, consist in something other than *Moha*, it may be asked; does it consist in enveloping knowledge (*Jñānāvarana*)? Or, does it consist in enveloping intuition (*Darśanāvarana*)? Or, does it consist in obstruction (*Antarāya*)? The functions of the former two, viz., the *Jñānāvarana* and the *Darśanāvarana* are only to envelope knowledge and intuition and need not be considered here, as they cannot be the internal conditions of eating in any way. The third, i.e., the *Antarāya*-karma also is not the internal condition of eating; for, the power of eating is attained only when the *Antarāya* which obstructs it, subsides. It should be remembered that in an Omniscient being all sorts of the *Antarāya*-karma are destroyed so that the Omniscient Being is

possessed of all powers including the power of eating. Let us next consider if Moha, as the alleged internal condition of eating, is opposed to Omniscience Moha? Is it stupefaction characterised by hunger? Or is it stupefaction in general? In the former case we ask. Is hunger the condition of eating in all cases? Or is it the condition of eating in our cases only? It may be contended in support of the first alternative position that all conscious acts including the act of eating are voluntary, i e, are preceded by a will; a conscious being first of all *thinks*, then *desires* or *wills*; then, *attempts* or *exerts* himself; and then does an act. The contention thus is that eating being an act, it must be preceded or conditioned by something; this something is hunger which is thus the condition of eating, accordingly if an Omniscient being be found to eat, He would be held to have hunger and as such He must be said to be imperfect and inomniscient. The Śvetāmbara school of the Jainas refute this contention by urging that hunger need not be the condition of eating in all cases, they maintain that all acts need not be preceded by a conscious and determining will. There are many acts which are clearly involuntary. Persons when sleeping or in a drunken state or in an unconscious condition do many acts which are not preceded by a conscious will. It is also an admitted fact that the acts of an Omniscient being, e.g., His staying and movements etc. are strictly self-determined and absolutely free, even though his acts are preceded by their usual means and antecedents. Hence it is that eating in the case of an Omniscient being does not oppose His Omniscience, because eating in his case is possible without

there being any hunger in Him. Coming to the second alternative, viz., the contention that hunger is the precondition for eating in our case, the Śvetāmbara thinker points out that this does not prove that the perfect and the Omniscient being also must have hunger, because he is found to eat. The Śvetāmbara theory is that the Omniscient Being eats because He has Vedanīya Karma (i. e., Karma which causes feelings of pleasure or pain) etc. left in him. Nor can it be contended that Moha or Stupor in general is the condition of eating, for, this implies that all acts are preconditioned by stupor; but the difficulty in this theory is its inability to explain the admitted fact that although the Omniscient being is completely devoid of all modes of stupor, He still does the acts of moving, staying, preaching etc. If it be contended that not Moha or stupor but the Ghāti Karma (i. e., Karma which determines one's status as a god or a man or as a sub-human creature or as an infernal being) etc. are the condition of his moving etc., Śvetāmbara reply is. Why not acknowledge that not Moha but the Vedanīya Karma etc. are the reasons for the Omniscient Beings' taking food? Thus it is that the Ghāti-karma as an internal condition of eating cannot be opposed to Omniscience. Is then the Aghāti-karma as an internal Karma of eating opposed to Omniscience?

Now, if the Aghāti-karma be said to be the internal condition of eating, it may be asked. What mode of the Aghāti is it? Is it the Āhāra-paryāpti, a mode of the Nāma-karma? Or is it the Vedanīya? The Nāma-karma is the material force which is instrumental in building up a body and all things

bodily. The Āhāra-paryāpti is a mode of this Nāma-karma which consists in a capacity to bring in molecules, requisite for the actual construction of the body. The Vedanīya is the pleasure-bearing or the pain-bearing Karma. The Śvetāmbara commentator points out that the Āhāra-paryāpti and the Vedanīya may be admitted to be the internal Kāraṇa of eating not severally but jointly. He urges that when the Āhāra-paryāpti, which is a mode of the Nāma-karma and which consists in a capacity to take in molecules competent to build up a body, arises in a being and there arises in him the Vedanīya-karma, consisting in a strong burning stomach-fire, it is then that the person takes to eating. But these two joint causes of eating are not opposed to Omniscience, inasmuch as the existence of the Āhāra-paryāpti and the Vedanīya in an Omniscient Being is admitted by the non-Śvetāmbara School of the Jainas also. The next contention of the opponent School in this connection is that the Aghāti-karma alone cannot be the cause of eating. The Aghāti-karma attended with Moha or stupefaction, causes one to eat, so that if the Omniscient Being is held to eat food, He must be supposed to have Moha in him, which is impossible. To this contention, the Śvetāmbara reply is that the causality of the Aghāti-karma unattended with Moha is not impossible just as the causality of such Karmas as Ghāti etc., is possible without their being accompanied by Moha. The opponent School try to refute this theory of the Śvetāmbara Jainas by saying that all Karmas which are of an evil nature depend upon Moha for their activity. The Ghāti, etc. are Karmas no doubt but they are not of an evil nature, hence

they are not dependent on Moha for their operation. But the Aghāti-karma, so far as eating is concerned, is of an evil nature because the Vedanīya-karma which is the moving cause of eating is Asātā or pain-bearing. Hence it is that the Aghāti Karma which is at the root of eating must depend on Moha for its operation, so that the theory of an eating omniscient Being leads to the absurd position that the Omniscient Being has Moha in him. The Śvetāmbara commentator refutes this criticism of their doctrine in this way. How do you say that Karmas of an evil nature must necessarily be attended with Moha? An appeal to our experience is of no help here. Because our experience shows that not only some of the evil Karmas but some of the good Karmas also are accompanied by Moha. But you are not nor anybody is prepared to admit that the good Karmas have Moha as their motive concomitant. The fact is that Moha is not an inseparable and necessary attendant of the Karmas. It is thus that eating due to the Aghāti-karma with its two modes, i. e., the Āhāra-paryāpti and the Vedanīya, independently of the Moha, is possible in an Omniscient Being. The Karma or the cause of eating is accordingly not opposed to Omniscience. Nor does the Kārya or the effect of eating oppose Omniscience. The opponent may contend that eating gives a sensation of taste which opposes Omniscience; but his contention is unsound. The Omniscient may eat but his eating would not generate any sensation of taste in him. It is an admitted fact that the gods constantly shower sweet-scented flowers on the Omniscient Being but that this does not produce any sensation of smell

in Him. The next contention of the opponent is that the Omniscient cannot be said to eat because eating would disturb His contemplation. This contention is also not maintainable. Acts like eating have nothing to do with one's contemplation. For a considerable time before He attains Omniscience, the Omniscient abstains from taking food; but in spite of the fact of His non-eating. He has not the pure contemplation during that period. This shows that eating has nothing to do with pure contemplation. Then when He attains Omniscience, He has the pure contemplation which is endless and can never be disturbed. It is an admitted fact that the pure contemplation of the Omniscient is not disturbed even when he does the acts of coming and going. It can safely be said accordingly that the act of eating cannot disturb the endless and the unmodifiable pure contemplation of the Omniscient. Nor can the opponent contend that the Omniscient Being cannot be said to eat, because eating would be an obstacle to His practice of doing good to others. The Omniscient Being finishes His eating within a very short time in the third quarter of the day; for the remaining portion of the day, He remains completely free for acts of charity. Fourthly, it cannot be apprehended that if the Omniscient eats, He may have the chance of being attacked with cholera; for, the Omniscient eats only what is good and moderate in quantity. Fifthly, the opponent cannot contend that eating may prevent the Omniscient from taking care in walking; for, the carefulness of the Omniscient is absolute. He never deviates from it, even when he walks; how then, can eating disturb his carefulness? Nor can the opponent contend

that eating cannot be predicted of the Omniscient as it would produce in the Omniscient such shameful and dirty acts as making stools etc. Because, the question is To whom are those acts shameful and dirty? Not certainly to the Omniscient Himself, because He being absolutely devoid of all forms of Moha, nothing can appear to be shameful or dirty to him. If it be said that those acts are shameful and dirty to beings other than Him, the reply is that no act of the Omniscient Arhat has ever appeared to be so to anyone. For instance, it may be pointed out that the Omniscient Arhat sits in an assembly of men, gods, devils and their ladies in a completely naked state but to none of them nakedness of the Omniscient Arhat has ever appeared as undesirable. The objector may urge that the Omniscient Lord is the supreme Being and that therefore His nakedness might not appear to be objectionable. The Śvetāmbara Jaina arguing in the same line points out that the Omniscient Arhat being a superhuman Being, His acts of discharging stool etc. are never visible to the eyes of the worldly beings. As regards the Omniscient Beings other than the Arhat, the Śvetāmbara thinker urges that those acts of theirs never appear to be shameful or dirty to people visiting them, as they do those acts in lonely places. Nor finally can it be contended that eating must be denied in an Omniscient Being because it would engender lethargy and sleep in him; for, lethargy and sleep are the effects of Moha and the Omniscient is absolutely devoid of Moha. Hence it is that *kārya* or the effect of eating also is not opposed to Omniscience.

Nor can it be contended that the *sahacana* or the attendant circumstances of eating can oppose

Omniscience. For, What is the Sahacara of eating, so that it is opposed to Omniscience? Is it something which consists in the nature of the Omniscience or is it something else? The former, i. e., the spiritual uplift of the Arhat is obviously not opposed to His Omniscience. If, then, the Sahacara of eating be conceived as something else than the nature of the Omniscience, it would consist in such inessential acts as moving the hand, the mouth etc. Obviously, these acts do not oppose Omniscience in a Being. The Sahacara of eating is thus not opposed to Omniscience.

In the same way it may be shown that the Uttara-cara (i. e., circumstances or matters subsequent to eating etc.) do not oppose Omniscience. Thus it is that eating and Omniscience are not opposed to each other.

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकारे प्रत्यक्षस्वरूपनिर्णयो नाम
द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

*iti pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāre pratyakṣa-
svarūpa-nirṇayo nāma dvitīyaḥ paricchedaḥ ॥*

TRANSLATION: Here ends the second chapter of the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra entitled the Determination of the nature of the Pratyaksa (or the Direct knowledge).

CHAPTER III

अस्पष्टं परोक्षम् ॥ १ ॥

aspastaṁ-parokṣam । 1 ।

TRANSLATION: The Indirect (knowledge) is not clear.

COMMENTARY: What is meant by 'clearness' has already been said. The Parokṣa Pramāna or the Indirect knowledge is wanting in that 'clearness'.

स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदात्तत्पञ्चप्रकारम्

॥ २ ॥

smaraṇa-pratyabhijñāna-taṁkānumānāgama-bhedāt

tat pañca-prakāram । 2 ।

TRANSLATION: It is of five kinds inasmuch as it may be 'Recognition', 'Conception', 'Induction', 'Deduction' and 'Authoritative Knowledge'.

COMMENTARY: This is clear

तत्र संस्कारप्रबोधसंभूतमनुभूतार्थविषयं तदित्याकारं

संवेदनं स्मरणम् । ३ ॥

*tatra saṁskāra-prabodha-saṁbhūtam anubhūtārtha-
viśayam tad ity ākāraṁ saṁvedanaṁ smaraṇam* । 3 ।

TRANSLATION: Recognition is the recollection of an object cognised before, in the form, 'it is that', and is due to the waking up of an impression.

COMMENTARY. In this sūtra, Smarana or Recognition is defined. The soul has the power or characteristic to have or retain a Saṃskāra or impression. When this Saṃskāra wakes up (*prabodha*) or comes up before it once more for yielding the fruit, we have the Smarana. This is the *cause* of recognition. The object of recognition is an object cognised before and this object may be a conscious being or an unconscious thing. Smarana consists in a form of knowledge, 'recalling' its object as 'that'. It is to be observed in this connection that not in all cases of statements based on Smarana, there should be an explicit use of 'That'. For example, the statement, 'Do you remember Caitra, we shall live in Kashmir and eat the grapes?' may be said to be a statement based on Recollection, although there is no use of 'That' or 'Those' in it. The fact is that the speaker speaks here of 'that Kashmir' and of 'those grapes' which are of his previous experience, so that the use of that or those is implied in the statement. This distinguishes Smarana from Pratyabhijñā, which consists in identification and conception or knowledge expressed always in such explicitly used words as 'That is but he'

तत्तीर्थकरबिम्बमिति यथा ॥ ४ ॥

tat tīrthakara-bimbam iti yathā । 4 ।

TRANSLATION. As for instance· That image of the Divine Teacher.

COMMENTARY· Here the statement and its corresponding form of cognition refer to an image of the Tīrthakara which was previously known, either through Direct Perception or through Recollection or through Conception or through Induction or through Deduction or through Authority. This as well as all forms of knowledge, based on a previous experience and expressed or expressible in judgements using 'that' or 'those', are instances of Smarana or Recollection

The philosophers of the Yauga School do not admit the Pramāṇa-hood of Smṛti; in other words, they do not admit that Recollection is a source of valid knowledge. They contend that Recollection arises from, i e., has for its matter Anartha or something which is not a present substance and that hence it cannot be said to consist in a valid knowledge. The Jainas set aside this contention of the Yauga School by pointing out that the mere fact that a form of knowledge has not a present substance for its matter does not show that it is not a form of valid knowledge. In such Inferences as 'there was a shower of rain', 'the constellation of stars, known as Śakata will arise', we have for their matters, phenomena which are past and future respectively, yet these Inferences are unquestionably valid forms of knowledge

There are other philosophers of the Yauga School who argue· Recollection is not valid knowledge; it revives the idea of the object of previous perception

and so far as the object of Recollection is concerned, it is wholly dependent on that previous perception. Inference, on the contrary, although for its genesis it is dependent on previous experience, is independent, so far as its object is concerned. In Inference we do not feel that the conclusion, i. e., the object of Inference is the same as that of a previous experience, which is the case in recollection. It is said 'Recollection is knowledge of objects which were already the objects of a previous experience: the validity of Recollection cannot be determined without referring to that previous experience. Hence that previous experience is the real valid knowledge, the business of Recollection being simply to revive the idea of its object.' The Jainas set aside the above contention of the Yauga School by pointing out that Recollection also is dependent on previous experience, only in so far as its genesis is concerned, it being possible because of the impressions left by the previous experience, but that as regards the determination of its object, it has independence. If it be argued that Recollection as a form of knowledge has no independence as it can do no more than reviving the idea of the object already experienced, then the retort may well be that inference also is not an independent source of valid knowledge, inasmuch as it does no more than establishing the fact which has already been proved by the premises that established 'pervasion' (the invariable connection between the Mark and the Proven). If it be argued that as the premises proving 'pervasion' dealt with a general truth (e. g., 'wherever there is smoke there is fire') and that as Inference establishes a concrete case (e. g., 'there is fire on that yonder hill-top') Inference

may be called an independent process, then it may be pointed out in reply that as previous experience gives us the knowledge of an object with many details and that as Recollection gives us the knowledge of the object with but a small number of details, Recollection also is an independent process. It may be argued that details in Recollection were known at the time of perception, for, otherwise their Recollection would be impossible (and that hence Recollection is not an independent process); to this the Jaina retort is: 'Why do you forget that 'fire' located in a particular place was also observed in the instances proving the 'pervasion', because, otherwise the Inference (proving the existence of Fire in a particular locality) would be impossible? (The meaning is that if you argue that because the details revived in Recollection were observed in perception, Recollection is not an independent process, it may be said that Inference also is then not an independent process, as its conclusion is implied in the premises, i e, the instances already observed). Again if it be contended that those premises gave us the instances of Fire of all times and of all places and that Inference establishes only one of such instances (thus showing that the matter of Inference is different from that of the premises), why the same thing may be said of Recollection (i e, Recollection revives only one or some and not all the details observed in Perception and is thus different from Perception). It may be said "Well, not in all cases does Recollection revive only some of the details, there are cases in which it is found to revive all the details, nay, even such details as colour etc., what can be its nature in such cases?"

(i e., is not Recollection identical with Perception in such cases, so far as its matter is concerned?) (Our answer is) No. In such cases, colour etc., are as much the particularities of the object as the fact that it is *being perceived*; but this (i e., the consciousness that the object is *being perceived*) is never present in Recollection: for, had that consciousness been present there, there would have been no Recollection but actual perception. In Recollection, what we have is the fact that the object was perceived. Hence it is established that Recollection is as much a source of valid knowledge as Inference.

The Jaina philosophers go on showing how the validity of Inference would be impossible without the validity of Recollection. They point out that Inference is dependent on a Recollection of the 'invariable relationship between the Mark and the Proven'. If the Recollection which thus revives the idea of the 'invariable relationship' be invalid (*apramāṇa*) then the 'invariable relationship' itself becomes incompetent for the purposes of the Inference, just as the 'invariable relationship' which is 'doubtful'. You cannot say that Recollection need not be a Pramāṇa in such cases its business being simply to re-collect the operation or the result of the evidences that established the Pervasion. For, a faithful recollection of such invariable relationship between the Mark and the Proven is impossible unless Recollection be a form of valid knowledge.

The Jaina thinkers finally point out that, according to the objectors themselves, Pramāṇa or valid knowledge has been defined as that by which an object is known. If what is known as the Dhārā-vāhika-Pratyakṣa or continued preception can be said to be a

Pramāna, there is no reason why Recollection should not be treated as a source of valid knowledge. The meaning may be made clear in this way. The Dhārāvāhika Pratyaksa is the perception of an object for a duration or continued period of time. A duration of time consists of many moments or points of time. Now, in the first moment of the perception we have certainly the perception of the object. If, then, in the succeeding moments, we have the perception of the same object, how can the Dhārāvāhika Pratyaksa be said to be a Pramāna which consists in a cognition of an (hitherto unknown) object? The Pramāna-hood of the Dhārāvāhika Pratyaksa is defended by pointing out the fact that in a perception we have along with the cognition of the object an apprehension of the peculiar factor or character of the moment, so that in the second moment, although we have the object of the first moment before us, the perception is not exactly the same as that of the first moment, the time factors and their consequent apprehensions being different in the two moments. Thus it is that in each moment of the Dhārāvāhika Pratyaksa, we have a distinct and separate perception peculiar to that moment, making the whole continued perception a very real source of valid knowledge. The Jamas urge that the Pramāna-hood of Recollection may be defended in a similar manner. The object of Recollection is no doubt the same as that of Perception. But just as the apprehension of the second moment in the Dhārāvāhika Pratyaksa has been shown to be different from that of the first moment, the cognitive process known as Recollection is distinguishable from perception.

अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं
संकलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ॥ ५ ॥

*anubhava-smṛti-hetukaṁ tiryag-ūrdhvatā-sāmānyādi-
gocaraṁ saṅkalanātmakaṁ jñānaṁ pratyabhijñānam* 151

TRANSLATION: Conception is due to Apprehension and Recollection and consists in a synthetic knowledge (of a thing under observation) with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essences underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics.

COMMENTARY: Pratyabhijñā is assimilative knowledge. Its causes are Apprehension and Recollection. The subject-matter of Pratyabhijñā is the characteristic or the group of characteristics inherent in the object under observation. The characteristics may be either Sāmānya or 'generalities' which make a thing similar to others or features which distinguish it from others. The Sāmānya again may be either Tiryak-sāmānya or Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya. The former is the group of characteristics which make a thing similar to the other members of its species. 'Go-tva' or Cow-hood is an instance of the Tiryak-sāmānya, representing the general characteristics common to the whole species of cows. The Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya is the immutable substratum which persists in and through the varied modifications of a thing. A lump of earth may now appear as a cup, then as a pitcher, next a doll and so on, but earth continues as the constant substratum of these earthen things. Earth is thus the Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya underlying these clay modifications.

Besides the Tīryak-sāmānya and the Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya, a thing has its own peculiar characteristics which distinguish it from other things. All these three classes of characteristics are the subject-matter of the Pramāna called Pratyabhijñā or Assimilation. The nature or business of conception is to present the thing under observation with reference to these characteristics.

यथा तज्जातीय एवायं गोपिण्डः, गोसदृशो गवयः ।

स एवायं जिनदत्त इत्यादि ॥ ६ ॥

*yathā tajjātīya evāyaṃ go-piṇḍaḥ, go-sadṛśo gava-
yah । sa evāyaṃ Jinadatta ityādi ॥ 6 ॥*

TRANSLATION. For example: That cow is of that species: a Gavaya is like a cow; he is that Jinadatta; etc

COMMENTARY The first example is one of the discovery of the Tīryak-sāmānya. The second example, although it is of the same nature, is introduced here to refute the position of the Nyāya School according to which the form of knowledge, 'A Gavaya is like a cow' is obtained through Upamāna. The Naiyāyikas confine Conception to Upamāna; and Upamāna, according to them, is a knowledge of the form 'a Gavaya is like a cow'. The objection of the Jainas is that if you restrict Conception to the form of the Upamāna of the Naiyāyika school, you will have to find some other Pramāna for such forms of knowledge as 'A Buffalo is dissimilar to cow.' The thinkers of Nyāya school analyse the process of the Upamāna in

the following way The fact that a Gavaya is similar to a cow is presented by perception, and then as a result of this at the sight of the Gavaya, there arises the cognition, 'That is the object signified by the word, Gavaya—an apprehension of the relationship of Samjñā (that which 'Defines') and Samjñī (that which is 'Defined'), a defining knowledge which is distinct from perception and all other sources of knowledge. Knowledge consisting in 'definition' is Upamāna The Jainas point out that the fact 'a Buffalo is dissimilar to a cow' is also presented by perception; and that as a result of this at the sight of Buffalo there arises the cognition, 'That is the object signified by the word, Buffalo.' This resulting knowledge about the Buffalo is also an apprehension of the relationship of Samjñā and Samjñī, a defining knowledge which is distinct from perception and all other sources of knowledge. Yet this knowledge about the Buffalo cannot be included in the Naiyāyika Upamāna which, as shown above, is based on observation of 'Similarity' only, as in the case of the Gavaya and not of Dissimilarity, as in the case of the Buffalo. This is hardly logical. The cognition about a Buffalo is as much definitive as the cognition about a Gavaya, so that it is unreasonable to exclude the former from the scope of Upamāna while including the latter in it. It cannot be said that the knowledge based on 'dissimilarity' does not lead to Definition. Take, for instance, the case. In a part of a forest, a group of animals, consisting of both Buffaloes and cows, was resting. A certain man was asked to bring a Buffalo from that group. Not knowing how a Buffalo looked, he asked what a Buffalo looked like and was told that a

Buffalo was dissimilar to a cow. The man went to that part of the forest and seeing a Buffalo there remembered the indicative description about the Buffalo and came to determine, that 'that is the animal, signified by the word, Buffalo' Hence the knowledge based on Dissimilarity may lead to Definition exactly in the same way as the knowledge based on Similarity. Take the next case. A man has the instruction 'a Gavaya is like a Cow', he sees a Horse which is dissimilar to a Cow and determines 'that is not the animal, signified by the word cow.' Under which Prāmāṇa would the Naiyāyika bring such judgement embodying a negative Definition? The Jainas take the right course by bringing all forms of knowledge negative or positive, which consist in comparison and synthesis (*saṃkalana*) under the one all-embracing Pratyabhijñā or conception. In the case of the Gavaya, Conception proceeds in this way. As soon as the man is told 'a Gavaya is like a cow' there arises in his mind a general idea of a Gavaya in a sketchy and schematic form as also an apprehension of the relation of the word Gavaya to that general idea. Then when the man roaming in the forest comes across a Gavaya he remembers the general idea of the Gavaya as well as his idea about the relationship of the word Gavaya to that general idea and comes to determine that 'that is the animal signified by the word, Gavaya, which is Pratyabhijñā or Conception based on *saṃkalana*, i. e., comparison and synthesis. The knowledge, 'that is the animal signified by the word Buffalo' is attained in the very same way (with this difference only that it starts with the instruction, 'a Buffalo is dissimilar

to a Cow') and is Pratyabhijñā or Conception accordingly.

The Jaina commentator goes on showing how the Mīmāṃsaka theory of Upamāna also is open to a criticism similar to that applied to the Naiyāyika. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, Upamāna as a valid form of knowledge is as follows. A man knows the Cow but has no experience about a Gavaya nor any instruction that 'a Gavaya is similar to a Cow'. He sees a Gavaya and determines: 'that Cow is similar to that (i. e., the animal before him, viz., Gavaya)'; this form of knowledge consisting in a cognition of Similarity is Upamāna, according to the thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā School. The objection of the Jaina commentator is that if you confine Upamāna to an apprehension of Similarity only, you are to find out some other Pramāna for such forms of knowledge as 'that Cow is dissimilar to that (e. g., Buffalo)' which consist in a cognition of Dissimilarity. The Mīmāṃsakas contend that Dissimilarity is 'non-existence (*abhāva*), i. e., want of Similarity' and that cognitions of Dissimilarity accordingly do really come under the Abhāva-Pramāna which is different from the Upamāna Pramāna. The Jainas criticise this contention by pointing out that a similar line of argument would show that Similarity is but 'The non-existence or want of Dissimilarity and that cognitions of Similarity are thus modes of the Abhāva Pramāna. The Mīmāṃsakas try to escape from this difficulty by pointing out that Similarity cannot be said to consist in non-existence or mere negation of Dissimilarity, as judgments incorporating Similarity are always positive assertions. The Jainas expose the weakness of this

contention by pointing out the judgments incorporating Dissimilarity also are often found to be positive assertions, so that there is no sense in describing Dissimilarity as only 'the negation of Similarity' and bringing the cognitions of Dissimilarity under the Abhāva-Pramāna.

'He is that self-same Jinadatta' too is an instance where Ūrdhvatā-Sāmānya, or substantial identity is the subject-matter of the Pratyabhijñā or conceptual knowledge. It should be observed that there must be an element of Recollection in all cases of Conception; but the second element in it need not be direct Apprehension or Perception always. In the judgment 'that very fire is inferred by me' 'That' refers to the element of Recollection, but the other element accompanying Recollection here is not perception but a matter of Inference (*anumāna*). Similarly in the judgment, 'That very object is hereby expressed', we have of course the element of Recollection, but the other element is neither Perception nor Inference here but Authoritative saying (*āgama*) These are nevertheless good cases of Conception, where Substantial Identity' is its object.

Such judgments as 'this is longer than that', 'that is shorter than that', 'this is minuter', 'this is grosser', 'this is nearer', 'this is swifter', 'this is more distant', 'that fire is brilliant', 'this sandal is sweet-scented' are instances of Saṃkalana (comparison and synthesis)

The Buddhists deny the Pramānahood of the Pratyabhijñā According to them our Conceptions are illusory as they are characterised by Saṃkalana or comparison and synthesis They say that it is true

that sometimes we have illusions like that of seeing two moons in the sky; but this does not show that the Pratyakṣa or the direct Apprehension is an illusory source of knowledge. The Pratyakṣa has been defined as 'free from mistake' (*abhrānta*); this characteristic of the Pratyakṣa is wanting in the vision of two moons and hence this vision is illusory and not Pratyakṣa at all. Where however we have Direct Apprehension which is 'free from such mistakes', we have the Pratyakṣa, which is thus a possible and valid source of knowledge. The Jainas reply that all knowledge which consists in mere Samkalana is not Conception. Knowledge, in order to be valid must be 'certain' (*vyavasāyī*) cognition, about the self or the not-self; so that where we have not the mere Samkalana but Samkalana along with the 'certain' cognition about the self or the not-self we have Conception which is thus not an essentially illusory mode of knowledge but is a Pramāna like the Pratyakṣa. The Buddhist philosophers urge that everything is momentary and that nothing, not phenomena lasting for a while, is mistaken to look for unity or identity in the various things and phenomena. The Jainas criticise the Buddhist theory of 'absolute impermanence' pointing out that the very Buddhist contention that all things are impermanent, assumes at least one permanent truth of the Doctrine of impermanence, and thus contradicts itself. The Jainas next show that even if things be impermanent, you cannot set aside all the forms of Conception. Rightly or wrongly, people do find unity and identity in things and the Jainas ask the Buddhists: If they do so wrongly, as you say, how do you account for this their mis-

take? If the Buddhists answer that this mistake is due to a Similarity in the succeeding phenomena, the question is Is there a real Similarity in those phenomena? If the Similarity in the things be real, then the Pramāṇahood of Pratyabhijñā which finds out the Similarity becomes irresistible. If, on the other hand, the Buddhists contend that each and everything is strictly peculiar (*svalakṣaṇa*) and that there is no real Similarity in the things, the Jainas point out that even this contention of the Buddhists admits the validity of that form of Pratyabhijñā which is expressed in such judgments as 'That is dissimilar or different from this'. The Buddhists answer that things are but the groupings of the atoms and that as such, the Dissimilarity also in things is not real. The Jainas point out that even this theory of the Buddhists cannot avoid the admission by them of the validity of such modes of the Pratyabhijñā as, 'That is a grosser grouping', 'That is a smaller grouping' etc. The Buddhists contend that even the groupings are not real and that it is only the individual atoms that are real. The Jainas urge that Buddhists in seeking to deny the validity of all forms of conception, only jump from one inconsistent position to another. If, as the Buddhists contend, there is neither Similarity nor Dissimilarity in the things and so on, then, what do they mean by their replies? If they say that by their arguments they are only expressing their subjective ideas and not the nature of any external thing, then the Buddhist theory that the external things have each a peculiar nature of its own goes. The Buddhists point out that the subjective ideas cannot be accounted for, unless external (particular) reals determining them are admitted. The

Jainas arguing in a similar line ask the Buddhists: How then are our idea of Similarity etc., be accounted for, unless you admit the reality of the Universals outside us? If the Buddhists argue that our ideas of Similarity need not be explained by any real counterparts external to and independent of us but that they can be accounted for by *Vāsanā* or a peculiar subjective tendency in us to verify the ideas, the Jainas retort by saying: 'There need not be any external particular reals at all then; for they can be similarly explained by our subjective tendency to verify the ideas.' The Buddhists urge that it is impossible to account for our ideas of external particular reals by *Vāsanā*, because there must be something external to and independent of the *Vāsanā* to regulate it. The Jainas point out that there is no real dispute over this proposition of the Buddhists. The real difficulty of the Buddhists, as pointed out by Jainas, is. Either admit the reality of the Similarities etc. or Universals or deny the reality of all external particular etc. reals. The Jainas maintain that the Similarities etc. are thus real and that in the cases where we find them out by the process of *Samkalana*, i. e., by comparing the given with a past idea and synthesising the two, we have Conception, i. e., *Pratyabhijñā* as a valid form of knowledge. Where, however we have no *Samkalana*, i. e., comparison and synthesis of the given with an idea, we have *Pratyakṣa* or direct Apprehension only.

It should be observed in this connection that even where the Similarity etc. are not real, i.e., objective existences independent of us, we may have *Pratyabhijñā*. And the *Pratyabhijñā* in such cases may be valid like the *Anumāna* in similar cases. 'Fire-ness' (the Univer-

sal underlying all instances of Fire), for instance, is not a reality existing outside our idea. Yet this Fire-ness is attached to all particular cases of fire and is on that account acknowledged to be the object of a valid Inference. In the same manner, there may be cases where Similarity etc., although not real, may be objects of valid Conception, being attached to similar (etc.,) objects.

'That is similar to that',—well, a question may arise as to whether this is Conception (*Pratyabhijñā*) or Direct perception (*Pratyakṣa*). In the given judgment, of the two matters, one is obviously directly perceived and the other, though really the object of an idea of a previously perceived thing, presents itself so vividly as to appear like an object of Direct Perception. Such judgments are ordinarily brought under the judgments based on Direct Perception, they are really, however, judgments of *Pratyabhijñā*.

'That (i e., the phenomenon before us) is inferred to be fire', 'This is the meaning of this sentence',—well, these are judgments of *Pratyakṣa*, because both the elements in the two judgments are matters of Direct Perception.

उपलम्भानुपलम्भसंभवं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसंबन्धा-
द्यालम्बनम् इदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवतीत्याकारं संवेदनमूहापर-
नामा तर्कः ॥ ७ ॥

*upalambhānupalambha-saṁbhavaṁ tri-kālī-kalita-
sādhya-sādhana-saṁbandhādya-ālambanam idam asmin
saty eva bhavāṇīty ākāraṁ samvedanam āhāparanāmā
tarkah* ॥ ७ ॥

TRANSLATION: Knowledge of the forms—‘this being, this is’ etc.,—arising from a critical examination of the facts observed and non-observed and consisting in the establishment of relationship, which subsists in all the three times, such as ‘the relationship between the Proven and the Mark’, *tarka* or Induction, otherwise known as *ūhā*.

COMMENTARY: The premises for Induction are the facts of experience, either observed or not observed or both. These facts of experience are thus the cause of Induction. The subject-matter or the content of Induction is the relationship which subsists between two things or phenomena and which relationship continues to be true in all the three times, i e., past, present and future. One instance of such a relationship is that between the Mark (e.g., smoke) and the Proven (e g., Fire), called the Vyāpti or ‘the invariable connection’. Another instance of such relationship is that between an object (*vācya* or what is signified) and its corresponding word (*vācaka* or what signifies). The nature of induction consists in a cognition of such truths of universal and eternal application. The form in which the inductive knowledge is expressed is: ‘This being, this is’ (e g., there being Smoke there must be Fire); ‘This not being, this is not’ (e.g, there being no Fire, there is no Smoke), the (signifying) word being of such and such a class, the (signified) object is of such and such class, ‘The object being of such a nature, it is expressed or signified by a corresponding word of such a nature,’ and so on. *Tarka* is inductive knowledge, it is otherwise called *ūhā*.

The thinkers of the Tāthāgata (Buddhists) School refuse to admit the validity of induction. The Jainas point out that to deny the validity of Induction would lead to agnosticism. It is in this way, "If Tarka or Induction is invalid, then, Anumāna or Inference would lose its life, because it would not get the Pratibandha (i.e., the invariable relationship, between the Mark and the Proven). And if Anumāna goes, the Pratyakṣa or Direct Perception also would lose its validity. For, upon getting the impressions through Pratyakṣa, the knower determines some of them to be true owing to their agreement with the objects as they are and some to be untrue, on account of their disagreement with the nature of the objects outside. He is not able to determine the validity or the invalidity of his impression, as soon as these are generated, for as regards their genesis, all the sense-impressions are similar to one another. It is their agreement or disagreement with the nature of the perceived objects that makes the sense-impressions valid or invalid and it is Anumāna (reasoning or inference) that discovers this fact of agreement or disagreement. Now, Anumāna is possible only if there be the Pratibandha and the establishment of the Pratibandha is impossible without Tarka." It is thus that the validity of the Pratyakṣa as a source of knowledge is dependent on the validity of Tarka. The Jaina philosophers point out that all determinations of 'knowables' (i.e. objects) are possible through Pramāṇas or forms of knowledge which are ultimately dependent on Anumāna or reasoning. But if Anumāna and the other Pramāṇas be thus impossible, how can the Buddhists call themselves Prāmāṇikas (i.e., persons who hold

Pramāna or valid knowledge to be possible) and how can they truly know or determine an object at all? The Buddhists are thus inevitably led to the theory of Agnosticism. Agnosticism again is an impossible position. Because in order to be a consistent and valid theory, a theory must be based on the Pramānas, but Agnosticism does not admit the validity of the Pramānas.

The Buddhists contend that the Vyāpti or the fact of the invariable relationship between the Mark (e.g., smoke) and Proven (e.g., fire) is obtained through Pratyaksa or direct apprehension in which Anupalambha or non-apprehension or non-perception may be included, so that Tarka or Induction need not be admitted as a separate source of knowledge. The Jainas point out that the Pratyaksa or Perception is always confined to particular instances, i.e., of Fire and Smoke. If the Vyāpti does not mean anything more than a particular instance under perception, why then Anumāna (which is based on the Vyāpti) may be identified with Pratyaksa and need not be admitted as a Pramāna, different from it. The Buddhists contend: we do not say that Vyāpti is identical with the particular fact of Perception: we say, Vyāpti is a fact of universal application, a Vikalpa or a concept which arises in us because of the force of the particular percept. The Jainas reply that they do not deny this proposition of the Buddhists; that they in fact do admit it when they say that Tarka arises from facts of Perception and non-perception; that what they want to urge is that this Vyāpti or the fact of universal application is known through a distinct source of knowledge called Tarka. It is next urged by the Buddhists that although Tarka leads to a proposition of universal application,

it practically puts forward the result of the operation of the Pratyaksa and that the latter and not the Tarka is the real Pramāna accordingly. In reply to this contention, the Jainas point out that a similar line of argument would show that the Anumāna which puts forward the result of the operation of the Pratyaksa or the Direct perception of the Mark is no Pramāna but that the real Pramāna is the Pratyaksa. The Buddhist philosophers try to avoid this difficulty by saying that the Pratyaksa of the Mark consists in a direct Perception of the Mark, while an Anumāna is a knowledge about the Proven and that hence Anumāna cannot be said to put forward the result of the operation of a Pratyaksa. The Jainas show by a similar line of argument that Tarka has for its object a Sāmānya, i e., a general relationship between the Mark and the Proven and cannot consequently be said to put forward the result of the operation of a Pratyaksa. The Buddhists contend. A Sāmānya or a general truth does not exist and cannot be admitted, how then can Tarka which deals with truths of general application be a Pramāna? The Jainas reply: How then can Anumāna be a Pramāna? It also deals with truths of general application. Dharmakīrti himself has said. "The other is characterised by Sāmānya or generality and that is the subject-matter of Anumāna". The Buddhists maintain that Anumāna as a Pramāna has validity only from a practical stand-point and that from the real or ontological stand-point it is Apramāna. The Jainas ask the Buddhists to admit the validity of Tarka also at least from a practical stand-point. If, however, the Buddhists contend that Tarka cannot have a practical validity because it is

out of touch with reality, then Anumāna also may be shown to be invalid on the self-same grounds. The Buddhists urge that although Anumāna deals with Sāmānya which is unreal, it is mediately or indirectly connected with real things and that as such it is a Pramāṇa. The Jains argue that the very same may be said of Tarka also. The Jains point out, however, that Sāmānya is real and not something unreal, as the Buddhists think; the reality of the Sāmānya is proved by the Similarity found in a number of modes. If thus the Sāmānya is a reality both Anumāna and Tarka are Pramāṇas, valid from a practical as well as from the ontological stand-point.

यथा यावान् कश्चिद् धूमः स सर्वो बह्वी सत्येव भवती-
ति तस्मिन्नसत्यसौ न भवत्येवेति ॥ ८ ॥

yathā yāvān kaścid dhūmaḥ sa sarvo bahvī satyēva bhavatīti tasmīn asaty asau na bhavaty eveti ॥ 8 ॥

TRANSLATION: For example: Whatever Smoke there is, all that is only when there is Fire; if it (fire) be not there, that (smoke) is not there.

COMMENTARY: The first is an instance of the Anvaya-Vyāpti, i. e., Pervasion or Inseparable Relationship, discovered by observation of facts in direct agreement with each other. The second is an instance of the Vyatireka-Vyāpti, i. e., Pervasion or Inseparable Relationship, discovered by a sort of negative experience that A being eliminated, B is thereby invariably eliminated.

अनुमानं द्विप्रकारं स्वार्थं परार्थं च ॥ ९ ॥

anumānaṁ dviprakāraṁ svārthaṁ parārthaṁ

ca १९१

TRANSLATION. Inference or Deduction is of two kinds (Inference) for one's own self and (Inference) for others.

COMMENTARY An explanation is required why the modes of Inference are stated, without first indicating its nature and it is as follows. The Svārtha or the Inference for-one's-own-self is the real Inference. When this Svārtha which one Makes for one's self is communicated to another, it is called the Parārtha or the Inference-for-others as will be apparent from the latter aphorism, "The Parārtha or the Inference-for-others, which consists in statements of the Abode (*pakṣa*) and of the Mark (*hetu*) is an Inference so called because of the transference of epithet." The word Anumāna which means essentially the Inference which one makes for one's own self, is applied to the Parārtha, which is really the effect of the Svārtha. The Parārtha is thus Inference communicated and is called an Inference, only by transference of the epithet. Now it is known to every one that one and the same definition cannot describe a being and another which is called the former only by transference of epithet. A cart for instance is sometimes called the bullock, because the cart, like a bullock, carries luggages. But there can be no one definition which can describe fully the nature of a bullock and of a cart at the same time. It has thus been impossible to give a

definition of Anumāna which would apply to the Svārtha and to the Parārtha as well.

A question may be asked: Why then place the Parārtha on the same footing as the Svārtha? The answer is that the Parārtha is employed in all public and private debates, in all authoritative writings and in all practical dealings among people, and to show its importance which is thus equal to that of the Svārtha, the Parārtha is here classified with the Svārtha.

Anumāna is so called because it is knowledge which is based on a previous (*anu*) cognition of the Mark and a recollection of the relation between the Mark and the Proven and which consists in a determination (*māna*) of the object, subsequent to that previous cognition. The Anumāna which is Svārtha is Inference which one makes for his own self. It is Parārtha, when it is communicated to another.

The form of Anumāna is ordinarily as follows: 'That Hill has Fire, because it has smoke' This Anumāna is valid, because it is based on apprehension of a valid Hetu (Reason or Mark), viz., Smoke. Now, why do we call the Hetu, Smoke, valid here? Because it is invariably connected with Fire, found to exist in the Hill and is known to be invariably connected with Fire (so that from the apprehension of Smoke, the Inference about Fire would be irresistible). This invariable or inseparable connection between Smoke and Fire is called Vyāpti or Pervasion. Now, the first characteristic of a valid Hetu, e.g., of smoke in the Inference under consideration, is thus its existence in the subject of Inference, viz., the Hill. This characteristic of a valid Mark is technically called *pakṣa-dharmatva*, meaning 'existence in the Pakṣa'.

The Hill is thus the Pakṣa in the present reasoning. The Hill is otherwise called the Dharmī or the Sādhya-Dharmī, because the Inference goes to show that 'it has the Dharma or the Sādhya-Dharma, i. e., the object of the Inference, Fire, inhering in it. Thus it is that so far as the first characteristic of a valid Hetu viz, its Pakṣa-Dharmatva is concerned the Pakṣa is the Dharmī. The Second characteristic of a valid Hetu as described above, e. g., 'Smoke is invariably connected with Fire', is technically expressed as that it is 'Pervaded' (*vyāpta*) by the Pakṣa (Fire, in the given Inference). Thus it is that so far as this second characteristic of a valid Mark, the Vyāpti or 'Pervasion' is concerned, the Pakṣa is the Dharma (and not the Dharmī; as in the case of the first characteristic). These two senses of the Pakṣa are to be distinguished and remembered, in considering the nature of an Anumāna or syllogistic reasoning. The thinkers of the Cārvāka School contend that Anumāna is no Pramāna. They argue. "Anumāna is no Pramāna, because it is (an) indirect (source of knowledge), Anumāna is indirect because it is dependent on (an understanding of) the Pakṣa with (its two) senses, applicable to it, which are as follows. When the 'Pakṣa-Dharmatva' is to be understood, Pakṣa is called the Dharmī, when however, the Vyāpti is considered, Dharma is the Pakṣa, these two senses of the Pakṣa are to be remembered in the case of establishing a matter of Inference. Pramāṇa, however, is immediate knowledge, like the Pratyakṣa."

The Jainas in criticising the above contention of the Cārvākas begin by stating that by cutting off the very branch, on which he has climbed the small-

minded Cārvāka always imitates the act of a devil. To prove that Anumāna is no Pramāṇa, the Cārvāka adduces a reason, 'Because it is indirect'; and thereby admits that Anumāna is a Pramāṇa. Coming to the substance of the Cārvāka objection, the Jainas point out that it does not hold good so far as the Jaina theory of the Anumāna is concerned. The Jainas do not maintain that the Pakṣa-Dharmatva or inherence-in-the-Pakṣa is an essential characteristic of a valid Hetu, so that they are under no necessity of applying the term Pakṣa to the Dharma. Nor do they state the Vyāpti in and through the Pakṣa, so that they are under no obligation to apply the term Pakṣa to the Dharma. According to the Jainas the Hetu has one and the only characteristic, which is that it (e. g., Smoke) is never cognised otherwise than in connection with the Sādhya-Dharma (e. g., Fire). Hence it is that the Cārvāka objection based on the different senses of the Pakṣa does not affect the Jaina theory of the Anumāna. The Cārvākas however point to a subsequent aphorism of the present treatise, viz., "So far as the Inferential knowledge is concerned the Sādhya or the matter of Inference is the Dharmī (Hill), containing the Dharma (Fire) and so far as Vyāpti or Inseparable connection is concerned, the Sādhya is the Dharma" and contend that the Jaina theory of the Anumāna involves an understanding of the two senses of the Sādhya, so that the Anumāna is bound to be mediate even according to the Jainas. The Jainas meet this objection by saying that on both these occasions, it is the Sādhya (the Hill containing the Fire) which is directly before us. The Vyāpti (invariable connection between Smoke and Fire) may

not be known to one to whom the matter of Inference is being communicated and for the purpose of demonstrating to him the Vyāpti, Dharma (Fire) may be represented as the Sādhya. but this demonstration of the Vyāpti is subordinated to and is meant for the establishment of the inferential truth about the Hill which is the real Sādhya. Hence the Sādhya is always the Dharmī and the Cārvāka objection regarding the mediate character of the Anumāna is unproved. The Jainas next point out that if Cārvākas cannot adduce any Reason to establish their contention about the invalidity of Anumāna, their contention is obviously groundless and as such unacceptable. The Commentator quotes with approval: "If there be any Hetu or Reason for the inference that Anumāna or Inference is valid knowledge, how can you say that Inference is no valid knowledge? If there be no Hetu or Reason for the Inference that Anumāna or Inference is no valid knowledge, how can you say that Inference is no valid knowledge?" Finally, in support of their theory that Inference is valid knowledge, the Jainas ask the Sophists. How do you say that a Pratyaksa or Perception is valid or correct? If you say that a Perception is valid because it is found to be consistent with or to correctly respond to a purposive effort (*artha-kriyā*) of ours, how can you say that Anumāna is not valid? The very determination of the Pratyaksa as valid involves Anumāna. It is thus correctly said: "How can one who denies the validity of all mediate knowledge establish the validity of his Pratyaksa or immediate knowledge?",

तत्र हेतुग्रहणसंबन्धस्मरणकारणकं साध्यविज्ञानं

स्वार्थम् ॥ १० ॥

tatra hetu-grahaṇa-sambandha-smarana-kāṅkāṣaḥ
sādhya-vijñānam svārtham । 10 ।

TRANSLATION: Of these the Svārtha or the Inference-for-one's-own-self, consists in a knowledge of the Sādhya or the Proven, through the apprehension of the Hetu or the Mark and a recollection of its (inseparable) relation (to the Dharma).

COMMENTARY: Hetu or Reason will be defined in the next aphorism. Literally it means that which leads to something which is not immediately known at the time. As shown before, 'the inseparable connection' between the Hetu and the Dharma is known by Tarka. The Svārtha or the Inference-for-one's-own-self is a correct (i. e., free from doubt etc.) knowledge about the Sādhya (the Proven which will be presently defined), arising from the apprehension, i. e., correct knowledge of the Hetu and a recollection of the inseparable connection between the Hetu and the Dharma.

निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुः ॥ ११ ॥

niścītānyathānupapatty-eka-laksano hetuḥ । 11 ।

TRANSLATION: The one and the only characteristic of the Hetu is that its incapability of being known otherwise (than in connection with the Dharma) is known for certain.

COMMENTARY: The Hetu is never, not even on a single occasion, known otherwise than in connection

with that is called the Sādhya. Wherever there is the Hetu there must be the Sādhya. This is the one (and the only) characteristic of the Hetu, according to the Jainas.

न तु त्रिलक्षणकादिः ॥ १२ ॥

na tu tri-laksanakādih ॥ 12 ॥

TRANSLATION: It is not something having three or such characteristics.

COMMENTARY: This aphorism is meant to distinguish the above Jaina characterisation of a Hetu from its other descriptions, given by other Schools. The Saugatas, i. e., the Buddhists, for instance, describe (1) Paksa-dharmatva, (2) Sapaksa-sattva and (3) Vipaksāsattva, as the three characteristics of a valid Hetu. The thinkers of the Yauga, i. e., the Naiyāyika School add to these three, two other characteristics, viz, (4) Abādhita-vīśayatva and (5) Asat-pratipaksatva. These five characteristics of a Hetu mentioned by Schools which are rival to the Jainas, may be described and illustrated as follows.—

1. *Pakṣa-dharmatva* Pakṣa is that in which the Dharma is inferred to exist. In the Inference, 'the Hill has Fire, because it has Smoke', the Hill is the Pakṣa, i. e., the Abode in which the Sādhya or the Dharma, i. e., Fire is inferred to exist. Now, in this Inference, the Hetu is Smoke which is found to exist in the Hill (The Pakṣa or the Abode). This characteristic of the Hetu is called its Pakṣa-Dharmatva. If, on the contrary, we take the Inference, 'Sound is

eternal because it is Visible', we shall see that the Hetu, viz., Visibility has not the characteristic of Paksa-Dharmatva, because Visibility never exists in a Sound.

2 *Sapaksa-Sattva* Sapaksa is that which like the Paksa contains the matter of Inference and is, on that account, of the same class as the Paksa. In the given Inference the Hill which is inferred to contain Fire, is the Paksa, and the Kitchen which also contains Fire, is the Sapaksa. The characteristic Sapaksa-Sattva means that a valid Hetu (i. e., Smoke in the given Inference) exists not only in the Paksa but also in the Sapaksa, e. g., a Kitchen and such-like places, containing Fire. In the Inference, 'Sound is eternal because it is Audible', on the contrary, we find that the Hetu, Audibility, although it may exist in the Paksa, Sound, is not present in the Sapaksa, i. e., other substances (e. g., Kāla or Time) which have eternality.

3. *Vipakṣāsattva* Vipaksa is that which contains what is opposed to the matter of Inference. In the given Inference, 'The Hill has Fire because it has Smoke', the Hill is the Paksa, as it is inferred to contain Fire, and a Tank would be the Vipaksa, because it is filled with water which is opposed to Fire. The characteristic, Vipakṣāsattva, means, that a valid Hetu (i. e., Smoke in the given Inference) must not abide in the Vipaksa, e. g., the Tank. If, however, we take the Inference, 'sound is eternal because it is Knowledge', we shall see that the Hetu, Knowability, is invalid, 'because Knowability is a characteristic which, though present in eternal substances like Sound is also present in non-eternal things and phenomena

4. *Abādhta-vīśayatva*: This characteristic of a valid Hetu means that it should not lead to a conclusion which contradicts what is given in direct Perception or what is enjoined in the authoritative Scriptures. Thus in the Inference, 'A fiery body is not hot because it is a substance like water' and in the Inference, 'A Brāhmana should drink wine, because wine is a liquid substance like water', the Reasons are invalid, because they are intended to prove things which go against the matters of Perception and the injunction of the sacred Scriptures, respectively.

5. *Asatpratīpakṣatva*. This characteristic of a valid Hetu means that it should not be such that what it proves may as well be contradicted by a different line of argument. Take, for instance, the Inference, 'Sound is non-eternal because in Sound the characteristic of eternality is not perceived'. In this argument, the Hetu, the non-perception of the characteristic of eternality, leads to a conclusion which is easily contradicted by a conclusion which is arrived at by a contrary line of reasoning, such as, 'Sound is eternal, because in Sound, the characteristic of non-eternality is not perceived.'

It is contended by the above-mentioned rival Schools of philosophy that a Hetu which has the above characteristics is a valid Hetu, competent to lead to the Sādhya. The Jainas maintain, on the contrary, that the views of the rival Schools about a valid Hetu are not correct

तस्य हेत्वाभासस्यापि संभवात् ॥ १३ ॥

tasya hetvābhāsasyāpi sambhavāt | 13 |

TRANSLATION: A Mark may be fallacious even though it may have those characteristics.

COMMENTARY: Take the argument: 'He is green, because he is his (a certain man's) son: like the other (known) sons of his'. Here all those five characteristics are present in the Hetu, yet it is invalid. The Buddhists, however, contend that in the given Reason, the characteristic *Vipakṣāsattva*, i. e., *Absence-in-the-opposite-of-the-Abode*, is absent: for it cannot be said that 'whoever is not green must not necessarily be his son'; and because of the absence of that characteristic in it, the Hetu is invalid here. The Jains point out that this defence of the Buddhists involves in different words an admission of the Jaina theory that a valid Hetu has one and the only characteristic that 'it is not cognised otherwise than in connection with the Sādhya'. The philosophers of the Yauga School again point out that *Vyāpti* is a relation (between the Mark and the Proven) free from any *Upādhi* or condition. The relation between 'Greenness' and 'his Son-hood' is not such a relation. An *Upādhi* or condition is that which is not essentially connected with the Hetu but is invariably found with the Sādhya. In the given argument, an *Upādhi*, viz., 'the effect of eating vegetables' etc. intervenes. In other words, it is found that a person's 'son-hood' does not necessarily involve 'eating of vegetables' etc.: it is found, on the other hand, that eaters of vegetables etc. are all green-complexioned. Hence it may technically be said that so far as the Hetu (i. e., 'his Son-hood') in the given argument is concerned, 'the effect of eating vegetables' etc. is a circumstance which

is not essentially connected with the Hetu while that circumstance is invariably found with the Sādhya (i e., Green complexion'). This circumstance, viz., 'the effect of eating vegetables' etc. intervenes. In other words, it is found that a person's son-hood does not necessarily involve 'eating of vegetables' etc.; it is found, on the other hand, that eaters of vegetables etc. are all green-complexioned. Hence it may technically be said that so far as the Hetu (i e., 'his Son-hood') in the given argument is concerned; 'the effect of eating vegetables' etc. is a circumstance which is not essentially connected with the Hetu while that circumstance is invariably found with the Sādhya (i. e., 'Green complexion'). This circumstance, viz., 'the effect of eating vegetables' is thus an Upādhi. Because of the intervention of this Upādhi, it cannot be said that 'whoever is not green must not necessarily be his son.' In plain language, it may be pointed out as follows. 'Green complexion' is found in those persons only who 'eat vegetables, a person is not necessarily 'green' because he is 'a certain man's son'; and conversely, it cannot be said that a person who is not green is not necessarily the given man's son. It is in this way that the Yauga (Naryāyika) thinkers show that in the Hetu ('his son-hood') the characteristic of the Vipaksāsattva is wanting and that it is invalid accordingly. The Jaina philosophers point out that this Yauga defence also is a restatement in a different language of the Jaina theory that the one and the only characteristic of a valid Hetu is that 'it is never cognised otherwise than in connection with the Sādhya'. For, if an unconditional (*anaupādhika*) relation is found to subsist between the Mark and the Proven,

there remains nothing more to be noticed as an additional characteristic or a new aspect of the Hetu, so far as Vyāpti is concerned. Save and except this one characteristic, viz., the existence of the unconditional relationship between the Reason and the Proven all the five characteristics of the Hetu, as stated by the rival Schools, are inessential.

The Buddhists argue that if the Paksa-Dharmatva of a Hetu be not admitted as a necessary characteristic of it, if that is, in the argument, 'the Hill has Fire because it has Smoke' it be not thought necessary to state that the Hetu, Smoke, exists in the Paksa, the Hill, then, any Hetu anywhere, e. g., Smoke in the Kitchen may well prove the Sādhya anywhere, e. g., Fire in the Hill. The Jainas point out that mere Paksa-Dharmatva cannot prevent 'a Hetu-any-where' from proving the 'Sādhya-anywhere'. The Buddhists may wonder how, for instance, Smoke in the Kitchen can prove Fire in the Hill, but the Jainas show the inessentiality of the Paksa-Dharmatva of a Hetu, for the purpose of its proving the Sādhya, by referring to the instance of the Water-Moon (i. e., the reflection of the Moon in a Sheet of Water) proving (the existence of) the Sky-moon (i. e., the Moon existing in the Sky). (The meaning is: The Phenomenon of the reflected Moon in a sheet of water, does not exist in the Sky; yet, from the observation of the reflected Moon in a sheet of water, one infers the existence of the real Moon in the Sky. In technical language, in the Inference of the real Moon in the Sky, the Sky is the Paksa or the Abode where the real Moon exists: but the Sādhya, i. e., the existence of the real Moon in the Sky is proved here by the phenomenon of the

reflected Moon, the Hetu, which obviously does not exist in the Sky and has not the Paksa-Dharmatva). To avoid this difficulty, the Buddhist argues. In this argument, it is not correct to look upon the Sky as the Dharmī or the Abode, where the Sādhya or real Moon exists, the real Abode is 'the one expanse of space' between the Sky-Moon and the Water-Moon; in this one expanse of space the Sky-Moon does exist so that this one expanse of space is the real Dharmī, and because in this one expanse of space, the Water-Moon also exists, we may safely say that the Hetu here, viz., the Water-Moon has the Paksa-Dharmatva and is competent to prove the Sādhya. The Jains refute this line of the Buddhist argument by pointing out that a similar line of argument may go to show that there is but one expanse of space between the Hill-top and the Kitchen and that the Smoke, the Hetu, existing in this one expanse of space in which the Fire also exists has the Paksa-Dharmatva and is competent to prove the Fire in the Hill-top accordingly. It may be contended by the Buddhists that in order that Hetu may prove the Sādhya, not only should the former exist in the Abode (i. e., have Paksa-Dharmatva) but that the Hetu and the Sādhya should be *causally connected*. Smoke, for example, is the effect of Fire. Smoke would prove Fire only when they are closely together in the same spot. In the case of the water-Moon proving the Sky-Moon the former is a valid Hetu, although it is existent miles away from the latter, because the Water-Moon is *caused* by the Sky-Moon. Smoke in the Kitchen, on the contrary, cannot prove Fire in the Hill-top, because the former is not *causally connected* with the latter.

The Jainas point out that this contention of the Buddhists clearly shows that the Hetu in an argument is valid and competent to prove the Sādhya not because the two exist in the same Paksa but because the two are 'inseparably related', because, in the words of the Jaina logic the Hetu is not cognised otherwise than in connection with the Sādhya. Accordingly so far as the essential characteristic of a valid Hetu is concerned, it is this one and this one only, viz., that it is never known to exist otherwise than in connection with the Sādhya. The Paksa-Dharmatva is not essential to the validity of a Hetu.

The Commentator states that the Yauga thinkers upholding the characteristic of the Paksa-Dharmatva in a Hetu are to be met in the same way as the Buddhists.

The Jainas go on showing that Sapaksa-sattva or the existence-in-the-similars-of-the-Abode is not also an essential characteristic of a valid Hetu. Similars-of-the-Abode (Sapaksas) are the instances in which the Hetu (Smoke) and the Sādhya (Fire) exist and which prove 'the inseparable connection' between the two. The Jainas ask. How would a Similar-of-the-Abode prove 'the inseparable connection' between the Mark and the Proven? To prove this inseparable connection another Sapaksa would be necessary and so on and so on, to Anavasthā or Infinite Regression. And if thus it is impossible to prove the inseparable connection between the Mark and the Proven in the so-called Sapaksa, there can be no real Sapaksa at all. It may also be said that if it can be possible to prove by Pramāṇas the 'inseparable connection between the Mark and the Proven' in Sapaksa, why not infer that

connection, with the help of those Pramāṇas in the Pakṣa itself without uselessly looking to the Sapakṣas at all ?

There are some thinkers again who uphold the doctrine of the Sapakṣa-sattva but try to avoid the above stated difficulties of the doctrine by defining the Sapakṣa as the Pakṣa itself. They state that the Sapakṣa is that which has the Sādhya-Dharma in it. According to these thinkers, the Sapakṣa and the Pakṣa are the one and the same thing. When we *want to say* that a thing has the Sādhya-Dharma, we call it the Sapakṣa; where, however, we *want to prove* the existence of the Sādhya-Dharma in it, we call the thing Pakṣa. The Jainas criticise this position by saying that it makes the act of Inference useless. If the Sapakṣa is the Pakṣa itself, then the Sapakṣa-Sattva required of a Hetu means that in the Pakṣa the Hetu and the Sādhya are found to be inseparably connected. And if thus the Sapakṣa-Sattva already establishes the inseparable co-existence of the Hetu and the Sādhya in the Pakṣa, what more remains for the act of Anumāna to establish? The Jaina commentator finally points out that the identification of the Sapakṣa with the Pakṣa is hardly consistent with the utterance of Dignāga, viz., "The Sapakṣa is a thing, similar (to the Pakṣa) and has the Sādhya-Dharma in common (with the Pakṣa)", or with that of Dharmakīrti, viz., "(The Hetu should have) existence in the Similar and non-existence in the Dissimilar of that (i e., the Abode)", the utterances of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti clearly indicating a distinction between the Pakṣa and the Sapakṣa.

The Yauga philosophers admit the validity of the two forms of the Anumāna, viz., the Kevalānvaya and the Kevala-vyatireka. The former is Inference based on positive experience that 'wherever there is the Mark, there is the Proven'. The latter is Inference based on a negative experience that 'wherever there is no Proven, there is no Mark'. The Jaina philosophers point out that the Nyāya thinkers are certainly unable to attribute to the Hetu in these two forms of the Anumāna all the five characteristics, stated by them.

The Jainas thus establish that the one and the only characteristic of a valid Hetu is this that it is "never cognised otherwise than in connection with the Sādhya". It may be said that this may be the essential characteristic but for practical purposes, we should recognise the other characteristics also. The Jainas reply that in that case the Buddhists, in addition to the three should recognise the Abādhita-viśayatva, the Asat-pratipaksatva and the Jñātatva (i. e., something the nature of which is known); and the Yaugas, in addition to the five (recognised by them) should recognise the Jñātatva, as the characteristic of a valid Hetu. It may be objected that when a Hetu has the characteristic of the Vipaksāsattva it may be presumed that it has also the characteristics of the Abādhita-viśayatva and the Asatpratipaksatva; and that when a Hetu is said to be Jñāpaka (i. e., that which makes known the Sādhya) its characteristic of the Jñātatva is implied. The Jainas criticise this contention also and ask. If implications are to be relied on, why not dispense with all the characteristics and state that a valid Hetu is only what is *gamaka*, i. e., leads to the Sādhya?

अप्रतीतमनिराकृतमभीप्सितं साध्यम् ॥ १४ ॥

apratītam anirākṛtam abhīpsitam sādhyam । 14 ।

TRANSLATION: The Sādhya or the Proven is what is Undetermined. Unopposed and Desired.

COMMENTARY What is to be proved is as yet not known for certain Secondly, it must not be something which is opposed to the matters of direct perception etc. And lastly, it must be something which is desired by the debaters to be proved.

शङ्कितविपरीतानध्यवसितवस्तूनां साध्यताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थ-

मप्रतीतवचनम् ॥ १५ ॥

*śaṅkita-viparītānādhya vasita-vastūnāṃ sādhyatā-
pratipatty-artham apratīta-vacanam* । 15 ।

TRANSLATION: It is said to be 'Undetermined' to show that things which are 'doubted', 'falsely understood' or 'little understood' are the facts to be Proven.

COMMENTARY: If the thing to be proved is not 'doubted', 'misunderstood' or 'little understood', its establishment is obviously useless.

प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धस्य साध्यत्वं मा प्रसज्यतामित्यनिराकृत-

ग्रहणम् ॥ १६ ॥

*pratyakṣādi-viruddhasya sādhyatvaṃ mā prasajya-
tām ity anrākṛta-graḥaṇam* । 16 ।

TRANSLATION: It is described as 'Unopposed' to prevent a thing opposed to direct experience etc. from becoming the Proven.

COMMENTARY: Thus, for example, one should not undertake to prove the existence of coldness in Fire, which is opposed to perception.

अनभिमतस्यासाध्यत्वप्रतिपत्तयेऽभीक्षितपदोपादानम्

॥ १७ ॥

*anabhimatasyāsādhya-tva-pratipattayeā bhīṣita-
padopādānam* | 17 |

TRANSLATION: The word Desired is used to show that what is against our choice is not the Proven.

COMMENTARY: One is not to prove something which he does not choose to prove.

व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयापेक्षया साध्यं धर्मं एवान्यथा

तदनुपपत्तेः ॥ १८ ॥

*vyāpti-grahaṇa-samayāpekṣayā sādhyam dharma
evānyathā tad-anupapatteḥ* | 18 |

TRANSLATION: So far as the question of 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*, or Inseparable Connection) is concerned, the Proven stands for the Dharma (or the phenomenon, inseparably connected with the Mark). Other wise the knowledge of the pervasion is impossible.

COMMENTARY: The word, *Sādhyā* or the Proven may refer either to the 'Fire' or to the 'Firy Hill', of

the stock example. Now, so far as the connection with the Mark is concerned, the word *Sādhya* must be taken to mean the phenomenon (i. e., Fire) and not the thing (i. e., the Hill) having that phenomenon. The reason is given below.

न हि यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र चित्रभानोरिव धरित्रीधर-
स्याप्यनुवृत्तिरस्ति ॥ १९ ॥

*na hi yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatra citi abhānor iva
dharitī dharaśyāpy anuvrttir asti* । 19 ।

TRANSLATION: It is not a fact that wherever there is Smoke, there is also a Hill, just as there is Fire.

COMMENTARY: The Hill is not 'invariably connected' with Smoke. It is Fire which is 'essentially' related to Smoke. Hence Fire is the Proven, while the Hill is not, so far as the *Vyāpti* or 'pervasion' is concerned

आनुमानिकप्रतिपत्त्यवसरापेक्षया तु पक्षापरपर्यायस्तद्वि-
शिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी ॥ २० ॥

*ānumānika-pratipatty avasara-pekṣayā tu pakṣāpara-
paryāyas tad-viśiṣṭaḥ prasiddho dharmī* । 20 ।

TRANSLATION: But so far as the subject or matter of Inference is concerned, it is the well-known Abode (*dharmī*) having that 'phenomenon', otherwise called the Pakṣa.

COMMENTARY: This is the second sense of the word Sādhya. Its first sense was the 'phenomenon' with which the Mark is invariably connected; it referred to Fire accordingly. The word, Sādhya, however, may mean that about or in which something is inferred. In its second sense, accordingly, the Sādhya refers to the subject of conclusion, i e, the Hill (*paksa* or *dharmī*) which contains the Fire (*dharma*).

धर्मिणः प्रसिद्धिः क्वचिद्विकल्पतः कुत्रचित्प्रमाणतः क्वापि
विकल्पप्रमाणाभ्याम् ॥ २१ ॥

*dharmiṇaḥ prasiddhiḥ kvaśid vikalpataḥ kutracit
pramāṇataḥ kvāpi vikalpa-pramāṇābhyām* । 21 ।

TRANSLATION: The Dharmī is known to us either through mere Supposition or through the Pramānas or through both Supposition and the Pramānas.

COMMENTARY: These are illustrated below.

यथा समस्ति समस्तवस्तुवेदी, क्षितिधरकन्धरेयं धूमध्वज-
वती, ध्वनिः परिणतिमान् इति ॥ २२ ॥

*yathā samasti samasta-vastu-vedī kṣitidhara-kandh-
areyaṁ dhūmadhvajavati, dhvaniḥ pariṇatimān iti* । 22 ।

TRANSLATION: For example, the Omniscient who knows all things exists; this Hill-top is fiery; Sound is adventitious.

COMMENTARY: In the first example, the Omniscient is the Paksa; this is an instance where the Paksa

is taken for granted, for without having recourse to reasoning one cannot be convinced of the possibility of Omniscience. The Paksa, Hill-top, in the second example is got through Direct Perception, a mode of the Pramāna. In the third example, Sound is the Paksa; it means all Sounds; but whence do we get all Sounds? The answer is that besides the one piece of Sound which we get through the Pratyaksa-pramāna, the fact of other Sounds is got through Vikalpa, i. e., taken for granted. Hence this Paksa of the third example is got through both Pramāna and Vikalpa.

Some argue that there can be no Paksa which is got through Vikalpa. In other words, their contention is that all Paksas must be got through the Pramāna and the Pramāna only. The Paksas alleged to be got through Vikalpa, i. e., hypothetically assumed are really got through the Pramānas. A fact got through Vikalpa only is impossible. To this contention, the Jaina reply is as follows. If there is no Dharmī known by Vikalpa, then how do you say 'there is no Dharmī known by Vikalpa' as a fact got through Vikalpa only, is impossible? The very argument by which you establish the impossibility of a Paksa, got through Vikalpa shows that the conception of such a Paksa is possible, for, without having a conception of it, one cannot deny it. The opponent may contend that the Paksa (Dharmī got through Vikalpa) in the argument under consideration is admitted, because of *paropagama*, i. e., because such a Dharmī is assumed by others and not by the Opponent himself. The Jainas point out that this fact of the Paropagama is either Pramāna or it is not. If it is Pramāna or valid knowledge, how can you say that a Dharmī got

through Vikalpa is impossible? If, on the other hand, the Paropagama is not Pramāṇa or valid knowledge, then you yourself must think the Dharmī got through Vikalpa to be possible, because otherwise you cannot go on with your argument. 'A Dharmī got through Vikalpa is impossible'.

The Jains thus show that the Pakṣa in some cases is assumed for the sake of argument; 'without admitting the possibility of such Pakṣas it is impossible for a debater to rest satisfied'.

पक्षहेतुवचनात्मकं परार्थमनुमानमुपचारात् ॥ २३ ॥

*pakṣa-hetu-vaśanātmakaṃ parārtham anumānam
upacārāt ॥ 23 ॥*

TRANSLATION: An Inference consisting in a statement of the Abode and the Mark is called the 'Inference-for-the-sake-of-others', by transference of epithet.

COMMENTARY: To convince a cultured mind, a syllogism consisting in a statement of the Abode (*pakṣa*) and the Mark (*hetu*) is enough. For a highly cultured mind, however, the statement of the Hetu only is enough. Thus if an intelligent man is informed of Smoke in a place, he will feel no difficulty in concluding that there must be Fire. The commentator states that although it is not said explicitly in the Sūtra for a highly cultured mind, only the statement of the Hetu required, it must be understood to be so implied in it. A dull mind, on the contrary, requires a long chain of premises, viz., Example,

Application, Conclusion, to be convinced of a truth as will be shown hereafter.

It should be noted that the statements of the Abode and of the Mark, are after all propositions, consisting of words. Inference, however, is a mode of knowledge. So, when it is said that the statements of the Pakṣa and the Hetu constitute Inference, it is to be understood that those statements are called Inference only by transference of epithet

The position is this. An intelligent man makes an Inference. This is his Svārthānumāna or Inference-for-one's-own-self. When he communicates the matter of this his Inference to others he uses the statements of the Pakṣa and the Hetu. These statements or propositions are, on the one hand, the effect of this Svārthānumāna or subjective Inference and on the other, the cause of the Parārthānumāna or the Inference-in-others. So, when it is stated that statements of the Pakṣa and the Hetu are the Parārthānumāna, it is to be understood that the word Anumāna is applied to either its cause or its effect here.

साध्यस्य प्रतिनियतवर्तिसंबन्धिताप्रसिद्धये हेतोरुपसंहार-
वचनवत् पक्षप्रयोगोऽप्यवश्यमाश्रयितव्यः ॥ २४ ॥

*sādhyasya pratinīyata-dharmī-sambandhitā-prasi-
ddhaye hetor upasañhāna-vacanavat pakṣa-prayogo'py
avaśyam āśrayitavyaḥ* | 24 |

TRANSLATION: To show that the Proven (*sādhyā*) is in the particular occasion connected with the Abode (*dharma*), the (explicit) statement of the Pakṣa (Abode) is certainly necessary, just like the statement showing the inherence of the Mark (*hetu*)

COMMENTARY: 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire' is a general statement. For the purpose of a particular Inference the Buddhists do admit the necessity of explicitly stating the fact of the existence of the Hetu in the Dharmī through a proposition, e. g., 'There is Smoke here'. The Jainas contend that for the same purpose of a particular Inference, e. g., for the purpose of showing the existence of Fire in the Hill, the Paksa (Abode, e. g., the Hill containing the Fire) also should be explicitly indicated in a syllogistic argument. Apparently, the Buddhists do not admit the necessity of explicitly stating the Paksa in a syllogism and the Jainas controvert this Buddhist position.

त्रिविधं साधनमभिधायैव तत्समर्थनं विदधानः कः खलु
न पक्षप्रयोगमङ्गीकुरुते ॥ २५ ॥

*trividham sādhanam abhidhāyaiva tat-samarthanam
vidadhānaḥ kaḥ khalu na pakṣa-prayogam angīkuruते*
| 25 |

TRANSLATION: Stating that the Mark may be of three kinds, who would not admit the necessity of explicitly stating the Abode for its support?

COMMENTARY: According to the Buddhists, a Hetu may be of three kinds. It may be the *Effect* of the Sādhya. Or, it may be *Identical-in-nature* with the Sādhya. Or, it may be so connected with the Sādhya, that wherever the latter is *not cognised*, the former is also not cognised. In a valid Inference the Hetu, which may be of any of the three sorts must be

shown to be Samartha or competent to prove the Sādhya; and for this purpose, again, the Hetu must be shown to be free from the fallacies, e g , the Asiddhatā, i. e , Unprovedness etc. An incompetent Hetu cannot prove the Sādhya. The Buddhists admit all this. They however, do not admit that the Paksa should be explicitly indicated in a syllogism. In criticism of this position of the Buddhists, the Jamas say that if the Paksa need not be stated then the Hetu, the competency of which to prove the Sādhya is admittedly necessary to be established in an Inference, need not also be explicitly stated. "If you say that unless the Hetu is stated, how can we prove its competency?, we reply, unless the Paksa is stated, how can we prove its competency? If you say that in an argument, the Paksa is well-understood and need not be explicitly stated, then we reply that in an argument the Hetu also is well-understood and need not be explicitly stated for the purpose of showing its competency. If, O Saugata, you say that the statement of the Hetu is necessary for convincing the dull-minded, then we ask, why don't you state the Paksa in an argument for convincing the dull-minded?

प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छिन्नार्थमिषायि वचनं परार्थं प्रत्यक्षं, पर-
प्रत्यक्षहेतुत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

*pratyakṣa-paricchināṁthābhūdhāyī vacanam parār-
tham pratyakṣam para-pratyakṣa-hetutvāt ॥ 26 ॥*

TRANSLATION A statement in words describing objects, determined by one's Direct Perception, is 'Direct Perception-for-others', since it causes Direct Perception in others.

COMMENTARY:- When a man determines an object by Inference, he has Svārthānumāna or Inference-for-One's-own-self. When, however, he embodies his knowledge in language, he may be said to effect a Parārthānumāna or Inference-for-others, for Parārthānumāna is nothing but a means of teaching others what one knows for oneself. In the same way, we may speak of a Parārtha-pratyaksa or Perception-for-others. One perceives some object. this is Pratyaksa or direct Perception-for-himself. When however he expresses in words the result of his Perception, his words may be said to constitute, Perception-for-others; these are meant for making others perceive what he himself, has perceived.

यथा पश्य पुरः स्फुरत्किरणमणिखण्डमण्डिताभरणमारि-
णीं जिनपतिप्रतिमाम् ॥ २७ ॥

*yathā paśya purāḥ sphurat-kiraṇa-maṇi-khaṇḍa-
maṇḍitābharaṇa-bhāṇīṇīṃ jina-pati-pratimām* ॥ 27 ॥

TRANSLATION. As for instance, see just in front of you, the image of the Lord-Jina, loaded with ornaments which are interspersed with glittering pieces of diamond.

COMMENTARY: By means of the above words, the speaker intends to make his audience perceive the image which he has himself seen. Hence these words may be said to constitute Perception-for-others.

In the same way, we may speak of 'Recollection-for-others' and so on. Thus in the lines, "Thou rememberst how thou, as the son of Daśaratha, shall

control the waters of the sea and cross it and coming near Laṅkā shall kill him, who took away your wife from the forest" we have an instance of 'Recollection-for others' and in the statement, "Recognise, he is the same saint who was venerated before" we have an example of 'Conception-(*pratyabhijñā*)-for-others'.

पक्षहेतुवचनलक्षणमवयवद्वयमेव परप्रतिपत्तेरङ्गं न
दृष्टान्तादिवचनम् ॥ २८ ॥

*pakṣa-hetu-vacana-lakṣaṇam avayava-dvayaṁ eva
para-pratipatter aṅgaṁ na dṛṣṭāntādi-vacanam* | 28 |

TRANSLATION. To convince others, only the two premises indicating the Abode and the Mark are required and not propositions, stating instances etc.

COMMENTARY: According to the Buddhists, an Anumāna consists of one proposition stating the Pakṣa-dharmatā or inherence of the Hetu in the Abode, and the Vyāpti or the inseparable connection between the Mark and the Proven. The School of Bhaṭṭa Prabhākara and Kapila held that an Anumāna should have three limbs, viz, a proposition stating the Abode, another stating the Reason, and a third, describing Instances. The logicians of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika Schools maintain that no less than five premises stating the Abode, the Reason, the Instance, the Application and the Conclusion are the limbs of a valid Anumāna, which premises are respectively called the Pratijñā (e. g., 'the Hill has Fire') the Hetu (e. g. 'because it has Smoke') the Dṛṣṭānta (e. g., 'whatever has Smoke has Fire, as for instance, the kitchen'),

the Upanaya (e. g., 'now, the Hill has Smoke') and the Nigmana (e g, 'there-fore the Hill has Fire'). It is clear that the Jaina theory of the two-limbed Anumāna is opposed to all those views. The argument of the Jainas is that, given the Pakṣa and the Hetu, a man of intelligence would safely and surely come to the right conclusion.

हेतुप्रयोगस्तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिभ्यां द्विप्रकारः ॥२९॥

*hetu-prayogas tathopapatty-anyathānupapattibhyām
dviprakārah* । 29 ।

TRANSLATION: 'It is got along with it', 'otherwise it is not got at all' in this way, the Mark may be indicated in two ways

COMMENTARY: The Reason or the Hetu in an Inference may be shown in either of the ways, viz., (1) it may be shown that the Hetu is present only when the Sādhya is present, or (2) it may be shown that the Hetu is absent whenever the Sādhya is absent.

सत्येव साध्ये हेतोरुपपत्तिः तथोपपत्तिः, असति साध्ये
हेतोरनुपपत्तिरेवान्यथानुपपत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

*saty eva sādhye hetor upapattiḥ tathopapattiḥ, asati
sādhye hetor anupapattir evānyathānupapattiḥ* । 30 ।

TRANSLATION: 'It is got along with it' implies that 'the Mark exists only when the Proven exists'. 'Otherwise it is not got at all' implies that 'the Mark does not exist if the Proven does not exist'.

COMMENTARY. This is the explanation of the two kinds of the Mark, described above.

यथा कृशानुमानं पाकप्रदेशः सत्येव कृशानुमत्त्वे धूम-
वत्त्वस्योपपत्तेः, असत्यनुपपत्तेर्वेति ॥ ३१ ॥

*yathā kṛśānumān ayaṁ pāka-pradeśaḥ saty eva
kṛśānumattve dhūmavattvasyopapattē asaty anupapa-
tter veti* | 31 |

TRANSLATION. For instance. That Kitchen has Fire in it because only if there be Fire, Smoke can be perceived there, or if there be no Fire, Smoke cannot be perceived there.

COMMENTARY: This is the illustration.

अनयोरन्यतरप्रयोगेणैव साध्यप्रतिपत्तौ द्वितीयप्रयोगस्यै-
कत्रानुयोगः ॥ ३२ ॥

*anayor anyataṁ-prayogeṇaiva sādhyā-pratipattau
dvitīya-prayogasyaiktrānupayogaḥ* | 32 |

TRANSLATION. To establish the Proven, the use of one of them being sufficient, the use of the other is unnecessary (where one has been used).

COMMENTARY: The real connection between the Mark and the Proven becomes manifest on the strict application of one of the two tests. Hence in an Anumāna, if both the two statements are given showing the application of both the two tests, the statements may be different but they refer to one and

the same subject matter and one of the statements is surely redundant.

न दृष्टान्तादिवचनं परप्रतिपत्तये प्रभवति, तस्यां पक्षहेतुवचन-
योरेव व्यापारोपलब्धेः ॥ ३३ ॥

na dr̥ṣṭāntādi-vacanam para-pratipattaye prabhavati
tasyām pakṣa-hetu-vacanayor eva vyāpāropalabdheḥ
| 33 |

TRANSLATION: In the matter of convincing others the premise stating the Example is not potent; that is done through stating the Abode and the Reason

COMMENTARY: The Jaina logician has already pointed out that the Example-premise is unnecessary even in an Inference-for-others. It is by the statement of the Abode and the statement of the Reason that one may be made to understand the truth of the matter (conclusion) of the Inference. The statement of the Example-premise is incompetent to convince one of the matter of the Inference.

न च हेतोरन्यथानुपपत्तिर्निर्णीतये, यथोक्ततर्कप्रमाणादेव
तदुपपत्तेः ॥ ३४ ॥

na ca hetor anyathānupapatti-nirṇītaye yathokta-
tarka-pramāṇād eva tad-upapatteḥ | 34 |

TRANSLATION: Nor, in the matter of determining the invariable relation of the Mark (to the Proven); for that is done by the Tarka-Pramāṇa (Induction) which has already been described.

COMMENTARY. In the preceding sūtra, it has been shown how the Example-premise is not competent for convincing others of the matter of Inference. It may be said that the Example of the Kitchen may help us in determining the Vyāpti, 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire.' The Jaina logician points out in this Sūtra that as the Vyāpti is already well-known through Tarka or inductive generalisation, the use of Examples is obviously superfluous.

नियतैकविशेषस्वभावे च दृष्टान्ते साकल्येन व्याप्तेरयोग-
तो विप्रतिपत्तौ तदन्तरापेक्षायामनवस्थितेर्दुर्निवारः

समवतारः ॥ ३५ ॥

*niyataika-viśeṣa-svabhāve ca dṛṣṭānte sākalyena
vyāpter ayogato vipratipattau tad-antarāpekṣāyām anav-
asthiter-durnivāraḥ samavatāraḥ* | 35 |

TRANSLATION: And because the Example holds good regarding a particular instance only, it does not prove general pervasion; and thus, as another Example would be required (and so on) the fallacy of going back ad infinitum would be irresistible.

COMMENTARY: This objection is an elaboration of that contained in Sūtra 34. The Example-premise refers to one instance only, of the co-existence of the Mark and the Proven. This does not prove their invariable co-existence. To prove it other Examples are required and so on. Without Inductive generalisation, we shall be flying from one instance to another, without ever reaching the general proposition, embodied in the Vyāpti. Hence it is not correct to

say that Example helps us in determining the Invariable Relationship.

नाप्यविनाभावस्मृतये, प्रतिपन्नप्रतिबन्धस्य व्युपन्नमतेः
पक्षहेतुप्रदर्शनेनैव तत्प्रसिद्धेः ॥ ३६ ॥

*nāpy avinābhāva-smṛtaye, pratipanna-pratibandhasya
vyutpanna-mateḥ pakṣa-hetu-pradaśanenaiva tat-
prasiddheḥ* । 36 ।

TRANSLATION Nor, to remind the fact of the Invariable Connection; for, a wise man, to whom the Invariable Connection has already been known recollects it as soon as the Abode and the Reason are pointed out.

COMMENTARY. It may thirdly be said that although the Example may not prove 'pervasion', still it is useful in as much as it reminds us of the connection between the Mark and the Proven. The Jaina logician points out that a man of intellect does not require to be reminded of a fact which he has already known. As soon as the Mark and the Proven are presented to him, he recollects the Invariable Connection between them without having to wait for an Example to be apprised of it.

अन्तर्व्याप्त्या हेतोः साध्यप्रत्यायने शक्तावशक्तौ च बहि-
र्व्याप्तेरुद्भावनं व्यर्थम् ॥ ३७ ॥

antaḥ-vyāptyā hetoḥ sādhyā-pratyāyane śaktāvaśaktāu ca bahir-vyāpter udbhāvanam vyartham । 37 ।

TRANSLATION: And since because of its 'internal inseparable connection' (pervasion) the Mark is

capable or incapable of establishing the Proven, the development of the 'external inseparable connection' is valueless.

COMMENTARY· Whether the Mark is capable or not to prove the Proven is dependent on whether it is essentially (*antai-vyāpti*) connected with it. An Example shows the Bahir-Vyāpti or external, i.e., superficial connection only, it does not prove the inseparable connection between the Sādhyā and the Sādhana.

The Commentator says· "This is the meaning, If the internal inseparable connection has the capacity to establish the Proven, the description of the external inseparable connection is certainly useless. 'That is my son because such voice is not to be heard anywhere else', here the Mark leads to the Proven, although there is no (Example showing) external inseparable connection here. 'He is greenblack, because he is his (a given person's) son, like his other sons', here, however, although there is the Example the Mark does not establish the Proven".

पक्षीकृत एव विषये साधनस्य साध्येन व्याप्तिरन्तर्व्याप्ति-
रन्यत्र तु बहिर्व्याप्तिः ॥ ३८ ॥

*pakṣī-kṛta eva viṣaye sādhanasya sādhyena vyāptir
antai-vyāptir anyatra tu bahir-vyāptiḥ* । 38 ।

TRANSLATION We have 'Internal inseparable connection where there is the 'pervasion' of the Mark by the Proven in the very object denoted as the Abode; elsewhere, however, we have the 'external connection'.

यथानेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु सत्त्वस्य तथैवोपपत्तेरिति, अग्नि-
मानयं देशो धूमवत्त्वात्, य एवं स एवं यथा पाकस्थानमिति
च ॥ ३९ ॥

*yathānekāntātmakaṃ vastu sattvasya tathāvopapa-
tter iti । agnimān ayaṃ deśo dhūmavattvāt, ya evaṃ
sa evaṃ yathā pākasthānam iti ca । 39 ।*

TRANSLATION: For instance a thing has many aspects because a substance is cognised to be so. That place has Fire because it has Smoke, whatever is such is such; as for Example, the Kitchen

COMMENTARY: The first of the above Inference is based on *antaivyāpti*, while the second points to *bahirvyāpti*.

नोपनयनिगमनयोरपि परप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्यं पक्षहेतु-
प्रयोगादेव तस्याः सद्भावात् ॥ ४० ॥

*nopanaya-nigamanayor api para-pṛatipattau sāmā-
rthyam pakṣa-hetu-prayogād eva tasyāḥ sadbhāvāt । 40 ।*

TRANSLATION: Similarly, in the matter of convin-
cing others, Application (*upanaya*) and Conclusion (*nigamana*) also are not potent; for, it is effected through the use of the Abode and the Reason.

COMMENTARY: Application and Conclusion are the two last premises in a five-limbed Nyāya Syllogism. The Jaina logician says that these two like the Example-premises, are useless, so far as arguments for convinc-
ing others are concerned. An intelligent man will

understand a truth, e. g., 'this Hill has Fire', as soon as the two propositions embodying the Abode (e. g., 'This Hill has Fire') and the Mark (e. g., 'Because it has Smoke') are stated to him.

समर्थनमेव परं परप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गमास्तां तदन्तरेण दृष्टान्ता-
दिप्रयोगेऽपि तदसंभवात् ॥ ४१ ॥

samarthanam eva param para-pṛatipatty-aṅgam
āstām tad antareṇa dṛṣṭāntādi-prayoge' pi tad-
asaṁbhavāt | 41 |

TRANSLATION To convince others, supporting the Mark is essential: without this, that is impossible even though the Example etc. may be used

COMMENTARY The essential thing in an argument for-the-sake-of-convincing-others of a truth is to support and demonstrate the Reason and for establishing it, the Hetu must be verified, even though the 'example-premise' or other premises are used. If the Reason is not well-established, it is impossible to establish the Proven in any way. Hence in an Anumāna, it is the Hetu alone which must be stated and verified. The premises of Example, Application and Conclusion are superfluous.

मन्दमतींस्तु व्युत्पादयितुं दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनान्यपि
प्रयोज्यानि ॥ ४२ ॥

manda-matīṁs tu vyutpādayitum dṛṣṭāntopanaya-
niḡamanāny api prayojyāni | 42 |

TRANSLATION: To convince the dull-minded persons, however, the premises of the Example, the Application and the Conclusion etc. are to be used

COMMENTARY: Parārthānumāna or Inference for others is two-limbed as the Jaina logician has been so long maintaining. Such a two-limbed argument, however, is meant for an intelligent pupil only; where the pupil is a dull or uninformed person, a more elaborate process of argumentation is necessary. To teach such a person, not only are all the five premises of a Nyāya syllogism necessary but the Jaina logician goes even further than this and conceives of a ten-limbed syllogism for such a person. These ten premises are: 1. Pakṣa premise or the proposition indicating the Abode. 2. Pakṣa-śuddhi-premise or the proposition verifying the Abode. 3. Hetu-premise or the proposition stating the Reason. 4. Hetu-śuddhi-premise or the proposition demonstrating the Reason. 5. Drṣṭānta-premise or the proposition stating the Example. 6. Drṣṭānta-śuddhi-premise or the proposition verifying the Example. 7. Upanaya-premise or the proposition describing the Application. 8. Upanaya-śuddhi-premise or the proposition verifying the Application. 9. Nigamana-premise or the proposition stating the Conclusion. 10. Nigamana-śuddhi-premise or the proposition verifying the Conclusion.

The Commentator says: "Of these the best (*utkiṣṭa*) form of an Inference-for-others is said to be ten-limbed. The mediocre (*madhyama*) form contains limbs from nine to two. The worst (*jaghanya*), however, consists in a statement of the Mark only". These three forms of an 'Inference-for-others' are

meant for (1) dull, (2) intelligent and (3) super-intelligent learners respectively.

प्रतिबन्धप्रतिपत्तेरास्पदं दृष्टान्तः ॥ ४३ ॥

pratibandha-pratipatteḥ āspadam dṛṣṭāntaḥ । 43 ।

TRANSLATION· Example is the place where the Inseparable Connection can be known.

COMMENTARY The Example is the place or phenomena (e. g., the Kitchen), where the Inseparable Connection between the Mark and the Proven (e. g., that between Smoke and Fire) can be ascertained.

स द्वेधा, साधर्म्यतो वैधर्म्यतश्च ॥ ४४ ॥

sa dvedhā sādharmaḥmyato vaidharmaḥmyataś ca । 44 ।

TRANSLATION· That is of two sorts: owing to its Homogeneity and Heterogeneity.

COMMENTARY: An Homogeneous Example resembles the Pakṣa in containing the Dharma or the phenomenon to be proved, a Heterogeneous Example is so called because it differs from the Pakṣa in not containing the Dharma.

यत्र साधनधर्मसत्तायामवश्यं साध्यधर्मसत्ता प्रकाश्यते,
स साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४५ ॥

yatra sādhanadharmasattāyām avaśyaṃ sādhyadharmasattā prakāśyate sa sādharmaḥmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ । 45 ।

यथा यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निर्यथा महानसे ॥ ४६ ॥
yathā yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatra vahnir yathā
mahānase । 46 ।

TRANSLATION: In the case, where the nature of the Mark being present, the nature of the Proven is found to exist as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the Homogeneous Example

For instance: Wherever there is Smoke, there is Fire; as for Example, (in) the Kitchen.

यत्र तु साध्याभावे साधनस्यावश्यमभावः प्रदर्श्यते, स
 वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४७ ॥

yatra tu sādhyābhāve sādhanasyāvśyam abhāvaḥ
pradarśyate sa vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ । 47 ।

TRANSLATION: In the case, however, where the Proven being absent, the Mark is shown to be absent as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the Heterogenous Example.

यथाग्न्यभावे न भवत्येव धूमो, यथा जलाशये ॥ ४८ ॥
yathāgny-abhāve na bhavaty eva dhūmo yathā
jalāśaye । 48 ।

For instance: Where there is no Fire, there can be no Smoke; as for Example, in the Pond.

हेतोः साध्यधर्मिण्युपसंहरणमुपनयः ॥ ४९ ॥
hetoḥ sādhyadharminy upasaṅharaṇam
upanayaḥ । 49 ।

TRANSLATION: Application is showing the Mark to be existent in the Abode

यथा धूमश्चात्र प्रदेशे ॥ ५० ॥
yathā dhūmas' cātra pradeśe । 50 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance: (the statement that) There is Smoke in this place.

साध्यधर्मस्य पुनर्निगमनम् ॥ ५१ ॥
sādhya-dharmasya punar nigamanam । 51 ।

TRANSLATION: Conclusion is applying the Proven to the Abode

यथा तस्मादग्निरत्र ॥ ५२ ॥
yathā tasmād agniḥ atra । 52 ।

TRANSLATION For instance. (the statement) so, there is Fire here.

एते पक्षप्रयोगादयः पञ्चाप्यवयवसंज्ञया कीर्त्यन्ते ॥ ५३ ॥
ete pakṣa-prayogādayaḥ pañcāpy avayava-samjñayā kīrtiyante । 53 ।

TRANSLATION. These five propositions, stating the Abode, etc , are also described as Limbs

COMMENTARY: The logicians of the old School used to call the five premises in a syllogism, its five Limbs (*avayavas*) The Jaina commentator says that if

these five syllogistic premises are to be called Limbs, the five Śuddhi-premises (i. e., propositions which verify them) noted in the Commentary on the Sūtra 42 above are also to be known as Limbs

उक्तलक्षणो हेतुर्द्विप्रकारः, उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभ्यां
सिद्धमानत्वात् ॥ ५४ ॥

ukta-lakṣaṇo hetur dvi-prakārah, upalabdhy-anupalabdhubhyāṃ bhūyamānatvāt ' 54 ।

TRANSLATION: The Reason, the nature of which has been described before, is of two sorts, it being different because of its being Positively Cognised or Negatively Cognised.

उपलब्धिर्विधिनिषेधयोः सिद्धिनिबन्धनमनुपलब्धिश्च
॥ ५५ ॥

upalabdhir vidhi-niśedhayoh siddhi-nibandhanam anupalabdhis' ca ' 55 ।

TRANSLATION: The Positively Cognised as well as the Negatively Cognised prove the Affirmation and the Negation (of some fact)

विधिः सदंशः ॥ ५६ ॥
vidhiḥ sad-aṃśaḥ ' 56 ।

TRANSLATION: The Affirmation is the aspect of Existence.

COMMENTARY. Both the Upalabdhi (Positively Cognised) and the Anupalabdhi (Negatively Cognised)

Hetus may be of two kinds inasmuch as each of them may be either Vidhi-sādhaka, i e., a Hetu Proving the Affirmative or the Existential aspect of some fact or Nisedha-Sādhaka, i e., a Hetu proving the Negative aspect of the fact.

प्रतिषेधोऽसदंशः ॥ ५७ ॥

pratiṣedho' sad-aṁśaḥ । 57 ।

TRANSLATION: The Negative is the aspect of Non-existence.

COMMENTARY. According to the principle of the Jaina philosophy, a thing has many aspects. From one standpoint, it may be said to be Existent while from another, Non-existent. Vidhi and for the matter of that, the Vidhi-Sādhaka (Affirmative) Hetu relates itself to the Existential aspect of the thing, Nisedha and for the matter of that, the Nisedha-Sādhaka (Negative) Hetu relates itself to the Non-existential aspect of the thing.

स चतुर्धा प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभाव इतरेतराभावोऽत्यन्ता-
भावश्च ॥ ५८ ॥

*sa caturdhā pīāg-abhāvaḥ pradhvamsābhāvaḥ
itaretarābhāvo' tyantābhāvaś ca* । 58 ।

TRANSLATION: That is of four kinds, viz, Prior Non-existence, Posterior Non-existence, Reciprocal Non-existence and Absolute Non-existence.

COMMENTARY. It has been said that a Nisedha-Sādhaka Hetu relates itself to the aspect of Non-

existence in a thing and the Vidhi-Sādhaka, to the aspect of Existence. The older logicians did not speak of any different modes of Existence and hence the present author does not classify Existence. But as regards Negation or non-Existence four forms of it are distinguishable, which are stated in this Sūtra and described in the Sūtra following.

यन्निवृत्तादेव कार्यस्य समुत्पत्तिः सोऽस्य प्राग्भावाः

॥ ५९ ॥

yan-nivṛttāy eva kāryasya samutpattiḥ so'sya prāg-abhāvaḥ । 59 ।

TRANSLATION: What subsiding, a fact in the form of its effect comes into existence is its Prior Non-existence.

COMMENTARY: What (e. g., B) coming to an end, a certain phenomenon (e. g., A) comes into existence, is its Prāgabhāva or Prior Non-existence. But if the said phenomenon A is capable of coming into existence, although the phenomenon B continues in existence, B cannot be the Prior Non-existence of A. Thus sometimes Knowledge arises when Darkness subsides, but Darkness cannot be looked upon as the Prior Non-existence of Knowledge (for, Knowledge may arise even though Darkness continues in existence). Darkness cannot be looked upon as the Prior Non-existence of the Knowledge-or-Form (*rūpa*) even, although ordinarily, we come to perceive the Form (of a thing) only when Darkness is removed. For, there are beings who can perceive the Form (of a thing) even in Darkness.

यथा मृत्पिण्डनिवृत्तावेव समुत्पद्यमानस्य घटस्य

मृत्पिण्डः ॥ ६० ॥

*yathā mṛt-pinda-nivṛttāv eva samutpadyamānasya
ghaṭasya mṛt-piṇḍaḥ | 60 |*

TRANSLATION. For instance: The lump of clay (is the Prior Non-existence), of the pitcher which is formed (out of it) on its cessation to exist.

COMMENTARY. As long as the Clay remains in a lump, there is no Pitcher. When, however, a Pitcher is formed out of it, the Clay no longer exists as a lump of Clay. Hence the lump of Clay is technically an instance of the Prior Non-existence, viz., of the Pitcher.

यदुत्पत्तौ कार्यस्यावश्यं विपत्तिः सोऽस्य प्रध्वंसमावः

॥ ६१ ॥

*yad utpattau kāryasyāvashyaṃ vipattiḥ so' sya
pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ | 61 |*

TRANSLATION. That arising, a fact which was an effect, comes to an end as a matter of necessity is its Posterior Non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ*).

COMMENTARY. Let us suppose that a fact (e g., B) which was not existing from the beginningless time but which came into existence at a certain point of time as an effect or result of Something else, comes to an end as a matter of necessity, when another phenomenon (e g., A) occurs; in that case, A would be the Posterior Non-existence, of B.

यथा कपालकदम्बकोत्पत्तौ नियमतो विपद्यमानस्य

कलशस्य कपालकदम्बकम् ॥ ६२ ॥

*yathā kapāla-kadambakotpattau niyamato vipadya-
mānasya kalāśasya kapāla-kadambakam* । 62 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance: The collection of pitcher-pieces (is the Posterior Non-existence), of the Pitcher which is necessarily destroyed on the rise of the Pitcher-pieces.

COMMENTARY: When a Pitcher is broken, Pieces come into existence; but in other words, Pieces coming into existence, the Pitcher must necessarily be broken. Pieces are thus the Posterior Non-existence of the Pitcher.

स्वरूपान्तरात् स्वरूपव्यावृत्तिरितरेतराभावः ॥ ६३ ॥

svarūpāntarāt svarūpa-vyāvṛttiḥ itaretarābhāvaḥ । 63 ।

TRANSLATION. Reciprocal Non-existence (*itaretarābhāvaḥ*) implies the retrogression of the nature of a thing from the nature of its opposite.

COMMENTARY: Two things, opposed to each other in nature (and not simply in outward appearance) may be said to imply the Non-existence-of-each-other. This mode of Non-existence is the *Itaretarābhāvaḥ*, otherwise called the *Anyāpoha*.

यथा स्तम्भस्वभावात् कुम्भस्वभावव्यावृत्तिः ॥ ६४ ॥

*yathā stambha-svabhāvāt kumbha-svabhāva-
vyāvṛttiḥ* । 64 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance. The retrogression of the nature of a Pitcher from the nature of a Pillar.

कालत्रयापेक्षिणी हि तादात्म्यपरिणामनिवृत्तिरत्यन्ता-

भावः ॥ ६५ ॥

kāla-trayaṭpekṣiṇī hi tādātmya-parināma-nivṛttir
atyantābhāvaḥ । 65 ।

TRANSLATION. Absolute Non-existence (or the *atyantābhāva* of a thing) is what, in all the three times, contradicts its identical nature

COMMENTARY: What is essentially opposed to the nature of a thing, its immutable nature as it was in the past, as it is in the present and as it will continue to be in the future, is its Absolute Non-existence

यथा चेतनाचेतनयोः ॥ ६६ ॥

yathā cetanācetanayor । 66 ।

TRANSLATION. As for instance: The Conscious and the Unconscious.

COMMENTARY Consciousness was never, can never be, nor will ever be the principle of the Unconscious substances, e.g., the Pudgala or matter. For, this is against the very nature of Consciousness. Similarly, the Unconscious substance, e.g., Matter is incapable of turning into a Conscious being, because this again is against the nature of an Unconscious substance. The Conscious and the Unconscious are thus the Absolute Non-existences of each other.

उपलब्धेरपि द्वैविध्यमविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विरुद्धोपलब्धिश्च

॥ ६७ ॥

*upalabdher api dvaividhyam aviruddhopalabdhir
viruddhopalabdhis' ca* । 67 ।

TRANSLATION: There are two kinds of the Positively Cognised (*upalabdhī*) Marks, viz., the Positively-cognised-compatible (*aviruddha-upalabdhī*) and the Positively-cognised-incompatible (*viruddha-upalabdhī*)

COMMENTARY: The Reason or the Mark in a syllogism has already been said to be either the Positively-Cognised or the Negatively-Cognised. The Positively-Cognised Mark, again, is either Compatible-with-(i.e., Unopposed-to)-the-Proven or Incompatible-with-(i.e., opposed-to)-it.

तत्राविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधिसिद्धौ षोढा ॥ ६८ ॥

tatrāviruddhopalabdhir vidhī-siddhau ṣoḍha । 68 ।

TRANSLATION: Of these, the Positively-Cognised-compatible proves *vidhī* (affirmation or existence) and is of six kinds.

साध्येनाविरुद्धानां व्याप्यकार्यकारणपूर्वचरोत्तरचरसह-
चराणामुपलब्धिरिति ॥ ६९ ॥

sādhyenāviruddhānāṃ vyāpya-kārya-kāraṇa-pūrvacaroṭtaracara-sahacarāṇām upalabdhir iti । 69 ।

TRANSLATION: A Mark, Compatible-with-the-Proven may be Positively-Cognised as the 'pervaded'

(*vyāpya*), the 'effect' (*kārya*), the cause (*kāraṇa*), the antecedent (*pūva-caṛa*), the 'subsequent' (*uttara-caṛa*) or the 'concomitant' (*sahacara*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY The above are the six modes of the Positively-Cognised Compatible Mark, *Aviruddha-upalabdhi Hetu*. These will be illustrated hereafter

The logicians of the Buddhist school contend that to establish a *Vidhi* or affirmative relation between the Mark and the Proven, a Compatible Mark is either the *Svabhāva* of (1 e., *identical in-nature* with) or the *Kārya* of (1 e., the effect of) the Proven. A *Kāraṇa*, i e., what is the 'cause' of the Proven, cannot serve as the Compatible Mark in such a matter. The Buddhists point out that a 'cause' does not invariably produce the 'effect'. The potency of a 'cause' may be suppressed, besides, many other conditions must operate in order that an effect may be produced. Thus it is that in order that an effect-phenomenon may be inferred from some other phenomenon as its cause, one must be sure that (i) its potency to produce the said effect is unimpaired and (ii) all the conditions for the production of the said effect are collected in it. As it is impossible for one to be sure of these two pre-requisites, it is unsafe, the Buddhists contend, to predict the 'effect' from the 'cause'.

The Jaina philosophers controvert the above position of the Buddhist thinkers in the following *Sūtra*.

तमस्त्विन्यामास्वाद्यमानावात्रादिफलरसादेकसामग्र्यनुमित्या
रूपाद्यनुमितिमभिन्नमानैरभिमतमेव किमपि कारणं हेतुतया यत्र
शक्तेरप्रतिस्खलनमपरकारणसाकल्यं च ॥ ७० ॥

tamasvinyām āsvādyamānād āmrādi-phala-rasād eka-sāmagry-anumityā rūpādy-anumitīm abhimanīyamānair abhūmatam eva kim api kāraṇam hetutayā yatra śakter apratiskhalanam apra-kāraṇa-sākalyam ca | 70 |

TRANSLATION: By admitting the validity of the Inference about the Form etc., through the Inference about the one Totality (of conditions) from the taste of the juice of fruits, e. g., a mango in a dark night, (the Buddhists admit) some cause to be the Mark or Reason, in which there are the unimpairment of the potency and the collection of the other conditions.

COMMENTARY: The Jainas controvert the Buddhist contention (that a 'cause' cannot serve as a sure Reason, that is, it is impossible to infer the Effect from the Cause), by pointing out that the Buddhists themselves admit the validity of some Inferences in which an 'effect-phenomenon' is inferred from a 'cause-phenomenon'. The Jainas further show that the Buddhists admit also that in such Inferences one knows for certain that the potency of the 'cause' to produce the effect remains unimpaired and that all the conditions for the production of the 'effect' are present in the 'cause'.

Let us take the case of a man who is tasting the juice of a sweet fruit like a mango in a dark night. The darkness of the night obviously prevents him from having a *direct perception* (*pratyakṣa*) of the fruit or its Form. Nevertheless from the Taste of the juice, he infers about the Form of the fruit. From the Taste, he infers at first about the one Totality of the conditions which generates that taste; and then, from

that Totality of conditions, he infers about the Form of the thing This Inference about the Form from the Taste involves the following data, the validity of which is admitted by the Buddhists, viz, the man had perceived the Form (Say A), some time before, this original percept of the form (Say A1) in the succeeding moment which was of the same kind with the Original percept (A) and with it an Idea of the Taste, which is, of course, an experience different from the Original percept Thus the Inference about the Form from the Taste, involves the validity of the assumption that the original percept of the Form (A) caused another percept of the Form (A) in the succeeding moment which was of the same kind with the original percept This is admitting that there are cause-phenomena which lead to the Effect-phenomena and that in these Cause-phenomena, their capacity to produce the Effect and the presence of all the requisite conditions for producing the Effects, are possible to be determined.

The Buddhists turn round and say that the Inference about the Form from the Taste does not involve, as shown above, any assumption that a Cause produced the Effect and as such the former would serve as a valid Reason According to the Buddhists, the given Inference involves the operation of a Svabhāva Hetu in the following manner The original percept of the Form (say A) being of such and such a nature is capable of producing the succeeding percept of the Form (say A1) of such and such a nature, as it produces the Taste of such and such a nature. The production of A1 by A here involves the identity-of-nature of A and A1, because a thing can produce another which is only of the same essence with it The Jains point out that

even the relationship of the Identity-in-nature between A and A1, as alleged by the Buddhists, cannot be discovered without first determining the absence of any obstacles between A and A1, and the presence of all the conditions in A for leading to A1. The Jainas argue that if after ascertaining the facts (i) that there is nothing to hinder A from leading to A1, and (ii) that there are all the conditions present in A for its leading to A1 one says that A is the *cause* of A, and in other words, that A is the Kārana-Hetu which is competent to lead to the Sādhya, A1, his position would in no way be wrong.

The real test in such cases, according to the Jainas, is whether the Mark is invariably connected with the Proven. Judged by this test, the Kārana-Hetu in a Syllogism, as also the Hetu in the argument, 'There is Shade here because there is the Cover (e.g., an umbrella)', are valid Hetus

पूर्वचरोत्तरचरयोर्न स्वभावकार्यकारणभावौ तयोः

कालव्यवहितानुपलम्भात् ॥ ७१ ॥

*pūrvacarottaracarayor na svabhāva-kārya-kāraṇa-
bhāvau tayoḥ kāla-vyavahitān upalambhāt* | 71 |

TRANSLATION: The Antecedent (*pūrvacara*) and the Subsequent (*uttaracara*) have not the natures of the Identical (*svabhāva*) or of the Cause-and-Effect (*kārya-kāraṇa*). For these relations (of Identity and Causality) are never known to subsist between phenomena which are separated by an interval of time.

COMMENTARY: Some thinkers contend that the Mark which is related to the Proven as its Antecedent

or as its Subsequent is included in the class of Marks which are either Identical-in-nature with the Proven or related to it as Cause-Effect and need not be mentioned separately. This, however, is an erroneous view inasmuch as two phenomena which are Identical-in-nature must be synchronous and in case they are Causally connected they must not be separated by any interval of time. For instance, the relation of Identity subsists between the fact of being a Product, and the fact of being Non-eternal the two facts, not being separated from one another by any interval of time. Then again the Causal Relation can subsist between two phenomena, when one owes its origin to the other; and this again is possible if the two phenomena are not separated by any interval of time. Fire and Smoke, for instance, are causally connected and are never separated in time. Hence the Antecedent (*pūrvacara*) and the Subsequent (*uttaracara*) Hetus cannot be included in the Hetus which are either Identical-in-nature (*svabhāva*) with or are related to the Proven as its Cause (*kāraṇa*) or Effect (*kārya*); for, admittedly, the Pūrvacara and the Uttaracara Hetus, as their names imply, are separated from the Sādhyā by an interval of time

न चातिक्रान्तानागतयोजप्रदृशासंवेदनमरणयोः प्रबोधो-
त्पातौ प्रति कारणत्वं, व्यवहितत्वेन निर्व्यपारत्वात् ॥ ७२ ॥

*na cātīkṛāntānāgatayor jāgrad-dasāsamvedana-
maraṇayoḥ prabodhotpātau prati kāraṇatvam, vyavahi-
tatvena nirvyāpātāt* ॥ 72 ॥

TRANSLATION. And the fact of one's being awake in the past and the fact of one's death in future are

not respectively the causes of one's waking consciousness and of one's seeing omens at present, for, these being separated are unrelated.

COMMENTARY: The principle of this Sūtra as already indicated in the last one, is that the Cause and the Effect must be immediately and directly connected. It is sometimes said that a man is conscious after his sleep *because* he was so before his sleep; and that one sees bad omens (e.g., he does not see the polestar) *because* he will die soon. These are loose expressions. There can be no immediate connection between a man's previous consciousness and his present consciousness and between his death which is to take place in future and the fact of his seeing evil omens at the present time. Hence these phenomena cannot be said to be *causally* related "If the causal relationship be supposed to subsist between such unconnected phenomena then anything can be the cause of anything".

स्वव्यापारापेक्षिणी हि कार्यं प्रति पदार्थस्य कारणत्वव्यव-
स्था कुलालस्येव कलशं प्रति ॥ ७३ ॥

*sva-vyāpārāpekṣiṇī hi kāryam prati padārthasya
kāraṇatva-vyavasthā Kulālasya eva kaśaṣam prati* ॥ 73 ॥

TRANSLATION: A thing is said to be the cause of another, when the latter is dependent on the operation of the former in the same way as a Pitcher on that of the potter.

COMMENTARY: To know whether the causal relationship subsists between two phenomena, the test of

Anvaya (e g, A existing, B invariably exists) and Vyatireka, e g, (B not existing, A never exists) is to be applied. In order that the two phenomena, e g, A and B may stand the test, one, i.e., A must be shown to be dependent on the energising or some activity (*vyāpāra*) of B. A Pitcher can be made only if there be a Potter (*anvaya*); if there be no Potter, no Pitcher can come into being (*vyatireka*). This invariable relationship (*anvaya-vyatireka*) between a Pitcher and the Potter is due to the fact that it is because of the activity of the Potter that the Pitcher can come into being. So it is that A can be called the effect of B, if its existence is due to some productive activity of B.

न च व्यवहितयोस्तयोर्व्यापारपरिकल्पनं न्याय्यमति-

प्रसक्तेः ॥ ७४ ॥

*na ca vyavahitayos taylor vyāpāra-parikalpanaṃ
nyāyīyam atīprasakteḥ* । 74 ।

TRANSLATION: The supposition of an essential connection between two phenomena (i.e., of a relationship of one being dependent on the operation of the other) which are separated from each other is not right, because of the fallacy of "the over-wide range" (*atīprasakti*)

COMMENTARY: The fallacy of *Atī-prasakti* consists in finding a connection where there is not, i.e., between two unconnected phenomena. To find a connection between a past and a future phenomena, to say that one causes, i.e., actively produces the other, to say, for instance, that the present waking consciousness of a

man is the effect of his being awake in the past or that his seeing bad omens at present is due to his imminent death in future, is thus committing the fallacy of Ati-prasakti.

परम्पराव्यवहितानां परेषामपि तत्कल्पनस्य निवारयितु-
मशक्यत्वात् ॥ ७५ ॥

*paramparā-vyavahitānāṃ pareṣām api tat-kalpa-
nasya nivārayitum aśakyatvāt* 1 75 1

TRANSLATION: Because it would then be impracticable to prevent that supposition (of relationship) between other mutually isolated things.

COMMENTARY: The Jaina thinker's contention is, as we have seen, that there cannot be any causal relationship between phenomena which are isolated, even though they are Antecedent or Subsequent, one to the other. Causal relationship involves the genesis of the one phenomenon from the other and accordingly two phenomena which are separated by an interval of time (being Antecedent or subsequent one to the other) cannot be said to be causally connected. The Jaina writer points out in this Sūtra that if the causal relationship were possible between two phenomena which are Antecedent or Subsequent, one to the other, there is no reason why it would not be possible between phenomena which are much more widely separated from one another. The opposite party here may contend that in the matter of causality, the applicability of the Anvaya and the Vyatireka is the test, the existence or absence of any interval or isolating matter

being inessential. For instance, Wood-and-Fire is the cause of Smoke because there is the Anvaya-Vyatireka relation between Wood-and-Fire and Smoke. Let us suppose that there is some Sugar in Wood-and-Fire. Admittedly, there is Smoke there; but you cannot say that Sugar is the cause of Smoke, although there is nothing to separate Sugar from Smoke here. Hence it is, the opposite party contends, in the matter of causality the applicability of the Anvaya-Vyatireka test is essential and not the presence or absence of any isolating matter between the two phenomena. The Jānas point out that if the phenomena are isolated, you cannot apply the test of Anvaya-Vyatireka. Consciousness for a Sleep and Future-death are isolated from Consciousness-after-sleep and present sight of Omens respectively. The relation of Anvaya is inapplicable here. Everyone will admit that when there is Consciousness-after-sleep, there is no Consciousness-before-sleep and when there is the sight-of-Omens, there is no death (i.e., the man is living). The opposite party insists that the Anvaya may be applicable, although the phenomena may be isolated. He would say that Consciousness-before-sleep, existing in its own time and Future-death happening in its own time produce their respective effects, i.e., consciousness-after-sleep and present sight-of-Omens in different times and are thus positively (*anvaya*) connected with them. To this contention, the Jaina reply is that if you say that there is thus Anvaya between phenomena, existing or occurring in different times, anything existing at any time may be looked upon as the cause of anything existing at a different time. The opposite party may say that in order that a causal relation may be esta-

blished, the Vyatireka test also should be applicable. The Jains point out, if the two phenomena are isolated the Vyatireka test is clearly inapplicable. Take, for instance, Consciousness-before-sleep. Admittedly, Consciousness-after-sleep is an event existing when Consciousness-before-sleep as an event does not exist. So, it cannot be said that Consciousness-before-sleep not existing, Consciousness-after-sleep does not exist. The Vyatireka test is thus inapplicable

The Jaina theory is thus established that if two phenomena are isolated there cannot be any causal relationship between them.

सहचारिणोः परस्परस्वरूपपरित्यागेन तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः
सहोत्पादेन तदुपपत्तिविपत्तेश्च सहचरहेतोरपि प्रोक्तेषु

नानुप्रवेशः ॥ ७६ ॥

*sahacāriṇoḥ paraspara-svarūpa-parityāgena tādāt-
myānupapatteḥ sahotpādena tad-upapatti-vipatteḥ ca
sahacara-hetor api proktesu nānupraveśaḥ* | 76 |

TRANSLATION: Two things which are concomitant cannot be Identical-in-nature, as they would thereby lose their respective natures; and because they are produced simultaneously, none of them can be said to rise from the other; hence the Concomitant (*sahacara*) Mark also cannot be included within the said classes.

COMMENTARY: In this Sūtra the Jaina logician means to point out that the Sahacara Hetu (the Mark which is Concomitant with the Proven) also is an independent Hetu and cannot be brought under the Identity-Hetu or the Effect-Hetu or the Cause-Hetu

If there is Identity in two concomitant things, then they have no principle of mutual exclusion in them and hence their independence of each other becomes impossible. Again, if one of them be supposed to rise from the other, then their concomitance becomes impossible, as in that case one must succeed the other. But this is not the case. Hence it (the Sahacara Hetu) is not included in the Svabhāva, the Kārya and the Kārana Hetus”

ध्वनिः परिणतिमान् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात्, यः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः स परिणतिमान् यथा स्तम्भो, यो वा न परिणतिमान् स न प्रयत्नानन्तरीयको यथा वान्ध्येयः, प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकश्च ध्वनिस्तस्मात्परिणतिमानिति व्याप्यस्य साध्येनाविरुद्धस्योपलब्धिः साधर्म्येण वैधर्म्येण च ॥ ७७ ॥

dhavanīḥ pariṇatimān prayatnānantarīyakatvāt, yaḥ prayatnānantarīyakaḥ sa pariṇatimān yathā stambho, yo vā na pariṇatimān sa na prayatnānantarīyako yathā vāndhyeyaḥ prayatnānantarīyakaś ca dhvanis tasmāt pariṇatimān iti vyāpyasya sādhyenāvnuddhasyopalabdhīḥ sādharmaṃyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca ॥ 77 ॥

TRANSLATION Sound is subject to Modification, because it is a Product whatever is a Product is subject to Modification: As for instance, a Pillar. On the other hand, whatever is not subject to Modification is not a Product As for Instance, the Barren Woman's Son. Now, sound is a Product. Hence it is subject to Modification. Here, the Mark is the Pervaded (*vyāpya*) of the Proven, compatible with it, Positively-perceived, both Homogeneously and Heterogeneously.

COMMENTARY: The above is an instance of the five-limbed syllogism which is meant for unintelligent persons and which illustrates the use of the Aviruddha-Upalabdhi Hetu of the Vyāpya form. In this, 'Sound is subject to Modification' is the Pratijñā or Proposition, stating the Abode (*dharmā*) with the Proven (*sādhya-dharma*) contained in it. 'Because it is a Product' is the statement of the Mark (*hetu*), 'Whatever is a Product' etc., are the statements of the Homogeneous (*sādharmya*) and the Heterogeneous (*vaidharmya*) examples (*drṣṭānta*) respectively pointing out the Pillar and the Barren Woman's Son and showing the 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*). Now, 'Sound is a Product', is the Application (*upanaya*). 'Hence it is subject to Modification' is the Conclusion (*nigamana*). In this Anumāna, the Mark, 'Because it is a Product', requires a little attention. It is a Positively cognised (*upalabdhi*) Mark. The Mark is also a Compatible (*aviruddha*) one as it establishes some form or mode of Vidhi (Existence or Affirmation). We have seen that a Positively cognised compatible mark may be of six kinds. The Mark in the argument under consideration, comes under the first class. It is the Vyāpya Hetu or the 'Pervaded' Mark. Although all Marks must be 'pervaded' by the Proven in order to be true Marks, the given Mark is called the Vyāpya Hetu here, in order to indicate that it is of the same Nature with the Proven and not its Cause or Effect etc. (The Vyāpya Hetu is practically the same as the Svabhāva Hetu).

अस्त्यत्र गिरिनिकुञ्जे घनञ्जयो धूमोपलम्भादिति

कार्यस्य ॥ ७८ ॥

*astyatra giṃ-nikuṅje dhanañjaya dhūmopalaṃbhād
iti kāryasya* । 78 ।

TRANSLATION. There is Fire in this Hill-grove;
As Smoke is seen: Here the Mark is the Effect (*kārya*).

COMMENTARY. Smoke is the Effect of Fire. Hence
Smoke which is the Mark here is the Kārya Hetu, i.e.,
the Effect Mark coming under the second class of the
Positively-cognised Compatible Marks.

भविष्यति वर्षं तथाविधवारिवाहविलोकनादिति

कारणस्य ॥ ७९ ॥

*bhaviṣyati varṣaṃ tathā-vidha-vārivāha-vilokaṇād
iti kāraṇasya* । 79 ।

TRANSLATION. There will be a Shower of rain:
As Clouds corresponding to that is seen. Hence the
Mark is the Cause (*kāraṇa*).

COMMENTARY: From the huge mass of swelling
Cloud, people infer an impending Shower of rain. This
is an instance of the Kāraṇa Hetu coming under the
third class of the Aviruddha Upalabdhi.

उदेष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते तिष्यतारका पुनर्वसुदयदर्शनादिति

पूर्वचरस्य ॥ ८० ॥

*udeṣyati muhūrtānte tiṣya-tārakā punarvasūdaya-
darśanād iti pūrvacarasya* । 80 ।

TRANSLATION: A Muhūrta after, the constellation
of Tisya will rise, as Punarvasu constellation is

seen to rise. Here the mark is the Antecedent Pūrva-cara.

COMMENTARY: Tīśya, otherwise called Pusya-star rises after Punarvasu star. This is an instance of the Pūrvacara Hetu coming under the fourth class of the Aviruddha-Upalabdhī.

उदगुर्मुहूर्तात्पूर्वं पूर्वफाल्गुन्य उत्तरफाल्गुनीनामुद्गमोप-
लब्धेरित्युत्तरचरस्य ॥ ८१ ॥

*udagur muhūrīāt pūrvam pūrvaphālgunya uttaraphāl-
gunīnām udgamopalabdhēr ity uttaracarasya 181*

TRANSLATION: A Muhūrta before, the Pūrva-phālgunī constellation rose; As the Uttara-phālgunī constellation is seen to rise. Here the Mark is Subsequent.

COMMENTARY: Pūrva-phālgunī constellation rises before Uttara-phālgunī stars This is an instance of the Uttaracara Hetu coming under the fifth class of the Positively-cognised Compatible Marks.

अस्तीह सहकारफले रूपविशेषः समास्वाद्यमानरसविशे-
षादिति सहचरस्य ॥ ८२ ॥

*astīha sahakāra-phale rūpa-viśeṣaḥ samāsvādya-
māna-rasa-viśeṣād iti sahaacarasya 182*

TRANSLATION: There must be a particular kind of shape in the mango fruit. As this has a particular kind of juice which is being tasted. Here the Mark is the Concomitant (*sahacara*).

COMMENTARY: This is an instance of the Sahacara Hetu coming under the sixth class of the Aviruddha Upalabdhi

The above are the six direct modes of the Aviruddha Upalabdhi Hetu. There may be other indirect forms of such Hetus which should be included in the six described above. One of such indirect forms is called the Kārya-Kārya-aviruddha-upalabdhi, which may be described as a Compatible Mark which is Positively cognised to be the effect of the effect of the Proven'. Let A be the Effect of B and let B be the Effect of C. One argues 'Here there was C, because A is seen'. The Anumāna here is based on a Kārya-kārya-aviruddha-upalabdhi Hetu. This is to be included in the Kārya-aviruddha-Upalabdhi Hetu, illustrated above.

विरुद्धोपलब्धिस्तु प्रतिषेधप्रतिपत्तौ सप्तप्रकारा ॥ ८३ ॥

*viruddhopalabdhis tu pratiṣedha-pratipattau sapta-
prakārā* । 83 ।

TRANSLATION: A Positively-cognised-Incompatible Mark (*viruddha upalabdhi*), however, proves Pratishedha (or the element of Non-existence, i e., Negation) and is of seven kinds

COMMENTARY: These are described below.

तत्राद्या स्वभावविरुद्धोपलब्धिः ॥ ८४ ॥

tatrādyā svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhiḥ । 84 ।

TRANSLATION: Of these, the first is the Positively cognised, which is Essentially-Incompatible (with the nature of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: This is the Svabhāva-Viruddha-Upalabdhi-Hetu which is directly opposed to the nature of the Proven.

यथा नास्त्येव सर्वथैकान्तोऽनेकान्तस्योपलम्भात् ॥ ८५ ॥
yathā nāsty eva sarvathaikānto' nekāntasyo-
palambhāt | 85 |

TRANSLATION: For instance: There cannot be only one aspect (of a thing), for, more than one aspect is met with.

COMMENTARY: 'One-aspect' is manifestly opposed to and Incompatible with 'More-than-one-aspect'. Just as the nature of a thing which is Existent is opposed to and Incompatible with the nature of a thing which is Non-existent, so, here in the Sūtra, we get an instance of a Hetu, (viz., More-than-one-aspect), the nature of which is positively-perceived (*upalabdhi*) to be Incompatible-with (*viruddha*) the nature (*svabhāva*) of the Sādhya (viz., One-aspect).

Some objectors here urge that the Hetu in the Sūtra is an Anupalabdhi (i.e., Uncognised or Negatively-cognised, as we have called it elsewhere) Hetu and not one which is Upalabdhi or a Positively-cognised one. They base their contention on the test, 'Every Negation (Pratiṣedha is due to Non-cognition' (Negative cognition or Anupalabdhi) The view is not correct.

For, the Hetu here is not something which is merely non-cognised. The objectors may point out that the opposition or the incompatibility between 'one-aspect' and 'many-aspect' like that between a touch of 'fire' and a touch of 'cold' is first established by a non-cognition of their respective natures, so that what is called the positive-cognition-of-the-Incompatibility is essentially but the non-cognition-of-the-natures. The Jains in criticism of this position point out that a similar line of argument might as well show that because an Anumāna is based on the Perception (*pratyakṣa*) of, say, the Hill (the Abode) and of Smoke (the Reason), therefore, the Anumāna is nothing but the Pratyakṣa.

प्रतिषेध्यविरुद्धव्याप्तादीनामुपलब्धयः षट् ॥ ८६ ॥

pratiṣedhya-viruddha-vyāptādinām upalabdhayaḥ
ṣaṭ ॥ 86 ॥

TRANSLATION: The Positive-cognition (*upalabdhī*) of what is Incompatible (*viruddha*)-with-the-pervaded (*vyāpta*) etc. of what is to be negated (i e., the Proven) are six in number.

COMMENTARY: There are, as already said, seven kinds of the Positively-cognised-Incompatible Marks (*viruddha-upalabdhī*) which lead to a negative conclusion (*pratiṣedha*). Of these, the first, i. e., the Svabhāva-Viruddha has already been described and illustrated. The other modes of the Viruddha-upalabdhī are the Viruddha-kārya, the Viruddha-Kāraṇa, the Viruddha-pūrvacara, the Viruddha-Uttaracara and the Viruddha-sahacara, which are illustrated below.

विरुद्धव्याप्तोपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यस्य पुंसस्तत्त्वेषु
निश्चयस्तत्र संदेहात् ॥ ८७ ॥

*viruddha-vyāptopalabdhir yathā nāsty asya puṁsas
tattvesu niscayas tatra saṁdehāt* । 87 ।

TRANSLATION: This man has not yet determined the truths; for he has doubts regarding them. This is an instance, where the Mark is Positively cognised (*upalabdhī*) to be 'pervaded-(*vyāpta*)-by-what-is-Incompatible (*viruddha*) with the Proven.

COMMENTARY: Here 'Determination of the truths' is the Proven, the negation of which is to be established. The Incompatible or the opposite of the 'Determination of the truths' is 'non-determination of truths'. 'Having doubts' is the Mark which is 'pervaded' by (i.e., invariably connected with) 'the non-determination of truths' which is opposed to and Incompatible with the Proven. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the *Viruddha-vyāpta-upalabdhī*.

विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धिर्यथा न विद्यतेऽस्य क्रोधाद्युपशान्ति-
वदनविकारादेः ॥ ८८ ॥

*viruddha-kāryopalabdhir yathā na vidyate' sya
krodhādy-upaśāntir vadana-vikārādeḥ* । 88 ।

TRANSLATION: This man's temper is not yet cooled down; because he has an angry face etc. This is an instance where the Mark is Positively-cognised (*upalabdhī*) to be the-Effect-(*kārya*)-of-what-is-Incompatible-with-(*viruddha*)-the-Proven.

COMMENTARY: 'Here Coolness of temper' is the Proven, the negation of which is to be established. The Incompatible or the opposite of 'the coolness of temper' is 'hot temper'. 'Red angry face, trembling lips etc.', indicate the Mark which is 'the-Effect-of-hot-temper', which is opposed to and Incompatible with the Proven. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the Viruddha-kārya-upalabdhi

विरुद्धकारणोपलब्धिर्यथा नास्य महर्षेरसत्यं वचः समस्ति
रागद्वेषकालुष्याकलङ्कितज्ञानसंपन्नत्वात् ॥ ८९ ॥

*viruddha-kāraṇopalabdhī yathā nāsyā maharṣeḥ
asatyam vacaḥ samasti, rāga-dveṣa-kāluṣyākalaṅkīta-
jñāna-sampannatvāt । 89 ।*

TRANSLATION: The speech of this sage is not false; for, he has knowledge which is not tarnished by the stain, due to attachment and envy. This is an instance where the Mark is Positively cognised (*upalabdhī*) to be the Cause (*kāraṇa*) of what is Incompatible-with (*viruddha*) the Proven

COMMENTARY Here 'Falseness of speech' is the Proven, the negation of which is to be established. The opposite, or the Incompatible of 'Falseness' is 'truth of speech'. Knowledge which is not tarnished by the stain due to attachment and envy is the Mark which is the 'cause' of 'truth of speech' which is opposed to and Incompatible, with the Proven here. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the Viruddha-Kāraṇa Upalabdhi

विरुद्धपूर्वचरोपलब्धिर्यथा नोद्गमिष्यति' मुहूर्तान्ते
पुष्यतारा रोहिष्युद्गमात् ॥ ९० ॥

*viruddha-pūrvacaro palabdhir yathā nodgamisyati
muhūrtānte pusya-tārā rohiṇy-udgamāt* | 90 |

TRANSLATION. A Muhūrta after, the Pusya-star will not rise; for Rohinī is seen to rise. This is an instance where the Mark is Positively-cognised (*upalabdhī*) to be the Antecedent (*pūrvacara*) of what is Incompatible with (*viruddha*) the Proven.

COMMENTARY: Here 'the rise of the Pusya-star' is the Proven, the negation of which is to be established. The opposite or the Incompatible of the rise of the Pusya-star' is the rise of the Mrgaśīrsa-star because just before the Pusya Star, it is Punarvasu which is to arise. The rise of the Rohinī is the Mark (a phenomenon) which is Antecedent to 'the rise of Mrgaśīrsa star' which is opposed to or Incompatible with the Proven. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the Viruddha-Pūrvacara-upalabdhī.

विरुद्धोत्तरचरोपलब्धिर्यथा नोद्गगन्मुहूर्तपूर्वं मृगशिरः
पूर्वफाल्गुन्युदयात् ॥ ९१ ॥

*viruddhottaracaro palabdhir yathā nodagān muhūrtāt
pūrvam mrgaśiraḥ pūrvaphālguny-udayāt* | 91 |

TRANSLATION: A Muhūrta before, Mrgaśīrah did not rise; for, Pūrva-phālgunī is rising. This is an instance where the Mark is Positively-cognised (*upalabdhī*) to be the Subsequent (*uttaracara*) of what is incompatible-with (*viruddha*) the Proven.

COMMENTARY: Here 'the rise of Mṛgaśīrah' is the Proven, the negation of which is to be established. The opposite or the Incompatible of 'the rise of Mṛgaśīrah' is 'the rise of Maghā' Because after the rise of Mṛgaśīrah, it is the Ādrā-stars etc., that are to rise. The 'rise of the Pūrva-phālgunī-star' is the Mark, (a phenomenon) which is Subsequent to 'the rise of the Maghā-star' which is opposed to or Incompatible with the Proven. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the Viruddha Uttaracara Upalabdhī.

विरुद्धसहचरोपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानं सम्यग्
दर्शनात् ॥ ९२ ॥

. viruddha-sahacaropalabdhīr yathā nāsty asya mithyā-
jñānam samyag-darśanāt । 92 ।

TRANSLATION: This man has not any false knowledge, for, he has got the right faith. This is an instance where the Mark is Positively cognised (*upalabdhī*) to be the Concomitant (*sahacara*) of what is Incompatible (*viruddha*) with the Proven.

COMMENTARY: Here 'False Knowledge' is the Proven, the negation of which is to be established. The opposite or the Incompatible of False knowledge' is 'True knowledge'. 'Right Faith' is the Mark which accompanies 'True knowledge' which is opposed to and Incompatible with the Proven. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the Viruddha-sahacara Upalabdhī.

The above are the seven kinds of the Positively-cognised-Incompatible Marks. It may be observed that all these Marks are Incompatible with or opposed to

the Proven, *directly* or *immediately*. If, however, we take into consideration the fact that a Mark may be opposed to the Proven not *immediately* but also *immediately*, we get various other kinds of Incompatible Marks, all of which, no doubt may be classed under the seven kinds of the Marks, described above. Thus, we may consider three sub-classes under the class of the Positively-cognised-Essentially-Incompatible Mark (*svabhāva-viruddha-Upalabdhi*). These are illustrated as follows:—

1. *Kāya-viruddha-Upalabdhi*: Where the Incompatibility subsists between the Mark and the Effect of the Proven. Thus, let us take the Anumāna: 'This man has in him no cause of pain for he has pleasure'. Here 'cause of pain' is the Proven and 'pleasure', the Mark. The Mark is Incompatible with the Proven here but not so, directly: for, strictly speaking, 'pleasure' is opposed to 'pain' only, which is but the Effect of the Proven. Thus, the Mark here is opposed to the Effect of the Proven and this accounts for the Essential-Incompatibility (though, mediate, after all) of the Mark with the Proven.

2. *Vyāpaka-viruddha-upalabdhi*: Where the Incompatibility subsists between the Mark and the 'pervader' (*vyāpaka*) of the Proven. Thus, let us take the Anumāna:- 'Physical contact (*saṃnikarṣa*) etc. are not sources of knowledge; for, these are unconscious (phenomena)'. Here, 'source of knowledge' is the Proven and 'unconscious' the Mark. The Mark is Incompatible with the Proven here but not so, directly; for, strictly speaking 'unconscious' is opposed to 'conscious' only. It is to be observed, however, that 'consciousness' is the 'pervader' (*vyāpaka*) of source of

knowledge (*vyāpya*) in the sense that all sources of knowledge are conscious processes. Thus the given Mark here is opposed to the 'pervader' of the Proven, and this accounts for the essential Incompatibility (through mediate, after all) of the Mark with the Proven.

3. *Kāraṇa-viruddha-upalabdhi*: Where the incompatibility subsists between the Mark and the 'cause of the Proven'. Thus let us take the *Anumāna*: 'That man is not shivering; for, there is Fire close to him'. Here 'shivering' is the Proven and 'Fire', the Mark. The Mark is Incompatible with the Proven here, but not so, directly; for, strictly speaking, Fire (heat) is opposed to Cold only, which is but the 'cause of the Proven'. Thus the given Mark here is opposed to the 'cause of the Proven', and this accounts for the Essential Incompatibility (though, mediate, after all) of the Mark with the Proven.

There may be similar sub-classes under the other classes of the Positively-cognised Incompatible Marks. We may notice one only here. Let us take the *Anumāna*: 'This man has not the peculiar shivering etc., due to cold; for, there is Smoke here'. Here 'shivering' etc., is the Proven and 'smoke' the Mark. The Mark and the Proven here are no doubt opposed to each other but not so, directly. Cold which is the 'cause of shivering' etc. is opposed to Fire, the Effect of which is smoke. Thus the 'cause of the Mark' here is opposed to the 'cause of the Proven', and this accounts for the Incompatibility (though, mediate after all) of the Mark with the Proven. The *Hetu* in this *Anumāna* is called the *Kāraṇa-viruddha-Kārya-Upalabdhi*. It is obviously included in the *Viruddha-Kārya-Upalabdhi Hetu*.

अनुपलब्धेरपि द्वैरूप्यम्, अविरुद्धानुपलब्धिर्विरुद्धा-

नुपलब्धिश्च ॥ ९३ ॥

*anupalabdher api dvairūpyam aviruddhānupalabdhir
viruddhānupalabdhiś ca* | 93 |

TRANSLATION: The Negatively cognised (*anupalabdhī*) Mark also is of two kinds, viz., the Negatively-cognised Compatible (*aviruddha*) and the Negatively-cognised Incompatible (*viruddha*).

COMMENTARY: In the first mode, the Mark which is 'Compatible with or unopposed to the Proven' (the negation of which is to be established) is not cognised. In the other mode, the Mark which is 'Incompatible with or opposed to the Proven' (the negation of which is to be established) is not cognised.

तत्राविरुद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधावबोधे सप्तप्रकारा ॥९४॥

*tatrāviruddhānupalabdhīḥ pratiṣedhāvabodhe sapta-
prakārā* | 94 |

TRANSLATION: Of these the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) Mark which is Compatible (*aviruddha*) proves Negation (*pratiṣedha*) and is of seven modes.

COMMENTARY: The Aviruddha-Anupalabdhī Hetu is of seven kinds, which are described below.

प्रतिषेध्येनाविरुद्धानां स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारणपूर्वचरोत्तर-
चरसहचराणामनुपलब्धिरिति ॥ ९५ ॥

pratiśedhyenāviruddhānām svabhāva-vyāpaka-kārya-kāraṇa-pūrvacarottaracara-sahacarāṇām upalabdhir

iti | 95 |

TRANSLATION: A Negatively-cognised Mark, Compatible-with-what-is-to-be-negated may be 'Identical-in-nature' (with the Proven), its 'Pervader', its 'Effect' its 'Cause', its 'Antecedent' its 'Subsequent' or its 'Concomitant'.

COMMENTARY: There are the Svabhāva-Anupalabdhi, the Vyāpaka-Anupalabdhi, the Kārya-Anupalabdhi, the Kāraṇa-Anupalabdhi, the Pūrvacara-Anupalabdhi, the Uttaracara-Anupalabdhi and the Sahacara-Anupalabdhi which are illustrated below.

स्वभावानुपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यत्र भूतले कुम्भ उपलब्धि-
लक्षणप्राप्तस्य तत्स्वभावस्यानुपलम्भात् || ९६ ||

*svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā nāsty atra bhūtale
kumbha upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasya tat-svabhāvasyā-
nupalambhāt* | 96 |

TRANSLATION: There is no Pitcher here, for its nature as known is not cognised. This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) and Identical-in-nature (*svabhāva*) with the Proven.

COMMENTARY: Here Pitcher is the Proven, the non-existence or negation of which is to be established, Pratiśedhya. 'Known nature', i.e., nature as cognisable through the senses is the Mark which is Identical- (*svabhāva*)-with-the-nature-of the Pitcher and is Com-

patible (*aviruddha*) with it. Hence, the Mark which is Negatively-cognised, i. e., not cognised (*anupalabdhi*) here, is the Aviruddha-Svabhāva-Anupalabdhi.

व्यापकानुपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यत्र प्रदेशे पनसः पादपानु-
पलब्धेः ॥ ९७ ॥

*vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā nāsty atra praśeṣe
panasaḥ pādapānupalabdhēḥ* 197

TRANSLATION: There is no Jack-fruit tree in this place; for, no tree is found here. This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) and the Pervader (*vyāpaka*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: Here 'Jack-fruit tree' is the Proven, the non-existence or negation of which is to be established (*pratiśedhya*). 'Tree' is the Mark, which is the 'Pervader' (*vyāpaka*) of the 'Jack-fruit tree' in the sense that 'whatever is not a Tree cannot be a Jack-fruit tree, and is Compatible (*aviruddha*) with it. Hence the Mark which is Negatively-cognised, i. e., not cognised (*anupalabdhi*) here, is the Aviruddha Vyāpaka-Anupalabdhi.

कार्यानुपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यत्राप्रतिहतशक्तिकं बीजमङ्कुरान-
वलोकनात् ॥ ९८ ॥

*kāryānupalabdhir yathā nāsty atrāpratihata-śakti-
kaṁ bījam aṅkurāṇavalokanāt* 198

TRANSLATION: There is no unimpotent seed here; for no shoots are seen. This is an instance where the

Negatively-Cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) and the Effect of (*kārya*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: Here 'Unimpotent Seed' is the Proven the non-existence or the negation of which is to be established (*pratiśedhya*). 'Shoot' is the Mark which is the Effect (*Kārya*) of the 'Unimpotent Seed' and is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) it. Hence the Mark which is Negatively-cognised, i.e., not cognised (*anupalabdhi*) here is the Aviruddha *Kārya*-*Anupalabdhi*.

कारणानुपलब्धिर्यथा न सन्त्यस्य प्रशमप्रभृतयो भावास्त-
त्त्वार्थश्रद्धानामावात् ॥ ९९ ॥

*kārāṇānupalabdhir yathā na santy asya prasama-
prabhṛtayo bhāvās tatītvārtha-śraddhanābhāvāt* | 99 |

TRANSLATION: This man has not the mental qualities of Restraint etc., for, he is not found to have Faith in the verities. This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark is compatible with (*aviruddha*) and the Cause of (*kāraṇa*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: Here 'Restraint etc.', are the Proven the non-existence or the negation of which is to be established (*pratiśedhya*) 'Faith in the verities' is the Mark which is the Cause (*kāraṇa*) of the 'Restraint etc.' and is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) them. Hence the Mark which is Negatively-cognised, i.e., not cognised (*anupalabdhi*) here, is the Aviruddha-*kāraṇa*-*Anupalabdhi*.

पूर्वचरानुपलब्धिर्यथा नोद्गमिष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते स्वातिनक्षत्रं
चित्रोदयादर्शनात् ॥ १०० ॥

*pūrvacarānupalabdhīḥ yathā nodgamisyati muhūr-
tānte svāti-nakṣatram citrodayādarśanāt* । 100 ।

उत्तरचरानुपलब्धिर्यथा नोदगमत् पूर्वभद्रपदा मुहूर्तात्पूर्व-
मुत्तरभद्रपदोद्गमानवगमात् ॥ १०१ ॥

*uttaracarānupalabdhīḥ yathā nodagamat pūrva-
bhādrapadā muhūrtāt pūrvam uttarabhādrapadodgamā-
navagamāt* । 101 ।

सहचरानुपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानं सम्यग्दर्शना-
नुपलब्धेः ॥ १०२ ॥

*sahacarānupalabdhīḥ yathā nāsty asya samyag-
jñānam samyag-darśanānupalabdheḥ* । 102 ।

TRANSLATION: A Muhūrta after, Svāti-star will not rise; for Citrā is not seen to rise. This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) Mark is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) and the Antecedent (*pūrvacara*) of the Proven.

A Muhūrta before, Pūrvabhādrapadā did not rise, for, Uttarabhādrapadā is not seen to rise. This is an instance, where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) Mark is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) and the Subsequent (*uttaracara*) (of the Proven).

This man has not got Right Knowledge, for, he is not found to possess Right Faith. This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) Mark is Compatible with (*aviruddha*) and the Concomitant (*sahacara*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: In the above instances, the negation or the non-existence of the Proven in each case is to be established (*pratiṣedhya*). In Sūtra 100, the Mark is the Antecedent (*pūrvacara*) of the Proven, (for, Citrā rises just before Svāti). In Sūtra 101, the Mark is the Subsequent (*uttaracara*) of the Proven (for, Uttara-bhādrapadā rises just after Pūrvabhādrapada), and in Sūtra 102, the Mark is the Concomitant (*sahacara*), of the Proven (for, Right Knowledge is always attended with Right Faith). In all these, the Mark is Compatible (*aviruddha*) with the Proven. Hence the Marks in the three instances, which are Negatively-cognised, i.e., not cognised (*anupalabdhi*) are respectively the Anupalabdhi Hetus of the Pūrvacara, the Uttaracara and the Sahacara kinds.

The above are the seven kinds of the Negatively-Cognised Compatible Marks. It may be observed that all these Marks are Compatible or in agreement with the Proven, *directly* or *immediately*. If, however, we take into consideration the fact that a Mark may agree with the Proven, not *immediately* but *mediately*, we get various other kinds of Compatible Marks, all of which, no doubt, may be brought under the seven kinds of Marks, described above. Only one such mode is noticed, here. Let B be the Effect of A and let C be the Essential condition (*vyāpaka*) on which B is dependent. The Anumāna is. 'There is no A; because C is not seen. Here there is agreement between A and C but this is not *direct*. C is not seen; therefore, its Vyāpya, B cannot be; and therefore, A, of which B is the Effect, cannot be. The Hetu in this Anumāna is called the Kārya-Vyāpaka-Anupalabdhi and may be

conveniently brought under the Vyāpaka-Anupalabdhi, considered above.

विरुद्धानुपलब्धिस्तु विधिप्रतीतौ पञ्चधा ॥ १०३ ॥

viruddhānupalabdhis tu vidhi-pratītau pañcadhā

103

TRANSLATION: A Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark which is Incompatible (*viruddha*) (with the Proven) leads to an affirmative conclusion (*vidhi*) and is of five kinds.

COMMENTARY: These are described below

विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावव्यापकसहचरानुपलम्भ-

भेदात् ॥ १०४ ॥

viruddha-kārya-kāraṇa-svabhāva-vyāpaka-sahacarānupalambha-bhedāt 104

TRANSLATION: Because the Negative-cognition may be different in accordance with the difference in the Non-Cognition of the Mark which may be Incompatible with the 'Effect', the 'Cause', the 'Nature', the 'Pervader' or the 'Concomitant' of the Proven.

COMMENTARY. These are illustrated below

विरुद्धकार्यानुपलब्धिर्यथात्र शरीरिणि रोगातिशयः
समस्ति, नीरोगव्यापारानुपलब्धेः ॥ १०५ ॥

viruddha-kāryānupalabdhir yathātra śarīriṇi roga-tiśayaḥ samasti nīroga-vyāpārānupalabdheḥ 105

TRANSLATION: In this person, there is great disease; for the operative signs of good health are not found in him. This is an instance where the Negatively-Cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark is Incompatible with (*viruddha*) the Effect (*kārya*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: Here 'Great disease', is the Proven which is to be affirmed (*vidheya*) 'Good health' is opposed to and Incompatible-with (*viruddha*) 'Great disease' which is the Proven in this case. 'Operative signs of good health' which are the Mark (*hetu*) here, and non-cognised (Negatively-cognised, *anupalabdhi*) are the Effect (*kārya*) of 'Good health'. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the Viruddha-kārya-Anupalabdhi.

विरुद्धकारणानुपलब्धिर्यथा विद्यतेऽत्र प्राणिनि कष्टमिष्ट-
संयोगाभावात् ॥ १०६ ॥

*viruddha-kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā vidyate'ta prā-
ṇini kṣaṣṭam iṣṭa-saṃyogābhāvāt* | 106 |

TRANSLATION: In this animal there is pain, for it is not (found to be) united with what is liked. This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark is incompatible with (*viruddha*) 'Pain' which is the Proven in this case. 'Being united with what one likes,' which is the Mark (*hetu*) here and non-cognised (Negatively-Cognised, *anupalabdhi*) in the 'Cause' (*kāraṇa*) of Pleasure'. Hence the Hetu in the given example is the Viruddha-Kāraṇa-Anupalabdhi.

विरुद्धस्वभावानुपलब्धिर्यथा वस्तुजातमनेकान्तात्मकमेकान्त-
स्वभावानुपलब्ध्मात् ॥ १०७ ॥

*viruddha-svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā vastu-jātam
anekāntātmakam ekānta-svabhāvānupalambhāt* | 107 |

TRANSLATION: All things have many aspects; for, the nature of having one aspect only is not found (in a thing). This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) Mark is Incompatible-with (*viruddha*) the Nature (*svabhāva*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: Here 'Having many aspects' is the Proven, to the 'Nature' (*svabhāva*) of which 'Having one aspect only' is opposed (*viruddha*). Hence in this example, the Mark (*hetu*) 'Having one aspect only' which is Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) is the Viruddha-Svabhāva-Anupalabdhī.

विरुद्धव्यापकानुपलब्धिर्यथा अस्त्यत्र छाया

औष्ण्यानुपलब्धेः || १०८ ||

*viruddha-vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā asty atra chāyā
ousnyānupalabdheḥ* | 108 |

TRANSLATION: There is Shade here; for Heat is not felt. This is an instance where the Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) Mark is Incompatible with (*viruddha*) the Pervader (*vyāpaka*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: Here 'Shade' is the Proven, to which 'Temperature' (*tapa*), i.e., is opposed (*viruddha*) 'Heat' (*auṣṇya*) 'pervades' (*vyāpaka*), i.e., is essentially connected with 'Temperature'. Hence, in this example, the Mark (*hetu*) 'Heat' which is not-cognised (*anupalabdhī*) is the Viruddha-Vyāpaka-Anupalabdhī.

विरुद्धसहचरानुपलब्धिर्यथा अस्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानं
सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलम्भात् ॥ १०९ ॥

*viruddha-sahacai ānupalabdhiḥ yathā asty asya
mithyā-jñānaṁ samyag-darśanānupalambhāt* | 109 |

TRANSLATION: This man has False knowledge; for, he is not found to have Right Faith. This is an instance where the Negatively-Cognised (*anupalabdhi*) Mark is Incompatible-with (*viruddha*) the Concomitant (*sahacara*) (of the Proven).

COMMENTARY: Here 'False Knowledge' is the Proven, which is to be affirmed (*vidheya*), and to which 'Right Knowledge' is opposed (*viruddha*). 'Right Faith' is the 'Concomitant' (*sahacara*) of 'Right knowledge'. Hence in this example, 'Right Faith' which is the Mark and which is Negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhi*) is the Viruddha-Sahacara-Hetu.

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालङ्कारे स्मरण-प्रत्यभिज्ञान-
तर्कानुमान-स्वरूपनिर्णयस्तृतीयः परिच्छेदः ॥

*iti pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāre smarana-pratyabhi-
jñāna-tarka-anumāna-svarūpa-niḥayaḥ tṛtīyaḥ paric-
chedaḥ* |

TRANSLATION: Here ends the Third Chapter, of the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, entitled, The Determination Of the Nature of Smarana (or Recollection), Pratyabhiñāna (or Conception), Tarka (or Induction) and Anumāna (or Deduction).

CHAPTER IV

आप्तवचनादाविर्भूतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः ॥ १ ॥

āpta-vacanād āvirbhūtam artha-saṁvedanam

āgamaḥ ॥ १ ॥

TRANSLATION: Āgama or knowledge from Authority means the knowledge of things, arising from authoritative sayings.

COMMENTARY: This is the definition of Āgama, the fifth form of the Indirect cognition. As there is much to be said with regard to this form, a separate chapter is devoted to its consideration.

उपचारादाप्तवचनं च ॥ २ ॥

upacārād āpta-vacanam ca ॥ २ ॥

TRANSLATION: By 'transference of epithet', the Authoritative saying also (is so called).

COMMENTARY: Āgama, as defined above, consists in a 'knowledge of things'. How is it, then, that sometimes the Authoritative sayings, which generate that knowledge, are called Āgama? The answer is that by 'transference of epithet' (*upacāra*), a cause is sometimes called after its effect. Hence Āgama stands also for the words or sayings from which the Authoritative knowledge is generated.

It is in this connection that the commentator criticises the view of the school of Kanāda, whose

contention is; "Word (i.e., Āgama or Knowledge derived from a Word) is (not a separate Pramāṇa or Source of Knowledge but) Inference; because it signifies its corresponding object through Pervasion (*vyāpti*). like Smoke". In other words, according to the Vaiśeṣika theory, the knowledge from Words is not a separate form of knowledge but is included in Anumāna or Inference. A Word does not signify an object immediately but like Anumāna or Inferential knowledge it does so, mediate through a Vyāptijñāna or a previous knowledge of inseparable relationship, just like an experience of Smoke which does not prove Fire immediately but does so mediate, through the Vyāptijñāna, that wherever there is Smoke, there is Fire.

The Jainas begin their criticism of the above theory of the School of Kanāda by pointing out that the Hetu or Reason in the argument adduced in support of the theory is fallacious. They say: If you hold that the Knowledge-from-a-word is mediate and inferential, why, then, a perception of a coin as genuine or as counterfeit is also inferential. The Vaiśeṣikas defend their position by pointing out that in the case of the perception of a coin, there is no element of mediation, for, as soon as one opens his eyes, he distinguishes, say, a genuine coin from a counterfeit one. The Jainas urge that in the case of Śabda (i.e., Knowledge-from-a-Word) also, there is no element of mediation); as soon as we hear a Word, we understand the object signified by it. Knowledge derived from Words is no more Inferential than the perception of the said coin. It may be said that if Knowledge, derived from Words were not Inferential, then even a foreigner who does

not understand the language of a particular country would be able to understand the object signified by a word, simply by hearing the Word. The answer is that in order to understand an object signified by a Word, mere hearing of the word is not enough. That presupposes an understanding of the meaning of a word. Obviously the foreigner does not know the meaning of the word and this accounts for his failure to understand the object signified by the word. But this does not mean that the knowledge of things derived from words is obtained by Inference. The perception referred to above, about the genuine or the counterfeit coin is also dependent on previous instructions from others as to the characteristics of a genuine or a counterfeit coin but is not Inference on that account. The thinker of the Vaiśeṣika school contends that the perception of a genuine or a counterfeit coin as genuine or counterfeit is not Inferential or mediate, inasmuch as at the time of perception the perceiver does not consciously take the aid of, i. e., bring before his mind those instructions which are only subconsciously present there, so that the perception of the coin as genuine or counterfeit is always direct. The Vaiśeṣika philosopher concedes of course that where the perceiver is compelled to consciously take the aid of, i. e., to actually reproduce in his mind those previous instructions about the characteristics of a genuine or counterfeit coin, his cognition is certainly mediate and is an Inference of the form, 'that coin is a counterfeit (or a genuine) one because it has such and such characteristics, like similar other coins seen before'. The Jaina thinker applies all these Vaiśeṣika arguments about perception to the case of a word and says that when

one understands an object on hearing a word, he does not consciously take the aid of, i. e., bring before his mind any previous instructions about its significance, so that his knowledge-from-the-word is always direct and immediate, where, however, he is compelled to take the aid of, i. e., to actually reproduce in his mind the previous instructions about the significance of the word, his cognition is certainly mediate and Inferential. Let us take an example. A man was told by Yajñadatta that the word, *panasa* signifies a tree, having such and such characteristics. He forgets that instruction. Thereafter, on another occasion, another man Devadatta speaks of *panasa* before him. He now recollects what Yajñadatta told him previously. His knowledge now about a Panasa-tree arising from his hearing the word '*panasa*' from Devadatta would be an Inference of the form: 'The Word, *panasa*, signifies a tree having such and such characteristics, as was previously said by Yajñadatta, accordingly, the Word *panasa*, now used by Devadatta, must also mean a similar thing'. It comes to this then that not all knowledge-from-Words is Inferential. The Jama commentator points out that in the Vaiśeṣika argument, 'A Word (i. e., Knowledge-from a-Word) is Inferential', the Sādhya or the Proven is vitiated by the fallacy, known as 'the partially-admitted', because it is admitted on all hands that in some cases, as shown above, the knowledge-from-Words, is certainly Inferential. But where a Śabda or Word is Āgama, its significance is known from before and is not forgotten, so that in order to understand the object, signified by it, one need not remember any Vyāpti; the knowledge, arising from hearing such a Word is never Inferential but is always

Direct and immediate: If the Vaiśeṣika does not admit that, his opponent then may well contend, as shown above, that the perception of a genuine or a counterfeit coin as genuine or counterfeit, is Inferential.

The Jaina commentator next points out that the Vaiśeṣika thinker will find difficulty in showing that the Hetu in their Inference fulfils the conditions of Pakṣa—Dharmatā etc. “How will he who holds that a Word involves Inference, show the Existence-in-the Abode etc., of the Reason? If the answer is, Caṭra intends to express the object, characterised by a raised neck etc., because he has uttered the word, ‘Go’ (Cow): like me:’ we may say that by this only the intention of the speaker is understood. How is the actual object obtained? If it is said that the object is understood from the intention, we say, No; the actual object may not always agree with the intention as in the case of ignorant persons (who may use words and expressions not in their proper sense)”, of course when the speaker is a sensible and dependable person, from his intention (as expressed in his use of the word, ‘Go’, one can safely infer the object of his intention. But still the objection is that no such chain of mental processes, the word, Go, is uttered by the person; that person has the intention of signifying a cow by uttering that word; that person is a sensible and dependable person; therefore, the word ‘Go’ uttered by that person signifies a cow, is perceptible. As soon as a Word is heard the cognition of the corresponding object arises, without any intervening mental process, just as the perception of form (*rūpa*) arises as soon as the eyes are turned towards an object. The commentator states that we would have admitted the intervention of such

a chain of mental processes between our hearing a word and understanding the object, signified by it, even though the chain is not perceptible "if there were no other course left to us". But there is no necessity for admitting the mediation of such a mental chain (*paramparā*). For there is a natural (*svābhāvika*) relationship of- the- Signifier- (*vācaka*) and- the- Signified (*vācya*) between a Word and its object, as will be shown hereafter.

यथा समस्त्यत्र प्रदेशे रत्ननिधानम्,

सन्ति रत्नसानुप्रभृतयः ॥ ३ ॥

yathā samasty atra pradeśe ratna-nidhānam, santi ratna-sānu-prabhrtayaḥ । 3 ।

TRANSLATION· In this part of the country, there is a diamond-mine There are things like Diamond Valleys etc.

COMMENTARY: Authorities will hereafter be shown to be either Human, e.g , parents etc., of Superhuman, e g , Tīrthamkara etc. The two examples are intended to illustrate the sayings of the two classes of Authorities.

अभिधेयं वस्तु यथावस्थितं यो जानीते यथाज्ञानं

चाभिधत्ते स आप्तः ॥ ४ ॥

abhidheyam vastu yathāvasthitam yo jānīte yathā-jñānam cābhidhatte sa āptaḥ । 4 ।

TRANSLATION· An Authority (*Āpta*) is he who knows a thing under consideration as it is and describes it in accordance with his knowledge.

COMMENTARY: 'Āpta' or Authority means a person from whom the knowledge of a given object is obtained. The word also means a person who is free from the debasing emotions of attachment, envy etc. A person subject to attachment etc., may know something but may choose to describe it in a false and mystifying way; to avoid this difficulty, it is said that an Authority describes the object of his knowledge in accordance with his knowledge. The commentator quotes: "Āgama means the Word of an Āpta; Āpta means annihilation of debasing emotions. A person whose debasing emotions are annihilated would never say a word which is false because his saying so is impossible".

Description need not be through Words alone. One may impart to another his knowledge regarding a thing not known to the latter, through writing, through numerical indications, or through gestures. In every case, however, the communicating person has Words stored up in his memory and is an Āpta, even though he teaches not through Words but through any of the indirect processes of expression described above. Āgama is Words, recollected.

तस्य हि वचनमविसंवादि भवति ॥ ५ ॥

tasya hi vacanam avisamvādi bhavati ॥ 5 ॥

TRANSLATION: His saying is free from inconsistency.

COMMENTARY: He who knows objects exactly as they are and who is able to teach exactly as he knows it is he whose words can be free from contradiction

and inconsistency. There are contradictions in the Words of persons who are ignorant and who are deceivers. A person is one's Āpta, if he does not mean to deceive him. This is the one common characteristic of all the Āptas who are wise men and who may be Rsi, Ārya or Mleccha

स च द्वेधा लौकिको लोकोत्तरश्च ॥ ६ ॥

sa ca dvedhā laukiko lokottaraś ca ॥ 6 ॥

TRANSLATION. He is either of the two, human or superhuman.

COMMENTARY Human (*laukika*) or Ordinary Authorities are ordinary mortals while the superhuman (*lokottara*) or Extraordinary Authorities are so called because they teach the way to Emancipation (Moksa).

लौकिको जनकादिर्लोकोत्तरस्तु तीर्थकरादिः ॥ ७ ॥

laukiko janakādir lokottaraś tu tīrthakaraḥ ॥ 7 ॥

TRANSLATION: The Father etc., are the Human while the Tīrthakara etc., are the Superhuman Authorities

COMMENTARY: The Father etc, include the Mother etc The Tīrthakara etc. include the Gaṇadhara etc

In this connection, the Jaina commentator criticises the view of the Śrotriya School, according to which, the Vedas are 'not man-made' (*apauruṣeya*) and as such, are eternally self-existent. If by the Vedas, only some Letter-sounds are meant then the Vedas

cannot be eternally self-existent, because, as will be shown hereafter, Letter-sounds are only peculiar modifications of matter. If, on the other hand, it is meant that as a body of unchanged and unmodified Scriptural sayings, the Vedas are eternally self-existent then the question is: How do you know this eternal self-existence of the Vedas?

Pratyaksa or direct perception cannot certainly prove the eternal self-existence of the Vedas, as it deals with the present only. It is said that "Eyes etc., perceive only what are connected with them and are existent at the present time". It is contended that *pratyabhijñā* or Reproductive Recognition (which is looked upon as a mode of the *pratyakṣa* by the other side) shows that the Vedas which one studied in his youth remain self-same even in his old age, thus proving that the Vedas are a self-existent reality uninfluenced by time. The Jaina thinker may argue, however, that if the eternity of the Vedas can be proved in this way, the eternity of such atheistic sayings as "The Self is but the Body which is only a collection of material substances" is as easily proved. It is said on behalf of the Vedic school that the Vedas are to be distinguished from the atheistic sayings inasmuch as the latter do not exist after they are uttered and that the Vedas, after they are uttered do still exist, although not in an explicit form. Thus the difference between the Vedas and the body of the atheistic sayings is said to be that while the latter perish and do not exist soon after they are pronounced and expressed, the former continue to exist in an implicit form even when they are not actually studied. The Jaina answer is that we may as well argue that even the atheistic doctrines continue to

exist in an implicit form, when they are no longer studied. Besides, Recollection can revive only what has been perceived. It revives the facts which one has perceived in his present life; or if the person happens to be gifted with the power of remembering the events of his past lives, Recollection can in his case revive the facts of only some of his past incarnations. How, then, is it possible for Recollection to establish that the Vedas were composed at no time during the beginningless antecedent time?

Anumāna or Reasoning also does not prove the eternal self-existence of the Vedas. We hear the Vedas only when they are chanted. Any Inference that the Vedas are eternally self-existent and have not any origin would thus be opposed to this fact of the Pratyaksa. If it be argued that the Vedas are existent in an implicit state when they are not chanted and that they become explicit when they are chanted and that thus the Vedas are existent at all times, well, the same argument may make all the books to be eternally existent. The Jainas next show how any Inference about the eternal self-existence and the authorlessness of the Vedas would be opposed to the following Anumāna.—

“The Vedas were composed by some men; because they are embodied in Letter-sounds; like the Kumāra-sambhava and other books”. In other words, the Jaina contention is that there can be no book unless it is composed by a man who conceives its plan and arranges words in accordance with it. You cannot have sounds which have consistent Meanings and which are expressed in Letters, from anything (e g, a conch-shell, a sea or a cloud) which is other than a

man. Therefore, if the Vedas are sayings, they must have had their Authors. There is nothing peculiar in the Vedas which would distinguish the Vedas from other books, which have all their authors. And even if there be any peculiarity, noticeable in the language of the Vedas, the Jainas point out that peculiarity is met with in other popular poems also. Why, then, will not the Vedas have their Authors, just like the other books? Thirdly, the Anumāna about the self-existence and the authorlessness of the Vedas would be opposed to the following Āgama or Scriptural saying:- "There was Prajāpati only; the day was not, the night was not; he contemplated; thence arose Enlightenment (*tapana*), from the Enlightenment, the four Vedas originated". The opponents would say that this scriptural saying is not Authoritative inasmuch as it does not state or lay down any duty;; the saying quoted above describes a fact or incident only and as such, not Authoritative. The Jainas point to similar other Scriptural sayings which state facts but which are nevertheless accepted as Authoritative by the Śrotriya School. To this Jaina contention, the Śrotriya reply is that although such Scriptural sayings do not expressly lay down any 'duty' they are nevertheless Authoritative because they point to a 'duty' in an implicit way by implying, that is "hence this is to be done or practised." The Jainas criticise this position of Śrotriya thinkers by asking, how is one to understand this implied command? Not certainly from the sayings themselves; because admittedly the sayings do not expressly state any 'command'. Nor, on the other hand, can you say that one is to understand this implied 'command' from one who finds out or puts this implied 'command' into the

sayings For, in such a case the validity of the alleged 'command' is questionable The sayings can stand only for what they explicitly state; they cannot guarantee the validity of, or justify, an action, the 'command' of which, one thinks, is implied in them. If the 'command' of Duty is not explicit in a Scriptural saying and if nevertheless, it be said to have its force because one thinks so, then the 'command' about Duty becomes dependent on the caprice and whim of any and every person If it be said that the 'command' about Duty is not dependent on the will of any and every person but that the Seer of 'duty' must first know the nature of things according to the Pramāṇas, then, it may be replied that the Scriptural sayings as Pramāṇas prove only what they explicitly state, that they determine the nature of things in their own way, that only this determination of the nature of things is what is wanted of them and that consequently, their determination of the nature of things and not their alleged implication about any 'duty' can be accepted as valid The Jainas accordingly contend that such Scriptural sayings, as "There was Prajāpati only etc., etc.," do point to the fact of the Vedas having their authors and are Authoritative to a Śrotriya, notwithstanding the fact that those sayings do not embody any 'command' about duty. The Jainas further point out that if any Scriptural saying in order to be Authoritative must embody a 'command' about duty at least impliedly as contended by the Śrotriyas, then they would urge that such scriptural sayings as "There was Prajāpati only etc., etc.," are Authoritative inas-much as they may be held to contain a 'command' impliedly in the same way as other Scriptural sayings

which do not express a 'command' explicitly but which are held to be Authoritative by the Śrotriya's themselves.

It should be remembered that the Śrotriya Anumāna under consideration is of the form: 'The Vedas are eternal and not-man-made'. In the last paragraph it was shown that the Pakṣa or the Abode in the Anumāna, (i.e., 'the eternal and not-man-made-Vedas') is opposed to the facts of Pratyakṣa (Direct Perception), of the Anumāna (Inference) and of Āgama (Authoritative Scriptural saying). The next paragraph will show how the said Śrotriya Anumāna is vitiated by fallacies in its Marks or Reasons (*sādhana*).

The Reason which is offered by the Śrotriya's in support of their Anumāna about the self-existence of the Vedas is the fact of 'the non-remembrance of any author of the Vedas'. In other words, the argument is that because no author of the Vedas is known, they must be self-existent. In showing that this Reason (*hetu*) is invalid, the Jainas ask: is this Reason 'unqualified' (*aviśeṣaṇa*) or 'qualified' (*aviśeṣaṇa*)? If it be 'Unqualified', then it is 'Vitiating' by the Example of an ancient well, mansion, pleasure-garden etc. The meaning is that because the author or the builder of a thing is unknown, you cannot look upon it as self-existent. For example, in the case of an ancient well, an ancient house or an ancient garden, people may not know who in the olden times built it, the name of its maker may have been forgotten long back: but nobody would be prepared to say that the well or the house or the garden is self-existent. If, on the contrary, the Śrotriya's make their Reason a 'qualified' one then it would be 'unproved-with-respect-to-Location' (*vyadhi-*

karanāsiddha). It is explained in this way. The Śrōtriya argument about the self-existence of the Vedas' in which the Reason is a 'qualified' one is; 'The Vedas are self-existent; because there being the unbroken line of their keepers (*saṃpradāya*), their authors are not remembered'. The Jainas point out that this argument of the Śrōtriyas is vitiated by the above mentioned fallacy of *Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha*. Because, the Hetu 'the non-remembrance of the authors of the Vedas', does not inhere in the said 'Saṃpradāya' but in something else, i e., in 'man'. In other words, a line (of tradition-carriers) is after all but an imaginary something, there is no meaning in saying that the line does not remember any author of the Vedas; therefore, the Śrōtriya argument is invalid. The Śrōtriyas may try to avoid this difficulty by putting their argument in a different form thus: 'The Vedas are self-existent; because their authors are not remembered, although there is that unbroken line of the keepers of the Vedas, like the Sky'. The Jainas urge that the 'qualifying element' (*viśeṣaṇa*), viz, the unbroken line is 'doubtful'. A house which has admittedly a beginning can claim no absolutely unbroken line of its possessors; it is 'doubtful' if the Vedas which are claimed to be beginning-less can have an unbroken line of their keepers. This *Viśeṣana* being 'doubtful' (*saṃdigdhā-siddha*) the Śrōtriya argument is unreliable.

In the foregoing paragraph, it has been shown that the Hetu, 'the non-remembrance of the author' in the Śrōtriya argument about the self-existence of the Vedas is invalid either because (i) the Hetu is a 'Vitiated' (*vyabhicārī*) one or (ii) because it is 'unproved-with-respect-to-Location' (*vyadhikaraṇāsiddha*) or (iii) be-

cause it is 'unproved-because-doubtful-respect-to-Location' (*samdhigdḥāsiddha*). The Jainas end their criticism of the Śrotriya Reason 'the non-remembrance of the author' by pointing out that it is also invalid because it is 'unproved-to-both-sides' (*ubhayāsiddha*). In other words, they urge that it can be shown that neither the Śrotriyas nor their opponents, i.e., the Jainas really admit the fact of 'the non-remembrance of the author' of the Vedas. It is in the Vedas themselves, the authority of which is not challenged by the Śrotriyas that we meet with expressions which point to the fact of their having been made, such as, 'One who makes the Vedas', 'Prajāpati made the king Soma and from him were made the three Vedas'. Besides, we find that to the various parts of the Vedas are attached the names of some sages, e.g., Kāṇva, Mādhyandina, Tittiri etc. Why is it? The Jainas contend that this is because these sages were the authors of those parts of the Vedas just as Manu etc., were the admitted authors of those law-books to which their names are found to be attached. The Śrotriyas argue that at the beginning of the Kalpa or the present Age, when the Vedas were not explicitly extant, it is those sages who 'saw' the parts bearing their respective names or who published those parts of the Vedas. In other words, parts of the Vedas bear the names of some sages, not because they were the actual authors or those parts which are eternally self-existent but because those parts were first revealed to or republished by them, at the beginning of the present Age. The Jainas set aside this doctrine of the Śrotriyas, by urging that time is beginningless, so that if the parts of the Vedas were remembered at the beginning of each Kalpa, to a particular

sage whose name is borne by that part, then each such part would have borne the names of an infinite number of such sages, to whom it was revealed in the infinite number of past Kalpas'. It is thus that the Śrotriyas themselves are bound to admit that the Vedas at places do show that they had their authors. On the other hand, the Jainas have their own theory about it, viz., that it was a devil, Kālāsura by name, who composed the Vedas. The Śrotriyas may contend that there would be difficulty if the authorship of the Vedas be ascribed to a particular person. The Jainas, however, reply that if there be any real difficulty about the ascription of the authorship of the Vedas to a particular person, then that particular person may not be held to be their author; but that this does not prove that the Vedas had not their authors at all.

It is thus that the Jainas show that the Reason 'The-non-remembrance-of-the-author' in the Śrotriya argument about the self-existence of the Vedas is invalid. In this connection, the Jainas set aside two other such Reasons in support of the doctrine of the self-existence of the Vedas. The two reasons may be gathered from the following passages of the Kārikā: "All study of the Vedas is preceded by its previous study by the teacher, because it is only the study of the Vedas that is talked of, just like any present day study. The times, both past and future, are devoid of any author of the Vedas, because they are times, just like the present time which is under experience". In other words, the two Reasons for the doctrine of the self-existence of the Vedas are: 1. The Vedas are always described as objects of study (which supposes their pre-existence) and 2. Time (past or future) does

not witness any author of the Vedas (just as the present time). The Jainas refute the validity of these two Hetus by putting forward the counter argument (the invalidity of the Reasons in which is obvious): 'The mind of those who have their eyes like those of the deer, is brittle like the horn of the deer'; well, the study of this passage is preceded by its previous study by the teacher; because it is only the study of this passage that is talked of, just like any present-day study. The times, both past and future are devoid of any author of that passage; because they are times just like the present time, shortly expressed, the meaning is that if the above two Hetus were competent to establish the doctrine of the self-existence of the Vedas, then the passage under consideration might as well be held to be a self-existent one from the beginningless time. Thus neither Pratyaksa nor Anumāna yields the fact that the Vedas are eternally self-existent. Does Arthāpatti establish that the Vedas are not-man-made? The Śrotriyas say that it is because the doctrine of the self-existence ('not-man-made-ness') of the Vedas is found to be consistent with the admitted facts and not-inconsistent with them, that Arthāpatti (Necessary implication) establishes that the Vedas are self-existent. The Śrotriyas contend that the Vedas are found to be 'faultless'. How is this possible? It is an admitted fact that any Sound or Word is tainted with the faults of its speaker. Of course, if the speaker is free from faults, his words may be faultless but as the Vedas cannot be said to have been composed by a faultless speaker. Speakers, good or bad, cannot be the authors of the Vedas. If, then, the Vedas are faultless, its only consistent explanation (by Arthāpatti) would be that

they were not-man-made. The Pramāna-hood or the truthfulness of the Vedas is impossible unless they are supposed to be self-existent. The Jainas begin their criticism of the Śrotriya argument based on Arthāpatti by questioning the Pramāna-hood of the Vedas. The Vedas, they point out, are Apramāṇa or not authoritative, as the instructions and injunctions contained in them are vicious, owing to their insistence on the killing of innocent animals. Even if they be held to be Pramāṇa or authoritative, this would not prove their self-existence. Words are authoritative, only if they emanate from a Qualified, i.e., a high-souled virtuous person. It is well-known that the utterances of a person who is given to emotions of attachment etc., are false, while those of one who practises truth, purity of conduct etc., are true. If, as the Śrotriyas contend, neither a good person nor a bad person made the Vedas then the Vedas would be no better than meaningless jargons. If the Śrotriyas ask: How do you show that the Vedas prove their author to be a Qualified person? the Jainas would answer by counter-asking: How do you show that the words of your fore-fathers, which are either embodied in writings or have been handed down in traditions, are words of authoritative persons, which are safely reliable in all matters relating to your conduct? Now, the words of our fore-fathers are relied on as words of authoritative persons, because the matters to which they relate, turn out to be true. In the same manner, if the Vedas are to be treated as authoritative, it would be because their instructions are actually found out to be true in matters which can be experienced. Cases of course there are where the Vedic injunctions do not turn out to be true, i.e., they do

not produce the results which they state. In these cases, the Vedic injunctions are not to be condemned as false but it is to be supposed that the said results are somehow prevented from being actual, on account of defects in the operative conditions which produce those results. Thus it is that if at all the Vedas are to be looked upon as authoritative, they must be held to have been not self-existent but made by a highly qualified person. But is there such a highly Qualified person, whose words would be absolutely true? Yes: would the Jainas say. They have already shown how the Arhat is a person who is free from the feelings of attachment and envy etc., and from ignorance; and as such, it is He for Whom alone, it is possible to compose the Āgama which is the store of absolutely true statements. The Arhat is absolutely free from all faults. He out of pity composes the Āgama and explains it in humanly intelligible language. You cannot say that the language of the Āgama is something superhuman. Words of the Āgama signify the objects of our experience in the same manner as the ordinary words. Therefore, if the ordinary words are the words of the human language, the words of the Āgama also must belong to the humanly intelligible language. In the case of current languages, we know that a word, belonging to the Aryan language does not signify the same object which is signified by it, when the word belongs to a Mleccha language. In the case of current languages we thus see that the same word would not always signify the same object. If, however, the language of the Āgama were superhuman, it would be impossible to determine the meanings of its words.

Thus it is that Arthāpatti does not show that the Vedas were self-existent. It rather shows that if the Vedas are Pramāṇa and authoritative, they must have been made by an Omniscient Being.

Neither Pratyakṣa nor Anumāna nor Arthāpatti thus proves the self-existence of the Vedas. Āgama or authoritative sayings also do not prove it.

For, as already quoted, there are Vedic sayings which clearly show that the Vedas were composed and not self-existent. Lastly, the Jainas point out that the Vedas as a systematised body (*ānupūrvī*) of Letter-sounds must be either an arrangement of different co-existent parts or of successively rising parts. But this is impossible. A Letter-sound according to the Śrōtriyas, is eternal and pervasive, so that we cannot talk of different parts (because each Sound is all-pervasive) and of different times (because each Sound is eternally present) for Letter-sounds. You cannot say that different parts and times regarding Letter-sounds are possible because of the Order in which they become explicit. For, this explicitness of Letter-sounds is due to human efforts, so that if the *Ānupūrvī* or the systematised character of the Vedas depends upon an order in which their different parts become explicit, the Vedas become man-made compositions.

वर्णपदवाक्यात्मकं वचनम् ॥ ८ ॥

varna-pada-vākya-ātmakam vacanam ॥ 8 ॥

TRANSLATION: A statement or saying consists in Letter-sounds, words and sentences

COMMENTARY: This is the description of a Vacana; the parts of which are Varna, Pada and Vākya. Sections and Chapters in a book may similarly be understood.

अकारादिः पौद्गलिको वर्णः ॥ ९ ॥

akārādīḥ paudgaliko varṇaḥ ॥ 9 ॥

TRANSLATION: Letter-sounds, e.g., A etc., are atomic.

COMMENTARY: The Jainas hold that Sounds are atomic, i.e., modes or products of matter. Letters of a language are thus effects of atoms, called Bhāsā-Varganā.

The Yājñika's, i.e., the believers in the Vedic sacrificial practices contend that the Letter-sounds cannot be proved to be impermanent, far less modifications of matter. Their theory is that Sound is eternal and their reasons are as follows— (1) Pratyabhijñā or Recognition shows that we have the self-same 'ga' (the third consonant in the Indian alphabet), the feeling that it is the self-same 'ga' whenever we come across 'ga'. (2) There is the Anumāna, 'Sound is eternal; because it is audible; like the Generality of Sounds', i.e., the general essence underlying all Sounds (3) Arthāpatti would show that unless Sound be supposed to be eternal, we cannot utter it in order that others may hear it. The Jainas criticise each of these three positions in the following way

1. As regards the alleged Pratyabhijñā or Recognition, the Jainas point out that Recognition rather shows that Sound is impermanent. Unless something

is non-eternal, at least in some respects, you cannot say subsequently that it is that self-same something which was previously perceived. Even the statement, 'I am that self-same self' can have any meaning only if the self, which was previously perceived, be supposed to be impermanent, in some respects. The Jainas next urge that the Pratyabhijñā that it is the self-same 'ga' is after all a fallacious form of it, as it is opposed to both Pratyaksa and Anumāna

(a) The Pratyaksa or direct Perception shows that a sound has its origin and its decay, and this yield of the Pratyaksa cannot in any way be falsified. You cannot say that this Pratyaksa is illusory, alleging that there is no real origination nor real decay of a sound and that when it is said to originate, it only becomes 'explicit' (*abhivṛyakti*) and that when it is said to perish it only enters into the 'implicit' (*anabhivṛyakti*) condition. Because a similar line of argument would make all things, e.g., a pitcher eternal. You cannot distinguish the case of the pitcher by saying that there are visible causes (viz., the potter, his wheel etc.) of the origination and of the decay of the pitcher, whereas in the case of Sound, we have no such causes. For, in the case of a Sound also, we have similar determining causes, viz., the activity of the palate etc. Nor can you say that Sound is eternal; that the palatal activity etc., do not generate it or destroy it but only make it 'explicit' or 'implicit'. For, a similar line of argument, 'the potter, his wheel etc., do not originate or destroy a pitcher but only make it 'explicit' or 'implicit' may go to show that a pitcher is eternal. Thus it is that the Pratyaksa, the Sound has its origin and its decay and is impermanent on that

account, cannot be explained away and falsified. It is to be noted also that the fact of a thing's becoming 'explicit' or becoming 'implicit' cannot psychologically give rise to the idea that the thing originates or that it decays. When a pitcher, for instance, becomes visible ('explicit') owing to sunlight being thrown over it, we do not feel that the pitcher is there originated; nor do we say that the pitcher is non-existent where it remains invisible (i.e., in an 'implicit' condition) in darkness. Thus the fact that we have the perceptions of a Sound originating or decaying, shows that it has really an origin and a decay and that it is by no means eternal. The perceptions of the origin and of the decay of a thing are not due to the perceptions of its becoming 'explicit' or 'implicit'. As shown above, we do not think that a pitcher is non-existent when it remains invisible in darkness. The Yājñikas cannot improve their position by saying that we do not think a pitcher (invisible in darkness) to be non-existent because we know then that we can feel its existence by touching. For, thereby the Yājñikas admit that when a thing is not 'explicit', there must be some positive evidence of its existence even then, in order that it may be looked upon as existent, and that if there be no such positive evidence, the thing must be held to be non-existent. If so, when a Sound is said to be in an 'implicit' state, why is there absolutely no evidence of its existence then? If it be said that the Sound (when not actually heard) persists in 'Om', we may say that as there is no evidence for it, the conclusion is irresistible that the Sound is non-existent then. Perceptions of origin and decay of Sounds are thus perceptions of real facts and cannot

be said to be illusory. This being the case, the Recognition that we hear again the self-same Sound 'Ga', sometime after we heard it for the first time is clearly opposed to the yield of such perceptions and as such, is fallacious itself.

(b) In the above sub-section (a) it has been shown that the Pratyabhijñāna, it is the self-same 'Ga', is a fallacious one, inasmuch as it is contradicted by the undeniable Pratyaksa about the impermanent character (i.e., origin and decay) of every Sound. In the present sub-section (b), the commentator shows how the alleged Pratyabhijñā about the eternal immutability of sound is contradicted by Anumāna, i.e., the reasoning: Sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristics of Intensity, Lowness etc., like pleasure, pain etc. You cannot object to the argument by saying that those characteristics do not pertain to the Śabda (i.e., Sound-in-itself) but to Dhvani which expresses or makes 'explicit' the Śabda. What, then, is the Dhvani? If you say that the Dhvani consists in peculiar palatal air, the question arises: How can the characteristics of Intensity, Lowness etc., which belong to the Dhvani be heard? For, Dhvani is Air and as such, is not audible and accordingly it is impossible for the characteristics of the Dhvani also to be heard. If you say that Dhvani also which expresses the Śabda is audible but that it is the Dhvani which has these characteristics, Intensity etc., and is non-eternal, your contention would not be proper. For, it is the Śabda or Sound which alone is characterised by audibility; if you say that Dhvani also is audible, you must hold it to be exactly identical with Sound and not as something different from it.

In this connection it may be asked: What do you mean by saying that the Dhvani is the Vyañjaka of, i.e., that which expresses or makes 'explicit', the Śabda? What is the actual function of the Dhvani? It is said that the Dhvani effects Samskāra or modification. What, then, is modified by the Dhvani the Sound, the Ear (the organ of hearing, *śrotra*) or both? Modification may consist either in giving rise to a different something or in removing an obstruction. In the first case, i.e., if the Dhvani be held to give rise to something different from Sound or Ear in the process at modifying the Sound at the Ear, then Sound or Ear, as the case may be, becomes clearly impermanent. You cannot contend that the essential nature of Sound or Ear may remain the same while there may arise a different mode there; for, in that case, the Dhvani remains unconnected with the Sound or the Ear. Nor can you say that a modification in the Ear or the Sound is possible only when the Dhvani is connected with the Ear or the Sound, for, what is this connection between the Dhvani and the Ear or the Sound? It is not 'contact'; for, the Dhvani is not a substance; if on the other hand, you say that the connection is one of Samavāya or Intimate Relationship, then the relata, i.e., the Dhvani and the Sound or the Ear become identical in some respects, which the Yājñīkas cannot admit. Hence it is that if the Dhvani be supposed to bring about modification in the Ear or the Sound, the latter becomes non-eternal.

Nor can it be said that the Dhvani is the Vyañjaka of a Śabda, in the sense that it removes what envelopes or suppresses a Sound. For, in that case, if once such obstacle is removed all the Sounds should be audible

at once. You cannot say that each Sound has its own peculiar obstacle and its audibility means the removal of its peculiar obstacle. For, all Sounds are but Sounds and have one and the self-same Ears as their organ. This shows that there cannot be different obstacles to different Sounds and that one and the same obstacle is the obstacle to all Sounds. Even admitting, for argument's sake, that there are different obstacles to different Sounds, in what way is the obstacle to one particular Sound removed? Is it removed wholly? If so, all persons would hear the Sound at once. If it is removed partially, how would a person hear the whole of a Sound? Besides, this leads to the position that a Sound has parts. It is thus unreasonable to hold that a Sound has its *Vyañjaka* or that which makes it explicit and that the characteristics of Intensity, Lowness etc., pertain to this *Vyañjaka*. The characteristics of Intensity, Lowness etc., are really the characteristics of a Sound. Such being the case, the inference about the impermanence of Sound is irresistible, because whatever has the characteristics of Intensity, Lowness etc., is non-eternal. Accordingly, the *Yājñika Pratyabhijñā* about the eternal identity of a Sound is a fallacious one, being opposed to the foregoing well-established Inference.

2. Having set aside the *Yājñika* contention about the eternal self-identity of Sound, based on a so-called *Pratyabhijñā*, the *Jaina* Commentator next takes up for consideration the *Yājñika* contention based on an *Anumāna* or reasoning. The *Yājñikas* put forward the argument 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible; like the Generality or Essence underlying all Sounds (*śabdatva*).’ The *Yājñika* argument is unsound be-

cause it cannot be a rule that whatever can be heard must necessarily be eternal. For, here is offered something which also is audible, "One who would like to have good reputation should seek the hands of his mother; should murder the Brāhmaṇas; and should drink wine, if he would like to go to heaven". If this statement be eternal it must be held to be authoritative, because it lays down an injunction or 'duty' and to disobey it or consider it to be repulsive would clearly be a sin. Such would be the dangerous consequence of the Yājñika position. Then again a Sound is sometimes Loud, sometimes Low, sometimes Intense, sometimes Soft, sometimes Sonorous, sometimes Harsh. If a thing be eternal, its characteristics also are eternal. Now, if these characteristics be eternal, we should always have these characters associated with a Sound, which is neither a fact nor is possible. If it be said that a particular characteristic, e.g., Loudness or Lowness etc., becomes explicit only at a particular time (while all the characteristics are eternally present in the Sound), you cannot explain how the diametrically opposed characteristics do reside in the self-same Sound. In the next place, it must be noted that Prabhākara (an exponent of the Yājñika School) does not admit the reality of the Universal, 'Sound generality' (*śabdatva*). Accordingly, so far as he is concerned, the example like 'Sound-generality (*śabdatva*)' in the Yājñika argument about the eternity of a Sound is 'useless-in-both-respects' (*ubhaya-vikala*). The meaning is as follows. In a syllogistic argument an Example (*drśānta*) e.g., 'the kitchen' is valid and relevant only if the proven (*sādhya*), e.g., 'Fire' and the Reason (*hetu*) e.g., 'Smoke' are found to be co-existent in it. The Example of

Śabdatva however in the Yājñika argument is 'useless-in-both 'respects', because its reality being denied, neither the Proven, i.e., 'Eternity' nor the Mark, i.e., Audibility can be said to be present in it. Prabhākara, however, puts his argument in the following way: 'All particular (cow-or Go-sounds though separated from each other in time and place, refer but to one and the same Go-sound; because it is the Sound, Go, that is generated (on all the occasions); like the particular Go-sound, uttered to-day'. The Jaina commentator criticises this argument by saying that it is wanting in a real Pratibandha or the inseparable relation-ship between a Mark and the Proven. An argument like that of Prabhākara can as well prove 'the eternity of a flash of lightening.'

3 The Yājñika argument based on Arthāpatti or 'Necessary Implication' is as follows: 'A Word (Sound) is related to the Object it signifies. When the Word is used it must be understood to signify that Object. Now, if the Word (Sound) be held to be impermanent, its use for others becomes impossible, for, the Word with its relation to the Object has already vanished, when it is being used for others. The Jains point out that this argument is utterly unsound. A similar argument would lead to the doctrine of the Eternity and the one-ness of the Objects also. The word Go (Cow), for instance, is applied to a particular cow, say, Bāhuleya and is thereby related to it. It cannot be applied to any other cow, e.g., Śābaleya unless Bāhuleya be identical with Śābaleya and is eternally existent. You cannot avoid the difficulty by saying that a Word means, not a particular thing, but the General Essence (*sāmānya*) underlying that thing

and the things of the same class. The Jainas urge that the Object signified by a Word cannot be a unsubstantial something like 'class-essence'; it is always the 'Class-essence-as-particularised-in-an-Individual (*sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka*).

What, then, is the nature of a Word (Sound) which signifies an Object? The signifying Word according to the Jainas, is not an eternal self-existent Sound, as the Yājñikas contend. In the first place, a Word has a General-Essence (*sāmānya*) underlying it. The Yājñikas, according to whom a Word is an eternally existent Word and is no *Sāmānya*, object to the Jaina theory by asking. What is this *Sāmānya* or Class-essence in a Word? Is it the Class-essence of Sounds (*śabdatva*)? Or is it the Class-essence of a limited-class (e. g., *go-śabdatva*, i. e., the Class-essence of all Go (Cow)-Words? Or, thirdly, is it the Class-essences of the successively arising component Letter-sounds (e. g., 'G-tva', 'O-tva') constituting a particular Word (e. g., Go)? The Yājñika's point out that the first of the three alternative positions is not tenable. You cannot say that a particular Word signifies a particular Object because it consists in the Class-essence of Sounds (*śabdatva*). *Śabdatva* or the Class-essence of Sounds is an Universal and a wide Generality. A particular *Śabda* or Word, possessing it, is not thereby enabled to signify the Object signified by it. Nor, is the second position tenable. There cannot be anything like the Class-essence of a limited Class of Words. Go (Cow) is a Word; there cannot be a Class-essence underlying all the Go-Words. The Word, Go, is made up of two successive Letter-sounds 'G' and 'O'. If you suppose that there is a Class-essence underlying

all the G-words, you would be required to solve the awkward problem of determining the 'locus' of this Class-essence. The Yājñikas lastly show that the so-called class-essence in a Word cannot be said to consist in the Class-essences of the successively arising component Letter-sounds ('G' and 'O' for instance), constituting a particular Word (Go). They contend that all Letter-sounds, e g, 'G' are identical, so that we cannot talk of any Class-essence, underlying a number of 'G'-sounds. The Jainas criticise the Yājñika theory by showing that the same Letter-sounds are not identical but are different from each other and that there is a Class-essence of Words, real in every sense of the term.

The Jaina Commentator urges that the fact that the Letter-sounds are really different from each other will appear to be clear if we look to the letter 'G' in the words 'Garga', 'Bharga', 'Barga', 'Svarga' etc. The letter 'G' is obviously not the same in all these words. If it be said that the difference is due to the difference in the elements expressing it (*vyañjaka-bheda*) and not to any difference in the essential nature of the Letter-sound 'G' then, it may as well be argued that there is but one essential Letter-sound and that all different Letter-sounds, A, I etc., etc, are but the same ultimate one Letter-sound, only differently expressed. The Yājñikas may point out that whereas in the case of all 'G'-sounds we have the self-same Sound everywhere, in the cases of the sounds, A, I, U etc., we have a different Sound in each case, so that all 'G'-sounds are but one and identical while Sounds A, I, U etc, are different from each other. One, however, may urge in reply to this Yājñika contention that all Letter-sounds

A, I, U etc., are all identical in as much as there is the same sense of a Letter-sound in them. The Yājñikas attempt to explain away this identity in the sense of different Letter-sounds A, Ā, I, U, etc., saying that this sense of identity is due to the Class-essence of Letters. A similar argument may be put forward against the Yājñika position; it may be urged that the 'G'-sounds are really different from each other and are sensed to be one and the same, because of a Class-essence, underlying them. The Yājñikas may contend that in the Letter-sounds, A, Ā, I, etc., a difference is perceived but not so, in the 'G'-sounds in Garga, Bharga etc., as the 'G'-sound in each of these originates from the operation of the same part of the utterer's mouth. The Jaina commentator points out that the self-same Letter-sound may come out of the different parts of the utterer's body. Thus the 'H'-sounds in "*saharsaṇ heṣante Hariharīti Hamnīṇaḥaṇayaḥ*" come from the throat while the 'H'-sounds in Vahni, jihva etc., come from the breast. What, then? It clearly shows that there may be a difference in the self-same Letter-sounds. And then it is not true that the 'G'-sounds which we perceive have no difference in them; every one knows that sometimes the Letter-sound is Intense, sometimes it is soft and so on. If it be contended that this difference is due to the elements that make the Sound explicit, well, this contention has already been set aside; this contention may lead to the absurd doctrine, already noticed, that there is but one ultimate Letter-sound, of which the varied Letter-sounds, A, Ā, I etc., are different expressions. Even if it be conceded that there is perceived no 'difference' (*viśeṣa*) in the 'G'-sounds, it is undeniable that a clear 'distinction'

(*bheda*) at least is perceived there, A perception of 'distinction' is possible where there is no perception of 'difference' Grains of mustard-seed in a mass may be perceived to be 'distinct' from each other, although their 'differences' from each other in respect of weight etc , may not be perceived Thus it is established that there is 'difference' (in the sense of 'distinctness' at least) among the various 'G'-sounds which we have

The Letter-sounds 'G' and 'O', as said already, compose the word 'Go', signifying a cow. It may be said that the Class-essences underlying these successively uttered Letter-sounds 'G' and 'O', these *Sāmānyas*, enable the word 'Go' to signify the object cow Really, however, it is the Class-essence underlying the Word, 'Go', and expressing itself in and through its similar modes (though different in each case), i.e., the 'G' - Words and embodying itself in the particular 'G' - Word in the given particular occasion, that signifies the corresponding Object, viz , the Cow, you cannot say that there is not the unitary Word Go, on the ground that it is made up of two successively arising Letters namely 'G' and 'O' The Word 'Go' is certainly not eternally self-existent but this does not prove that it is thereby not a unitary Word and is unable to signify an Object. The unitary character of the Word, 'Go', is due to its underlying material Essence (called *bhāṣā*) which progressively manifests itself in and through the successively arising component Letter-sounds, viz , 'G' and 'O', which constitute the word, 'Go'. This material Essence (called *bhāṣā* or *bhāṣā-vaiśaṇā*) is the substantial basis of every Go-word and embodies itself variedly in the varied

Go-words which are nevertheless similar to each other because of their said material basis. The Word 'Go' in which is thus embodied this Class-essence in a particular manner on a particular occasion and which is thus similar to the other modes of the Class-essence, is thus enabled to signify its Object, viz., a Cow. The Yājñika theory about the eternal self-existence of Words, based on Arthāpatti, is weak accordingly.

The Jaina theory is thus established that the Letter-sounds A etc., are atomic, i.e., modifications of Matter.

The philosophers of the Yauga School are prepared to admit that Sound is non-eternal but they would not admit that it is material. The Jaina thinkers ask them, 'Why do you not accept the Atomic theory of Sound? (1) Is it because you hold that the substratum of Sound cannot be touched? (2) Or because it can pass through extremely dense substances? (3) Or because before and after its occurrence, the form of Sound is not perceived? (4) Or because Sound does not move even the very minute substance having a form? (5) Or because Sound is an attribute of Ether? The commentator goes on setting aside all these contentions.

(1) You cannot say that Sound is not Atomic because its substratum cannot be touched. The substance which is the basis of Sound is Bhāsā-varganā, a very minute matter. The fact that it does not give rise to actual perceptions of touch does not prove that it has not the capacity of being touched. Fine material particles which give out smell cannot be touched but no body would say that the particles

have not the capacity of being touched. The Yauga thinkers might of course say that in the case of the smelling particles where these are dense enough we can actually touch them; so that we are sure that the smelling particles can be touched; accordingly, when the smelling particles are fine and cannot be touched this experience about the touch of the gross smelling particles tells us that the fine smelling particles, although they are not actually touched have the capacity of being touched; but in the case of Sound we have never any experience about the touch of its substratum and we cannot say accordingly that the substantial basis of Sound has the capacity of being touched. The Jainas point out that this Yauga argument does not prove that the substratum of Sound is essentially incapable of being touched. It may be admitted that in the case of Sound, we have not the direct experience of touching it. Pudgala or Matter according to the Jainas has the property of touch; this property of giving rise to tactile sensations may be either explicit or implicit in Matter, Sound, as we have seen, is but a mode of Matter, according to the Jainas and there is absolutely no reason why this capacity of being touched, may not be supposed to lie implicit in the substance of Sound. This argument of the Jainas is quite plausible and makes the Yauga proposition 'Substratum of Sound cannot be touched', which is the Hetu for the Yauga theory about the immaterial nature of Sound, a proposition of 'doubtful (*samdigdha*) validity, if not invalid altogether. And then it is not quite correct to say that there is no evidence about the basis of Sound being incapable of being touched. In support of the foregoing

contention, the Jainas put forward the following argument in a syllogistic form:— 'The substratum of Sound is capable of being touched; because it is an object for the sense-organs, being perceptible (i. e., audible) by a man at a distance, when it (i. e., the Sound) comes from the direction from which the wind is blowing and not being perceptible (i. e., inaudible) by the man near at hand if it originates in a direction towards which the wind is blowing; as in the similar cases of the substance, emitting Smell. (2) So far as the second Reason for the Yauga conclusion about the immateriality of Sound, viz., that Sound can pass through extremely dense substances is concerned the Jainas point out that the analogy of Smell holds good. The particles of good-smelling substances, for example, would come outside a room, although its doors are shut, if the substances are within the room; these particles would be perceived within the room, even though its doors are shut, if the substances are outside the room, the particles of the good-smelling substances are nevertheless atomic. In the same way, the substrata of Sound are atomic, although Sound can be perceived outside or inside the room in the above manner. It may be contended that although the doors of the room are shut, there are always some minute pores through which the Smell-particles can pass; if there be no such pores, the Smell-particles would not be perceived inside or outside the room, as described above: so that the passing of the Smell-particles into or outside a room, the doors of which are closely shut does not stand in the way of their being Atomic. The Jaina reply is that the very same thing may be said about

the Sound-substrata. Sound-substrata, as material particles pass into and come out of a closely shut room, because there are always some pores; in cases of absolute density, the egress and the ingress of Sound would be impossible like the egress and the ingress of Smell (3) You cannot say that Sound has not an atomic basis for the reason that its form is not perceived before and after its occurrence For, lightening etc., are not perceived before and after their flash but they are not unsubstantial or immaterial on that account. The non-perception of the form of a thing, before and after its appearance is no ground for holding that the thing has not a material basis. (4) As for the argument that Sound has no material substrata because it does not move any of the tiniest thing in its way, the Jaina reply is that the analogy of Smell would hold good here also. When you smell something, the smelling particles are not found to move or push aside the hairs that grow in the nostrils; yet nobody questions the fact that Smell has a material substratum Why, then, would Sound not have a material substratum even though it does not move aside any little things in its way? (5) The last Reason that 'Sound is an attribute of Ether', the Jainas contend, is 'unproved'. The syllogistic argument put forward by the Jainas against this Reason is 'Sound is not an attribute of Ether; because it is an object of our perception; like Form etc'. The Jaina argument, on the other hand, for the positive establishment of their own theory is. 'Sound is a material mode; because it is an object of our sense-perception, like Form etc.

वर्णानामन्योन्यापेक्षाणां निरपेक्षा संहतिः पदम्, पदानां
तु वाक्यम् ॥ १० ॥

*varṇānām anyonyāpekṣāṇām nirapeksā samhatih
padam, padānām tu vākyaṁ* । 10 ।

TRANSLATION: A Word is a combination of Letters which are related to one another and which are unrelated (to the Letters of another Word), a (similar) combination of Words makes a Sentence.

COMMENTARY: Ordinarily a Word which signifies an Object consists at least of two Letters; for example the Word 'Ka' which means "Brahma" addressed, consists of two letters, 'K' and 'A', The Word 'Gauh' which means a 'Cow'. consists of three letters 'G', 'Au' and 'H'. There are, however, some single 'Letter-sounds, which signify Objects; for example, the Letter-sound, A signifies 'Viśnu'. These single Letters are Words when they thus signify Objects by themselves, i. e., without depending on other Words.

स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्यसमयाभ्यामर्थबोधनिबन्धनं शब्दः

॥ ११ ॥

*svābhāvika-sāmarthyā-samayābhyām artha-bodha-
nibandhanaṁ śabdah* । 11 ।

TRANSLATION. A Word signifies its Object by means of both its Natural force and Applied meaning.

COMMENTARY: There are two things in a Word by means of which it is enabled to signify its corresponding object. One is its Natural (*svābhāvika*) power

to express a meaning; this power is otherwise called *yogyatā*. The other is called *samaya* or *saṃketa*, i.e., a meaning attributed to Word by convention. A Word signifies its corresponding Object because it has both a *Yogyatā* and a *Samketa* or *Samaya*.

The above theory of the Jainas that a Word signifies an Object by means of both its Natural force and its Applied meaning, is opposed to the view of the Naiyāyikas according to whom it is through the *Samaya* alone or the meaning attributed to the Word by some agent external to it, that a Word expresses its Object. The reason of the Jainas for attributing a Natural capacity to a word for expressing an Object, in addition to its conventional significance is as follows:— The *Samaya* or the Conventional meaning is the meaning applied to a Word by man. It is thus subject to the will of man. The will of man, however, cannot be allowed to determine the nature of relationship of things and phenomena. If the will of man had the full scope in the word, well, the Object might have been the 'Signifier' (*vācaka*) and the Word, the 'signified' (*vākya*). To avoid this difficulty, the Nyāya thinkers argue that only that which has the Generalities (*sāmānya*) of Letters 'G', 'O' etc., can be the 'signifier', i.e., a Word and that the rest are the 'signified', i.e., the Object, just as that which in addition to having the Essence of Substantiality (*driavyatva*) has the Essence of Fire (*agnitva*) can alone produce burning and not that which has the exsence of Water (*jalatva*). In criticism of this Nyāya contention, the Jainas point out that without a supersensuous Natural force, the mere Essence of Fire cannot be a dynamic cause. The Essence of Fire is a mere unpro-

ductive Generality; if the dynamic power of Burning be not added to it, phenomena which are the effects of other causes are of the same (i.e., of no) consequence to the static Essence of Fire, as the phenomena of Burning. The Essence of Fire (*agnitva*) is something which is in and by itself, unrelated to the phenomena of Burning. Without the addition of the Supersensuous power of Burning, the Essence of Fire is no more the cause of Burning than it is that of removing thirst. In the same way, if a word 'Go', for example, is to signify a Cow, you are to admit a Natural power in it for signifying the Object, besides its having the Letter-Generalities of 'G', 'O' etc. To this Jaina criticism, the Naiyāyikas may retort by asking:— Why should we suppose a supersensuous Natural Force? The Fire-essence attended with such attendant conditions as 'contact with one's hand' etc., would cause Burning; there remains nothing to be done by the alleged Natural Force. Jayanta has said, "The effect (e.g., Burning) arises from the nature of a thing (e.g., Fire-essence) helped by the attendant conditions. It is not possible to suppose an additional supersensuous power". The argument, again, that fire might as well be the cause of the Removal of Thirst like that of Burning is not valid. We cannot determine at our will a new (i.e., unobserved) causal relationship between phenomena. We accept the state of facts as observed and act accordingly. Water would not remove Cold nor Fire, Thirst at our will. We determine Fire and not Water to be the cause of Burning and act accordingly, because reliable and authoritative persons have so determined or because we have found out in our experience (by methods of both Agreement and Differ-

ence (*anvaya* and *vyatneka*) that it is Fire and not Water that causes Burning. The Jainas urge that this Naiyāyika argument also is fallacious. The very self-same Fire which is found to cause Burning is also found not to cause Burning when some Mystic processes etc., intervene. If the Fire-Essence were competent to cause Burning, there is no reason why it would not burn on those said occasions. This phenomenon of non-burning at times, necessitates the supposition of an additional supersensuous Force, over and above the Fire-Essence. In reply to Jayanta's argument, it has accordingly been said: "The effect does not sometimes arise from the Nature of a thing although helped by the attendant conditions. Why, then, would it not be possible to suppose an additional supersensuous power?" As regards the Naiyāyika contention that our own experience or authoritative instruction tells us that it is Fire which is the cause of Burning, the Jainas point out that that is not the real issue. The real issue according to the Jainas is, how the Fire causes burning. If it be contended that Fire, because of its Fire-Essence is competent to cause Burning, the question is why this Fire-Essence does not remove Thirst as well. The Naiyāyikas try to explain away the phenomena of Fire's non-burning in connection with hindrances as the Mystic processes by saying that this phenomenon does not negative the theory of the Fire-Essence. They point out that just as experience tells us that Fire is the cause of Burning, the same experience would tell us that the 'Absence-of-hindrances' is also a necessary condition for Burning. When on account of the intervention of the Mystic processes, Fire does not burn, it is not to be understood that

some supersensuous power in Fire has become impotent. It is rather to be understood that on account of the intervention of the Mystic processes, the 'Absence-of-hindrances' which as shown above is also a necessary condition for Burning is not present and that as such, the Burning does not happen on account of some derangement in the totality of its conditions. In other words, the phenomenon of non-burning by Fire in some cases does not show that there is a supersensuous power in Fire which has become impotent; it shows that fire does not burn because all the conditions for Burning are not operative. The Jains criticise this view of the Naiyāyikas by urging that the 'Absence-of-hindrances' is a negation after all and that it is not possible for a Negation to bring about something which is positive (i. e., the positive fact of Burning). In order to show that the 'Absence-of-hindrances', although a Negation can bring about something positive (like the phenomenon of Burning) the Naiyāyikas enunciate a general proposition, a Negation or Non-existence can nevertheless cause or give rise to a Positive or Existent fact. They point out, for example, that 'the non-performance of the Religious Duties', a Negation, which is Antecedent (*prāgabhāva* as they call it) nevertheless generates the posterior fact, viz, a mode of Sin which is called the 'Pratyavāya'. That this Sin is a positive fact is evidenced by the Injunction of Expiation (*prāyaścitta*), laid down in the religious books; for, Expiation, as a positive fact, removes only something which is positive or actually Existent; otherwise, it would be useless. Thus it is that the 'Non-performance-of-the-Religious-duties', which is a Negation generates something which is positive. The

Jainas criticise this Naiyāyika theory by saying that the Pratyavāya, as a positive Sin, does not arise from a Negation like the 'non-performance-of-the-Religious Duties', it is due to the positive performance of acts which can be distinguished from the purely Negative i e., the 'Non-performance-of-Duties'. In reply to this theory of the Jainas, the Naiyāyikas quote—"The Non-existence of the Enemy and of the Friend causes respectively Pleasure and Pain. The non-existence of Thorns makes one lay his foot on the way", The Jainas point out that here also the Non-existences are not the causes. The causes of the Pleasure, the Pain, the Laying of the Foot are the (Positive) facts of knowledge, concerning the Non-existence of the Enemy, the Friend and of the Thorns. And these facts of knowledge again are caused by the actually Existent things which are other than the Enemy, the Friend and the Thorn, and not by the pure Non-existence thereof

The Naiyāyika's contend, what is the harm if Negation or Non-existence be supposed to be capable of producing a positive fact, just like an Existent being?. Negation (*abhāva*) does not mean 'want-of-all-capacity,' it means what is known by the knowledge of the form, 'it is not'. A Bhāva or a Positive fact is what is the object of a knowledge of the form, 'it is'; and similarly, an Abhāva or Negation is the object of the knowledge of the form, 'it is not'. Consequently, a Negation need not necessarily be supposed to be absolutely impotent. The Jainas criticise this theory of the Naiyāyikas by saying—"The Abhāva or Negation, as it is conceived by the Naiyāyikas, is in every way different from the Bhāva or a positive Fact and as such, the Abhāva cannot Produce a Bhāva. The

commentator puts this Jaina argument in the following syllogistic form "The Abhāva, which is the subject of contention (i. e., Abhāva, as conceived by the Naiyāyikas) is unproductive of a Bhāva; because it is different from the Bhāva, in every way; that which is so, is so: as for instance, the horns in a horse; it is so; therefore, it is such." It is to be noted that in the above syllogism, the words, 'the Abhāva which is the subject of contention here', mean the three of the four forms of Negation, admitted by the Naiyāyikas. These three are the Prāgabdhāva or the prior Negation, the Pradhvamsābhāva or the posterier Negation and the Parasparābhāva or the mutual Negation or Exclusion. These three forms of Negation, according to the Naiyāyikas, can give rise to a Positive Fact, although they are different from an Existent Thing, in every way. It is to be observed also that this Naiyāyika conception of Abhāva is different from the Jaina conception of it. According to the latter., Abhāva is in some respects non-different from a Bhāva and as such, can be its producer in some cases. But the Jains point out that if, as contended by the Naiyāyikas, Abhāva is different from a Bhāva in every way, it would be impossible for the Abhāva to give rise to a Bhāva. Another point to be remembered in connection with the above Jaina syllogism is that the above syllogism is applicable to the three forms of Abhāva only and not to the fourth form of it. The fourth form of Abhāva, according to the Naiyāyikas is the Atyantābhāva or the Absolute Non-existence, which according to the Naiyāyikas themselves, is unproductive of any Positive Fact. If the Jaina syllogism were applied to Atyantābhāva also, the

argument would be tainted with the fallacy of 'Siddha-Sādhyatā' or the Admitted Proven. The Absolute Non-existence having been admitted by the Nyāya thinker to be 'unproductive of a positive Fact' the Jaina attempt to prove it by arguments would be clearly uncalled-for. Accordingly, it is to be understood that the above Jaina syllogism, 'Abhāva is unproductive of a Bhāva, because it is different from it in every way', is meant to apply to the three forms of the Abhāva admitted by the Naiyāyikas and not to its fourth form. The Naiyāyikas in their turn try to show the invalidity of the above Jaina Syllogism in the following way:—'The Unproductive Negation' is the Dharmā or Abode in that syllogism and the Naiyāyikas ask: Is such Negation known to you or not? If it is known to you how have you known it? If you say that you got it through the Pratyaksa or Perception then how can you say that a Positive fact cannot come out of a negation? For such a Pratyaksa is certainly a Positive fact which comes out of a Prior Non-existence. Anumāna again, cannot give the idea of such a Non-existence; for, in that Anumāna the idea of such a Non-existence must necessarily be presupposed to get at which another Anumāna would be necessary and for that another and so on thus involving Anavasthā or an Infinite Regression. It is not the province of Upamāna or Analogy to deal with Non-existence. The Naiyāyikas go on showing that if the idea of such a Non-existence is accepted as a Hypothesis (*vikalpa*), then the question would be: Is the Hypothesis based on the Pramāṇas or is it a mere Supposition? The former cannot be the case; for, if a Hypothesis is solidly based on valid forms of

knowledge, it cannot be called a Hypothesis. If on the other hand, it be nothing more than a mere Supposition, it is entirely unreliable. The Naiyāyikas thus contend that the Jainas cannot show that their idea of 'Unproductive Negation' is validly determined. And if the Dharmī itself is not validly determined, the Hetu or Reason in their argument would be tainted with the fallacy of *Āśrayāsiddha* (i.e., a fallacy which consists in the Abode being unproved). If the Jainas say that the Dharmī in their argument was not known for certain, the Naiyāyikas ask, why, then, do you accept it as a Dharmī? Such unproved Dharmī leads to the fallacy of *Āśrayāsiddha*. To the above Naiyāyika criticism of their Syllogism the Jaina reply is as follows: We apprehend *Abhāva* or Non-existence by *Vikalpa* or Hypothetical Supposition. This does not necessarily involve the fallacy of the *Āśrayāsiddha* or make the Dharmī unacceptable. Where the object under consideration is 'no-substance' (*avastu*, such as *Abhāva*) we, must have recourse to *Vikalpa*. It is *Vikalpa* that gives us the idea of Negations; otherwise, we would not have used in our talks such expressions as 'the son of a barren woman.' The Naiyāyikas cannot say that they do not use such expressions. If in a debating hall, the subject of the debate be: 'Is there such a thing as a barren woman's son? or, 'is there no such thing as a barren woman's son?—one is bound to use such expressions. Whichever of the alternative propositions one supposes, he is to state the source of his knowledge. *Anumāna* cannot be the source of his knowledge about the Negative thing, because that would bring in the fallacy of the *Āśrayāsiddhi*. Yet in a debating Hall, he cannot do

without stating the source of his knowledge; and if Anumāna cannot be the source of his knowledge about the Negative fact, it must be admitted to be Vikalpa.

In the said debate: 'Is there such a thing as a barren woman's son?', the Naiyāyika cannot avoid his obligation to state the source of his knowledge, saying that he denies both the propositions. For, this is unreasonable; of Affirmation and Negation, he must commit himself to one. Nor can the Naiyāyika escape the difficulty by saying that it is not possible either to affirm or to negate about a Non-existent thing, because that would be a self-contradictory statement. When the Naiyāyika says that there can be no Affirmation or Negation about a Negation, he obviously denies something about Negation; yet his own statement is that neither Affirmation nor negation is possible about a Negation

It is thus proved that the Naiyāyika is bound to admit that Negation which is the Dharmī in the Jaina syllogism is apprehended by Vikalpa and as such, is quite valid.

The Jainas further point out that the *dr̥ṣṭānta* or the Example of 'the horns in a horse' is also conceived in and through Vikalpa. It is a valid Example inasmuch as it shows how a phenomenon which is different from a real and existent thing is unproductive of a positive fact. This Example is not 'unconnected-with-both' (*ubhaya-vikala*), because it (i.e., 'the horns in a horse') embodies in itself both 'the phenomenon of being different from a real and existent thing' (the *Sādhana* or the Reason) and 'the phenomenon of being unproductive of a positive fact' (the *Sādhya* or the Proven).

It will be remembered that in the syllogism which the Naiyāyikas have been attacking, the Jainas put forward the Reason, 'because it (i.e., the Abhāva or Negation) is different from the Bhāva (i.e., an Existent or Positive fact) in every way'. The Nyāya thinkers now attack this Reason of the Jainas in the following way. According to the Jainas Abhāva is non-different from a Bhāva; and so, the Reason, put forward by the Jainas 'because the Abhāva is different from the Bhāva in every way' is 'unproved' and inadmissible, so far as the Jainas are concerned. The Jainas set aside this objection of the Naiyāyikas by urging firstly, that in their syllogism under consideration, the Jainas were describing the Abhāva, as it was conceived by their opponents (and not by the Jainas) and secondly, that the Abhāva was identical with and non-different from the Bhāva.

Hence it is proved that an Abhāva or Negation can never produce a Bhāva or a positive fact.

Coming to the Naiyāyika contention that the Fire-Essence along with the 'Absence-of-hindrances' causes Burning, the Jainas point out that if, as the Naiyāyikas do, you hold that the Fire-Essence is something different from the Absence-of-hindrance in every way, the Fire-Essence itself becomes 'something-of the nature-of-a-Hindrance,' because, as it is technically expressed, the Fire-Essence is thereby admitted to be 'receding' (*vyāvartamāna*) from the 'Absence-of-hindrances', just like the said Mystic processes which are Hindrances to the Phenomenon of Burning. And if Fire-Essence be thus Hindrance to Burning, how can the phenomenon of Burning arise (be produced) at all? The Naiyāyikas try to avoid this difficulty by saying that

Fire-Essence can never be a Hindrance to Burning, because in it there is the Prior Non-existence of a Hindrance. The Jainas contend that this assertion of the Nyāya philosophers cannot be logical. The doctrine of a prior Non-existence tells us only that the Prior Non-existence of a Hindrance cannot be identical with or inherent in the nature of the Hindrance; it does not show that the Fire-Existence which 'recedes' from the 'Absence-of-Hindrances' cannot be a Hindrance. It can rather be plausibly said that just as a Hindrance to a thing is a Hindrance by 'receding' from the Nature of the thing, in the same manner, Fire also by 'receding' from the Absence-of-Hindrances is itself a Hindrance. The Jainas, however, who uphold the doctrine of the Syādvāda or the theory of 'the manifold aspects of a thing' avoid this difficulty by urging that a thing is of a two-fold nature, inasmuch as it is Existent or Positive in-some-respects and that consequently, Fire which is of the nature of the Absence-of-Hindrance in some respects cannot be a Hindrance in those very respects.

In this connection, the Jainas go on showing that if, as the Naiyāyikas contend, the Absence-of-Hindrance be a cause of Burning, how is it that the Effect (i.e., Burning) is not produced, when there is only one such Hindrance, although there are then the Absence-of-many-Hindrances? A potter is the cause (i.e., the maker) of a pitcher; but our experience tells us that if there be wanting one such potter (in technical language, if there be one Hindrance) the pitcher may still be produced because of the activity of another potter (in technical language, because of the Absence-of-Hindrance). It is not the Naiyāyika theory that so far as

the effect is concerned, it is only the Absence of-the-absence-of-one-Hindrane that holds up the Effect (i.e., Burning); the Naiyāyikas rather maintain that the absence of each of the many Hindrances has the power of effectuating. How is it then, the question is repeated, that there is no Burning although there are the Absences of many Hindrances and if there be only one Hindrance only? The Naiyāyikas try to explain the case by saying that a single Absence of a single Hindrance does not produce the Effect but that all the Absences of all the Hindrances collectively produce it. The Jainas criticise this view by urging that in that case no Effect can ever be produced; for, Hindrances are so numerous in this world that it is impossible to secure total absences of all of them. To this Jaina criticism, the Naiyāyikas reply that in order that an Effect may be produced, complete Absences of all the Hindrances are not necessary but the Absences of those Hindrances only are necessary which have the Power of preventing the Effect from emerging. The Jainas meet this Naiyāyika contention by asking: What do you mean by "Power" here? If by Power you mean a supersensuous power in things, then the Jaina theory of supersensuous power in things is admitted. If, on the other hand, by "power" you mean the nature of the thing, i. e., the nature of the Hindrance itself, then you cannot explain how while all the Hindrances have the nature of Hindrances inherent in them, it is only some Hindrances, which prevent the Effect from emerging. Fire, for example is of one and the same nature: there are no varieties of Fire. It cannot be said accordingly that a difference among the Hindrances to Burning can be made by saying that while

some of those Hindrances relate to a particular variety of Fire others do not.

The 'Absolute Non-existence' (*atyantābhāva*) of Hindrance is a pure Negation and as such, it cannot be the cause of a Positive Fact. As regards the other modes of Non-existence, the question may be asked: Does each of these modes co-operate with Fire in effectuating, singly or do they do so, in combination? The *Prāgabhāva* or the Prior Non-existence of a Hindrance cannot be said to be the cause of Burning in as much as Fire is found to burn when there is the *Pradhvamsābhāva* or the Posterior Non-existence of the Hindrance. In the same manner, the posterior Non-existence of a Hindrance cannot be said to be the cause of Burning because there may be Burning when there is the Prior Non-existence of Hindrance. Nor can the *Parasparābhāva* the Reciprocal Non-existence of a Hindrance be said to be the cause of Burning; Reciprocal Non-existence is a relation between the Hindrance and its contrary only; it shows, for example, that when the contrary of the Hindrance, is absent, the Hindrance is present; the Reciprocal Non-existence does not show, however, that when the Hindrance is present, Fire cannot be present and if when the Hindrance to Burning is present, Fire is also present, there is no reason why Burning would not be produced, thus the Reciprocal Non-existence of Hindrance cannot be looked upon as the cause of Burning by Fire. Can those modes of Non-existence be then the cause of Burning, in combination with one another? Can the Prior and the Posterior Non-existences of Hindrances combined together, be the cause of Burning by Fire? They cannot be so looked

upon; because when there is any 'Exciting condition' (*uttambhaka*) Fire causes Burning, even though the Non-existences, Prior and Posterior, of Hindrances are not there. And for the reasons already stated, why the Reciprocal Non-existence of Hindrances cannot be said to be the cause of Burning, the combinations of the Prior Non-existence with the Reciprocal Non-existence, of the Posterior Non-existence with the Reciprocal Non-existence or the combinations of all the three modes of Non-existence cannot be said to be the cause of Burning, can it be said however, that Prior Non-existence of Hindrances or the Exciting conditions, when fit and suitable, produce Burning? The Jainas urge that, even this cannot be maintained. The relationship of cause and effect can be said to subsist between those phenomena only, the presence and the absence of one of which is unconditionally followed by the presence and the absence of the other. The causal relationship cannot be said to subsist between the phenomenon of Burning on the one hand and the phenomena of the said Non-existences or Exciting condition on the other; because, as shown above, there is no such invariable and unconditional relationship between them. Burning is produced sometimes when there is the Prior Non-existence of the Hindrances, sometimes when there is the posterior Non-existence of the Hindrances, sometimes again when there are the Exciting conditions. This is no invariable relationship and hence there is no causal connection between Burning and those phenomena. The Naiyāyikas criticise this view of the Jainas by pointing out there may be causal relationship, although

the relationship may not be invariable. The genesis of a scorpion may sometimes be from Cow-dung and sometimes from a Scorpion; yet, Cowdung is as much a good cause of Scorpion as another Scorpion. The Jainas point out that in both Cow-dung and a Scorpion there is a power to produce a scorpion. It is the possession of this power, that makes the Cow-dung and the Scorpion to be the causes of a Scorpion. As there is no common power inherent in the phenomena of the Non-existences, prior or posterior, or in the Exciting condition to produce Burning, the former do not produce the latter invariably and as such, there cannot be any causal relationship between them

The Jainas thus establish their theory that the Non-existence of Hindrances cannot be said to produce a positive fact. The commentator points out that these arguments apply with equal force to the contention, "Non-existence may be of the same nature as a Positive fact; it may consequently be a good cause and there is no necessity for admitting a supersensuous power in things".

The followers of Aksapāda (i.e., the Nyāya philosophers) try to set aside the Jaina theory of the Natural power in the following way:—

What is your theory about a Hindrance? is it 'inoperative' or 'operative'? If it be 'inoperative' i.e. if it does not produce any effect at all but remains thoroughly impotent throughout, then a Horse, a Fly, a pot etc., i.e., any thing and every thing might as well be called a Hindrance (to Burning). If, on the other hand, a Hindrance, be held to be something 'operative', the question is:— Does its activity consist in producing

something or in destroying something? If the former, does it produce in Fire, a Power opposed to its Power of Burning or does it produce there a Phenomenon which is different from Burning? The former cannot be the case, as there is no evidence for it; the Non-emergence of Burning is effected if there is the Hindrance; the Hindrance is not found to generate a Force which is opposed to the Fire's Power of burning. If, on the other hand, you say that the Hindrance gives rise, in Fire, a Phenomenon which is different from, i.e., opposed to Burning, it comes to this then that the Non-existence of the Hindrance would generate Burning; and thereby, you admit that a Non-existence can be a cause; and so all your objections, just urged, showing how none of the modes of Non-existence can be a productive cause can be now turned against you. Now, if you say that the function of the Hindrance is but a 'destructive' one, the question is What does it destroy, say, in Fire?

Does the Hindrance-to-Burning destroy the Power (of the Fire to Burn) or does it destroy the Phenomenon (of Burning)? If a (Temporary) Hindrance is held to destroy the Fire's Power of Burning, how then, can the Fire burn again, when the Hindrance is removed? If you say that another power of Burning is then generated there, we ask; To what is this generation of a fresh Power due? To something Exciting? Or, to the Non-existence of Hindrance? Or, to the Group of Conditions of peculiar Space, Time, etc.? Or to something Supersensuous? Now, the first of these four alternatives, viz., that the Power of Burning is generated by an 'Exciter', is not maintainable; because Fire is found to burn, only when there is the Non-

existence of Hindrances, even though there is no 'Exciter' there. If, however, the second alternative be accepted and it be said that it is the Non-existence-of-the Hindrances, that generates the Power, the position practically amounts to this that the Non-existence-of-the-Hindrances-to-Burning gives rise to Burning; and if so, the hypothesis of a power in Fire for the purpose of Burning is useless. Thirdly, the Group of Conditions consisting of peculiar Time, Space, Circumstances etc, cannot be the Cause; as it is present even when the Hindrance exists. If, lastly, you say that something Supersensuous generates the power of Burning, what then, is the use of supposing farther, a Supersensuous Power in Fire, for Burning? The Something 'Supersensuous' is what burns and no intervention of a Power is necessary. Hence it is not reasonable to suppose that the destructive function of the Hindrance consists in destroying the Power inherent in Fire. In the same way, it may be shown that the destructive function of the Hindrance cannot said to consist in destroying the phenomenon of Burning. The Naiyāyikas thus show that the Jainas who maintain the theory of a Supersensuous Power in a thing for the peculiar functioning of the thing, cannot consistently explain the nature and operation of a Hindrance to the said functioning of the thing.

To the above criticism of their theory of the inherent Natural Power in things for functioning, by the followers of Aksapāda, the Jainas reply by asserting that the function of the Hindrance consists in destroying that Natural Power and that the other possible functions of a Hindrance, as conceived and criticised by the Naiyāyikas in the above paragraph

need not be answered. When a Hindrance destroys the Natural power in Fire to burn, the Fire, helped by another Power inherent in it regenerates it when the Hindrance is removed and the Fire is found to burn again. The Naiyāyikas object to this contention of the Jainas by asking: Where the Hindrance is present does this 'another Power' exist or not? If it does not, how is it generated? If you say that this 'another power' is generated by Fire, helped by still 'another power' inherent in it, the position obviously leads to Infinite Regression. If, on the otherhand, the Jainas say that the said 'another Power' exists when the Hindrance is present, then they must hold that 'another power' generates the Power of Burning at the time also when the Hindrance-to-Burning is actually present, a clearly inconsistent position.

The Jainas reply to this criticism by asserting that at the time when the Hindrance is present, this 'another power' (which regenerates the power of Burning in Fire when the Hindrance is removed) does exist and does generate the power of Burning in Fire even then, but the actual Burning is not there, because the Power of Burning which is generated then by that 'another power' is being destroyed by the Hindrance as soon as that power of Burning is being generated. When the Hindrance is removed, however, the Power of Burning which is generated in Fire by the said 'another power' inherent in Fire is no longer destroyed and the phenomenon of Burning results and becomes manifest.

Thus the Jaina doctrine of a Natural Power in things for their respective functionings, and for the matter of that a Natural Power in a Word to signify

its corresponding Object, is established. It cannot be contended that if a Natural Force is admitted in a Word, it alone is competent to express the Object and the Applied meaning (*samaya*) is useless. The Applied Force is useful in a subsidiary way, just as, although a Shoot arises from a Seed, Water, Soil etc., are also necessary for its origination. It is said that if a Word be supposed to have a Natural Force, it cannot have different meanings; the Word, '*caura*', for instance which means a 'thief' is understood by the people of the south to mean 'food', such differences in the meaning of a Word, it is contended, show that a Word cannot have a Natural Force. The Jainas criticise this position by pointing out that all Words have the Power of signifying all Objects: that the particular significance of a Word is determined by the particular conditions, prevailing in a country, which conditions thus attach what we call the Applied Force or the Acquired Meaning of the word.

The Saugatās (Buddhists) object to the Jaina doctrine that a Word signifies its Object by means of its Natural and Acquired forces and they argue in the following way —

What is the nature of the Object, alleged to be signified by a Word? Is it a Generality, i e., a Class-essence? Or, a Particularity, i e., the Individual? Or, is it of the nature of both Generality and Particularity? The first cannot be the case, for a Generality or Class-essence having no 'productive potence' has no existence and is as unreal as a Sky-lotus. The second also cannot be the case; for Individuality consists in the strictest form of Particularity; such an absolutely particular cannot be the matter of conception and hence cannot

be signified by a Word. Even if such a strict Individual can be embodied in language, it is clear that a Word is useless when it is used; because it cannot be said to express, at the time when the Word is used, the same Individual Object which it signified when it was formed for the first time. As regards the third case, it may be asked: Does the Word signify the Generality and the Individuality in their exclusiveness or in their identity? You cannot hold the first alternative position for the reasons, just stated. The second position is not maintainable, as generality and Individuality contradict each other and cannot be identified. The Buddhist conclusion is that a Word cannot have any Object for signifying it. An Idea is specially Particular and is strictly different from all other Ideas. This Individual Idea which is strictly Particular and purely subjective, is 'externalised' and 'generalised' owing to the faculty of Conception. This conceptualised Idea makes the really different Objects one; it is the one cause of the really different Objects being understood as one; and it consists in an idea of really different Objects being understood as one. An Idea, thus 'externalised' and 'generalised', when embodied in language is a Word. When a Word is heard it Generates in the mind of the hearer an Idea similar to a previous Idea. A Word is called, 'Apoha' by the Buddhists because it 'excludes' (*apoha*) the Idea which is different (*viparīta-ākāra*) from its own (*svākāra*). There is thus no real counterpart of a Word; there is no real Signifier (*vācaka*) and no real Signified (*vācya*). The relationship between the Signifier and the Signified is really one of causation in the conceptual Apoha itself. It is the subjective concept which is the Word on

the one hand and when externalised, is its so-called Object

As indicated before, the Jainas are upholders of the doctrine that a thing is constituted of both Generality and Individuality, the two constituents being identified in some respects; hence according to them a Word which signifies an Object has also two aspects, one the General and the other the Particular. The Buddhists contend, as we have seen, that a Word cannot express a real Object. In refutation of this view of the Buddhists, the Jaina commentator quotes from a Buddhist thinker himself "Whatever is the object of a Concept (*vikalpa*) is the object of (i.e., signified by) a Word" This shows that a Word does not stand for Concept but that it directly expresses the corresponding Object. And even, if it be assumed (though not admitted by the Jainas) that Word has no direct connection with Reality, still it is a *Pramāṇa*. (i.e., a valid source of knowledge) like *Anumāṇa*. It may be contended by the Buddhists that *Anumāṇa* is a *Pramāṇa* because it is in touch with Reality mediately after all, though not immediately. The Jainas uphold the *Pramāṇahood* of a Word (*śabda*) by pointing out that the very same thing may be said about the 'Śabda' as well. The Buddhists urge that the difficulty in the way of accepting Śabda as a source of valid knowledge is that Words, expressing events of the past or of the future or expressing such imaginary objects as a sky-lotus, are clearly out of touch with the matters of experience, as they are. The Jainas reply that this is not a ground for rejecting Śabda as a *Pramāṇa*. In the case of *Anumāṇa* also, we have many syllogistic arguments, such as "there was rain because the moun-

tain streams are found to be swift", "The Bharanī-constellation will arise, because the Revatī-constellation is found to rise". There are no horns in an ass; because such a phenomenon is opposed to all manners of experience", in which the subject-matters of the Inferences are not existing at the time of reasoning; but inspite of this, Anumāna as a form of valid knowledge is never challenged by the Buddhists themselves. The Buddhists complain that if Words be accepted as a source of correct and dependable knowledge many assertions of cheats and deceivers are to be admitted to be true. The Jainas in reply to this contention of the Buddhists point out that we have many arguments, e.g., "This is real; because it can be enquired into" which are admittedly specious; but that Anumāna as a mode of valid knowledge is not to be rejected on that account. The Buddhists of course defend the validity of Anumāna as a form of knowledge by pointing out that we have the means for finding out the invalidity of an Anumāna, where it is invalid; in the syllogistic argument given above, we can at once say that it is incorrect, because the Hetu or the Reason ('capability of being enquired into') is invalid inas much as it does not stand the test of the Vipaksāsattva (Non-existence-in-the-Dissimilar-Abodes). (The plain meaning is that the argument is easily judged to be invalid because it is not a fact that something which is unreal cannot be enquired into). The Jainas defend the Pramāna-hood of Śabda by applying the similar line of argument. They point out that as in the case of the Anumāna, exactly so in the case of the Śabda, we have the means of finding out the unreliability of the Words, which come from cheats and deceivers. Where,

for example, the assertions are the assertions of a cheat or a deceiver, we can detect the unreliable character of these statements, we can say, "These assertions are not Āgama or Authoritative; because they do not bear the mark of authoritative assertions" Some of the Buddhists object to this line of the Jaina argument by contending that it is not possible to determine whether the Words, heard on an Occasion come from an Authoritative person or not The Jainas ask: Why should it be so? Do you mean to say that there is no person at all who is reliable? Or, that even if there be reliable persons, it is impossible for us to know that they are reliable? Or, that even if they are known, they remain silent? Or, that even if they speak truly their Words would be unintelligible to us? Well, these are worthless arguments, all persons, as a matter of fact do distinguish the instructions of their mothers, fathers, brothers, sons, preceptors, saints, from the words of the sophists and follow the former while rejecting the latter; which shows that as a matter of fact and practice, all persons know how to distinguish Authoritative sayings from the assertions of cheats and deceivers.

Some thinkers of the Buddhist School contend that the knowledge about an object which we derive from hearing a Word involves Reasoning. It is said, "That person is understood to have the Intention of signifying a tree, because he has used the word, 'Tree'; like myself, on previous occasions". After this Intention is inferred, the further Reasoning follows; "This Intention is true, because it is the Intention of a reliable person, like the Intention of mine". It is contended that the knowledge of an object arising

from one's Words is thus mediate, involving, as it does, an Inference about the Intention of the person using the Words and the further Inference that that Intention of his is true. The Jainas point out that this Argument of the Buddhists is similar to the Vaiśeṣika contention and is set aside by the Jaina criticism of the Inferential theory of the Word, advanced by the Vaiśeṣikas. In further criticism of the Buddhist theory, the Jainas ask: Does the Inference about the Intention, described in the arguments above arise when the Word 'Tree' is used to signify a Tree or when it is used otherwise? The second position is not maintainable, because when a person uses the Word, 'Tree' with reference to a 'Room' or when a mad or a dreaming person uses the word, we cannot say that the said Inference about the said Intention of the person is made by us. If, then, the Buddhists are to maintain the first, alternative position that a Word is judged to signify its corresponding Object only when it is used in reference to its corresponding Object and that, mediately through an Inference about the Person's Intention, it may be pointed out that there would be no harm if a Word is said to signify its Object directly by its own force. "A Word is not afraid of its Object." One advantage of the Jaina theory of the Power in a Word to express its Object directly is that it dispenses with the chain of mediation which is never consciously perceived.

The Jainas next take up for consideration the Buddhist theory that a Word is but an idea embodied in language, an Idea which though it stands for a strictly individual Object of a particular time only, nevertheless is conceptualised and thus represents a

number of Objects (which are in reality strictly different each from the other) as one and the same. The Jains ask: What do you mean by this One-ness or Sameness of Objects? One-ness which is the alleged object by the Idea (and for the matter of that of a Word) cannot mean Identity; for, although the Word, Pot, stands for a Cap, a Glass, a Plate etc., we never say that the Object signified by the Word, Pot, are all identical, we have particular Ideas for particular Objects. Nor can the One-ness mean 'not-two-ness' (i.e., Non-difference). "Non-difference" in Objects means either that those Objects are the modifications of one and the same substance or that each of those Objects is absolutely different from the Objects other than it. By 'one-ness' the Buddhists cannot mean the first position because they repudiate the theory that objects may be the modifications of one and the same substance. Then again the fact that an object is absolutely different from all other objects does not refer to any positive real content in an object which can be the Object of an Idea. Besides, what is this fact of an object being absolutely different from all other objects, the fact, that is, of 'Retrogression-from-others'? If 'Retrogression-from-others' means that all objects are absolutely different from all objects, then the position comes to this that there remains no difference in the objects, for, all of them have the one and the same characteristic. If, on the other hand, 'Retrogression-from-others' means that a thing is different from the things of a different class, the position involves the fallacy of the 'Mutual Dependence' (*parasparāśrayatva*). That a thing is different from the things of a different class implies that it belongs to its own class, and a

thing's belonging to its own class again implies that it is different from the things of a different class

It is thus that the Buddhists cannot support their theory that an Idea (and for the matter of that, a Word) which is strictly particular according to them, stands for a number of objects making them one. For, then, objects cannot be said to be Identical. Nor can they be said to be modifications of one and the same substance. Nor, lastly, can the Idea or the Word be said to have for its Object the fact of a thing's 'Regression-from-others'.

It is in the same manner that the other contentions of the Buddhists viz, that the Conceptualised Idea is the one cause of the really different Objects being understood as one and that it consists in an Idea of really different Objects being understood as one, are to be set aside.

In criticism of the Buddhist contention, it may be asked: If the Object signified by a Word, is nothing but a subjective Idea, how is it that a person 'tends towards' (*pravṛtti*) it, as something external to him? The Buddhists may reply that this 'tendency' is due to one's apprehending an Object in the act of Apprehension itself, where there is no real Object at all. What then, is this 'apprehension of an Object'? According to the Buddhists, it consists in falsely apprehending an Object, where it is not. To this, the obvious Jaina objection is that an 'apprehension' is possible only when there is an Object for it, so that if our 'apprehension' of an Object is to consist in apprehending an Object where there is no Object at all, such an 'apprehension' is impossible. On the other hand, if the Object of our 'apprehension' is unreal, how is it that

we direct our 'purposive' activity towards it? Certainly one who wants to burn something or to cook his meals would not go towards something which is in reality no Fire at all, but to which the properties of Fire are falsely attributed. The Buddhists point out that it is by mistake that we direct our 'purposive activity' towards the Objects of our 'apprehension', just as persons wanting to get Silver tend towards Oyster-shells which look like Silver but which are not Silver at all. The Jainas urge that this theory of the Buddhists is wrong. If all our 'tendencies' towards Objects are mistaken, if there are no real Objects as the Objects of our efforts, how do we have the feelings of satisfaction, the feelings, namely, that 'we have gained or attained the Objects'? The Buddhist contention that the Object, signified by a Word, is nothing more than a subjective Idea and has no real existence outside the mind, is thus unsupportable.

Lastly, the Jainas criticise the Buddhist doctrine that the relationship of the Signifier and the Signified between a Word and its Object is essentially a relationship of Cause and Effect. If you say that a Word must signify the Object, because the Word is the cause of the Object, the position becomes anomalous in various ways. A Word when heard causes a peculiar (auditory) sensation in us. But nobody would say that because the Word causes that peculiar auricular sensation, it signifies that Sensation. Then, again, the 'absolute Individuality' (*svalakṣaṇa*) causes its Idea in us, though mediately, just as a Word is said to cause that Idea. If then the Word is the Signifier (*vācaka*) of the Idea because the Word causes that Idea, will one be justified in saying that 'the absolute Individu-

ally, (*svalakṣaṇa*, which is the objective content of the Idea, according to Buddhists) is the Signifier (*vācaka*) of the Idea, on the ground that the *Svalakṣaṇa* causes that Idea, though but mediately? To hold that the relationship between a Word and its Object is but a relationship of Cause and Effect is practically to make the relationship of Signifier (*vācaka*) and Signified (*vācya*) inapplicable in the manner we apply it.

Hence it is but correct to hold with the Jāmas that a Word generates in us a knowledge about an Object, which has both a General and a Particular aspect.

अर्थप्रकाशकत्वमस्य स्वाभाविकं प्रदीपवद्वयार्थत्वायार्थत्वे
पुनः पुरुषगुणदोषावनुसरतः ॥ १२ ॥

*artha-prakāśakatvam asya svābhāvikaṃ pradīpavad
yathārthatvāyathārthatve punaḥ puruṣa-guṇa-doṣāṃ
anuserataḥ* । 12 ।

TRANSLATION: Its Natural Function is, like Light to reveal Objects; but whether the revelation is correct or not, depends on the competency or the incompetency of man.

COMMENTARY: The Natural Force of a Word consists in its power of expressing an Object. In this respect, it is similar to Light which also reveals an object. A Light, when lit, reveals all Objects near to it, no matter whether they are good or bad, just so, does a Word, when uttered by a speaker produce in the minds of the hearers, an Idea of an Object, no matter whether it is real or false, consistent or inconsistent, useful or

useless, known-for-certain or Yet-to-be-ascertained. This much is the Natural Force or Function of a Word. But the difference between a word and a light lies in this that whereas the revelation of an Object through a Word is dependent on the knowledge (*vyutpatti*) of significance (*saṃketa*) of the Word, the revelation of an Object by a Light is not so dependent on anything else.

Whether a Word correctly represents reality, as it is or whether it presents before us something unreal is, however, dependent on the fact whether the speaker is truthful and pure in character or a false and deceitful person. Truth or falsity of a Word thus follows the goodness or the faultiness respectively of the character of its speaker. If a speaker is possessed of Right Faith and is pure in character and conduct, his hearers would get from his words ideas of reality exactly as it is; the Words of a person who is not so, would not yield such knowledge of reality.

If it be contended that the Natural Function of a Word is to express whether its Object is Real or Unreal (and not simply to express an Object no matter whether it is Real or Unreal), the difficulty would be that in that case there would be no reason why the words of a cheat would be unreliable while those of a good man would be reliable. Generosity etc., are the *good qualities* in a man while Envy etc., are the *faults* in him. The followers of Jaiminī maintain that the reliability of Words does not depend on the good qualities (*guṇas*) of the speaker. (The meaning is All Words, by themselves express truths; Words are not true because their speakers are good persons. Hence Words are *Pramāṇas* or Sources of correct knowledge,

unless their truthfulness is affected by the faults of the speaker). In criticism of this theory the Jainas ask: If Words are true in and by themselves and if goodness in the speaker has nothing to do with their Pramāṇa-hood, may it not be contended that faults in the speaker cannot similarly make the Words Apramāṇa or unreliable? The fact is, as the Jainas point out, that Words signify objects, no matter whether the Objects are Real or Unreal. It is goodness in the speaker that makes his words Pramāṇa and it is badness in him that makes his words Apramāṇa. To say, as the Śrotriyas do, that Words in and by themselves express truths, that faults in the speaker, however, make the Words Apramāṇa, that goodness in the speaker does not make Words Pramāṇa but only mitigates or suppresses the faults of the speaker is a weak and inconsistent position.

सर्वत्रायं ध्वनिर्विधिनिषेधाभ्यां स्वार्थमभिदधानः सप्तमङ्ग-
मनुगच्छति ॥ १३ ॥

*saivatrayaṃ dhvanir vidhi-niṣedhābhyāṃ svārtham
abhidadhānaḥ saptabhaṅgīm anugacchati* | 13 |

TRANSLATION In all cases a Word in expressing its Object follows the Law of Sevenfold predication by its affirmation and negation.

COMMENTARY: According to the principle of the Jaina philosophy, a Thing is not confined to one aspect only but has many aspects (*anekānta*) Thus in some sense, it is existent; in some sense, again it is non-existent. Similarly, viewed from one standpoint, a

thing is eternal but viewed from another, it is impermanent. As a matter of fact seven such aspects may be found out in a thing from seven viewpoints. Now, Word is but a counterpart of the thing and like those in the Thing, a Word also has seven aspects, so far as its manners of expressing it are concerned.

एकत्र वस्तुत्येकैकधर्मपर्यनुयोगवशादविरोधेन व्यस्तयोः
समस्तयोश्च विधिनिषेधयोः कल्पनया स्यात्काराङ्कितः सप्तधा
वाक्प्रयोगः सप्तमङ्गी ॥ १४ ॥

*ekatā vastuny ekaikadharmā-paryanuyogavaśād-
avirodhena vyastayoh samastayoh ca vidhi-nisedhayoh
kalpanayā syāt-kārāṅkitaḥ saptaadhā vāk-prayogaḥ
Saptabhaṅgī* 14 1

TRANSLATION. The law of Sevenfold Predication consists in using seven sorts of expression, regarding one and the same thing with reference to its particular aspects, one by one, without any inconsistency, by means of affirmation and negation, made either separately or together, all these seven expressions being marked with 'in some respects' (*syāt*).

COMMENTARY: This is a description of the celebrated doctrine of the Saptā-Bhaṅgī or the Law of Sevenfold Predication. Analysing the description given above, we can thus find out the nature and conditions of the Saptā-Bhaṅgī.

1. The Seven Predications are to be made regarding one and the same Thing, e.g., Jīva or Animal. The Words, 'one and the same thing' prevent the predications being 'a hundred-fold' (i.e., many-fold) one,

things in the world being so many, hundreds and hundreds, in number.

2. The Seven Predications are to be made not only with regard to one and the same thing but with reference to 'one' only of its various attributes, e.g., Existence. Seven propositions, indicating seven different attributes of a Thing do not constitute the Saptabhāga. Attributes, as aspects of a thing, are infinite in number. If one of such attributes or aspects be taken into consideration, we shall see that Seven Predications or Statements can be made with reference to it. It is thus that a predication is said to be seven-fold and not Infinite-fold. Of course, if it is contended that the attributes or aspects of a thing are infinite in number and that with reference to each one of these attributes and aspects, seven predications can be made and that consequently, Predication may be Infinitely-seven-fold, well, the Jaina Philosophers have no objection to that position.

3. Each of these Predications must be based on principles of 'affirmation' and 'negation'.

4. That Seven Predications must be made in such a way that none of them be inconsistent with the facts of Perception etc.

5. Each of these statements must be marked with the expressions, 'in some respects'.

तद्यथा—स्यादस्त्येव सर्वमिति विधिकल्पनया प्रथमो

मङ्गः ॥ १५ ॥

*tad yathā, syād asty eva sarvaṃ iti vidhi-kalpanayā
prathamō bhāṅgaḥ* । 15 ।

TRANSLATION: It is in this way, in some respects everything in existent The first Predication consists in such an affirmative statement

COMMENTARY. The expression, 'in some respects', means in respect of its own Substance, Place, Time and Modification and not in respect of the Substance, Place, Time and Modification of other things Thus, when we say that a Pitcher exists, we mean that in some respects only it exists For example, the Pitcher exists as a solid Substance (made of clay) and not as a liquid substance (consisting in Water); it Place (say) Kānyakulja, it exists at the Time (say) of winter and not at the Time (say) of Spring; it exists Appearing (say) as a black thing and not Appearing (say) as a red thing The words, 'in some respects', thus give a definite content and character to the Thing under consideration and prevent it from having the content and character of other things and thereby losing its own definite and determinate self.

This Bhanga or predication yields the knowledge of a thing as it is distinguished from things which are other than it and which are not intended to be meant by it This predication thus indicates the definite and the determinate nature of the thing; without this predication, the definite nature of the thing would not be stated at all, without this predication any statement regarding the thing would be as good as no statement at all.

If the words 'in some respects' were omitted and if it were simply stated the pitcher *exists*, it is clear that its Existence would be identical with the Existence of a pillar etc, so that the pitcher would have no

definite character attributable to it alone. The words 'in some respects' indicate in what definite way and manner the pitcher exists; these words state that the pitcher exists with respect to its own substance and not with respect to the Substance etc., of other things. Thus if a statement regarding the nature of a thing is to have a real meaning, an intelligent man should always understand it in such a limited sense, even though the words 'in some respects' do not occur in it.

स्यान्नास्त्येव सर्वमिति निषेधकल्पनया द्वितीयः ॥ १६ ॥

syān nāsty eva sarvaṁ iti niṣedha-kalpanayā dvitīyaḥ ॥ 16 ॥

TRANSLATION: In some respects, everything is Non-existent. The second Predication consists in such a negative statement.

COMMENTARY: A thing is never intended to be non-existent in respect of its own Substance etc. But it cannot be said that the thing is not intended to be Non-existent in respect of the Substance of other things; for, that would be depriving the thing of its own definite and determinate nature.

Thinkers who fix upon the Existential aspect of a thing as its only aspect are not justified in contending that the Non-existential aspect of thing is not proved. Reasoning will show that a thing is Non-existent in some respects. That a thing has a Non-existential aspect besides the Existential is practically admitted when it is said that the Reason or the Hetu in a syllogism had the characteristic of the Vipakṣāsattva.

(Non-existence-in-the Dissimilar-Abode) It may be contended that the Non-existence-in-the-Dissimilar-Abodes is not a separate characteristic of the Mark, it means the same thing as the Existence in-the-Abode. In other words, it is contended that the fact that Reason exists when the Proven exists is identical (only otherwise stated) with the fact that when the Proven does not exist, the Reason does not exist. There cannot be any aspect viz., the Non-existential over and above the Existential. The Existential is the aspect which we have, it is impossible for us to have what is Non-existential in a thing. The Non existential opposes the existential. We cannot have the Non-existential as an invariable associate of the existential in one and the same thing. We have never the impression that a thing, i.e., the nature of a thing is Existent as well as Non-existent. It is accordingly contended that the Non-existential aspect of a thing is *nothing* other than the Existential aspect. The Jainas oppose this view by saying that to identify Existence with Non-existence would be denying the three-fold characteristics of a Valid Hetu, for, the Vipaksāsattva, which is admittedly one of the three characteristics of a Hetu would in that case lose all its meaning and real utility. If Existence and Non-existence mean the same thing, no one would 'tend towards' or 'recede from' a thing. A real thing which one 'tends toward' or 'recedes from' is not due simply to the extension of its Non-existence, nor is Non-existence due simply to the exclusion of the Existence of the thing. The existential and the Non-existential are thus different aspects in a thing, although they are so connected that one is impossible without the other.

Just as Existence and Non-existence are two different and real aspects in a thing, as shown above, the other five, viz., Simultaneous Existence and Non-existence, Successive Existence and Non-existence etc., which will be shortly described, are to be understood as separate aspects of the thing

स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवेति क्रमतो विधिनिषेधकल्पनया
तृतीयः ॥ १७ ॥

*syād asty eva syān nāsty eva iti kramato vidhi-
niṣedha-kalpanayā tṛtīyaḥ* । 17 ।

TRANSLATION: In some respects everything is Existent; in some respects it is Non-existent. The third Predication consists in such affirmative and negative statements, made one after the other

COMMENTARY: Everything is Existent with regard to its own Substance etc. It is Non-existent with regard to the Substance etc. of other things. The third Predication consists in making statements, viz., that Everything e g, the Pitcher exists and that Everything, e g., the Pitcher does not exist, one after the other.

स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया चतुर्थः

॥ १८ ॥

*syād avaktavyam eveṭi yugapad vidhi-niṣedha-kal-
panayā caturthaḥ* । 18 ।

TRANSLATION: In some respects, everything is Inexpressible. The fourth Predication consists in such affirmative and negative statements made simultaneously.

COMMENTARY Here the thing is called Inexpressible. It is evident that if we consider a thing to be Existent and Non-existent at the same time, the thing becomes incapable of being expressed in words, as no word can signify both Existence and Non-existence at the same time. If we call the thing, 'existent', well, this word is not competent to signify both the attributes viz., 'existence' and 'non-existence', for, the word 'existent' cannot signify 'non-existence'. If on the other hand, we call the thing 'non-existent', it is clear that this word is incompetent to signify both these attributes as the word, 'non-existent' cannot signify 'existence'. It is thus that if existence and non-existence be simultaneously attributed to a thing, it becomes incapable of being expressed in words.

Some thinkers choose to make this predication the third and the third, already described, the fourth. This is immaterial.

स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिकल्पनया युगपद्वि-
धिनिषेधकल्पनया च पञ्चमः ॥ १९ ॥

*syād asty eva syād avaktavyam eveti vidhi-kalpanayā
yugapad vidhi-nisedha-kalpanayā ca pañcamah 1 19 1*

TRANSLATION. In some respects, everything is Existent, in some respects, everything is Inexpressible. The fifth predication consists in an affirmative statement together with a combined affirmative and negative statements made simultaneously.

COMMENTARY: A thing is Existent with reference to its own Substance etc., as already shown and it is

Inexpressible when Existence and Non-existence are simultaneously attributed to it. The fifth mode of Predication consists in stating that a thing is Existent and that it is Inexpressible.

स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति निषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च षष्ठः ॥ २० ॥

syān nāsty eva syād avaktavyam eveti niṣedha-kalpanayā yugapad-vidhi-nisedha-kalpanayā ca
saṣṭhaḥ । 20 ।

TRANSLATION: In some respects, everything is Non-existent, in some respect, everything is Inexpressible. The sixth Predication consists in a negative statement together with a combined affirmative and negative statements, made simultaneously.

COMMENTARY. A thing is Non-existent with reference to the Substance etc., of other things, as already shown and it is Inexpressible when Existence and Non-existence are simultaneously attributed to it. The sixth mode of Predication consists in stating that a thing is Non-existent and that it is Inexpressible.

स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति क्रमतो विधिनिषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च सप्तमः ॥ २१ ॥

syād asty eva syān nāsty eva syād avaktavyam eveti kramato vidhi-nisedha-kalpanayā yugapad-vidhi-nisedha-kalpanayā ca saptaṁ ॥ 21 ॥

TRANSLATION: In some respects everything is Existent; in some respects, everything is Non-existent;

in some respects, everything is Inexpressible. The seventh Predication consists in an affirmative and a negative statements, made one after the other together with a combined affirmative and negative statements made simultaneously

COMMENTARY A thing is Existent with reference to its own Substance etc. and is Non-existent with reference to the Substance etc. of other things, it is Inexpressible when Existence and Non-existence are attributed to it simultaneously The seventh mode of Predication consists in pointing these out.

विधिप्रधान एव ध्वनिरिति न साधुः ॥ २२ ॥

vidhi-pradhāna eva dhvanir iti na sādhuḥ । 22 ।

TRANSLATION The view that a Word is mainly affirmative is not correct

COMMENTARY Here, again, some one-sided views are sought to be criticised in light of the Law of Seven-fold Predication

निषेधस्यापि तस्मादप्रतिपत्तिप्रसक्तेः ॥ २३ ॥

nisedhasyāpi tasmād apītipatti-prasaktēḥ । 23 ।

TRANSLATION For, then it would be unable to express Negation.

COMMENTARY This Sūtra gives the reason for what is stated in Sūtra 22. above

अप्राधान्येनैव ध्वनिस्तमभिधत्ते इत्यप्यसारम् ॥ २४ ॥

*api ādhānyenaiva dhvanis tam abhidhatte ity apy
asāram* । 24 ।

TRANSLATION: The view that a Word expresses Negation indirectly is also unsubstantial

COMMENTARY. The reason is given below

क्वचित्कदाचित्कथंचित्प्राधान्येनाप्रतिपन्नस्याप्राधान्यानुप-
पत्तेः ॥ २५ ॥

*kvacit kadācit kathameit pi ādhānyenāprati-pan-
nasyāpi ādhānyānupapattēh* । 25 ।

TRANSLATION Because it in its indirectness cannot be conceived, unless it is somewhere, sometime and somehow perceived in its directness

COMMENTARY If a phenomenon (e g , Negation) be never perceived in its directness, if it remains always indirect, it must be said to be unknown and unknowable. Regarding such a phenomenon, it is not even correct to say that it is indirectly understood, for, we have never known its true nature at all

The view, described and criticised in Sūtras, 22-25, is the view held by persons according to whom, the proposition embodied in the first predication is true absolutely and not, in some respects only.

निषेधप्रधान एव शब्द इत्यपि प्रागुक्तन्यायादपास्तम् ॥ २६ ॥

*niṣedha-pi ādhāna eva śabda ity api prāgukta-nyāyād
apāstam* । 26 ।

TRANSLATION For the same reason the view that Word is mainly negative is also unsound.

COMMENTARY The view that a Word is essentially negative in significance, is held by those according to whom the proposition embodied in the second Predication is true *absolutely* and not *in some respects* only.

क्रमादुभयप्रधान एवायमित्यपि न साधीयः ॥ २७ ॥

*kramād ubhaya-pradhāna evāyam ity api na
sādhīyah* | 27 |

TRANSLATION. The view that both (Affirmation and Negation) predominate in a Word, one after the other is also not good

COMMENTARY The view, referred to, is the view of the absolutists in connection with the third predication

अस्य विधिनिषेधान्यतरप्रधानत्वानुभवस्याप्यबाध्यमान-

त्वात् ॥ २८ ॥

*asya vidhi-nisedhānyatara-pradhānatvānubhavyā-
py abādhyamānatvāt* | 28 |

TRANSLATION For, the fact that either one of affirmation or negation predominates in a Word is not Opposed to experience

COMMENTARY We all know that Words are sometimes mainly positive and sometimes mainly negative in their significance Hence we cannot make

a statement that all Words are firstly positive and then negative or *vice versa*.

युगपद्विधिनिषेधात्मनोऽर्थस्यावाचक एवासौ इतिवचो न

चतुरस्रम् ॥ २९ ॥

*yugapad-vidhi-nisedhātmano'ṛthasyāvācaka evāsau
iti vaco na catuṣasram* । 29 ।

TRANSLATION: Nor is the view reasonable, that a Word does not (i.e., cannot) signify an Object which has simultaneously both a positive and a negative nature

COMMENTARY: The view referred to in this aphorism is the view of those absolutists according to whom, the proposition of the fourth Predication is absolutely true and not true in some respects only

तस्यावक्तव्यशब्देनाप्यवाच्यत्वप्रसंगात् ॥ ३० ॥

tasyāvaktavya-śabdenāpyavācya-tva-prasangaṭ । 30 ।

TRANSLATION: For, a thing cannot be fully described even though the thing is, referred to by the term Inexpressible.

COMMENTARY This is the reason for the criticism applied to the absolutist contention regarding the fourth Predication

विध्यात्मनोऽर्थस्य वाचकः सन्नभयात्मनो युगपदवाचक एव
स इत्येकान्तोऽपि नैकान्तः ॥ ३१ ॥

*vidhyātmano'ṛthasya vācakaḥ sann ubhayātmano
yugapad avācaka eva sa ity ekānto'pi naikāntaḥ* । 31 ।

TRANSLATION Also the one-sided view is not attractive, that while a Word signifies an Object which has a positive nature, it cannot signify the Object because the Object has both (a positive and a negative) nature simultaneously

COMMENTARY This relates to the absolutist view regarding the fifth Predication

निषेधात्मनः सह द्वयात्मनश्चार्थस्य वाचकत्वावाचकत्वाभ्या-
मपि शब्दस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥

*nisedhātmanah saha dvayātmanas' cārthasya vāca-
katvāvācakatvābhyām api pratyamānatvāt ॥ 32 ॥*

TRANSLATION Because it is a matter of experience, that while a Word signifies a negative phenomenon, it does signify the phenomenon which has both a positive and a negative nature

COMMENTARY This is the reason for the criticism

निषेधात्मनोऽर्थस्य वाचकः सन्नभयात्मनो युगपदवाचक
एवायमित्यप्यवधारणं न रमणीयम् ॥ ३३ ॥

*nisedhātmano'rthasya vācakah sann ubhayātmano
yugapad-avācaka evāyam ity api avadhānāṇaṇi na rama-
ṇīyaṇi ॥ 33 ॥*

TRANSLATION: Unattractive also is the view that while a Word signifies an Object which has a negative nature it cannot signify the Object because the Object

has both (a positive and a negative) nature simultaneously.

COMMENTARY: This relates to the absolutist theory about the sixth Predication

इतरथापि संवेदनात् ॥ ३४ ॥

itarathāpi samvedanāt | 34 |

TRANSLATION: Because it is known to do otherwise also

COMMENTARY The reason for the criticism is that our experience tells us that the function of a Word is not so limited as contended in Sūtra, 33. A Word is known also to signify Objects having an affirmative nature, a dual nature and so on, as pointed out in the various Predications.

क्रमाक्रमान्यामुभयस्वभावस्य भावस्य वाचकश्चावाचकश्च
ध्वनिर्नान्यथा इत्यपि मिथ्या ॥ ३५ ॥

*krāmākrāmābhyām ubhaya-svabhāvasya bhāvasya
vācakaś cāvācakaś ca dhvaniṁ nānyathā ity api
mithyā* | 35 |

TRANSLATION Even the theory is wrong that while a Word does nothing but expresses an Object which has successively the dual natures (viz., the positive and the negative), it is unable to express the Object because it has the same two natures simultaneously also.

COMMENTARY : This is the wrong theory about the function of a Word, based on an absolutist conception of the seventh Predication.

विधिमात्रादिप्रधानतयापि तस्य प्रसिद्धेः ॥ ३६ ॥

vidhīmātrādi-pradhānatayāpi tasya prasiddheḥ । 36 ।

TRANSLATION For, a Word is also known to be mainly affirmative and so on

COMMENTARY. This is the reason why the seventh absolutist theory about the significance of a Word is also not acceptable

The Jaina view is that just as an Object has seven aspects, the Word corresponding to it has also seven indications, each signifying one of the said seven aspects of the Object

एकत्र वस्तुनि विधीयमाननिषिध्यमानानन्तधर्माभ्युपगमेना-
नन्तमङ्गीप्रसंगादसंगतैव सप्तमङ्गीति चेतसि न निधेयम् ॥ ३७ ॥

ekatva vastuni vidhīyamāna-nisīdhyamānānanta-dharmābhyupagamenānanta-bhaṅgī-prasamgād asamgatairva sapta-bhaṅgīti cetasi na nidheyam । 37 ।

TRANSLATION It should never be thought in mind that the theory of the Sevenfold Predication is not satisfactory on the ground that there may be an infinite number of aspects, positive and negative, of one and the same thing and that there may be made an infinite number of Predications, regarding the thing accordingly

COMMENTARY. The above objection is set aside below.

विधनिषेधप्रकारापेक्षया प्रतिपर्यायं वस्तुन्यनन्तानामेव
सप्तमङ्गीनां संभवात् ॥ ३८ ॥

vidhi-niṣedha-prakārāpekṣayā prati-paryāyam va-
stunty anantānām eva saptabhaṅgīnām sambhavāt । 38 ।

TRANSLATION Although regarding a thing, an infinite number of Predications may be made, there can be only seven Predications consisting in various ways of affirmation and negation, regarding the thing considered in one of its particular modifications

COMMENTARY It is true that with regard to a thing considered as the sumtotal of its attributes and modifications an infinite number of Predications may be made, but if we single out any particular attribute of the thing or any of its particular modifications and consider it in relation to the thing, we shall see that seven and only seven statements can be made.

प्रतिपर्यायं प्रतिपाद्यपर्यनुयोगानां सप्तानामेव संभवात्
॥ ३९ ॥

prati-paryāyam pratipādyā-parīyanuyogānām sapta-
nām eva sambhavāt । 39 ।

TRANSLATION. For relations of any Mode to a thing can be of seven sorts.

COMMENTARY This explains why the Predications cannot be more than seven.

तेषामपि सप्तत्वं सप्तविधतज्जिज्ञासानियमात् ॥ ४० ॥

tesām api saptatvam saptavidha-taj-

jijñāsā-niyamāt ॥ 40 ॥

TRANSLATION: And those are of seven sorts because there can be only seven modes of questioning.

COMMENTARY This explains why the above-mentioned Relations cannot be more than seven

तस्या अपि सप्तविधत्वं सप्तर्धैव तत्संदेहसमुत्पादात्

॥ ४१ ॥

tasyā api sapta-vidhatvam saptadhaiva tatsandeha-
samutpādāt ॥ 41 ॥

TRANSLATION And that too again is of seven modes because there can be only seven forms of Doubt (regarding) the nature of a Mode

COMMENTARY This explains why the above-mentioned questionings cannot be more than seven

तस्यापि सप्तप्रकारत्वनियमः स्वगोचरवस्तुधर्माणां सप्तवि-
धत्वस्यैवोपपत्तेः ॥ ४२ ॥

tasyāpi sapta-prakāratva-niyamaḥ sva-gocara-vastu-
dhamāṇāṃ saptavidhatvasyaivopapattēḥ ॥ 42 ॥

TRANSLATION And that again is of seven sorts, because a particular modification of a thing under one's observation is found to have seven forms

(The substance underlying the above chain of reasoning is as follows Let us take a thing, e.g., an

Animal and one of its numerous attributes or modes of functioning, e g., Existence. Experience will tell us that Existence is not an absolutely fixed one manner of functioning. In fact, it means not less or not more than seven forms. i.e., Existence-in-some-respects. Non-existence-in-some-respects, Both-existence-and-non-existence-in-some-respects and so on. This being so, when Animal and Existence are taken up for consideration, seven forms of Doubt arise, due to the said seven forms of Existence. These seven forms of Doubt give rise to seven forms of Questioning. These seven forms of Questioning end in finding out that Existence and animal are related in seven ways. These Relations between Existence and Animal when embodied in statements are the Predications or the Bhaṅgas. For the foregoing reasons, Predications are seven only and neither more nor less).

इयं सप्तमङ्गी प्रतिमङ्गं सकलादेशस्वभावा विकलादेश-
स्वभावा च ॥ ४३ ॥

*iyaṃ sapta-bhaṅgī prati-bhaṅgaṃ sakalādeśa-sva-
bhāṁvā vikalādeśa-svabhāṁvā ca* 143 1

TRANSLATION: Each of these Sevenfold Predications is both a Synthetic and an Analytic one.

COMMENTARY: This is explained below.

प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृत्ति-
प्राधान्यादभेदोपचाराद्वा यौगपद्येन प्रतिपादकं वचः सकला-
देशः ॥ ४४ ॥

*pramāna-pīatipannānanta-dharmātmaka-vastunaḥ
kāladibhiḥ abhedavṛtti-pīādhānyād abhedopacārād vā
yauḡapadyena pīatipādakaṃ vacaḥ sakalādeśaḥ । 44 ।*

TRANSLATION· A Synthetic statement is the statement presenting with the help of the Pramānas a Thing which has an infinite number of (different) Attributes and Modes at once as an undifferentiated whole, the identity in respect of Time etc., being either made prominent in or being foisted upon it

COMMENTARY A thing has an infinite number of Attributes and Modes. The Pramānas present the Thing as a whole by identifying the Attributes and the Modes of the thing with the Thing and by identifying the different Attributes and the Modes themselves. This identification is effected by the Pramānas either by giving prominence to the fact of real identity or by introducing a fact of identity where there are differences. The result of the application of the Pramānas, when embodied in language is the Sakalādeśa or a Synthetic statement.

The Nayas, which according to the Jainas, are also sources of valid knowledge, give, on the contrary, prominence to the differences in the Thing and its Attributes and Modes or introduce differences where they are not manifest. A statement based on the Nayas is the Vikalādeśa or an Analytic one. When the fact of identity among the Thing and its Attributes and Modes is solely attended to and emphasised, the thing can then be considered as a Totality, in which all its different Attributes and Modes are simultaneously gathered, unified and identified and a statement regarding the Thing is then Synthetic. In Vikalādeśa and

Analytic statements, the Attributes and the Modes of the Thing are considered one by one separately

In its synthetic aspect, a Word stands for a Thing and all its Attributes and Modes simultaneously because no difference in them is felt and all of these are identified. When, however, these Attributes and Modes are differentiated from one another, it is clear that no one Word can express all of them simultaneously, then each Word would be Analytic in character and would stand for one specified and individual characteristic or aspect of the Thing.

To understand the Synthetic and the Analytic views of a Thing and its Attributes, let us consider the judgment: 'In some respect, a substance, e g., an Animal exists'. Here Animal is the Thing and Existence is one of its Attributes. The significance of this judgment may be considered through eight categories, viz, *kāla* (time), *ātma-tūpa* (nature), *artha* (substance), *sambandha* (relationship), *upacāra* (modification), *gumdeśa* (location), *samsarga* (connection) and *śabda* (expression in language). Now, when a Synthetic view is taken of the judgement it means that like Existence all the other Attributes of the Animal also are included in it. Thus by saying that the 'Animal Exists', we mean

(i) At the *time* when Existence inheres in the Animal other Attributes also do so. (ii) Other Attributes also are as many Attributes of the Animal as Existence inasmuch as all of them have the *nature* of Attributes in them (iii) Other Attributes and Modes have the same *substance* Animal underlying them, as Existence. (iv) The same *relationship* (i.e., identity in some sense) subsists between the other Attributes and the Animal as that between Existence and the Animal.

(v) Other attributes also *modify* the Animal in the same way as does Existence. (vi) Other Attributes inhere in the same *part* of the Animal wherein Existence inheres (vii) Other attributes are *connected* with the Animal in the same way as Existence is connected with it

(N B.) The difference between Relationship (*sambandha*) and Connection (*samsarga*) is that whereas in two Related phenomena the fact of Identity is prominent although there is Difference, in two connected phenomena, the fact of Difference is prominent although there is Identity) (viii) The *Word*, Existence, which here signifies Animal which has Existence, also signifies the Animal which has other Attributes also This is the Synthetic view of a Thing and its Attributes, which is based on a consideration of their essential Identity or where a consideration of their essential Identity is not possible, upon a foisting of an idea of Identity on them.

The identification of the various Attributes of a Thing in the above way is possible where emphasis is laid on the substantial aspect of the Thing and the aspect of its varied Qualities and Modes is less prominent Where on the other hand, the latter aspect is prominent, it is clear, the various Attributes and Modes of the Thing cannot be so identified. Thus if the various Attributes and the Modes appear prominently in their variety, we by saying that 'a Thing has Existence' indicate

(i) At the *time* when Existence inheres in the Thing, Attributes other than Existence cannot inhere in it. (ii) Other Attributes cannot have the same *nature* as that of Existence (iii) Other Attributes cannot have the same *substratum* as that of Existence (iv) The same

relationship that subsists between Existence and the Thing cannot subsist between the other Attributes and the Thing. (v) Other Attributes do not *Modify* the Thing in the same way as Existence does (vi) Other Attributes cannot have the same *abode* as that of Existence (vii) The *connection* of other Attributes with the Thing cannot be the same as that of Existence with it. (viii) The *Word* Existence which signifies the Thing which has Existence cannot signify the thing which is possessed of Attributes, other than it

तद्विपरीतस्तु विकलादेशः ॥ ४५ ॥

tadviparītas tu vikalādeśaḥ । 45 ।

TRANSLATION. Opposite to that is the Analytic statement.

COMMENTARY. Contrary to the Synthetic view is the Analytic, which takes a Thing in its aspect of variety; and where the Thing appears as a Unity, the Analytic view may still consist in considering it to be a Multiplicity This has been shown above It is the Naya which studies the Attributes and the Modes of a Thing in their variedness and leads us to an analytic statement. This will be more fully considered, when the nature of the Nayas will be considered

तद् द्विभेदमपि प्रमाणमात्मीयप्रतिबन्धकापगमविशेषस्वभाव-
रूपसामर्थ्यतः प्रतिनियतमर्थमवद्योतयति ॥ ४६ ॥

*tad dvibhedam api pramāṇam ātmīya-pratibandha-
kāpagamaviśeṣa-svabhāva-ūpa-sāmarthyataḥ pramāṇya-
tam artham avadyotayati* । 46 ।

TRANSLATION Both these two kinds of the *Pramāṇas* reveal their respective Objects by means of their capacity to do so, when obstacles to them are removed in a peculiar way

COMMENTARY Both the Direct and the Indirect forms of knowledge whose natures have been described in the foregoing chapters reveal their Objects, e.g., a Blue thing etc. This is due to their capacity (*yogyatā*) to do so. The revelation of Objects by the *Pramāṇas* becomes possible, only when the Obstacles-to-knowledge such as the 'knowledge-Obscuring' etc., are removed in peculiar manners, i.e., when they are 'annihilated', 'mitigated' and so on.

न तदुपपत्तितदाकारताम्यां, तयोः पार्थक्येन सामस्त्येन च
व्यभिचारोपलम्भात् ॥ ४७ ॥

na tadupapatti-tadākāratāmyāṃ, tayoh pārthakyaena sāmastyena ca vyabhicāropalambhāt 147

TRANSLATION They reveal the objects, not because they arise from the objects, nor because they have a form, similar to that of the objects. For, these are also found to be connected with other phenomena.

COMMENTARY The Jaina theory has been stated to be that the knowledge of an object is due to the removal of its obstacles. Some object to this theory of knowledge by saying that knowledge reveals an object because the object *gives rise to* it, some again contend that knowledge reveals the object because it assumes the form of the object. The Jainas set aside

both these views When a pitcher is broken into pieces, the state of the-pitcher-being-into-pieces certainly *arises* from the state of the pitcher as a whole, but none would say that the state-of-the-pitcher-being-into-pieces is *aware* of the state of the Pitcher as a whole. The fact that a phenomenon *arises from* another phenomenon does not thus necessarily show that the former is *aware* of the latter. Then again, a pillar is of the *same form* as that of another pillar, but neither of the pillars is *aware* of the other pillar, on that account. A phenomenon having a *form similar* to that of another, is thus not necessarily *aware* of that.

The Jainas next show that it cannot be contended also, that knowledge cognises the object, because it *arises from* the object as well as is of the *same form* with it. A pitcher is of a certain *form* at a particular moment. At the succeeding moment it is also of the *same form*. The pitcher of this second moment certainly *arises from* the pitcher of the first moment and is of the *same form* with it. But the pitcher of the second moment is not *aware* of the pitcher of the first moment. Thus it is that a phenomenon *arising* from another phenomenon as well as having a *form similar* to that of it, is not necessarily aware of it. Nor can the objectors defend themselves by urging that a pitcher cannot be aware of another pitcher because it is unconscious, although the former may *arise* from the latter and have a *form similar* to that of the latter, that knowledge, however, is a conscious process and is *aware* of the object when it *arises from* the object and assumes the *form* of the object. For, cases there are where knowledge which *arises from* a preceding knowledge and is of the *same form* with it, is not *aware* of it. Let

us suppose, we are perceiving a certain object As soon as the object is perceived, the perception gives rise to a feeling (of agreement with or of repulsion from the object) and other conscious processes such as after-sensation etc Now, these subsequent conscious states certainly *arise from* the perception and are of the *same form* with it, yet in these processes, you do not get a consciousness of the original perception. This shows that even a conscious process may not know a process which *generated* it and which was of the *same form* with it.

In further criticism of the objectors' view the Jainas ask What do you mean by saying that knowledge is of the *same form* with the Object? If you mean by it that knowledge presents before the knower, the form of the object, then your position consists in begging the question, for, presenting before the knower the form of the object means the same thing as revealing the object and your contention practically amounts to this that knowledge reveals its object because it reveals its Object If on the other hand by 'knowledge being of the same form with the object', you mean that knowledge assumes the form of the object, we ask Does the whole of the knowledge assume the form of the object or does a part of it assume the form? In the first case, knowledge becomes unconscious like its Object and cannot be a Pramāṇa. If however, you contend that only a part of the knowledge assumes the form of a part of the object it would be impossible for the knowledge which is admittedly not something grossly material to know the grossly material object. Moreover if it be possible for knowledge to cognise an object, although but partially corresponding to it,

why, then, a piece of knowledge must know all the objects of the world at once, for, knowledge is partially identical with all the Objects, in as much as it has the fact of existence in common with all of them. If you contend that although knowledge is partially similar to all the existing objects, it cannot know them all at once, as it is not similar to them with respects to the characteristics peculiar to each, we answer: Well, let then knowledge know simultaneously all Objects which are similar to each other in form (which is admittedly) an impossibility. If lastly you contend that knowledge assumes the form of that object only, from which it arises and thereby knows it, it may be pointed out in reply (as in the previous paragraph) that in that case the feeling and other subsequent conscious processes e.g., an after-sensation etc., which arise from the perception of an object and which are of the same form with the perception would have been conscious of that perception (which is not the case).

Hence it is not proper to say that knowledge becomes *aware* of its object because it *arises from* it and because it has the *same form* with it, Knowledge reveals its object because, as the Jaina theory is, the obstacles to knowledge are then removed.

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकारे आगमस्वरूपनिर्णयो नाम
चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः ॥

*iti pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālamkāre-āgama-svarūpa-
ṇirṇayo nāma catuṛthah pañicchedah ।*

TRANSLATION: Here ends the Fourth chapter of the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālamkāra, entitled the Determination of The True Nature of The Āgama or Authoritative Knowledge.

CHAPTER V

तस्य विषयः सामान्यविशेषाद्यनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु ॥ १ ॥

*tasya viśayaḥ sāmānya-viśeṣādy anekāntātmakam
vastu ॥ १ ॥*

TRANSLATION The Object of that (i.e., the Pramāṇa) is a Thing having a nature which has many aspects, viz., the General and the Particular and so on

COMMENTARY The nature of the Pramāṇa or valid knowledge has been described in the foregoing chapters. In the present chapter, the nature of its object is indicated. According to Jainas, the object of valid knowledge is always a unity of many apparently varying aspects or characteristics, such as the General and the Particular, the Existent and the Non-Existent, and so on. The Jaina theory is thus opposed to the views of those thinkers according to whom a Thing or object of valid knowledge is only the General Essence or is only the Particularity or is both the Generality and the Particularity in their mutual exclusiveness.

The philosophers of the Yauga School maintain that the General and the Particular aspects of a Thing are opposed to each other. Cow-hood is the generality or the class-essence which is present in all, i.e., many individuals (*sarvagata*), while the particular cows, e.g. Śābala, Śābaleya, Bāhuleya etc., are marked by particular characteristics distinguishing each of them from

others of their class. The class-essence (*sāmānya*) and the Particularity (*viśeṣa*) are thus absolutely opposed to each other, like, as the Yauga thinkers argue, Water and Fire; a Thing cannot accordingly be looked upon as a unity of such aspects or characteristics which are absolutely opposed to each other, in this way.

In criticism of the above Yauga theory, the Jaina philosophers ask: what do you mean by the *Sāmānya* being *Sarvagata*, i.e., by the all-pervasive character of the Class-essence? You can mean that the Class-essence permeates either the Individuals-of-the-class (*vyaktisarvagata*) or all being (*saiva-sarvagata*). The Jainas show how neither of the positions is tenable.

It cannot be said that the Class-essence, e.g., Cow-hood (*gotva*) permeates the Individuals of the Cow-species. For, in that case you must admit that when a Cow-calf is being born the Class-essence exists in the Individual Cows only. Now, the question is: After the Calf is born, how does it get the class-essence? You cannot say that a class-essence is born with the calf; for, according to you, the Class-essence is eternal. Now, can the Class-essence of the Cow-hood be said to come from another Individual Cow. For, in that case the question would be: when the Class-essence comes to the calf from the said Individual cow, does it leave that Individual cow or does it not leave that? The former alternative is impossible; for, in that case the said Individual Cow would be devoid of the Class-essence of Cow-hood. If you hold the second alternative position, we may ask: Does then the class-essence come to the calf, accompanied by that Individual cow or does a part of the class-essence come to the calf, its remaining part remaining with that Individual cow?

Now, neither of the positions is maintainable; you cannot say that with the Class-essence the Individual cow also comes to the calf, for, in that case, the calf will be cognised as that Individual cow. Nor is it permissible to think of parts in a Class-essence, for, if the class-essence were constituted of parts it would, like an Individual of the Class, be perishable. In this connection, the Yauga philosophers defend their position by saying: "A knife, consecrated by incantations, may be invested with such a mysterious power that it would enter the stomach and destroy the disease there, but would in no way injure the stomach; in the same manner we may think curious power in the Class-essence which, without moving from its locus, would be present at the place of the birth of the Calf which originates from its own causes." The Jainas urge that the Yauga thinkers are compelled to resort to such absurd explanations because their fundamental theory is that the Class-essence is an absolute one and in no way, a manifold. Reason however would show that a Class-essence is in some respects a manifold. If the Class-essence were rigidly one, it would be impossible for it to go to the Individuals of the different times and places. If the nature of the Class-essence be contended to be such that it is apprehended to go to the Individuals although it does not actually go there; what is the use of admitting the Class-essence at all? Again if you admit such a mysterious power, why, then, there is no use in admitting the reality of more than one Individual. For, let there be one Individual only and let it be invested with the said mysterious power: this one Individual by its mysterious power would then manifest itself differently in different places and times

and all the other Individuals would be but unreal and unsubstantial. It is thus that the Class-essence cannot be held to permeate the-Individual-of-the Class (*vyakti-sarvagata*).

Nor is the position maintainable that the Class-essence permeates all the being (*sarva-sarvagata*) For, in that case, the Class-essence would be perceptible even where the Individuals of the Class are not perceived. If you say that in the absence of the Individuals, the Class-essence is imperceptible because it remains in an implicit state then, we may say that an Individual of a given class also remains in an implicit state and is not to be talked of as absent or non-existent there. If you contend that when an Individual is not perceived, it is to be understood that it is absent on the ground that evidences proving its existence are wanting, we may argue that when the Class-essence is not perceived, it is to be understood that the class-essence also is actually absent (instead of being in an implicit state there) on the ground that the evidences proving its existence are wanting. Again, you must admit that when the Class-essence becomes manifest or explicit in an individual according to you the whole nature of it becomes manifest: otherwise, the Class-essence instead of being one would be of different natures viz., explicit and implicit etc, and would thereby be no Class-essence at all. So when that Individual is absent, we must say that the Class-essence also is absent there, the Individual is held to be absent or non-existent there on the ground that it is not perceived there; similarly, where the Class-essence is not perceived, it must be held to be non-existent also. You cannot say that where the Class-essence is not perceived

it is not absent but is present in an implicit state. An implicit state of the Class-essence can be talked of, only if the Class-essence were capable of being made explicit in (literally, by) the Individual. The Class-essence however, is of one, self-same eternal form according to you, how, then can it become explicit at one time and implicit at another? In this connection it may also be asked Does the Individual do any thing affecting the Class-essence when it makes it explicit or does it do nothing? If you say that the Individual does something affecting the Class-essence, we ask What is it? If the answer is that the Action of the Individual consists in making the Class-essence capable of being cognised, the question is: Is this cognisability of the class-essence something different from the class-essence or is it the same as the Class-essence? In case the Class-essence and its cognisability remain different from and unconnected with each other, then practically nothing is done affecting the Class-essence, it continues in the same state and in its nature of essential incognisability. If, on the other hand, you contend that the Class-essence and its Cognisability are one and the same thing, then when the Individual makes the Class-essence cognisable, the Individual practically makes or generates the Class-essence, which means that the Class-essence is not eternal, as contended by you. If again it be contended that the Individual's activity affects the Class-essence in this sense that it produces the knowledge of the Class-essence, then it may be asked. How do you establish the independent reality and the real existence of the Class-essence itself? For, a knowledge of sameness or similarity is derived from the Individuals. You

cannot say that the Class-essence helped (*sahāya*) by the Individual yields this knowledge. Let us take the example of the making of a pitcher; here we have the potter and he is helped in his act by his stick etc.; the stick etc., cannot make the pitcher, the making of the pitcher necessitates the real existence of the potter. But what do we get in the case of a knowledge of sameness or similarity? It is the Individual which yields the knowledge, so far as this knowledge is concerned, we have no experience of any Class-essence involved in it (like the potter in the matter of making a pitcher) working in and through the Individual. It is thus not correct to say that the Class-essence is made explicit and that, by the Individual co-operating with and affecting the Class-essence. Nor finally can it be said that the Individual makes the Class-essence explicit without cooperating with or affecting the Class-essence; for, in that case, an Individual belonging to the Class, say A would indicate the essence of an entirely different Class, B. Hence it cannot be maintained that a Class-essence is not absent but is implicitly present in a place where its Individual is not found; the correct position is that where the Individual is non-existent, the Class-essence also is non-existent. The doctrine that the Class-essence permeates all beings, that the Sāmānya is Sarva-Sarvagata, is thus wrong.

The Jaina theory is that the Class-essence is not a strictly unitary identity which permeates a number of Individuals but that it is in some respects identical with each of the varied Individuals and that as such, like the Peculiarity characterising and marking out each of the Individuals the Class-essence is, in some

respects different in each of the Individual. A certain Individual on account of its own peculiarity is judged to be different from another Individual. In the same manner, on account of the apprehension of the Class-essence which consists in Similarity, we have such ideas as this Individual is like that, 'that Cow is like that' etc. It cannot be said that because the Class-essence is identical with the Individual, the class-essence is not a Generality or Class-essence. The Form (*rūpa*) of a particular thing is not separate from the particular thing. Yet, it is never denied that Form is a general quality attached to all things. The fact is that although the Form of a thing is attached to it, it is, in some respects, distinguishable from it also. In the same manner, the Class-essence, although it is identified with the Individual is in some respects distinguishable from it also. It may be contended here. If the Similarity is present in the Individual, how is it that where an Individual is perceived it is not then and there determined to be Similar (to another)? The answer is given by the Jainas in the form of a counter-question. The peculiarity of each Individual being present, how is it that when an Individual is perceived, it is not then and there determined to be Different from another? The fact is that the determination of Similarity as well as that of Disparity are both dependent on the perception of a thing other than the one under observation.

If, as the Jaina theory is, the Class-essence is not absolutely opposed to the Particularity (i.e., the Individuality) the Particularities also are not absolutely opposed to the Class-essence. Of course as the Yauga thinkers contend, if the Class-essence were all-permea-

tive (*sarvagata*) the Particularities on account of their being attached to an Individual as such would have been opposed to the Class-essence. The Class-essence, as the Jainas have shown, is not all-permeative but is attached to or rather identified with the Individual. The Class-essence and the Particularity are thus in some respect non-exclusive of each other and exist as different aspects, viz, one and many respectively. As unopposed to the Particularities, the Class-essence may be looked upon as Many while as unopposed to the Class-essence, the Particularities may be looked upon as One. The Class-essence is viewed as one from the standpoint of the Samgraha Naya, i.e., Collective viewpoint (an abstract and partial view, after all). From the standpoint of the Pramāṇa or comprehensive viewpoint the Class-essence consists in Similarity and is different in different Individuals, just like the peculiarities distinguishing Individuals, one from the other. It is thus that the Yauga theory of the Class-essence and the Particularities being absolutely opposed to each other is wrong.

The example of Water and Fire introduced by the Yauga thinkers does not also serve their purpose. It will be remembered that the Yauga contention was that the Class-essence and the Particularities were like Water and Fire, absolutely opposed to each other. But are Water and Fire absolutely opposed to each other? As Water and Fire, they are no doubt opposed, but as substances, they are not so opposed. Water and Fire are thus not absolutely but only in some respects opposed to each other and as such, the example of Water and Fire does not prove the absolute opposition between the Class-essence and the Particularities.

The Class-essence and the Particularities being thus not absolutely opposed to each other, the Jainas point out that there is no difficulty for a Thing to be of a General and a Particular nature

अनुगतविशिष्टाकारप्रतीतिविषयत्वात्, प्राचीनोत्तराकार-
रित्यागोपादानावस्थानस्वरूपपरिणत्यास्यक्रियासामर्थ्यघटनाच्च
॥ २ ॥

*anugata-viśiṣṭākāra-pratīti-viśayaivāt, pīācīnottarā-
āra-parityāgopādānāvasthāna-svai rūpa-parimatyāi tha-
kriyā-sāmarthyā-ghaṭanāc ca* ॥ २ ॥

TRANSLATION Because it is perceived to have a nature similar to that of some things (i.e., things of the same class) and a nature peculiar to itself, and because it is capable of producing effects by the modification of its nature which consists in its persistence through the giving up of its old form and the assuming of a new form

COMMENTARY It has been said that a Thing or Object of knowledge has many aspects This is here shown in two ways

1 A being, a Cow, for instance, is found to have some features which are similar to those of the other cows, these similarities constitute what is called the Tiryak-sāmānya (Species-Idea) and make us apprehend the being as a cow Besides, this Tiryak-sāmānya, again a cow presents some features which are peculiar to its Individual self and on account of which it is individualised as Śābala, Śyāmala etc. This shows how a being has two aspects, viz., General and Particular.

2. A thing is found to be producing effects. It is now in one form, then in another form and again, in another form and so on. Its forms are changing, the old being replaced by a new one. This is one aspect of the thing, the aspect of its successive, varying and manifold forms. But besides this aspect, the thing presents another aspect, i.e., an aspect of persistence. The thing persists in and through assuming the successive forms and gives rise to effects which are of practical utility by modifying itself. This aspect of persistence has been called the *Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* (Substantial Persistence). Here again, we meet with two aspects in a thing, viz., one varying and the other persisting.

Besides the two pairs of aspects in a Thing described above, there are various other such aspects perceived in it, e.g., Existent and Non-existent etc., which are harmonised in the Thing. The Jaina theory is thus fully corroborated by experience, the theory that a Thing has many aspects (*anekānta*).

सामान्यं द्विप्रकारं तिर्यक्सामान्यमूर्ध्वतासामान्यं च ॥ ३ ॥

sāmānyam dviprakāram tiryak-sāmānyam ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam ca । 3 ।

TRANSLATION: Generality is of two kinds, viz., the Species-Idea (*tiryak-sāmānya*) and Substantial persistence (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*).

COMMENTARY: The object corresponding to the perception of Similarity of a being with another is the Tiryak-sāmānya (i.e., the Class-essence or the Species-Idea). What is apprehended as persisting through the

varied changes and modifications of a Thing is the Ūrdhvatā Sāmānya (i.e., Substantial Persistence). The Sāmānya or Generality is of these two kinds

प्रतिव्यक्ति तुल्या परिणतिस्तिर्यक्सामान्यम्, शबल-
शाबलेयादिपिण्डेषु गोत्वं यथा ॥ ४ ॥

*prati-vyakti tulyā-parimatis tiryak-sāmānyam, śaba-
la-śābaleyādi-piṇḍeṣu gotvaṁ yathā* ॥ 4 ॥

TRANSLATION. The Tiryak-sāmānya or the Species Idea consists in similar features found in each of the Individuals of a class, for instance, 'Cow-hood' in Śabala, Śābaleya and other Individual Cows

COMMENTARY. Features found in an Individual which make the Individual similar to the other Individuals of the Class constitute the Tiryak-Sāmānya or the Species-Idea commonly called the Class-essence

The Saugata philosophers deny the reality of the Species Idea. They deny that there is any Sāmānya in an Individual which presents it as similar to the other Individuals

No doubt, an Individual, e.g., a particular Cow appears to be similar to the other Individual Cows, in-as-much as every Individual Cow is apprehended as a Cow. But to account for this apprehension of Similarity, no real Sāmānya is necessary. The perception that the Individual which is perceived is different from all the other things of the world (*anya-vyāvṛtti*) will suffice for our apprehension of Similarity. The features found in an Individual under perception are absolutely particular and peculiar to itself, and it is impossible

for the particular features of an Individual to be in any way assimilated to the features of another Individual. A real Sāmānya or a group of similar features in the Individual is thus impossible.

The Jainas criticise the above Saugata view in the following way. You say that a thing is perceived to have its nature receding from the nature of all other things (*anya-vyāvṛtti*) The question is: Is this 'Retrocession' (*anya-vyāvṛtti*) something objective or something subjective? If you say that this Retrocession which forms the nature of every Individual thing of our experience is objectively real then you cannot deny the reality of the Sāmānya inasmuch as this objective Anya-vyāvṛtti is itself a Sāmānya which underlies a number of Individual things. If on the other hand you maintain that this fact of Anya-vyāvṛtti or Retrocession of a thing and the consequent Sāmānya is nothing more than a subjective ideal of the percipient, you are to explain how this purely subjective idea appears as an objective fact, outside and independent of the percipient. If you contend that the said Retrocession of a thing and the consequent Sāmānya is neither an objective fact nor a subjective idea, you are still to state whether it is something or it is nothing. If it is something, it must be something either objective or subjective, and you are entangled in the difficulties, just pointed out. If again it is nothing, how do you account for its perception or apprehension as something? If you say that it is a creature of our pure imagination (*vāsanā*), then the difficulty is that in that case, it cannot be, as it is, dependent on and connected with the outside objects. And then again, Imagination is always determined by the object and the state of

things which have been actually perceived So, if you hold, as you do, the Sāmānya to be absolutely unreal and non-existent, it would be impossible to have an idea of it even in Imagination Again, what does Vāsanā do in this connection? Does Vāsanā objectify the Sāmānya, when it generates that idea? In that case, Vāsanā goes into and permeates the Individuals and becomes the real Sāmānya If, on the contrary, you maintain that Vāsanā only generates the idea of the Sāmānya (without being the object of that idea), you must state what is the object of that idea An idea without its object is impossible The discussions above have shown that there would be difficulties unless the idea of the Sāmānya be supposed to have a real objective Sāmānya as its object Coming back to the doctrine of the Anya-vyāvṛtti, which according to the Saugatās accounts for our idea of the Sāmānya, the question is Does a thing recede from another thing which is dissimilar from it or which is similar to it? Let us consider the first position According to it, a deer, for instance would recede from a horse, a wave etc, etc, and since according to the Saugatās, the Anya-vyāvṛtti or Retrocession of a thing from other things gives rise to the idea of the Sāmānya or Similarity, the deer should appear to be similar to the horse, the wave etc If on the other hand, you hold the second alternative view, you thereby admit the objective reality of the Sāmānya or Similarity The Saugatās may contend that on account of a peculiar faculty (*pratyāsatti*) of our mind, a thing appears to be similar to another thing; and that the same peculiar faculty may present a thing as similar to another, although the espectivev natures of the two things have no real essential

Similarity in them. The Jainas criticise this view by pointing out that a theory on the same line would obliterate the difference between the Conscious and Unconscious beings.

The up-holders of the doctrine of the Non-duzi Brahma (Brahmādvaita-vāda) maintain that on account of Pratyāsatti, beings appear to us to be Conscious or Unconscious; they further maintain that on account of the same Pratyāsatti, they may appear to us to be Conscious or Unconscious although they are lacking in natures. The Advaita theory, we may remember, is that the things of our empirical experience have no real natures of their own that it is the Brahma which underlies them and forms their nature and that the Brahma is different from both the Conscious and Unconscious beings of our experience. The Jainas have shown that if the Brahma is neither Conscious nor Unconscious, it is impossible for it to manifest itself differently as either Conscious or Unconscious in and through the beings of our empirical experience. The same criticism would apply to the Saugata contention. If there be no real points of Similarity or Sāmānya in two or more things, it is impossible for them to appear as Similar. The Jainas urge that there is no Svālakṣaṇa (Peculiarity) perceptible in a thing without a Sāmānya (Similarity) being there. You cannot object to the Jaina theory by saying that the Peculiarity which makes a thing dissimilar from and the Similarity, which makes a thing similar to, another are opposed to each other. Like knowledge, a thing may be a unity of two natures.

Hence it is to be admitted that just as our idea of a thing being Dissimilar to another is explained by

the objective existence of a real Dissimilarity in the things, our idea of a thing being Similar to another is explained by the objective existence of a real Similarity in the things

पूर्वापरपरिणामसाधारणं द्रव्यमूर्ध्वतांसामान्यं कटककङ्क-
णाद्यनुगामिकाञ्चनवत् ॥ ५ ॥

*pūrvāpara-parināma-sādhāraṇam dravyam ūrdhvatā-
sāmānyam kaṭaka-kankaṇādy anumāmi-kāñcanaavat* । 5 ।

TRANSLATION 'Persistent Substance' (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) is the substratum which remains the same in all its modifications, antecedent and subsequent, as for instance, Gold which continues through (the ornaments e g) *kaṭaka*, *kankaṇa* etc.

COMMENTARY Derivatively, the words *Dravya* (Substance) means that which goes to (i.e., stands under or is modified into) the Modes. Modes and aspects may and as a matter of fact, do change; but the Substance underlying them remains the same.

The followers of Śuddhodana's son (i.e., the Buddhists) deny the reality of a Substance which persists through all the times. According to them, 'whatever is Existent is Momentary; the subject matter of the dispute here, Sound etc., is Existent' is the valid argument, put in the syllogistic form in the Buddhistic way. In other words, there cannot be any real permanent or persisting substance because everything (i.e., whatever exists) is Momentary. It will be seen that in the above argument, 'Existence' is the Mark or Hetu, 'Momentariness or Impermanence' is the Proven

or Sādhya and 'Sound' etc., is the Abode or Pakṣa and the Buddhist syllogistic argument amounts to this, "All Existents are Impermanent. Sound is an Existent: therefore, Sound is Impermanent." The validity of the argument depends on the validity of the first general proposition and the Buddhists prove it by proving that the Mark here 'Existence' has all the three characteristics of a valid Mark. They proceed in this way. Existence is equivalent to 'Productive Activity': whatever is Existent is Productive of some result and whatever does not produce any result is not Existent. Now, this Productive Activity is found by direct experience to be present in Sound and such-like things and phenomena; therefore, it can be said that the Mark, Existence, in the given Buddhist argument, has the characteristics of the Pakṣa-dharmatā (Existence-in-the-Abode) and the Sapakṣa-sattā (Existence-in-the-similar-Abodes). As for the characteristic of the Vipakṣa-asattā (Nonexistence-in-the-Dissimilar Abodes) it is shown in this way. Whatever produces any results, produces them either successively (*krama*) or all at once (*akrama*). Therefore, successiveness (*krama*) and simultaneity (*akrama*) are what 'pervade' (*vyāpaka*) the 'productive Activity' or for the matter of that 'Existence'. Now the Vipakṣa in the given Buddhist argument would be a thing or phenomenon which is not Momentary like Sound but is permanent. The Buddhists show that these Vyāpakas (*Krama* and *Akrama*, successiveness and simultaneity in the matter of producing results) are not found in connection with the Vipakṣa, i.e., a permanent Thing. How? If the Thing is permanent and has the capacity to produce all its results, then when the Thing is producing its

present-time results, it would be producing its past and future-time results also along with the present results simultaneously, but this is never the case. Therefore a permanent thing does not produce the result simultaneously. If, on the other hand, a Thing is Permanent and you say that the Thing, which is producing its present-time results, has not the capacity to produce its past and future time results, then it would ever be impossible for it to produce those results. Hence it is that a permanent Thing cannot Produce its results successively. It is not reasonable to say, the Buddhists argue, that a Permanent Thing has the capacity to produce all its results but that it does not produce them all at once, because the 'Subsidiary conditions' upon which it is dependent are not present. For, why should the permanent Thing be dependent on these Subsidiaries? Do the Subsidiaries generate the Thing? Or, do the Subsidiaries help the Thing? Or do its Effects or Results depend on these subsidiaries? The first cannot be the case, the Thing is already taken as determined either as eternal or as due to its own cause. The second alternative also is unsubstantial. All depends on the capacity of the Thing itself. It is said: "If the Things is itself able (to produce its effects) what is the use of the Subsidiary help? If the Thing itself is unable (to produce its effects), what is the use of the Subsidiary help?" And for this reason, the third alternative also is untenable. You cannot say that the Effect is dependent on many conditions and does accordingly require the Subsidiaries. For, the Effect is not an independent phenomenon, it is nothing but the Effect of the Thing. If it were an independent phenomenon it could not be called the Effect of Thing. If

the Thing is absent, no amount of Subsidiaries can generate the Effect. The result is that the Krama and Akrama, successiveness and simultaneity, which are Vyāpakas of the fact of Productive Activity and Existence are not found in experience in connection with the Permanent Thing which is the Vipakṣa. Therefore we have here a case in which the Vyāpaka of the Hetu is not found in the Vipakṣa, from which it follows that the given Mark, Existence or Productive Activity, has the characteristic of the Vipakṣāsattā. The given Reason is thus a fully valid Hetu. A Permanent Thing cannot produce results and therefore cannot be an Existent fact.

The Jainas criticise the above Buddhist theory of the Impermanence of things by pointing out (i) that the Reason or Hetu in the Buddhist argument is not proved (*asiddha*) by direct experience, (ii) that it is 'doubtful' (*samdigdha-anaikāntika*) and (iii) that it is opposed to what is to be proved (*viruddha*).

The Buddhists have contended that Existence, the Mark in their argument is equivalent to Productive Activity and that this Productive Activity in things is apprehended by direct perception or Pratyakṣa. But what is the object of this Pratyakṣa? Does it grasp the cause? Or, the Effect? Or Both? If the Pratyakṣa grasps the cause only or the Effect only, it is clear that the Productive Activity of a thing is not perceived. In order to have the perception of the productive Activity, one must perceive both the Cause and the Effect and determine 'this is the Cause' and 'this is the Effect'. It may here be said that since the nature of a thing is both the Cause and the Effect here, the perception of the Thing either as the Cause or as the Effect would

suffice for our perception of the Productive Activity of a Thing. The Jainas point out that this argument is wrong. Fire is the cause of Smoke but suppose a man does not know this. Then, because Fire, as a matter of fact, generates Smoke, would such a man, when he sees Fire be able to determine the further fact that it is the cause of Smoke or when he sees smoke, the further fact that it is the Effect of Fire? To apprehend the Productive Activity of a Thing, a perception of it as the cause and a perception of it as the Effect are both necessary, just as to determine the fact that a particular Fire causes Smoke, a perception of Fire as the cause and a perception of smoke as the Effect are necessary. Will then the Buddhists admit the third position and say that perception grasps the Thing, both as a Cause and as an Effect and in this way, the Productive Activity of the Thing? But this is impossible, as a phenomenon is but Momentary and cannot have the duration for witnessing the two stages of the Cause and the Effect. If the Buddhists admitted that Perception had the persistence to apprehend the two successive aspects of causality then this would have shown that there are cases (e.g., Perception) in which their Hetu 'Existence', implied (Persistence) what was opposed to their Proven, Impermanence, and was invalid for the purposes of their argument. Nor can the Buddhists argue that the two perceptions of the Cause and the Effect jointly give rise to the idea of the Productive Activity of the Thing; for, this is not the same thing as to say that perception apprehends the Productive Activity. The Buddhists may contend that as the idea of the Productive Activity is due to the perception of the Cause and the Effect, the perception may be

said to give us the apprehension of the Productive Activity. To this, the Jaina reply is that so far as the Perception either of the Cause or of the Effect is concerned, neither gives the apprehension of the relationship of causality between them, so that the idea of Productive Activity is not an exact picture of what we have in Perception. Hence the Mark—'Productive Activity' is 'unproved' or *Asiddha* in the Buddhist Premises so far as direct experience is concerned

The Jainas next show now the Reason, 'Productive Activity (Existence)' in the Buddhist syllogistic argument under consideration, is *Samdigdha* or 'doubtful' so far as its competency to lead to the Proven 'Impermanence' is concerned. It is in this way. That which is both Impermanent and Permanent is certainly opposed to what is purely Impermanent. Simultaneity (*akīrama*) and successiveness (*krama*), as already shown, are the *Vyāpakas* or Pervaders of Productive Activity, which is the *Hetu* in the Buddhist argument. The Jainas show that Simultaneity and Successiveness are not found (*anupalabdhī*) to be absent in what is both Impermanent and Permanent. What follows from this is that the *Hetu*, 'Productive Activity', is 'Doubtful' inasmuch as its pervaders, simultaneity and successiveness thereby the *Hetu* itself, are not found to be absent in what is both Impermanent-and-Permanent, the *Vipaksa* of the Proven, Impermanent phenomenon. The Jainas point out that successiveness (*krama*) in Productive Activity consists in doing on producing some other result after doing one result. A pitcher though perishable is in some respects a persistent thing also. Yet, when carried on the head of the maidservant, the pitcher, being successively joined by

attendant circumstances, moves there and thereby generates successive feelings of fatigue there, this is well known. It is thus possible for a Thing which is both Permanent-and-Impermanent to be successively (*kṛāma*) productive of results (*artha-kṛiyākāri*). This shows that there are cases in which the Vyāpaka of the Buddhist Hetu and for the matter of that, the Hetu itself does not recede (*vyāvṛtti*) from the opposite (*vipaksa*) of the Proven. The Buddhist Hetu is consequently a Samdigdha or 'doubtful' one. Here the Buddhists will contend. "An Effect comes out of the capable nature (of a thing) which is characterised by an activity-of-not-withholding (*aksepakīyā*) the Effect. Now, if the thing had that nature previously also (as the hypothesis of a 'persistent thing' assumes) how is it that that Effect did not come out previously? It has been rightly said, "Effects are delayed when the causes are not near-at-hand. But if there is the capable cause why will they be withheld from coming out?" The Jāmas urge that the Buddhist's contention is not sound. The Activity of non-withholding-the-Effect (*aksepa-kīyā*) is not the invariable characteristic of the nature of a thing. From the view-point of its 'substantial capacity' (*dravya-śakti*), the nature of a thing is Capable, from the viewpoint of its 'modal' (i.e., actual or active capacity, *paryāya-śakti*) it is Incapable. Let us take a Seed. When earth, air, heat etc., are applied to it, it is then and then only, that there is generated in it a peculiar nature consisting in 'modal capacity' to produce the Shoot (i.e., the Effect) actually. The Buddhists here contend as follows — "When the Seed exists as a Seed, you say that it has not the 'modal capacity' which is generated only when proper earth, water and air

are applied to it "The question is - When the 'modal capacity' is generated, is it 'different from the Seed-substance or is it not different or is it both-different and-not-different from the Seed-substance? If the 'modal capacity' is different from the seed, it is of no use, it is even impossible to look upon it as an assistant or co-worker of the Seed, to be a co-worker its nature and activity must have some points of identity with that of the 'seed,' which is impossible, if the 'modal capacity' is essentially different from the Seed, it cannot be said that co-operation between the Seed and the 'modal capacity' is made possible through a *via media*, because this *via media* would suppose another and that another, leading to an Infinite Regress. If secondly, you say, the 'modal capacity' is not different from, i.e., identical with the Seed-substance, then it is that with the generation of the 'modal capacity' the said substance is created, which is practically admitting the doctrine of non-persistence or impermanence of things. Nor lastly, can it be said that the 'modal capacity' is both-different-and-not-different from the substance; for, so far as this doctrine attributes impermanence to an aspect of a Thing, it is all right; but the Doctrine reserves some aspect of the Thing to which it does not attribute impermanence; and to this extent, the doctrine is unintelligible and inconsistent." The Jainas criticise this Buddhist contention by saying that they accept the third alternative, viz., "the Modal capacity' is both-different-and-not-different from the Substance. There is no inconsistency in the Jain theory. With regard to its substantial aspect, a Thing is permanent; with regards to its Modal aspect, it is Impermanent. You cannot say that because the Thing

is not different from its Modes (which are admittedly Impermanent) the Thing is Impermanent. Because the Thing is in some respects different from the Modes too, Identity and Difference need not oppose each other. In our ordinary practice, we often attribute apparently contradictory phenomena to one and the same Thing and that, quite sensibly, as will appear from the following lines in a poem' "The heart is pressed by a solid mass of anxiety but is not broken asunder, the enfeebled body is under stupor but does not lose consciousness; the internal heat is burning the self but does not reduce it to ashes, the Cosmic Arbiter who cuts the vitality is striking but is not cutting off the life" The fact is that a Persistent Thing is not intended to be identical with its Modes in those very respects, in which it is said to be different from these 'This is its essential substratum and these are its Modes'—well, in this way a difference is marked out while by saying 'this is the Thing' Identity is emphasised in a Thing. Even the Buddhists admit that the same Apprehension is 'undetermined' (*avikalpa*) and 'determined' (*savikalpa*) 'correct' (*abhrānta*) and 'incorrect' (*bhrānta*), both an 'effect' (*kārya*) and a 'cause' (*kāraṇa*). It is thus possible for Productive Activity to be present in a Thing which is both-Impermanent-and-Permanent, through Simultaneity and successiveness. The Buddhist Reason 'productive Activity' is thus 'Doubtful', so far as the Buddhist argument is concerned.

Thirdly, the Jainas contend that Hetu in the Buddhist argument is not only *Asiddha* and *Samdigdha*, as shown above, but is *Viruddha*, or 'opposed to the Proven'. In other words, they hold that the Productive Activity, either simultaneous or successive, is impossible

in a Thing if it be Impermanent. Successiveness (*kṛāma*) is of two sorts, viz , Successiveness-in-a-position (*deśa-kṛāma*) as found, e.g , in pairs of swimming water-fowls arranged in a beautiful order and successiveness-in-time (*kāla-kṛāma*) as in the case of, e.g , honey, fruits, snails etc., successively filling a pitcher Successiveness of the Productive Activity of any of these two kinds is impossible in a Thing if it is Impermanent If a Thing is Impermanent (*ksanika* or momentary, as the Buddhists say) it perishes as soon as and at the very place where it produces or gives rise to certain phenomenon; it cannot persist in order to hold any other phenomena in any other part of it or give rise to any other effect in any other time Successiveness in Productive Activity is thus impossible in an Impermanent Thing. Nor can it be said that simultaneity in Productive Activity is possible in a Thing if it be Impermanent A thing is momentary (*ksanika*) and without parts (*anaiśa*) according to the Buddhists If such a Thing give rise to varied effects simultaneously, as contended by the Buddhists, are we to understand that the-Knowledge-of-the-Thing is produced by the very same nature of the Thing, by which nature its form is produced or that the-form-of-the-Thing is produced by the very same nature of the Thing, by which nature its knowledge is produced or that the knowledge and the form of the Thing are produced respectively by different natures of the Thing? In the first case, the-knowledge-of-the-Thing becomes equivalent to the-form-of-the-Thing because the knowledge is a product of the nature which produces the form In the second case, the-form-of-the-Thing becomes equivalent to the knowledge-of-the-Thing because the form

is a product of the nature which produces the knowledge. In the third case, the Buddhist position regarding the indivisible identity and one-ness of the nature of the Thing consisting in the form of the Thing is contradicted. The Buddhists may here contend: The nature of a Thing consists in the form (*īṇpa*) which is an undiversified identical whole, but it is possible for this nature of the Thing consisting in the undiversified form, to produce effects (e g, knowledge etc,) different from the form, when the (said nature of the) Thing is attended with other circumstances (*sāmagrībheda*). The Jains point out that this contention of the Buddhists is tantamount to admitting that this nature in connection with different attendant circumstances produces different effect-phenomena and practically gives a go-by to the Buddhist theory of Impermanence. It is thus clear that Productive Activity, either Successive or Simultaneous, is not possible in a Thing if it be Impermanent. Accordingly, the Buddhist Mark, Productive Activity, is 'opposed' (*viruddha*) to the Proven in the Buddhist syllogism. Another Argument of the Buddhists in support of their doctrine of the momentary nature of Things is as follows — Things irresistibly and without being dependable on any conditions or circumstances tend towards annihilation, just as the immediate and unconditional group of causal conditions produce their effects unfailingly. This shows that Things have Annihilation as their essential nature and are necessarily Impermanent and momentary. That things irresistibly and of and by themselves, tend towards Annihilation will be evident from such facts as that a pitcher is found to be destroyed when a man strikes it with a heavy stick.

You cannot contend that Annihilation is not the nature of the pitcher but that it happens to it on account of outside conditions and circumstances. For, if you say that the pitcher has a nature (not consisting in Annihilation) which the Annihilating conditions and circumstances, e g, the heavy stick destroy the question arises Is that nature perishable? Or is it imperishable? If it is imperishable, then no conditions or circumstances whatsoever in the world would be able to destroy it. If on the other hand the nature of Things is perishable, then the destroying conditions and circumstances are clearly useless and redundant. As it is said, "If the Thing is perishable by its nature, nothing is done to it by its destroying causes. If it is imperishable by its nature, nothing is done to it by its destroying causes" Then again what is Annihilation, brought about by the Annihilating causes? Is it something not different from the nature of the Thing? In that case when there is Annihilation, we have but the nature of the Thing, but the nature of the thing having been due to its own causes, the Annihilating causes becomes abortive. Or, is Annihilation something different from the nature of the Thing? Now, if Annihilation be different from the nature of the Thing, it must be either contemporaneous with or succeeding to it. The first cannot be true, for, in that case Existence and Non-existence, the Nature of a Thing and its Annihilation could have been simultaneously perceived. If then Annihilation is a later event, the question is When Annihilation happens to the nature of a thing, what does come upon it that it no longer generates its knowledge and no longer produces its effect? When a cloth is made from threads, none can prevent a pitcher

from generating its knowledge and producing its effects. If then the event of cloth-making does not stop the functions of the pitcher, there is no reason why the event of Annihilation should stop the activities of a Thing. It may be argued that the event of the cloth-making does not stop the functions of the pitcher because the nature of the cloth is not opposed to the nature of the pitcher but that the event of Annihilation is something opposed to the nature of a Thing and does consequently stop its usual functions. The argument is unsubstantial. For, the question is: What is Opposition? Does the opposite mean the Annihilator? Or does it mean Annihilation? If the Opposite mean the Annihilator, then the position involves *anavasthā* or Infinite Regress, without explaining what is opposition, for, an Annihilator means what effects Annihilation, so that when it is said that the Opposite means the Annihilator the position comes to this that Annihilation means what effects Annihilation and that you go back and back always assuming the phenomenon of Annihilation and never explaining it. Nor can it be said that the opposite means Annihilation itself. It is for this reason, Annihilation is a fact or phenomenon which has been premised to be different from the nature of the Thing, just as any other thing is different from the nature of that Thing, how then is it that Annihilation, and not any other thing, is said to be opposed to the nature of the Thing? If it be contended that Annihilation is said to be opposed to the nature of a Thing because it effects something with regard to and is consequently related to the thing the question is: What is this Relation? It is not a case of Causal relationship (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*). You can not say

that Annihilation is the Effect of the pitcher; for, it has been admitted that Annihilation is the Effect of the Hammer-blow etc. Nor can you say that the relationship here is one of Contact (*samyoga*); for, Annihilation is not a tangible substance that it may come in contact with the pitcher, besides, if the relationship were one of Contact here, we must have to admit that Annihilation is contemporaneous with the nature or existence of the pitcher. Thirdly, the relation here cannot be one of Qualification (*viśeṣaṇabhāva*), because this mode of relation admittedly is one that subsists between the pitcher and the piece of ground which it occupies. Lastly, the relation here cannot be one of Non-difference (*aviśvabhāva*); for, the question is: Is this Non-difference absolute or is it partial (i.e., in some respects only)? The first cannot be the case here because Annihilation has been premised to be different from the nature of the pitcher; nor can you say that the pitcher is in some respects identical with its Annihilation, because that would involve contradiction. All this shows that the nature of a Thing is perishable *per se* and that its Annihilation is not dependent on or brought about by any external cause.

The Jainas meet the above argument of the Buddhists by pointing out that the Buddhists fail to see that reasoning on a line similar to theirs would show that the causes and conditions, which are responsible for the Generation of a Thing are but redundant (leading to the conclusion that a Thing, is not momentary and perishable by nature) as the Buddhists contend but that it is essentially existent and persistent. For, it may be asked: What is the nature of the Thing which is said to be generated by the generating causes?

If that nature is existent *per se* then the generating Causes are clearly unnecessary. If on the other hand that nature of Thing is not existent by itself, then no generating causes can change it and make it existent. Besides, the Buddhists themselves do not admit that a Thing which is non-existent by nature is produced by the generating causes. Here the Buddhists may argue as follows. A Thing which is not produced is non-existent, a Thing which is produced, is existent, so that the generating causes of a Thing cannot be said to be redundant.

The Jainas point out that a similar line of argument would show that the annihilating causes of a Thing are not redundant. In continuation of their counter-argument in connection with the generating causes the Jainas quote "If a Thing is existent by itself, nothing is done to it by its so-called generating causes, if on the other hand, a Thing is non-existent in itself nothing is done to it by its so-called generating causes." Then again the question may be raised. What is a Generator? Is it something not different from the Thing generated? If so, then we cannot speak of the Generation of the Thing. In order that there may be the generation of the Thing, the cause of the Generation must in some way be different from the Thing itself, if the Generation of a Thing be not different from the Thing in some respects we cannot talk of the Generation of the Thing but can only say this is the Thing, which is not the same thing as to talk of its Generation. Is then a Generator different from the Thing which is generated? This also cannot be. For, in that case, we cannot say that the Thing is generated. Then again if you hold that a Thing is generated even

though the Generator is different from that Thing, it may legitimately be asked; why is this particular Thing and not any other Thing in the World, generated by the Generator? If it be urged in reply that, that particular Thing is Generated because that Thing is related to the Generator, then the Jaina contention is that the alleged Relationship is inexplicable inasmuch as (for the difficulties discussed by the Buddhists, as shown in the preceding paragraph) it cannot be considered to be one of Cause-and-Effect, Contact etc. The Jainas thus show that there is no utility in developing arguments in the above Buddhists' manner. The correct position to be taken is as follows.—A Pitcher is generated from Clay which is its material (*upādāna*) cause, when the stick, potter's wheel etc., co-operate with the said material cause; in the same manner, the Annihilation of the pitcher arises from that same material cause, when it is attended with the phenomena of a strong stroke from a cudgel. The Annihilation of the pitcher is not absolutely different from the pitcher, inasmuch as the identical substance, clay, underlies both, yet the Annihilation of the pitcher, again is the Annihilation of the pitcher and not the Annihilation of the cloth, because in the former case there is the substratum, Clay, which underlies the pitcher and its Annihilation, just as that Substance underlies the pitcher and its Generation (the Substance, Clay, having on the other hand nothing to do with the cloth or its Annihilation or its Generation). The pitcher and its Annihilation, however, are not in every way identical because in that case either of them would be non-est and unreal. This position does not involve any contradiction, because just as knowledge is one

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human brain, and the second part to a description of the results of the experiments conducted in the laboratory of the author.

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*guṇaḥ saha bhāvē dharma yathātmam vijñāna-vyakti-
śakti yādih* 171

TRANSLATION. An Attribute is co-existent with the nature (of a thing) as for instance, the Actual and the Potential knowledge etc., in a soul.

COMMENTARY. The Characteristic of an Attribute is that it co-exists with and inheres in the object. Such an Attribute is the actual consciousness which is present in a soul at a particular time. The potentiality of consciousness which becomes actual in future times in a soul as well as the feelings of happiness, youth etc., etc., are other Attributes of the Soul.

पर्यायस्तु क्रमभावी यथा तत्रैव सुखदुःखादिः ॥ ८ ॥

*paryāyas tu kramabhāvī yathā tatāiva sukha-
duḥkhādih* 181

TRANSLATION: A Mode is the evolute, as for instance, the feelings of pleasure, of pain etc., in that.

COMMENTARY: The characteristic of a Mode is that it gradually evolves. Pleasure, Pain etc., are the Modifications in a soul, similarly, glee, sorrow etc are the Modifications in the soul. Attributes are what co-exist with, i.e., are always present in the Object. Happiness, cognition, power etc., are the Attributes of a soul, because no soul is ever without them. Modes, on the contrary, are the evolving and as such, transient and temporary aspects of the object. Pleasures, pains, glee, sorrow etc., which come and go, are the Modes

in a soul It may be said, however, that Attributes and Modes are the same in some cases How then are they differentiated?

The answer is that while Attributes inhere in a thing at all times, Modes emerge from time to time It is to be observed in this connection that the Attribute and the Mode do not differ from each other absolutely. The position that they are identical with each other in some respects is not inconsistent They do not differ in the manner a pillar differs from a pitcher; nor are they absolutely identical They are identical so far as the Dharmī their Abode (i.e., their underlying Substance) is concerned, they are different so far as their respective characteristics are concerned.

The philosophers of the Yauga school object to the above doctrine in the following way if the Dharmas (i.e., the Attributes and the Modes) be identical with each other with respect to their Dharmī (i.e., the Substance), it may be said that a similar line of argument would show that the Dharmī in its turn, is differentiated-in-itself This would go against the doctrine established by Pratyabhyñā or conception that the Dharmī or the substance is one and the self-same The Jarnas reply to this objection by saying that the objection is not wholly baseless and that the doctrine implied in the objections is not wholly erroneous For, according to them, the substratum is not absolutely self-identical but in some respects differentiated-in-itself. They contend that what is really established by Pratyabhyñā is not that the Substratum is absolutely self-same and self-identical but that it is so, in some respects only

The Jainas substantiate their objection to the doctrine of the absolute self-identity of Substance by pointing out that if the Substance underlying the Thing be as capable of functioning in the past and in the future as it is at the present time it would have functioned in exactly the same way in the past and in the future, as it functions at the present time. If it be contended that the substance is incapable of functioning in the past and in the future in the manner it functions at the present time, then its functioning at the present in the manner it does, becomes inexplicable. Nor can it be contended that although the substance is capable of functioning in the past and the future in the same manner as it does at present, it did not do so in past and the future, because its Assistants (*apekṣa-nīya*, i.e., conditions and circumstances upon which it counts and depends) were not present then and that it functions at present in the manner it does because these Assistants are now near-at-hand. For, in that case the question may be asked: What is this Dependence (*apekṣā*) on the Assistants? (1) Does it mean that the Substance is helped (*upakāra*) by the Assistants when doing functions? (2) Or, does it mean that whenever the substance functions, it is always attended with the Assistants (*anvaya*)? (3) Or, does it mean that it never functions without the Assistants (*vyatireka*)? (4) Or, does it mean that the substance functions whenever there are Assistants and that it never functions without them (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*)?

(1) Now, the first position is not maintainable. The helping (*upakāra*) of the Substance implies help by the Assistants; the help by the Assistants in its turn, necessitates helping the Assistants by other

Assisting circumstances and so on and so on, which means Anavasthā or Infinite Regress. And then again what is this help? Is it of the same nature as the Substance? This cannot be Substance is already existent while the Help is emergent. To say that Help is of the same nature as the Substance is to look upon the already existent Substance being thing emergent, existence and emergence being opposed to each other. Nor will it be reasonable to hold that Help is essentially different from the Substance. A thing cannot be affected in any way by the being or the non-being of another thing which is essentially different from it. The Help if it is essentially different from the Substance, is absolutely of no use to it. You cannot contend that the Help although essentially different from the Substance, still renders some indirect assistance (*upakāra*) to it, for, thereby you call in Anavasthā.

(2) It is also unreasonable to hold that the Substance functions only when there are the Assistants. The Substance is as it is, it does not change itself when the Assistants are absent, so, it can certainly function, even though these Assistants are absent. Consider the position from another view-point. The Substance does not change itself when the Assistants are absent, it may be argued that hence the Substance does not function when the Assistants are absent, then when the Assistants are there, it functions, this means that when there are the Assistants the nature of Substance is changed, this change in the nature of the Substance is thus causally connected with the presence of the Assistants, and if this changed nature of the Substance is thus causally connected with the Assistants it cannot let

go those Assistants (i.e., the Assistants must thenceforth be always there) because otherwise the substance would be devoid of its nature

(3) The above shows how the contention that the Substance never functions in the absence of the Assistants is not maintainable (of course, if, as the Yaugas maintain, the Substance be an absolute self-identity) for, what does the contention, the substance never functions in the absence of the Assistants, really mean? It means that the nature of the substance consists in an 'absolute inactivity-in-the-absence of the Assistants' (*tadvirahākariṭ-svabhāva*). Now if this be the immutable nature of the Substance, it can never be functioning, even though at some time there may come those Assistants to it, for, it is an unchangeable absolute self-identity.

(4) In the same manner, the fourth alternative, the Substance functions when there are the Assistants and it does not function in their absence, is also unacceptable, if the Substance be held to be an absolute self-identity. You cannot attribute contradictory natures or aspects to the Substance. If you hold that the Substance functions in conjunction with the Assistants, this means that the nature of the Substance is essentially connected with that of the Assistants; and if so, how can the Substance be at any time without them? Hence it cannot be said that the Substance may be with the Assistants and may be without them, if it is a strict self-identity. It may be contended that the contradiction may be avoided by introducing the element of Time. There is no contradiction in saying that the Substance is with the Assistants at some time and is without them at other time. The

Jainas point out that this position also is unmaintainable. The Substance has been held by the Yaugas to be an immutable self-identity; it is the same at all times, it is not possible for it to be in union with the Assistants at some time and to be without them at some other time, which means a change in its nature. Nor can it be contended that the 'union-with-the-Assistants' and the 'disunion-with-the-Assistants' are after all but the aspects (*dharma*) of the Substance, aspects which are not essentially connected with the Substance (*dharma*) so that these aspects, direct as they are, do not imply a change in the nature of the Substance. The Jainas point out that assuming (though thereby admitting) that the Aspects are essentially unconnected with the Substance, it would not help the matter at all, for, it is the Substance that functions and produces effects and not the group of Aspects. If then the Substance is the selfsame all along and if at the time of functioning and producing effects, it can function and produce the effects, it should also function and produce those effects, in the previous times also. To avoid the 'differentiation-in-itself' you have kept the Substance untouched by the Aspects and tried to explain the facts of functioning and non-functioning by attributing differences to the Aspects. But you cannot avoid the contradiction if you admit, as you must, that it is the Substance that functions and that the Substance sometimes functions and sometimes does not.

It is thus clear that if the Substance be held to be absolutely immutable and self-identical, the position becomes full of contradictions at every step. A Thing has origin (*utpāda*) Decay (*vyaya*) and persistence

(*dhrauvya*) and the Jainas maintain that this triple character or aspect of the Thing is not possible, unless the Thing be held to be both permanent (*nitya*) and impermanent (*anitya*). So far as its underlying Substance is concerned, a Thing has neither Origin nor Decay. This is clear from the unbroken continuity (*anvaya*) perceptible in the Substance of the Thing. It may be objected here that things like nails in the fingers are cut off and grow again, so that a Continuity is perceptible here also but that nobody looks upon things like nails as permanent, on account of their continuity. To this the Jaina reply is that the continuity which is perceptible in things like nails is not real. Closer observation (*pramāṇa*) would falsify the unbroken character of the continuity, found in them. The continuity which is found in the Substance, underlying a Thing is never falsified by experience, the real character of the continuity of the Substance underlying a Thing is firmly established by such valid sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as correct Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Hence it is that a Thing has persistence so far as its underlying Substance is concerned.

From the view-point of its Modes, however a Thing has both its Origin and its Decay. Modes have a form which is exclusive (*askhalita*). This exclusiveness of the form distinguishes a real Mode from what is a false or illusory experience. A real Mode has a form which excludes other forms, a form which holds its own until it is destroyed and replaced by other forms. The experience of Yellowness in a white conch is not the experience of a real Mode, because this Yellowness, instead of being destroyed and then replaced by Whiteness, co-exists with the latter. This, however, does not

mean that the series of feelings, viz , Joy, Anger, Indifference etc , possessed by a soul are not psychological modifications and are of non-exclusive forms. They are of exclusive forms, inasmuch as so long as any of them possesses the percipient, it is not opposed by any other feeling

To the above Jaina theory of the three-fold-Character of Things, some object as follows Are the facts of Origin etc , different from each other or are they not? If the facts of origination etc , are different from each other, how can you speak of one Thing as having three natures? If the facts of origination etc., are not different from each other, how can you speak of one Thing as having three natures? The objection is misconceived The three natures or aspects of the Thing are different from each other in some respects only The fact that the three aspects of Origination, Decay and Persistence are different in some respects is not unproved' That which was non-existent comes into existence, that which is existent vanishes into non-existence, the Substratum persists, well, these are the three peculiar characteristics of the phenomena of Origination etc , well-known to all Then again the three phenomena, although different from each other in some respects are not absolutely so They are all connected with each other There is no Origination without Decay and Persistence, there is no Decay without Origination and Persistence, and there is no Persistence without Origination and Decay The facts of Origination, Persistence and Decay are thus dependent on each other and inhere in the Thing Why then can a Thing not have a triple nature? The following poetic lines are also interesting in this connection.

“When the pitcher on her head was destroyed, the daughter was sorry, the son was glad, and the king was indifferent”. In the same light the truth is to be understood that a Thing has a triple nature, one of its forms is destroyed, another is generated, the Substratum underlying both the forms persists” Thus it is that a Thing is both permanent and impermanent and as such many sided

Similarly it may be shown that a Thing is many-sided inasmuch as it is both existent and non-existent. One may of course contend: Well, that is a Contradiction; how can one and the same thing, e.g., a pitcher, be both existent and non-existent? Existence and Non-existence repudiate each other, otherwise, they would have been identical phenomena, hence if a fact is existent, how can it be non-existent? And if it is non-existent, how can it be existent? The Jaina philosophers point out that the contention is unsound. The objection might have force, if it were held that a Thing is existent in those very respects in which it is non-existent and that it is non-existent in those very respects in which it is existent. A Thing may be said to be existent with respect to its (1) own Form, e.g., that of a pitcher, (2) own Substance, e.g., gold, (3) own Place, e.g., a city and (4) own Time, e.g., spring-season. There would be no inconsistency or contradiction, if it is said that the Thing, e.g., the pitcher does not exist (1) as a cloth, (2) as made up of Threads, (3) as a thing made in a village and (4) as a thing of the summer-season. There are thinkers of the Saugata School who deny that a Thing is non-existent with respect to the nature of other things (*parāsattva*). The Jains point out that the theory of these philosophers would lead

to the conclusion that a Thing, e.g., the pitcher has the nature of all things (*sarvātmakatva*) If absolute existence is attributed to the pitcher, if, that is, the pitcher be held to be existent with respect to the 'nature' etc., of other things also, just as it is existent in respect of its own 'nature' etc., why, then would the pitcher not have the nature of all things? It is this *Parāsattva* or negation in respect of the nature of other things that makes a thing 'exclusively definite' (*pratiniyata*) The Saugatas may contend that there is nothing like the *Parāsattva*, that is to say, that no real content is implied when a Thing is said to be non-existent in respect of the nature of other things and that what is said to be the *Parāsattva* or negation with respect to the nature of other things is but the *Sva-Sattva* or affirmation with respect to its own nature The Jainas repudiate this contention by urging that 'negation' cannot be the same thing as 'affirmation' and that consequently the *Parāsattva* does point to a real aspect (of a thing) which is not the same as that implied by the *Sva-Sattva* The further contention of the Saugatas in this connection is that the *Parāsattva* is not cognised separately, nor can it be said that it is not cognised, hence this *Parāsattva* is something like magic, a pure negation after all, which is not expressible in words, has no real content with reference to a thing and which is not attributable to a thing The Jainas argue that if the *Parāsattva* or the negation of the nature of other things is not attributed to a thing, then the thing cannot be prevented from having 'the nature of other things' (*parāsattva*) and thus they show in this way The negation (*asattva*) of the 'negation of its own nature' (*svasattva*) leads to the attribution of 'its own nature'

(*svasattva*) to a thing; in the same way, the negation (*asattva*) of the nature of other things (*parāsattva*) in a thing must lead to the attribution of the 'nature of other things' (*para-sattva*) to the thing. The Saugatas try to meet this objection of the Jainas by saying. The 'Positive nature' (*bhāvarūpa*) of a thing or its 'exclusive definiteness' (*partinryata*) is not due to the 'negation of the negation' (*abhāva-mvrtti*) of that nature but the positive and the definite nature of the thing is due to its own generating causes and conditions (*sāmagrī*); hence there is no need for admitting the *Parāsattva*. The Jainas set aside the Saugata view by urging that without 'negation', i.e., the 'negation' of the nature of other things' (*parāsattva*) in the thing the positive and the exclusively definite nature of that thing is never possible. The nature of a thing, the *Sva-sattva*, is the 'negation of the negation of itself', the nature of other things, the *Parāsattva* is similarly the 'negation of the negation of the nature of these thing'. If then the *Parāsattva* is not attributed to a thing, if that is, the negation of the nature of other things is not attributed to it, the *Para-sattva*, i.e., the nature of other things, which has been shown to be similar in character to the *Sva-sattva*, may as well form the nature of the thing.

The thinkers of Yauga School maintain that a difference is cognised between one thing and another, in technical logical language, this is expressed by saying that 'mutual non-existence' (*paraśpaiābhāva*, or negation of each other), which is in every way different from the nature of a thing is cognised, and this cognition of the 'mutual non-existence' gives us the knowledge of the thing as 'exclusively definite' (*padān tha-*

pratītyama); hence there is no need for supposing, as the Jainas do, that there is an element of non-existence (so far as other things are concerned) in a thing. The Jainas point out that this contention of the Yauga School is not reasonable. If a pitcher be not the negation of a cloth, then it may be looked upon as a cloth. Again a pitcher is a pitcher because it is different from the 'negation of the pitcher' (*ghatābhāva*), now, a cloth also is different from the 'negation of the pitcher', hence a cloth also may be looked upon as a pitcher. The Jainas continue their criticism of the Yauga theory by pointing out that the Yaugas have premised that it is the knowledge of the 'mutual negation' that distinguishes one thing from another. The question, however, which arises in this connection is. Are the two things which the 'Mutual negation' is said to differentiate, one from the other essentially different from one another? Or, are they essentially not different from one another? You cannot say that the 'mutual negation' differentiates the two essentially different things, because the two things are, of and by themselves, different from one another (and it is consequently meaningless to say that the 'mutual negation' which is extraneous to both of them differentiates them). Nor is the second alternative acceptable; because between two things which are essentially not-different a 'mutual negation' is impossible. Then again it has been premised by the Yaugas that a Thing (*bhāva*) and its Negation (*abhāva*, i.e., the *parasparābhava* or 'mutual negation' in this case) are different from one another; the question, however, which crops up here is: Is this difference between the thing and its negation, due to the nature of the thing and its negation, or is

this difference due to another Negation, intervening between the thing and its negation? If you say that it is the natures of the thing and its negation that differentiates them, then, why do you not admit that it is the natures of two things that make them different and deny that the extraneous negation (the *Parasparābhāva* of the *Yaugas*) differentiates them? If, on the other hand, you hold the second alternative view, then there comes up the *Anavasthā* or Infinite Regress; for extraneous Negation which is to differentiate a thing from its negation would require another negation for its own differentiation from the thing and so on and so on. All these difficulties (in the theory of the *Yauga* philosophers) can be avoided, if instead of maintaining that a thing is different from its negation in every way (as the *Yaugas* say) it is held that a thing and its negation are not different from each other in some respects.

A thing which is a Mode, e.g., a pitcher or a cloth has thus an aspect of Existence and an aspect of Non-existence or negation. It is not rightly conceived or described, if it is said to be simply Existent. From the view-point of its own Substance, a thing is certainly Existent; but so far as the Substance of other things is concerned, it has also an element of Non-existence or negation in itself, the result is that a thing which is thus a negation of things other than itself has no chance of identifying itself with these other things.

It is clear that a thing has many aspects (*anekānta*) viz., the Existent and the Non-existent. In the same manner, an intelligent man should understand the manifold character of similar other aspects of a thing, should see, that is, how a thing is, for example, different

from another thing (in some respects) as also not different from it (in some respects).

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकारे प्रमेयस्वरूपनिर्णयो नाम
पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः ॥

*iti pramāṇa-nayatattvālokāṅkāre prameya-svarū-
pa-nirṇayo nāma pañcamah paricchedah ।*

TRANSLATION· Here ends the Fifth chapter of the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkārā* entitled the Determination of The True Nature Of The Prameya (or the Object Of Knowledge)

CHAPTER VI

यत्प्रमाणेन प्रसाध्यते तदस्य फलम् ॥ १ ॥

yat pṛamāṇena prasādhyate tad asya phalam । 1 ।

TRANSLATION: What is effected by the Pramāṇa is its Fruit.

COMMENTARY: The nature, the number and the object of the Pramāṇa have been dealt with. The Fruit of the Pramāṇa, viz., the destruction of Ignorance etc., is proposed to be discussed now.

तद् द्विविधमानन्तर्येण पारम्पर्येण च ॥ २ ॥

tad dvividham ānantaryeṇa pārapariyeṇa ca । 2 ।

TRANSLATION: It is of two sorts, viz, the Direct and the Indirect

COMMENTARY: These are described below

तत्रानन्तर्येन सर्वप्रमाणानामज्ञाननिवृत्तिः फलम् ॥ ३ ॥

tat ānantaryeṇa sarva-pṛamāṇānām ajñāna-nivṛtṭiḥ phalam । 3 ।

TRANSLATION: As regards the Direct Fruit, the Direct Fruit of all the Pramāṇas is the annihilation of Ignorance.

COMMENTARY· It is to be understood that the immediate (Direct) effect of all the Pramāṇas is the certain knowledge about the self or the not-self, the knowledge which consists in the destruction of all forms of Ignorance, e.g., Viparyaya etc.

पारम्पर्येण केवलज्ञानस्य तावत्फलमौदासीन्यम् ॥ ४ ॥

pāraṃparīyeṇa kevala-jñānasya tāvat phalam audā-sīnyam । 4 ।

TRANSLATION· As regards the Indirect Fruits, the Indirect Fruit of the Pure Knowledge is (a spirit of) Indifference

COMMENTARY: Although all things are directly cognised by the Omniscient Being, He has no desire for the removal or the acquisition of anything; and hence His is an attitude of absolute Indifference towards all things. The reason for this is that His object has been attained. The causes which bring about the Samsāra (the Series of mundane existences) are to be avoided and the ways and means which effect the Moksa (or the final Liberation) are to be pursued. Now, Omniscience having been attained, the Omniscient has not the causes of the Samsāra to be avoided by Him, nor the means and ways for the attainment of the Moksa to be pursued by Him. There thus remains nothing to be realised or striven after for such a Being and hence, He is indifferent to all things.

शेषप्रमाणानां पुनरुपादानहानोपेक्षाबुद्धयः ॥ ५ ॥

śeṣa-pramāṇānāṃ punar upādāna-hānopekṣā-buddhayaḥ । 5 ।

TRANSLATION: The Indirect Fruit of the remaining Pramāṇas is either a spirit of Appropriation or a spirit of Avoidance or a Spirit of Indifference.

COMMENTARY: Thus, if a thing is found to be pleasant, e.g., camphor etc., we want to 'appropriate' it; if it is found to be unpleasant, e.g., cold, charcoal etc., we want to 'avoid' it; and if it is found to be of no use or consequence to us, e.g., a blade of rotten grass, we neglect it.

तत्प्रमाणतः स्याद्भिन्नमभिन्नं च प्रमाणफलत्वान्यथानु-
पपत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

*tat pramāṇataḥ syād bhinnam abhinnam ca, pramāṇa-
phalatvānyathānupapatteḥ* ॥ 6 ॥

TRANSLATION: As the Fruit cannot otherwise be understood to be the Fruit of the Pramāṇa it is in some respects both separate from and identical with the Pramāṇa

COMMENTARY: According to the philosophers of the Yauga School, the Fruit is different from the Pramāṇa while the Saugata thinkers maintain that the Fruit is identical with the Pramāṇa. These are one-sided views and the above aphorism indicates the correct theory, the theory of the Jama School

उपादानबुद्ध्यादिना प्रमाणाद्भिन्नेन व्यवहितफलेन हेतोर्व्य-
भिचार इति न विभावनीयम् ॥ ७ ॥

*upādāna-buddhy-ādinā pramāṇād bhinnena vyava-
hitaphalena hetor vyabhicāra iti na vibhāvānīyam* ॥ 7 ॥

TRANSLATION: The Reason (in the above Jaina argument, the Fruit cannot otherwise be understood to be the Fruit of the Pramāna) should not be supposed to be (fallaciously) connected also with the fact that the Fruit is distinct and separate from the Pramāna because of the spirit of Appropriation etc

COMMENTARY: The Yauga philosophers contend that the spirit of Appropriation etc., which characterise the Fruit shows that the Fruit is distinct from the Pramāna. In order that the Fruit may be the Fruit of the Pramāna, the Fruit must be distinguished from the Pramāna. The Yauga philosophers show in this way that the fact that the Fruit is the Fruit of the Pramāna leads to the position that the Fruit is different from the Pramāna and not necessarily to the theory of the Jainas that the Fruit is both different from and identical with the Pramāna.

तस्यैकप्रमातृतादात्म्येन प्रमाणादनेदव्यवस्थितेः ॥ ८ ॥

tasyaika-pramātr-tādātmīyena pramāṇād anēdavyavasthiteḥ । 8 ।

TRANSLATION: The Fruit is to be judged as not different from the Pramāna as both of them have the same identical Knower.

COMMENTARY: The one and the same self that modifies (*parināti*) itself into Knowledge also modifies itself into the Fruit of Knowledge. Hence, Knowledge and its Fruit are identical.

प्रमाणतया परिणतस्यैवात्मनः फलतया परिणतिप्रतीतेः

॥ ९ ॥

*pramāṇatayā pariṇatasyaivāīmanah phalatayā pari-
ṇati-praṭīteḥ* । 9 ।

TRANSLATION: Because the same self which is modified into the Pramāna is found to be modified into the Fruit.

COMMENTARY: This is explained below.

यः प्रमिमीते स एवोपादत्ते परित्यजत्युपेक्षते चेति सर्वसं-
व्यवहारिभिरस्खलितमनुभवात् ॥ १० ॥

*yaḥ pramīmīte sa evopādatte parityajaty upeksate
ceti sarva-saṁvyavahāribhir askhalitam anubhavāt* । 10 ।

TRANSLATION. He that cognises does also appropriate, renounce and neglect (the objects of his cognition, as the case may be) well, this is the invariable experience of all observers

COMMENTARY: No sane man feels that in the process of his cognition one self works and that a different self of his appears in his attitude of appropriation, of avoidance or of neglect.

इतरथा स्वपरयोः प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थाविप्लवः

प्रसज्येत ॥ ११ ॥

*itathā sva-parayoḥ pramāna-phala-vyavasthā-vip-
lavaḥ prasajyeta* । 11 ।

TRANSLATION: Otherwise there would be confusion between one's own Knowledge and its Fruit and those of another person.

COMMENTARY: If one and the same Self be not supposed to underlie the Pramāṇa and its Fruit, it would be impossible to determine such things as this Knowledge and the Fruit are mine, these are other person's etc., etc. Hence it is that although the Fruit is characterised by a spirit of Appropriation etc., it is not different from Knowledge.

अज्ञाननिवृत्तिस्वरूपेण प्रमाणादभिन्नेन साक्षात्फलेन साधन-
स्यानेकान्त इति नाशङ्कनीयम् ॥ १२ ॥

*ajñāna-nivṛtti-svarūpeṇa pramāṇād abhinnena sākṣāt
phalena sādhanasyānekānta iti nāśaṅkānyam* । 12 ।

TRANSLATION: The Reason is not to be suspected to be connected also with the fact of the Direct Fruit being (absolutely) identical with Knowledge, consisting, as it does in the subsidence of Ignorance.

COMMENTARY: In the sixth aphorism above it has been said that according to the Jinas, the Fruit of Knowledge is in some respects different from and in some respects not different from Knowledge. The Reason for the said Jaina proposition, as given in that Sūtra was, 'The Fruit cannot be otherwise understood to be the Fruit of the Pramāṇa. Some thinkers contend that this Reason is bad, as it does not lead to the Jaina theory necessarily. The Reason, i.e., the fact that the Fruit cannot be otherwise understood to be the Fruit of knowledge rather proves that the Fruit is different from Knowledge, a position which is opposed to the above Jaina theory but with which nevertheless, the Reason given

by the Jainas is said to be quite consistent. This amounts to saying that the Jaina Hetu for the said Jaina theory is *vyabhicārī*, i.e., fallacious on account of its being connected with the opposite of what the Jainas want to prove. In the seventh Sūtra and the Sūtras, following it, this objection of the opponents has been considered and the Jainas have refuted the charge that their Hetu is *Vyabhicārī*.

In the present aphorism, the objection brought by the Śākya School of thinkers against the Jaina theory is considered. The Śākya philosophers point out that the Direct Effect of all Knowledge has been said to be the Annihilation of Ignorance. This shows that the Fruit of Knowledge is absolutely 'identical' with knowledge. This amounts to saying that the Jaina Hetu, viz., the fact that 'Fruit cannot be otherwise understood to be the Fruit of Knowledge' is *Anaikāntika*; that is to say, that the said Jaina Hetu, instead of being invariably connected with the Jaina theory, viz., that the Fruit is in some respect different from and in some respects identical with Knowledge, is also consistent with the proposition, 'the Fruit is absolutely identical with Knowledge', a proposition, opposed to the theory of the Jainas. On this ground the Śākyas maintain that the Jaina Hetu is fallacious and consequently, the Jaina theory wrong.

The Jainas set aside this Śākya contention in this Sūtra and the Sūtras, following it.

कथंचित्तस्यापि प्रमाणाद्भेदेन व्यवस्थानात् ॥ १३ ॥

kathamcit tasyāpi pramāṇād bhedena vyavasthānāt

TRANSLATION: For, in some respects, it is judged to be separate from Knowledge.

COMMENTARY: This is explained below.

साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रमाणफलयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥ १४ ॥
sādhya-sādhana-bhāvena pramāṇa-phalayoḥ prati-
yamānatvāt । 14 ।

TRANSLATION: Because Knowledge and its Fruit appear as 'what effects' and 'what is effected'.

COMMENTARY. That which appears as 'what is effected' (*sādhya*) and that which appears as what 'effects' it (*sādhana*), i.e., by means of which something is effected are different from each other; as for instance, the fact of cutting and the axe; now, Knowledge and its Fruit consisting in the subsidence of Ignorance appear as what 'effects' (*sādhana*) and what 'is effected' (*sādhya*)

प्रमाणं हि करणाख्यं साधनम्, स्वपरव्यवसिती साधकतम-
 त्वात् ॥ १५ ॥

pramāṇam hi karanākhyam sādhanam, sva-para-
vyavasītau sādhakatamatvāt । 15 ।

TRANSLATION: Because of the instrumentability of the Pramāṇa in bringing about certain Knowledge regarding the Self and the Not-self it is the Sādhana or the Instrument, that which effects

COMMENTARY: That which is instrumental in bringing about some phenomena is called an Instru-

ment (Sādhana or something which 'effects'); as for instance, an axe; now the Pramāṇa is instrumental in bringing about the certain Knowledge about the Self and the Not-self and is an Instrument or Sādhana on that account. -

स्वपरव्यवसितिक्रियारूपाज्ञाननिवृत्त्याख्यं फलं तु साध्यम्,
प्रमाणनिष्पाद्यत्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

*sva-para-vyavasiti-kriyā-rūpājñāna-nivṛttyākhyam
phalaṁ tu sādhyam, pramāṇa-niṣpādyatvāt* 16

TRANSLATION: The Fruit described as the subsidence-of-Ignorance, consisting in the fact of certain knowledge regarding the Self and the Not-self is what is effected; as it is what is achieved by Knowledge.

COMMENTARY: That which is established by the Pramāṇa is something 'effected' (*sādhyā*); as for instance, 'a spirit of Appropriation' etc., now, the Fruit is what is established by the Pramāṇa. Hence it is not proper to say that the Fruit is absolutely 'identical' with the Pramāṇa. Their absolute 'identity' would negative their respective natures as Knowledge and its Fruit. The Pramāṇa consists in an exactly similar 'form' (*sārūpya*) of the object, the Fruit in 'understanding' (*adhigati*) it; now, if the Pramāṇa and the Fruit were 'absolutely identical' with each other, we could not talk separately of them, viz., of the Pramāṇa as consisting in 'an exactly similar form' of the object and of the Fruit as 'understanding' it. In this connection, the opponents may contend that the Pramāṇa and the Fruit are identical and that yet it is possible to

talk separately of them in this way. The Sārūpya or the 'exact form', characterising the Pramāṇa is the retrogression from the inexact form (*asārūpya-vyāvṛtti*) and the Adhigati or the 'understanding' characterising the Fruit is the retrogression from the 'not-understanding' (*anadhigati-vyāvṛtti*). These two 'retrogressions' (*vyāvṛtti*) being different, it is possible for us to talk of the Pramāṇa and the Fruit as different, although they are absolutely identical with each other. The Jains set aside this contention by pointing out that unless the Pramāṇa and the Fruit themselves are essentially different from each other it is impossible for us to talk of their natures as different from each other. Then again, it is not always very safe to talk of a thing through the fact of its being opposed to what it is not (*vyāvṛtti*). A Pramāṇa, as alleged by the other side, is a Pramāṇa because it is opposed to 'what it is not' (*apramāṇa*) and the Fruit of a Pramāṇa is the Fruit because it is opposed to what it is not (*aphala*), but can we say that because a Pramāṇa is different from another mode of Pramāṇa, the former must be Apramāṇa? Or, because a Fruit of the Pramāṇa is different from another kind of Fruit, the former must be an Aphala?

प्रमातुरपि स्वपरव्यवसितिक्रियायाः कथंचिद्भेदः ॥ १७ ॥

pramātū api sva-para-vyavasiti-krīyāyāḥ kathamcidbhedah । 17 ।

TRANSLATION: The Knower also is distinct in some respect from his act of Knowing for certain, the Self and the Not-self

COMMENTARY: It is incidentally pointed out in this Sūtra that not only is Knowledge (*pramāṇa*) distinct in some respects from its Fruit (*phala*) but the knower (*pramātā*) also is to be distinguished from the Fruit, which consists in the act of certain knowledge of the Self and the Not-self.

कर्तृक्रिययोः साध्यसाधकभावेनोपलम्भात् ॥ १८ ॥

karṭṛ-kriyayoh sādhyā-sādhakā-bhāvenopalambhāt
| 18 |

TRANSLATION: As an Act and its Doer are observed to be related as 'what is effected' (*sādhyā*) and 'what effects it' (*sādhakā*).

COMMENTARY: What are observed as the Doer and the Deed are different from each other; as for instance, Devadatta and his Act of cutting wood, now, the Knower and his Act, consisting in his certain knowledge regarding the Self and the Not-self are observed as the Doer and the Deed. (Therefore, the Knower is distinct, in some respects, from the Fruit of knowledge).

कर्ता हि साधकः, स्वतन्त्रत्वात्, क्रिया तु साध्या, कर्तृ-
निर्वर्त्यत्वात् ॥ १९ ॥

kartā hi sādhakah, svatantrativāt; kriyā tu sādhyā
karṭṛ-nirvartyativāt | 19 |

TRANSLATION: Because of his independence, the Doer is he who 'effects' (*sādhakā*) (something); the Act on the other hand, is what 'is to be effected'

(*sādhya*) because it is dependent on the Doer for its effectuation.

COMMENTARY: He who with reference to an Act is independent of it is the Doer, as for instance, the cutter, with reference to the cutting of wood, now, the Knower with reference to the Act of Knowledge for certain of the Self and the Not-self is independent. How is the independence of Doer proved? It is in this way. An Act cannot be effected by itself; its effectuation is dependent on some being different from it; in the matter of effecting an Act, the Doer is thus looked upon as playing the main part (and may accordingly be said to be independent of the Act).

The Act, consisting in the certain knowledge of the Self and the Not-self, on the contrary, 'is what is effected' (*sādhya*), because it is what is done by the Doer (i.e., the Knower) Whatever Act is done by the Doer is to be treated as 'what is effected' (*sādhya*); now, the Act consisting in the certain knowledge about the Self and the Not-self is found to be something which is done by a Doer; and hence it is to be judged to be something which is effected (*sādhya*)

This Sūtra explains why the Doer (*kartā*) is he who effects (*sādhaka*) (something) and the Deed is something which is effected (*sādhya*) and proves that the Doer is distinct from the Deed on this account

न च क्रिया क्रियावतः सकाशादभिन्नैव, भिन्नं वा; प्रति-
नियतक्रियाक्रियावद्भावमङ्गप्रसंगात् ॥ २० ॥

*na ca kṛiyā kṛiyāvataḥ sakāśād abhinnaiva, bhinnaiva
vā; pratinyata-kṛiyā-kṛiyāvad-bhāva-bhaṅga-prasaṅgāt*
1 20 1

TRANSLATION: The Act is not the same as the Agent, nor is it different from him, To hold otherwise would be by implication denying their natures as the Act and its Agent.

COMMENTARY: The Saugata thinkers identify the Act with the Agent. The Jainas reject this theory on the ground that in that case the Agent alone becomes the sole reality and not both of them, for, if, both the Act and its Agent were equally real, one cannot talk of their identity.

The philosophers of the Vaiśeṣika and other Schools, on the contrary, maintain that an Act is 'absolutely different' from the Agent. The Jainas criticise this position also and point out that in that case, one cannot say that a particular Act is a particular Agent's Act; for, since the particular Act is 'absolutely different' from (i.e., absolutely unrelated to) the particular agent, the Act might as well be looked upon as the Act of any other Agent. It cannot be said that it is the 'intimate relationship', (*saṃavāya*) which determines which Act is to be known to be which Agent's; for the *Samavāya* relationship is too universal and pervasive to be capable of settling which Act is to be which Agent's.

Accordingly, it is clear that to hold an Act and its Agent as 'absolutely identical' with or as 'absolutely different' from each other is to destroy their respective characters. The correct position is that an Act and its Agent are 'in some sense identical' with and 'in some sense, different' from each other.

संबृत्त्या प्रमाणफलव्यवहार इत्यप्रामाणिकप्रलापः, परमार्थतः
स्वाभिमतसिद्धिविरोधात् ॥ २१ ॥

*samvṛtīyā pramāṇa-phala-vyavahāra ity aprāmāṇika-
pālāpaḥ, pramāṇīthataḥ svābhīmata-siddhi-virodhāt*
| 21 |

TRANSLATION. The contention that the theory about (the reality of) certain Knowledge and its Fruit is based on imagination is but unreasonable talk; for, this view is opposed to be real establishment of itself.

COMMENTARY. According to some thinkers, the attempt on the part of the Syādvāda (i e, the Jaina) School to establish that certain Knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its Fruit are in some sense identical with and in some sense different from each other, is useless; for, certain Knowledge and its Fruit are both imaginary (*sāmvṛta*). The Jainas criticise this position in the following way. The thinker who looks upon the *Pramāṇa* and its Fruit as imaginary must establish his position positively. Now, how is he to prove his position, through the *Pramāṇa* (i e, valid knowledge) or through the Non-*pramāṇa* (i e, invalid or no-knowledge)? If through the latter, his disputation is valueless and his position remains unproved. He can neither say that he can prove his position through *Pramāṇa*, i e, any of the recognised instruments of valid knowledge. For, what would be the nature of the *Pramāṇa* to be used by him? If the *Pramāṇa* used by him to prove the imaginary Character of the *Pramāṇa* and its Fruit be itself unsubstantial and imaginary, his position is not proved and the opposite doctrine that the *Pramāṇa* and its Fruit are real is substantiated. If, on the contrary, it is contended that the *Pramāṇa* proving the imaginary nature of the

Pramāṇa and its Fruit is real and substantial, then the sophist's own position, viz., the proposition that the Pramāṇa and its Fruit are never real or substantial, is clearly contradicted.

Hence it is that the contention that the Pramāṇa and the Fruit are all imaginary, is opposed to its own substantiation.

ततः पारमार्थिक एव प्रमाणफलव्यवहारः सकलपुरुषार्थ-
सिद्धिहेतुः स्वीकर्तव्यः ॥ २२ ॥

*tataḥ pāramārthika eva pramāṇa-phala-vyavahāraḥ
sakala-puruṣārtha-siddhi-hetuḥ svīkartavyaḥ* । 22 ।

TRANSLATION: Hence it is to be admitted that the Pramāṇa and its Fruit have their real and essential worth and that they are the causes of fulfilment of all the objects of desire.

COMMENTARY: The above is the conclusion of the preceding debate

प्रमाणस्य स्वरूपादिचतुष्टयाद्विपरीतं तदाभासम् ॥ २३ ॥
*pramāṇasya svarūpādi-catustayād viparītaṁ tadā-
bhāsam* । 23 ।

TRANSLATION: A Pramāṇa-Fallacy is what is opposed to any of the four things regarding a Pramāṇa, e g., its Nature etc

COMMENTARY: True knowledge is to be attained, this however is possible through the avoidance of False or Fallacious knowledge. Hence what is Falla-

cious knowledge is also to be understood. Now, Fallacious knowledge is what is different from (*viparīta*) or opposed to the True Knowledge. In the previous chapters, the *Pramāna* has been considered with reference to its Nature, its Number, its Objects and its Fruit. The four broad classes of the *Pramāna*-fallacy would accordingly be. 1. Fallacies, regarding the Nature of the *Pramāna*; 2. Fallacies, regarding its Number; 3. Fallacies, regarding its Object; and 4. Fallacies, regarding its Fruit.

अज्ञानात्मकानात्मप्रकाशकस्वमात्रावभासकनिर्विकल्पकसमा-
रोपाः प्रमाणस्य स्वरूपामासाः ॥ २४ ॥

*ajñānātmakānātmā-prakāśaka-svamātrāvabhāśaka-
nirvikalpaka-samāropāḥ pramāṇasya svarūpābhāsāḥ*
। 24 ।

TRANSLATION: The Fallacies, regarding the Nature of the *Pramāna* (i.e., Knowledge) are: The view that it is essentially Unconscious; the view that it does not reveal the Self; the view that it reveals the Self only; the theory of the Undetermined Perception; and the Fallacy consisting in *Samāropa* or Ignorance.

यथा संनिकर्षश्चिद्विदितपरानवभासकज्ञानदर्शनविपर्यय-
संशयानध्यवसायाः ॥ २५ ॥

*yathā sanīkarṣaśchidvīdita-parānavabhāśaka-
jñāna-darśana-viparyaya-saṁśayānādhyavasāyāḥ* । 25 ।

TRANSLATION: (It would be Fallacious to regard as valid Knowledge such phenomenon as) For instance:

Contact etc. Knowledge, unconscious of the Self, Knowledge, not revealing any Not-self; Pure Sensation; Illusion; Doubt and Inattention

COMMENTARY: These are respectively the instances of the five forms of the Fallacy or wrong view about the Nature of the Pramāṇa or valid Knowledge described above. Saṃnikarṣa or Contact (of a thing with a sense-organ) has been shown to be no more than a physical process; it is not a Pramāṇa or a form of valid Knowledge; to look upon Contact as Pramāṇa would be identifying Knowledge with an Unconscious phenomenon and would be a Fallacy. Then again in Knowledge, the Self is directly revealed; accordingly any theory denying the reality or the knowability of the Self would come under the second form of the Fallacy regarding the Nature of Knowledge. Conversely, any theory denying the reality or the knowability of the Not-self or the external Real would be the third mode of the Fallacy in respect of the Nature of the Pramāṇa. Fourthly, Pramāṇa is *certain* and definite Knowledge; the Nirvikalpa, otherwise called Darśana, which consists in 'pure Sensation' undetermined or unmodified in any way, cannot give such a *certain* Knowledge of its Object; accordingly, to regard 'Pure Sensation' as a Pramāṇa or a form of valid Knowledge would be committing a Fallacy regarding the Nature of the Pramāṇa. Lastly, it need scarcely be said that the three forms of Ignorance (*samāropa*) do not give us any correct Knowledge, to look upon them as Pramāṇas would be but fallacious

तेभ्यः स्वपरव्यवसायस्यानुपपत्तेः ॥ २६ ॥

tebhyaḥ sva-parā-vyavasāyasyānupapatteḥ । 26 ।

TRANSLATION For, they are not the sources of the certain Knowledge about the Self and the Not-self.

COMMENTARY. This has already been made clear.

सांख्यबुद्धारिकप्रत्यक्षमिव यदाभासते तत्तदाभासम् ॥ २७ ॥

sāṃkhyabuddhārika-pratyakṣam iva yad ābhāsate tat tadābhāsam । 27 ।

TRANSLATION. That which (falsely) appears as the Practical-Direct Experience (*sāṃkhyabuddhārika-pratyakṣa*) is a Fallacy with respect to that.

COMMENTARY. A more detailed description of the Fallacies regarding the Nature of the Pramāṇa is hereby begun. The Pramāṇa has been said to be either Direct (*pratyakṣa*) or Indirect (*parokṣa*). The Direct again is either Practical (*sāṃkhyabuddhārika*) or Transcendental (*pāramārthika*). When an object appears as an object of our Practical experience but is really no such object at all we have a Fallacious Practical experience. It should be noted here that the Fallacies of this kind come under two classes in as much as the Direct-Practical experience is of two modes viz, the Sensuous (the *indriya-nibandhana*) and the Mental (the *anindriya-nibandhana*)

यथासुधारेषु गन्धर्वनगरज्ञानं, दुःखे सुखज्ञानं च ॥ २८ ॥

yath'āmbudhāresu gandharva-nagajñānam, duḥkhe sukha-jñānam ca । 28 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance; To take clouds for a Gandharva city or to feel Misery as Happiness

COMMENTARY: The first instance relates to the first form of the Direct-Practical experience, i.e., the Sensuous and the second, to the second, i.e., the Mental. As regards the Fallacies regarding Grasp (*avagraha*), Attention (*ihā*) etc., their nature can be easily understood and they are not accordingly illustrated here.

पारमार्थिकप्रत्यक्षमिव यदाभासते तत्तदाभासम् ॥ २९ ॥

pāramārthika-pratyakṣam iva yad ābhāsate tat tadābhāsam । 29 ।

TRANSLATION. That which (falsely) appears as the Transcendental Direct Experience (*pāramārthika-pratyakṣa*) is a Fallacy with respect to that.

COMMENTARY. It should be remembered here that the Transcendental Experience has been shown to be of two kinds, viz., the Vikala (or Incomplete) and the Sakala (or Complete).

यथा शिवाख्यस्य राजर्षेरसंख्यातद्वीपसमुद्रेषु सप्तद्वीपसमुद्र-
ज्ञानम् ॥ ३० ॥

yathā śivākhyasya rājarṣer asaṁkhyāta-dvīpa-samudreṣu sapta-dvīpa-samudra-jñānam । 30 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance: The (false) cognition in the royal sage Śiva, of only seven islands and seven seas in the countless islands and seas.

COMMENTARY. Clairvoyance or Avadhijñāna is one of the forms of the Incomplete Transcendental Experience. The present instance is one of Fallacious Clairvoyance, called the Avadhī-Ābhāsa or the Vibhanga. It is said that king Śiva had the Transcendental Vision that there were only seven seas and seven islands in the Universe, although in reality their number is incalculable.

It is to be noted in this connection that although one can have fallacious Clairvoyance, it is impossible for one to have Mind-reading (*manah-paryaya*) and Omniscience (*kevala*), which are in any way Fallacious. For, Mind-reading is due to practised self-control and Omniscience, to the annihilation of all its obstacles; so that one can have either Mind-reading and Omniscience in their correct forms or none of them at all; a Fallacious Manah-paryaya or a Fallacious Kevala is impossible.

अननुभूते वस्तुनि तदितिज्ञानं स्मरणाभासम् ॥ ३१ ॥

ananubhūte vastuni taditi-jñānaṃ smaraṇābhāsam
I 31 I

TRANSLATION. Fallacious Recollection consists in knowing a thing which was not previously perceived to be something which was previously perceived.

COMMENTARY. Recollection Fallacy is the first of the Fallacies regarding Indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).

अननुभूते मुनिमण्डले तन्मुनिमण्डलमिति यथा ॥ ३२ ॥

ananubhūte muni-maṇḍale tanmuni-maṇḍalam iti
yathā I 32 I

TRANSLATION: For instance: To take a congregation of sages which was never seen before for one which was already experienced.

COMMENTARY: This is an example of the Recollection (Recognition)-Fallacy.

तुल्ये पदार्थे स एवायमिति, एकस्मिंश्च तेन तुल्य इत्यादि-
ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासम् ॥ ३३ ॥

*tulye padārthe sa evāyam iti, ekasmimś ca tena
tulya ity-ādi-jñānaṃ pratyabhijñānābhāsam* | 33 |

TRANSLATION: To identify one thing with another which is only similar to it; and (conversely) to regard one and the same thing as two similar things, cases like these are examples of the Fallacy regarding Assimilation.

COMMENTARY: Pratyabhijñāna (Assimilation or Conception) as shown before, gives us the ideas of such things as the Tiryak-Sāmānya or the Class-essence, the Urdhvatā-Sāmānya or the Substratum etc, etc. Two things having the same Class-essence, are not however, identical; a thing having on the other hand the same Substratum, continues to be the same identical thing. To think otherwise, e g, to identify two things which are only similar or to consider a thing which has the same substance to be two similar things, would be committing Fallacies regarding Assimilation. The other cases of Fallacious Conception are to be similarly understood.

यमलकजातवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

yamalaka-jātavat । 34 ।

TRANSLATION: As is the case of twin children

COMMENTARY: In the case of twins' (i.e., boys born of the same mother on the same day), people often take one for the other and conversely, think the same child to be other than by himself and to be like his brother.

असत्यामपि व्याप्तौ तदवभासस्तर्कमासः ॥ ३५ ॥

asatyām api vyāptau tadavabhāsas tarkābhāsaḥ
। 35 ।

TRANSLATION Induction-Fallacy consists in finding Pervasion, where there is none such.

COMMENTARY: Pervasion or Vyāpti means Avinābhāva, i.e., the-absence-of-the-one-in-the-absence-of-the-other.

स श्यामो मैत्रतनयत्वादित्यत्र यावान्मैत्रतनयः स श्याम इति यथा ॥ ३६ ॥

sa śyāmo Maitra-tanayatvād ity atra yāvān-Maitra-tanayaḥ sa śyāma iti yathā । 36 ।

TRANSLATION. For instance. In the argument 'He is dark-complexioned, as he is the son of Maitra', the (inductive) proposition (is fallacious) that 'Who ever is Maitra's son is dark-complexioned'

COMMENTARY Tarka establishes propositions of Universal application. In the example, given above, the proposition, 'Whoever is Maitra's son is dark-complexioned', is said to be such a Universal proposition. On examination, however, it will be found that there is no necessary relationship between the 'Sonship of Maitra' and 'Dark Complexion'. A dark complexion is dependent on one's mother's vegetable diet during her pregnancy etc. Hence our use of the process of Induction would be Fallacious, if we lose sight of this essential fact and establish such propositions as 'Whoever is Maitra's son is dark-complexioned'. The correct Inductive proposition would be to say 'Whoever while in his mother's womb is constitutionally modified by his mother's Vegetable diet, is dark-complexioned'.

पक्षाभासादिसमुत्थं ज्ञानमनुमानाभासमवसेयम् ॥ ३७ ॥

paksābhāsādi-samuttham jñānam anumānābhāsam avaseyam | 37 |

TRANSLATION: Cognition arising from a false knowledge about the Abode etc., is to be known as Inference-Fallacy.

COMMENTARY: Herewith is begun a consideration of the various modes of the fallacious Inference or Anumānābhāsa. It may be noticed in this connection that as Anumāna or Deductive Inference is either 'for one's own sake' (*svārthānumāna*) or 'for the sake of others' (*parārthānumāna*), we may have two kinds of the corresponding Anumāna Fallacy.

तत्र प्रतीतनिराकृतानभीप्सितसाध्यधर्मविशेषणास्त्रयः

पक्षाभासाः ॥ ३८ ॥

tatra pratīta-nirākṛtānabhīpsita-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇās trayah pakṣābhāsāḥ । 38 ।

TRANSLATION: Fallacies regarding the Abode are of three kinds viz., That in, which the Proven-phenomenon is 'known': That in which it is 'opposed'; and That in which it is 'undesirable'.

COMMENTARY: The Pakṣa or the Abode has already been described as something (e.g., the Hill) which contains the 'Phenomenon-indicated-by-the Proven' (the Sādhya-Dharma, e.g., Fire). The three characteristics of a valid Abode, as already pointed out, are (1) that it must contain a phenomenon the existence of which there is 'unknown' (*apratīta*): (2) that the fact of the existence of the phenomenon in it, must be 'unopposed' (*anirākṛta*) to matters of observation and experience: and (3) that the existence of the Proven-phenomenon, in the Abode must be something which is 'desired' (*abhīpsita*) to be proven. Accordingly, the corresponding fallacious forms of the Abode (the Pakṣābhāsas) would be the following three viz., (1) the Pratīta-Sādhya-Dharma-Viśeṣaṇa, i.e., that in which the existence of the Proven-phenomenon is already a 'known' fact: (2) the Nirākṛta-sādhya-Dharma-Viśeṣaṇa, i.e., that in which the existence of the Proven-phenomenon would be 'opposed' to fact of experience: and (3) the Anabhipreta-sādhya-Dharma-Viśeṣaṇa i.e., the Abode, in which the existence of the Proven-phenomenon is undesired to be proved.

प्रतीतसाध्यधर्मविशेषणो यथाऽऽर्हतान्प्रत्यवधारणवज्रं परेण
प्रयुज्यमानः समस्ति जीव इत्यादि ॥ ३९ ॥

*pratīta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇo yathārhatān-prat-
yavadhāṇamavañjam pareṇa prayujyamānaḥ samasti jīva
ity ādi* । 39 ।

TRANSLATION: One states to the thinkers of the Ārhatas (Jaina) School such truths as that the Soul exists etc., such a statement would be an instance of the fallacious Abode-in-which the-existence-of-the-Proven-phenomenon-is-already-known

COMMENTARY: The Ārhatas or the thinkers of the Jaina School hold that all things, e.g., the Soul etc., are Anekānta in nature, i.e., that all reals have various aspects. Hence they are prepared to admit every well-reasoned truth. It is redundant accordingly to argue or urge the matter of such truths as that the Soul exists etc., before the Jainas, the truths being well-known to them.

Accordingly to tell the Jainas such things as that the Soul exists etc., would be to commit the Fallacy of the Pratīta-Sādhya-Dharma-Viśesana which is otherwise called the Siddha-Sādhana and the Prasiddha-Sambandha.

निराकृतसाध्यधर्मविशेषणः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकास्ववचना-
दिभिः साध्यधर्मस्य निराकरणादनेकप्रकारः ॥ ४० ॥

*nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇaḥ pratyaksānumā-
nāgamaloka-svavacanādibhiḥ sādhyā-dharmasya nirāka-
raṇād aneka-prakārah* । 40 ।

TRANSLATION· The fallacious Abode in-which-the-existence-of-the-Proven-phenomenon-is-Opposed is' of many kinds, inasmuch as it may be 'opposed' to Direct Experience, to Inference, to Authoritative truth, to Popular understanding, to one's own statement etc , etc.

COMMENTARY· The Fallacy, described above, viz., the Nirākṛta-Sādhya-Dharma-Viśeṣana, is of eight modes inasmuch as the fact of the existence of the Proven, phenomenon in the Abode may be 'opposed' to Direct Experience (*pratyakṣa*), to Inference (*anumāna*) to Authority (*āgama*), to Popular understanding (*loka*), to One's Own Statement (*sva-vacana*), to Recollection (*smaraṇa*), to Assimilation (*pratyabhijñāna*) or to Induction (*tarka*) These are illustrated below.

प्रत्यक्षनिराकृतसाध्यधर्मविशेषणो यथा नास्ति भूतविलक्षण
आत्मेति ॥ ४१ ॥

*pratyakṣa-nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇo yathā
nāsti bhūta-vilakṣaṇa ātmeti* । 41 ।

TRANSLATION There is no Soul, differing in nature from the material Elements this is an instance of the fallacious Abode in-which-the-existence-of-the-Proven-phenomenon-is-Opposed-to-Direct-Experience.

COMMENTARY Direct Introspection (*sva-saṁvedana*) tells us that there is a Soul over and above our material Body which is constituted of the Elements of Earth, Water, Fire and Air The proposition stated above is contradicted by Direct Experience, just as the

proposition, 'Fire is not hot' is contradicted by actual Perception.

अनुमाननिराकृतसाध्यधर्मविशेषणो यथा नास्ति सर्वज्ञो
वीतरागो वा ॥ ४२ ॥

*anumāna-nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇo yathā-
nāsti sarvajñaḥ vītarāgo vā* । 42 ।

TRANSLATION: There is no Being who is Omniscient or totally Passionless; this is an instance of the Fallacious Abode in-which-the existence-of-the-Provenphenomenon-is-Opposed-to-Inference

COMMENTARY. That which is a defect or a privation is found on some Occasions to be radically removed for its own causes, e.g., the mud or dust collecting on gold which is found to subside. Now, obstacles to Knowledge and Passionlessness are similarly found to be defects which are removable. Accordingly, if all the obstacles to Knowledge and Passionlessness are removed from the Soul of a person, that person necessarily becomes Omniscient and totally Passionless. This is a truth established by reason (*anumāna*) and the proposition, there is no Being who is Omniscient or totally Passionless, stated above being opposed to it, is fallacious.

Another instance of such a Fallacy would be to argue: 'Sound is not subject of modification'. Because 'Sound is subject to modification because it is a product (the fact of being a product)', being inseparable from the fact of being subject to modification'.

आगमननिराकृतसाध्यधर्मविशेषणो यथा जैनेन रजनिभोजनं
मजनीयम् ॥ ४३ ॥

āgama-nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇo yathā Jainena iajambhojanaṁ bhajanīyam । 43 ।

TRANSLATION: A Jaina should take meals at night; this is an instance of the fallacious Abode, in-which-the-existence-of-the-Proven-phenomenon -is-Opposed to Authority

COMMENTARY: There are authoritative texts in the Jaina Scriptures to the effect that a Jaina should never eat at night. Accordingly, the instruction to eat at night is fallacious, being Opposed to the matter of such texts. Another instance of such a Fallacy would be to argue that 'a Jaina should always long for enjoying the other people's wives'

लोक-निराकृतसाध्यधर्मविशेषणो यथा न पारमार्थिकः प्रमाण-
प्रमेयव्यवहारः ॥ ४४ ॥

loka-nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇo yathā na pāramārthikaḥ pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāraḥ । 44 ।

TRANSLATION: Knowledge and its Object are not (transcendentally) real; this is an instance of the fallacious Abode, in-which-the-existence-of-the-Proven-phenomenon-is-Opposed-to-popular-understanding

COMMENTARY: All people feel that the Pramāṇas (i.e., the sources and instruments of Knowledge) are real and that through them we are enabled to determine Truths (which are not only of practical value but are transcendentally real). Hence the proposition stated in the Sūtra is fallacious, as it is Opposed to the intuition of all people.

The Objectors here argue as follows:—Is this Popular understanding Right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or wrong Knowledge (*apramāṇa*)? If the latter, then a proposition cannot be called fallacious, if it is Opposed to that. If the Popular understanding be a *Pramāṇa*, is it something over and above Direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) etc.? This is impossible because a *Pramāṇa* is either *Pratyakṣa* or *Parokṣa* and there can be no *Pramāṇa* which is over and above the *Pratyakṣa* and the *Parokṣa*. If then, the Popular understanding is included in either the *Pratyakṣa* or the *Parokṣa*, then the Fallacy in connection with the Popular understanding cannot be a separate Abode-Fallacy (*pakṣābhāsa*), as it may be conveniently brought under the Abode-Fallacy in-connection-with-the-Direct perception' (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) etc. The Commentator notes that this contention is not unsound; but that the Fallacy with reference to the Popular understanding is separately mentioned here for exciting the inquisitive spirit of the learners.

Another instance, of such a Fallacy is to argue, The skull bones of a human skeleton-head are 'pure' things, because they are parts of an animal body; like a conch-shell or an oyster-shell etc.

स्ववचननिराकृतसाध्यधर्मविशेषणो यथा नास्ति प्रमेयपरि-
च्छेदकं प्रमाणम् ॥ ४५ ॥

*svavacana-nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇo yathā
nāsti prameya-paricchedakam pramāṇam* | 45 |

TRANSLATION: There is no *Pramāṇa* (i.e., the instrument of Knowledge) to determine the *Prameya*

(i e., the object of Knowledge); this is an instance, of Fallacious Abode, in-which-the existence-of-the-Proven-phenomena-is-Opposed-to-One's-Own-Statement

COMMENTARY: One who does not admit the validity of any of the Pramānas cannot even expect that his own word can express his intentions, accordingly, he ought to remain silent always. For, if he utters, 'There is no Pramāna to determine the Prameya', his utterance would be based on the acceptance of the validity of his own words and thus the subject matter, of his utterance would be falsified by the fact of his own uttering the words. Accordingly, the proposition stated in the Sūtra is Fallacious

Another instance of such a Fallacy would be to say, 'I am always keeping silence'.

It may be noted here that although 'one's own Statement ((*svavacana*))' comes under Śabda or word and is practically included in the Āgama Pramāṇa, a Fallacy corresponding to it is separately mentioned here for exciting the inquisitive spirit of the learners

Besides the Abode-Fallacies, illustrated above, there are three other forms of such Fallacies. (1) Firstly, there is the Abode-Fallacy-in-which-the existence-of-the Proven-phenomena-in-the-Abode-is-Opposed-to-Recollection' (*smāna-mākrta-sādhyadharma-viśeṣaṇa*). One, of failing memory, for instance, says, 'That mango-tree is devoid of fruits', but this argument will appear as Fallacious to one who correctly remembers that the tree is bent with the weight of fruits (2) Secondly, there is the Abode. Fallacy-in-which-the existence of-the Proven-phenomena-in-the Abode-is-Opposed to-Assimilation' (*pratyabhijñā-mākrta-sādh-*

yadharma-viśeṣaṇa). For instance, if there are two things which are only *similar* and if one mistakenly bases some of his argument on the assertion that these things are *identical*, his argument would be wrong as his basal proposition is inconsistent with the Conception of one who rightly knows that they are only *similar* and not *identical* (3) Thirdly, there is the Abode-Fallacy-in-which-the-existence-of-the-Proven-phenomena-in-the Abode-is-Opposed-to-Induction' (*tarka-nuākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇa*) If, for example, one bases his reasoning on such a general proposition as 'One who is the son of a certain (given) person, must necessarily be green-black' his reasoning will be wrong to one who knows that the general proposition upon which he bases his reasoning is Opposed to the valid inductive proposition that one because he is the son of a vegetarian mother, is necessarily green-black.

अनभीप्सितसाध्यधर्मविशेषणो यथा स्याद्वादिनः शाश्वतिक
एव कलशादिरशाश्वतिक एव वेति वदतः ॥ ४६ ॥

*anabhīpsita-sādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇo yathā syādvā-
dinaḥ śāśvatika eva kalasādir aśāśvatika eva veti vada-
taḥ* ॥ 46 ॥

TRANSLATION: An upholder of 'the theory of Possibility' (*Syādvāda*) i e., a Jaina says: 'A pitcher etc., are eternal or that they are non-eternal; this is an instance of the fallacious Abode-in-which-the-existence-of-the-Proven-phenomenon-is-Undesired.

COMMENTARY: This is the third and the last form of the Abode Fallacy (*paksābhāsa*). It consists in assert-

ing a relation between the Abode and the Proven which is 'undesirable' For example, if a Jaina, the fundamental principle of whose metaphysics is to attribute non-absolute and relative characteristics to a thing says that 'things are eternal' (leaving out of consideration the aspect of their non-eternality) or that 'things are non-eternal' (leaving out of consideration the aspect of their eternality) he would be committing a Fallacy of the above kind if he means seriously what he says. A similar instance of such a Fallacy would be in the case of a Tāthāgata (Buddhist) to say, 'sound is eternal'

The above are the only three forms of the Abode Fallacy

According to some logicians, there are three other such Fallacies, which are as follows.

1 Aprasiddha-Viśesana, i.e., A (Fallacious) Abode, in which the existence of the Proven-Phenomenon is Unrecognised.

2 Aprasiddha-Viśesya, i.e., A (Fallacious) Abode, which itself is Unrecognised'

3 Aprasiddhahobhaya, i.e., A ' (Fallacious) Abode which has both (the above two characteristics of) Unrecognitions

The Jaina commentator refuses to recognise the above three as Abode-fallacies at all

As regards the first, he says that it is no Fallacy. The basal principle of all inference is that the existence of the Proven-phenomenon (e.g., the Fire) in the Abode (e.g., the Hill) must not be a known or recognised fact before it is inferred, it is only a hitherto unknown or unrecognised fact that can be the matter of an Inference. If an already known fact were the matter of an Inference, the Inference would be tainted with

the Fallacy, known as the Siddha-Sādhya (i.e., having for its conclusion what is already well-established). The objectors however contend here that by the Aprasiddha-Viśeṣaṇa, they do not mean that the Proven phenomenon is Unrecognised to exist in the Abode only but that they mean to refer to a Proven-phenomenon, the existence of which is Unrecognised in any place whatsoever. As an instance of such a fallacious Proven-phenomenon, they refer to the fact of Destructibility as understood by the thinkers of the Sāṃkhya School. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers a thing when not in evidence, has only passed into 'the unmanifest state' (*tirobhāva*); it has not been destroyed: The Sāṃkhya thinkers thus maintain that the phenomenon of Destructibility is never known or recognised to be connected with anything whatsoever. Accordingly, if you want to prove 'A is destructible', your argument would be wrong according to a Sāṃkhya thinker: the Pakṣa, A, in the argument would be a fallacious Abode, the Aprasiddha-Viśeṣaṇa, inasmuch as the Proven phenomenon viz. the fact of Destructibility is Unrecognised to have any connection, not only with A, but with anything whatsoever. The Jaina commentator points out that a Pakṣa is not necessarily Fallacious in an argument, if the argument seeks to connect the Pakṣa with a phenomenon which is not found in experience to be connected with anything else. The objector here is apparently a Buddhist and the Jaina commentator substantiates his criticism in this way. You, the Buddhist, prove by reasoning that a thing is momentary, i.e., impermanent, but if the Aprasiddha Viśeṣaṇa is a real Abode-Fallacy at all, is not your argument about the Impermanent nature of a

thing vitiated by the above Fallacy of the Aprasiddha Viśesana? For, 'absolute Impermanance' the proven-phenomena in your argument is not found in experience to abide in anything whatsoever

The Jaina commentator next points out that there cannot be anything like the Aprasiddha-Viśesya or an Abode-Fallacy in which the Pakṣa or the Abode is absolutely Unrecognised. It has already been shown how in some cases the Dharmī, i.e., the Pakṣa or the Abode is hypothetically assumed (*vikalpa*), so that there cannot be any Inference in which the Abode is absolutely Unrecognised.

If then the Aprasiddha-Viśesana and the Aprasiddha-Viśesya are no Fallacies there cannot be any Fallacy of the nature of the Aprasiddhobhaya

असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकास्त्रयो हेत्वभासाः ॥ ४७ ॥

asiddha-viruddhānaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ | 47 |

TRANSLATION The Unproved (*asiddha*), the Opposed (*viruddha*) and the Doubtful (*anaikāntika*) are the three classes of the Mark-Fallacy

COMMENTARY The Mark or the Hetu has been described as "that which is known to be inseparably connected with the Sādhya-Dharma or the Proven-phenomena" What is not correctly determined as inseparately connected with the Proven and yet appears as such is a Mark-Fallacy (*hetvābhāsa* or Fallacious Mark)

यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिः प्रमाणेन न प्रतीयते सोऽसिद्धः ॥ ४८ ॥

*yasyānyathānupapattiḥ pramāṇena na pratīyate so'-
siddhaḥ* । 48 ।

TRANSLATION. (The Mark) the inseparable connection of which (with the Proven) is not determined through the Instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the 'Unproved' (*asiddha*).

COMMENTARY. The Mark which is known to be connected with the Opposite of the Proven is the 'Opposed' (*viruddha*) and the Mark, the inseparable connection of which with the Proven is known to be Uncertain is the 'Doubtful' (*anaikāntika*). In these cases, the nature of what appears as the Mark is *known*. But there may be cases in which the nature of this Mark is *not correctly known*. This happens when a man labours under Ignorance (*ajñāna*), Dubitation (*saṁdeha*) or Illusion (*viparyaya*). In such cases what appears as the Mark is the Unproved (*asiddha*).

स द्विविध उभयासिद्धोऽन्यतरासिद्धश्च ॥ ४९ ॥

sa dvividha ubhayāsiddho'nyataśāsiddhaś ca । 49 ।

TRANSLATION. That (the Unproved) is of two modes, viz, the Unproved-to-both-parties and the Unproved-to-one-party.

COMMENTARY. The fact of the inseparable connection of the Mark with the Proven 'may be Unproved to both the Disputant (*vādi*) and the Opponent (*pratīvādi*) in which case we have the Fallacious Mark, called the Unproved-to-both-parties (*ubhayāsiddha*),

Where, however, the true character of the Mark is Unproved to one of the parties only i.e. to either the Disputant or the Opponent, the Fallacious Mark is the Unproved-to-one-party (*anyatarāśiddha*)

उभयासिद्धो यथा परिणामी शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वात् ॥ ५० ॥

ubhayāśiddho yathā parimāmi śabdaś cākṣuṣatvāt
| 50 |

TRANSLATION Sound is subject to modification, because it is visible, here the Mark is Unproved-to-both-parties

COMMENTARY It goes without saying that neither the Disputant nor the Opponent will admit the Visibility of Sound, which is put forward as the Mark in the given argument Hence the Mark here is Unproved-to-both-parties.

अन्यतरासिद्धो यथा अचेतनास्तरवो विज्ञानेन्द्रियायुर्निरोध-
लक्षणमरणरहितत्वात् ॥ ५१ ॥

*anyatarāśiddho yathā acetanāstanavo vijñānendri-
yāyur nirōdha-laksana-marana-rahitatvāt* | 51 |

TRANSLATION Trees are unconscious, because they have not the death characterised by a suppression of the power of cognition of sense-faculty and of vitality, here the Mark is Unproved-to-one-party.

COMMENTARY The thinkers of the Tāthāgata School hold that Trees are unconscious The Hetu or the Reason in their argument is that Trees do not die

a death characterised by a loss of the power of cognition, of sensibility and of vitality, as is the case with animals. Now, this Hetu may be admitted by the Buddhists but the Jainas do not admit its validity. According to the Jaina scriptures, Trees have life, sense-faculties and the power of cognition (so that a death characterised by a loss of these powers does happen to the Trees). Hence the Hetu in the given argument is Unproved-to-one-party, i.e., to-the-Opponent.

An instance of a Mark which is Unproved-to-the-Disputant would be: 'Happiness etc., are unconscious because they have their origin'. Now, if the debate be about the character of Happiness etc., and if the disputant in the debate be a thinker of the Sāṃkhya School, the Validity of the Hetu (the fact of the origin of Happiness etc.) is unacceptable to him, because the Sāṃkhya School of philosophers maintains that nothing has ever an 'origin' (*utpatti*) but that it comes to 'explicitness' (*āvibhāva*) only.

The logicians of other schools, however, classify the Asiddha or the Fallacy-of-the-Unproved-Mark in the following way:

1. The Svarūpāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-by-its-nature or a Mark, the nature-of-which-is-Unproved; as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'Sound is impermanent, because it is Visible. Now, it may be urged that the Mark here i.e., Visibility inheres in such Abodes (*adhikaraṇa*) as Form etc., and as such, it should not be looked upon as the Svarūpāsiddha but as the Vyadhikaranāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-Unproved-because-of-its-inhering-in-an-Opposite (i.e., Different) Abode. But the Up-

holders of the Svarūpāsiddha theory point out that the Mark (Visibility) in the given argument is not shown in the argument as 'inhering in a different Abode'. The Mark in the given argument is rather shown as inhering-in-the-Abode-Sound. We are to judge the Mark as it is shown in the argument. Now, as Visibility inhering-in-Sound is an impossible phenomenon the Mark in the given argument is to be looked upon as the Svarūpāsiddha and not as the Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha

2. The Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-Unproved-because-of-its-inhering-in-an-Opposite (i.e., a different)-Abode; as for instance the Mark in the argument, 'Sound is impermanent, because a Cloth is a Product' Some may here argue that as the fact of being a Product which is the Mark in the argument, inheres in Sound also, the Mark here cannot be said to be the Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha; but the unpholders of the Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha here point out that although 'the fact of being a product' inheres in Sound also, it is not so shown in the argument. The Mark is rather shown as inhering in a *different* Abode. We are to judge the Mark as it is shown in the argument and accordingly, the Mark in the given argument is the Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha

3. The Viśesyāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-character-being-Unproved, as for instance the Mark in the argument, 'Sound is impermanent, because when possessed of a class-essence it is Visible.'

4. The Viśesanāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-quality-being-Unproved; as for instance, the Mark in the argument 'Sound is

impermanent, because when visible, it is possessed of a Class-essence'.

5. The Paksaikeśāsiddha, otherwise called the Bhāgāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved, because-of-a-part-of-its-Abode-being-Unproved; as for instance the Mark in the argument, 'Sound is impermanent, because it is adventitious' (*prayatnānantarīyaka*), i.e., produced by efforts. Sounds which we make are no doubt produced by us, so that the adventitious character is admittedly present in these Sounds. But the Sounds which arise from musical instruments are not generated by us; these sounds cannot accordingly be said to be adventitious. Thus, so far as these Sounds are concerned, the Mark, i.e., the adventitious character is not present in them and is accordingly the Bhāgāsiddha. It may be objected that these Sounds of musical instruments are produced by the efforts of God and are adventitious so that the Hetu is not Bhāgāsiddha in the argument. But the upholders of the Bhāgāsiddha theory here point out that by 'the adventitious character' of Sound it is meant that it is 'subject to modifications' (in intensity etc.,) in accordance with the modifications (in intensity etc.,) in the efforts of its generator. God however is eternal; his efforts are not subject to modifications from time to time; and hence the Sounds of musical instruments which are admittedly subject to modifications in intensity etc. cannot be said to be due to the efforts of God, i.e., adventitious. The Hetu, 'the adventitious character' is thus Bhāgāsiddha. From another view-point also, it is Bhāgāsiddha. The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit the existence of God, they cannot admit that the Sounds of musical instruments are produced by the efforts of

God; so far as the Mīmāṃsakas are concerned, the Hetu in the argument, viz., 'the adventitious character' of Sounds is thus Bhāgāsiddha

6 The Āśrayāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-Unproved, as because-of-its-locus-being Unproved, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'The Pradhāna (the one self-existent primal material cause of the world according to the thinkers of the Sāṃkhya School) exists because the world has a cause which is subject to modification'

7 The Āśrayaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-Unproved-because-of-a part-of-its locus-being-Unproved, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'The Pradhāna (the cosmic material cause), the Purusa (the souls) and the Īśvara (God) are eternal, because they are not created beings. The Jainas admit the reality of the Souls but not of the Pradhāna and of the Īśvara. So far as the Jainas are concerned, some (i.e., a part) of the loci, viz., the Pradhāna and the Īśvara being Unproved, the Hetu in the argument is Āśrayaikadeśāsiddha

8 The Samdigdhāśrayāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-Unproved-because-of-its-Locus-being-Doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, (where an animal is a Gavaya but the observer is doubtful whether it is a Cow and argues) The Cow is a wild Cow, because it is full of fear at the sight of man

9. The Samdigdhāśrayaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved because of-a-part-of-its Locus-being-Doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, (where there are two animals one of which is a Cow and the other, a Gavaya but the observer is doubtful whether the two animals are Cows and

argues) These two Cows are wild cows because they are full of fear at the sight of man.

10 The *Āśraya-saṃdigdha-vṛttyāsiddha*, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-the-operation-of-the Mark-in-a-point-of-the locus-being-Doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument (where the natures of both the locus, viz., a place alleged to contain peacocks and the Reason, viz., the sound peculiar to peacocks etc are known but where it is doubted whether there is really the operation of the Reason-phenomena, i.e., the peacock-sound in the place and yet this observer argues) This is a place having peacocks, because it is filled with peacock-sounds.

11 The *Āśrayaikadeśa-saṃdigdha-vṛttyāsiddha*, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-the-operation-of-the Mark-a-part-of-the Locus-being-Doubtful; as for instance, the Mark in the argument, (where the natures of both the Locus, viz., a *Sahakāra* and a *Karnikāra* trees and the Reason, viz., the sound peculiar to peacocks, are known but where it is doubted whether there is really the operation of the Reason-phenomena, i.e., the peacock-sound in a part of the Locus, i.e., in either the *Sahakāra* or the *Karnikāra* tree and yet the observer argues) Both of these two trees, viz., the *Sahakāra* and the *Karnikāra*, contain peacocks because both of them are filled with peacock-sounds.

12 The *Vyārtha-viśesanāsiddha*, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-qualifier-being-useless, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, Sound is impermanent because being possessed of a class-essence, it is a product.

13 The *Vyārtha-viśesyāsiddha*, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because of its-character-being-use-

less, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, Sound as impermanent because being a product, it is possessed of a class-essence

14 The Saṃdigdhāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which is-Unproved-because-of-its-being Doubtful; as for instance, the Mark in the argument, (where it is doubted whether what is observed is Smoke or Water-vapour and yet, the observer argues) That place is full of fire because it is full of Smoke.

15. The Saṃdigdha-viśesyāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which - is - unproved - because - of - its-Character-being-Doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'Even today Kapila is subject to attachment etc, because being possessed of the character of Purusa (i.e., a pure Soul) he has not right knowledge generated in him as yet'

16 The Saṃdigdha-viśesanāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved because-of-its-Qualifier-being-doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'Even today Kapila is subject to attachment etc because being devoid of right knowledge, he is possessed of the character of a Purusa.'

17 The Ekadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-partially-Unproved; as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'A thing has prior Non-existence, because it is characterised by annihilation and origination.

18 The Viśesanaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-Qualifier-being-partially-Unproved, as for instance 'the Mark in the argument, Darkness is of the nature of negation, because owing to its being different from a substance, an attribute and activity, it is an Effect' It is to be noted that so far as the Jainas are concerned the

contention that Darkness is not a substance is Unproved.

19. The Viśeṣyaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-character-being-partially-Unproved; as for instance the Mark in the argument, 'Darkness is of the nature of negation, because being an Effect it is different from a substance, an attribute and activity.

20. The Saṃdigdhaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-being-partially-Doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'That man is not Omniscient because he has the feeling of attachment and because he is a speaker.' There is nothing to show conclusively that the man is subject to the feeling of attachment and hence the fact of the man's having the feeling of attachment, a part of the Mark, is Doubtful

21. The Saṃdigdha-viśeṣanaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-Unproved-because-of-its Qualifier-being-partially-Doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'That man is not Omniscient, because being possessed of the feeling of attachment and being a speaker he is possessed of the character of a Purusa'

22. The Saṃdigdha-viśeṣyaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark-which-is-Unproved-because-of-its character-being-partially-doubtful, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'That man is not Omniscient because being possessed of the nature of a Purusa he has the feeling of attachment and is a speaker.

23. The Vyārthaiikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-being-partially-useless, as for instance the Mark in the argument, 'That mountain-

region is full of fire because it is full of perceptible smoke'

24. The Vyārtha-viśesanaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-Qualifier-being partially-Useless, for instance, the Mark in the argument, 'Sound is an attribute because owing to its having a class-essence and owing to its knowability it is cognisable by one of the outer senses. It is to be observed, here that a class-essence like that of being a from (*īūpatva*) although it is perceptible by one of the outer senses is nevertheless not an attribute. Hence that part of the Reason-premise is relevant, which speaks of 'having a class-essence' (instead of being a class-essence) as a subsidiary of the Reason for Sound being an attribute. But Knowability is obviously irrelevant as a subsidiary of the Reason for Sound being an attribute.

25 The Vyārtha-viśesyaikadeśāsiddha i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-character-being-partially-Useless, as for instance, the Mark in the argument, Sound is an attribute, because being cognisable by one of the outer senses, it is possessed of Knowability and of a class-essence'

In this way, the objectors go on mentioning and illustrating various other modes of the Unproved (*asiddha*) and ask the Jainas. Why are not these modes recognised by you?

The Jainas answer that of the above alleged Reason-fallacies those which are really the Fallacies of the Mark or the Reason are included either in the class of the Unproved-to-both-the-parties or of the Unproved-to-one-of-the-parties the only two classes of the Reason-fallacies recognised by the Jainas. As

regards the Hetvābhāsa, called the Vyadhī-karana, i.e., a Mark which is Unproved-because-of-its-inherence-in-an-Opposite-Abode, the Jainas point out that there are cases in which such a Mark is not Fallacious. Let us consider the argument, 'The Son is possessed of the Brāhmaṇa-hood because his Father has the Brāhmaṇa-hood. Here the Reason, Brāhmaṇa-hood inheres in the Father, an Abode different from the Abode of the Proven. Yet the argument is often accepted as quite sound, which would not have been the case if the Mark, Brāhmaṇa-hood, inhering, as it does, in a different Abode were Fallacious, i.e., Vyadhīkaranāsiddha. The Objectors contend that if a Mark (Brāhmaṇa-hood) inhering in a different Abode (Father) were a valid one, then how is it that this Mark does not prove the Brāhmaṇa-hood of, say, a dancer, a servant etc. as well? The Jainas meet this contention by counter-asking: How is it that an Abode, e.g., a Hill, in and by itself, does not prove the existence of Fire there? If it be said that the Hill, in and by itself, does not, prove the existence of Fire in it, because there is Vyabhiçāra or a relationship-which-is-inconstant' between Hill and Fire, the Jainas may reply that the Brāhmaṇa-hood in a Dancer, a Servant etc. is Unproved, as there is no constant relationship between Brāhmaṇa-hood and the being of a dancer, a servant etc. The Brāhmaṇa-hood in the Father on the other hand proves the Brāhmaṇa-hood of the Son, because the former is necessarily suggestive (*gamaka*) of the latter. The Objectors contend that if a Hetu or Reason is in all cases related to what is connected with the Proven, then a Hetu cannot be the Vyadhīkaraṇa, i.e., inherent-in-a-different-Abode in any case. The Jainas

point out that in cases where the Hetu is not related to what is connected with the Proven, they are prepared to admit that the Hetu is fallacious and that they would not mind if the Hetu is called Vyadhikarana in such cases. The Jainas hold that such being the characteristic of a Vyadhikarana Hetu, Knowability etc. in the above examples are instances of Vyadhikarana Hetus and that Hetus which are Vyabhicārī (i.e., connected-with-what-is-other-than-the-Proven) etc. are not to be looked upon as Vyadhikarana Hetus. Accordingly if the objectors define a Vyadhikarana Hetu as a Hetu which is stated to exist in an Abode, different from the Pakṣa or the given in an argument, the Jainas would point out that to that definition it should also be added that such a Hetu is also to be Agamaka or unsuggestive of the Proven. In other words, according to the Jainas, a Vyadhikarana Hetu is that which exists in a different Abode and is unsuggestive of the Proven. The objectors contend that this addition to their definition is not necessary, a Hetu is Vyadhikarana, only if it exists in a different Abode. They point out that in the argument about the Son's Brāhmaṇa-hood from his Father's Brāhmaṇa-hood, the Hetu is not really a Vyadhikarana, because the Hetu 'because the Father is possessed of Brāhmaṇa-hood' implies 'because he is born of a Brāhmaṇa', so that there is no question of the real Hetu, existing in a different Abode in this argument. When, however, the Hetu is found in a different Abode, it is a Vyadhikarana Hetu. The Jainas, on the contrary, point out that unless an argument exposes explicitly the unsuggestive character of the Hetu, the Hetu cannot be condemned as a Vyadhikarana-siddha Hetu. Let us take the Hetu, 'because a

cloth is a product'; it no doubt establishes 'the cloth is impermanent'; but unless the unsuggestive character of this Hetu is clearly stated or understood there is no reason why it should not by 'implication' establish the further fact that 'Sound is impermanent' from this fact, 'the cloth is impermanent', so that in relation to the conclusion, 'the Sound is impermanent' you cannot say that the Hetu 'because a cloth is a product' is Vyadhikarana. You are always to carefully consider whether the Hetu in an argument is suggestive of the Sādhya. In the example given of the Vyadhikaranasiddha Hetu, you are to consider, there cannot be a rule that 'because a cloth is a product', a thing other than a cloth is necessarily impermanent'; in other words you are to find out that 'the fact of a cloth being a product' does not necessarily lead to 'the fact of a thing other than a cloth being impermanent'; the Hetu 'the fact of a cloth being a product' is not-in-constant-relationship with' (*vyabhicāra*) and is unsuggestive-of (*agamaka*) the Sādhya, so far as the conclusion 'a thing other than a cloth' is concerned; unless this unsuggestive character of a Hetu is found out, you cannot say that a Hetu is Vyadhikaranāsiddha, even though it exists in a different Abode. As a matter of fact, the arguments, 'There is Moon in the sky, because Moon is found in the water', 'The Śakāṭa-constellation will rise because the Krittikā-constellation is found to rise', show that a Hetu may exist in a different Abode and yet be not a Fallacious one of the class of the Vyadhikaranāsiddha. In other words, a Hetu may be a Vyadhikarana and yet be not an Asiddha one.

The Jainas next point out that the Mark-Fallacy known as the Āśrayāsiddha or a Mark which is Un-

proved because-of its Locus-being-Unproved is not really a Fallacy of the Mark. Such a Fallacy is alleged to be committed in an argument (e g, Omniscient Being exists) in which the Locus of the Proven) the Dharmī i e, the Omniscient Being) is unproved. The Jamas urge that the Dharmī or the Locus cannot be said to be absolutely Unproved. They proceed in this way if you ask: How is the Locus, the Omniscient Being proved? we may ask How is that unproved? If it be said that the Pramānas show the impossibility of Omniscience, the Jaina thinkers point out that what the Pramānas of the objectors deal with is not the matter of Omniscience itself but the possible existence or non-existence of an Omniscient Being. The fact of Omniscience itself is taken for granted in the arguments of the objectors and their arguments are aimed at establishing the non-existence of Omniscience. The Jainas urge that if the fact of Omniscience were not taken for granted in the arguments of the Objectors, their arguments would be absolutely pointless, the argument would be about nothing, so to say, just like the brandishing of a sword, in sky. In other words, the arguments of the objectors would be Āśrayāsiddha, i e, fallacious arguments in which the Locus of the Proven is unproved. The arguments of the objectors aimed against the theory of the Jamas that the Locus cannot be said to be absolutely unproved are thus fallacious. This is finely described in the couplet "If in your Anumāna or argument, there can never be a case in which the Locus is unproved, how can you say that there may be cases in my Anumāna in which the Locus is unproved? If in your Anumāna (i e., the counter-argument used against the Jaina theory that there cannot be any argument in

which the Locus is absolutely Unproved), there is the Fallacy of the Unproved Locus, then how can your argument (which is admittedly fallacious) set aside my (i.e., a Jaina's) theory?" The fact is, as the Jainas point out, that the Locus (Dharma) in an argument cannot be said to be absolutely Unproved by any one using an argument. The existence or the truth of the Locus may not be strictly proved but the Locus must be admitted for the time being as a 'Hypothetical Assumption' or an Assumption-for-the-argument's-sake (Vikalpa); otherwise the very argument becomes impossible. The assumption of the Locus in an argument which is an unavoidable necessity does not however amount to its demonstrative proof; the strict proof of the Locus requires further Pramāṇas. The Objectors criticise this theory of the Vikalpa or Assumption and contend that if what is given by Vikalpa is to be tested by Pramāṇas, it may as well be said that what is given by the Pramāṇas, is also to be substantiated by further Pramāṇas and so on; to avoid this absurdity, one is compelled to accept the matter of Vikalpa as true in and by itself; the objectors point out that if in this way Vikalpa or Assumption be a complete proof of its matter, any and every Reason, e.g., 'the fact of being visible' would be a good Hetu for the conclusion 'Sound is impermanent' the conclusion being true in and by itself because of Vikalpa. The Jainas urge, in reply, that this is a misconception of the nature of Vikalpa.

Vikalpa does not say that the Locus is an existent fact; an argument would have been useless, if the Locus were proved to be true by Vikalpa. An analogy will here well explain the Jaina position. The Pratyakṣa

or direct perception gives us the apprehension of the Hill either as Fire or as Non-fire; but this does not mean that our argument (*anumāna*) about the Fire character of the Hill is useless. The objectors may contend here that the Pratyaksa gives us the apprehension of the Hill, devoid of any details whether as Fire or as Non-Fire and that the Anumāna establishing the Fire character of the Hill is not useless. The Jainas turn this line of the objectors' argument against the objectors themselves and point out that the Vikalpa gives us the idea of the Omniscient devoid of the details whether as existent or as non-existent and that the Anumāna trying to attribute any of these details to the Omniscient is not similarly useless. If, however, the objectors ask. How is this content or matter of the Vikalpa, the Omniscient which is neither existent nor non-existent conceivable? the Jainas would reply by counter-asking: How is the content or the matter of the Pratyaksa, the Hill, which is neither Fire nor Non-Fire, conceivable? If again, the objectors maintain that the matter of the Pratyaksa is thus much viz., that is a Hill, the Jainas would similarly urge that the matter of the Vikalpa also is just an idea of the Omniscient and nothing more than that. The Jainas point out that in this way there is some similarity between the matter of the Pratyaksa and the matter of the Vikalpa. The difference between them is that whereas the Pratyaksa being a Pramāna or a source of true knowledge its matter is real and true, the Vikalpa being a mere Assumption its matter is nothing more than something *assumed*. The objectors cannot say that the Vikalpa is useless to a reasoning man. For, when a sophist, proud of his argumentative power,

supports a false proposition, e.g., that there is such a thing as the horn in an ass, no right-thinking reasoning man tolerates it but puts forward reasons for setting aside that false proposition: in such cases, the latter must proceed by assuming the absurd thing and then showing its absurdity. It is thus that the Vikalpa is in many cases unavoidable to a reasoning man. The objectors might say that where a sophist is found to support a false proposition, the proper course for a right-thinking reasoning man is to keep silence. The Jainas point out that no reasoning man including the objectors themselves, would ever keep silence when a proposition which is false according to him is mooted out before him but that he would at once adduce arguments to refute it. This necessitates an Assumption for-the-argument's-sake (*vikalpa*) of the subject-matter of the false proposition, for the time being even by a right-thinking reasoner. This, however, does not mean that the Vikalpa is enough and Pramāṇa or proof is not necessary. The Pramāṇa is necessary to establish the truth or otherwise of a matter under observation. One may assume something; another may *assume* its exact opposite. In such cases, Pramāṇa comes in and decides for certain whether the subject-matter of one Assumption or of the other is really existent. The Objectors argue that there are cases in which the subject-matters of the Vikalpa are incapable of being proved by the Pramāṇa; in such cases, these subject-matters may be said to be established by the Vikalpa or Assumption and good reasoners are often found to accept the Vikalpa-proved character of these subject-matters. The objectors thus show that the Vikalpa, if admitted to be a source of knowledge may

be tantamount to proof in many cases and contend that the Vikalpa may in this way attribute Visibility to Sound. The Jainas admit that the Vikalpa may attribute Visibility to Sound; but the real existence of Visibility in Sound is not proved thereby. Visibility in Sound is a mere Assumption. The Vikalpa or Assumption, however, does not prove the real-existence of Visibility in Sound. If the Pramāṇa is brought to bear on this subject matter of the Vikalpa, it will be found that the Visibility in Sound is contradicted by direct perception. The real existence of Visibility in Sound is thus not proved by Vikalpa and there is no sense in saying that the Vikalpa, as a source of knowledge, if admitted, may establish Visibility in Sound. It is in this way that the Jainas show that the so-called Āśrayāsiddha is not a real Hetu-fallacy.

The argument that 'there is the Pradhāna, because the universe is due to a cause which has modifications' is bad not because the Āśraya or the Locus is Unproved but because the Hetu or the Reason, i.e., 'the fact that the universe is due to a cause which has modifications' is Svarūpāsiddha or Fallacious 'because of-its-nature-being Unproved'. It is in this way that the fallacious Hetu called the Āśrayaikadeśāsiddha, i.e., a Mark, 'a part of the Locus of which is Unproved' may be shown to be not a real Hetu-Fallacy. It will be remembered that the so-called Āśrayaikadeśāsiddha fallacy has been illustrated as follows: 'The Pradhāna and the Soul are eternal: because they are uncreate' (the reality of the Pradhāna which is one of the Locī in the argument, being Unproved). The objectors point out that if in this argument, the Āśrayaikadeśāsiddha fallacy is not admitted the Pradhāna would become eternal like the

Soul. The Jainas refute this contention of the objectors in the following way. In what sense, do you think the Pradhāna to be eternal? If you say that the Pradhāna is eternal in the sense that it has an existence which has 'neither a beginning nor an end', then it is clear that the Hetu in the argument, i.e., 'the fact of being uncreate' does not necessarily establish (*vyabhicāra*) such an Eternality. A fact, e.g., absolute Non-existence (or for the matter of that, an Absolutely Non-existent fact) is obviously uncreate but it is not Eternal in the sense that it is eternally Existent. If on the otherhand, you mean by Eternality having no beginning or end', then the given argument is vitiated by Siddha-sādhyatā, i.e., an attempt to prove an addmitted fact. If by the Eternality of the Pradhāna, nothing more is meant than that 'the Pradhāna has neither a beginning nor an end' then no argument is necessary to prove this; for, the Jainas admit that the Pradhāna as an Absolute Non-existence, i.e., an Absolutely Non-existent fact, has neither a beginning nor an end. An argument thus becomes Fallacious not because the Locus or a part of it is 'Unproved' but because the Hetu in it is not necessarily connected with the Proven. To this position of the Jainas, the objectors (who are upholders of the Āśrayaikaśāśiddha Fallacy) object by saying: Take the argument, 'Devadatta and a Barren Woman's son are possessed of mouths; because they are speakers'; surely, the argument is wrong, not because there is no necessary relationship between 'possession of mouths' (Proven) and 'the fact of being speakers' (the Mark) but because a Barren Woman's son (a part of the Locus) is Unproved. The Jainas however urge that even this argument is wrong because of the fallacious

character of the Hetu in it. The 'speakership of the Barren Woman's son' is fallacious as a Hetu; there is no evidence which would prove 'speakership in a Barren Woman's son'. The Hetu being an impossibility, the argument based on it is wrong. The Āśrayaika-deśāsiddha is thus not a real Hetu Fallacy.

The Jainas go on showing that the Saṃdigdhāśrayāsiddha also is not a Hetu Fallacy. The Hetu (e.g., Smoke) is what is invariably connected with the Sādhyā (e.g., Fire). The Dharmī or the Abode (e.g., the Hill) in which the Sādhyā-Dharma or the Proven-phenomenon (e.g., Fire) is to be established is otherwise called the Pakṣa. If the Dharmī is Unproved, it is a case of the Pakṣa-Fallacy. The Pakṣa is a well-known fact (*prasiddha*). If its character as the Pakṣa is 'doubted' (*saṃdigdha*) then it is not a well-known fact and as such, it is a fallacious Pakṣa. Accordingly, what is called the Saṃdigdhāśrayāsiddha is not really a Hetu-fallacy but a Pakṣa-fallacy.

The Saṃdigdhāśrayaika-deśāsiddha also is similarly not a Hetu-Fallacy. It will be remembered that in the cases of such a Fallacy, the nature of the Hetu as well as the nature of the Locus are known but the argument becomes fallacious because it is based on a Doubtful knowledge of the-operation-of-the-Reason-in-the-Locus. The Jaina logicians point out that if Pakṣa-dharmatva (Existence-in-the Abode) be admitted to be a characteristic of a valid Reason, then of course the Āśraya-Saṃdigdha-vṛttisiddha may also be admitted to be a mode of the Asiddha or Unproved Hetu. The Jainas, however, do not admit the Pakṣa-dharmatva to be a characteristic of a Hetu and Āśraya-Saṃdigdha-vṛttisiddha is not a mode of the Asiddha Hetu

according to them Are we then to say, ask the objectors, that even if the fact of the 'operation-of-the Reason-in-the Locūs' (*āśrayavṛtti*) is not ascertained one is entitled to infer, for example, 'the existence of Peacocks in a certain place from the peacock sound'? The Jainas answer that the inference is certainly wrong; but this is not because the-operation-of-Reason-in-the-Locūs is doubted but because the Hetu in the argument is not necessarily connected with the Sādhya and as such is Agamaka i.e., not-leading-to-the Proven. And it is for this reason:- Peacock-sound as a Mark, establishes the existence of the Peacock with which fact as the Proven it is necessarily connected. Peacock-sound, however, does not prove the existence of the Peacock *in a certain given place*; if the Proven be, not the existence of the Peacock simply but its existence *in a certain given place*, then the valid Mark for such a Proven would be, not the Peacock-sound simply, but the Peacock-sound emanating from *that given place*. The Peacock-sound thus does not prove the existence of the Peacock *in a certain place*, not because it is an Asiddha Hetu of the Āśraya-Saṃdigdha-Vṛtṭyasiddha kind but because it is Agamaka.

In the same way, the Jainas urge, the alleged Hetu-Fallacy of the Āśrayaikaśeṣa-Saṃdigdha-Vṛtṭyasiddha mode is also to be understood as not a Fallacy of the Asiddha class.

The Jainas point out that the alleged two modes of the Fallacious Reason viz , the Vyārtha-viśeṣaṇa and the Vyārtha-viśeṣya, are not Asiddha Hetus The application of these two kinds of the Reason is due simply to want of skill on the part of the speaker which makes him indulge in redundant and useless words

The alleged Asiddha Fallacies of the Vyarthakadeśa-siddha etc., etc., are also to be similarly understood

Thus it is established that of the various modes of the Asiddha described by the objectors, some are not Asiddha at all and those which are really Asiddha come under either the Ubhayāsiddha (Unproved-to-both-the-parties) or the Anyatarāsiddha (Unproved-to-one-of-the-parties), the two broad classes of the Asiddha Hetus recognised by the Jainas.

It is contended by the objectors that there is not really any Asiddha Hetu (i.e., Reason which is fallacious because-of-its being unproved) which is Anyatarāsiddha or unproved-to-one-of-the-parties (either the Disputant or the Opponent). They argue as follows.—In a disputation, Pramāṇas or valid arguments are either put forward to establish what is Unproved-to-one-of-the-parties by the other party or not so put forward by him. If the Pramāṇas are so put forward, then there cannot be anything like an Anyatarāsiddha Hetu because the Pramāṇa as convincing arguments would make the Hetu 'proved' not only to the party who puts them forward but to the other party also. If, on the other hand, no Pramāṇas are put forward for the verification of the Hetu, then the Hetu is Ubhayāsiddha or Unproved, not only to one of the parties but to both the parties. The objectors contend further that the Anyatarāsiddha character of a Hetu cannot be also supported by saying that a Hetu is Anyatarāsiddha, at least so long as it is not established by the Pramāṇas. For, such temporary 'un-proof' of a Hetu does not make it an *essentially* Unproved Hetu. You cannot call a Hetu Anyatarāsiddha *by nature*, even so long as it is not established, just as you cannot call a

real Jewel a false stone, even so long as it is not found to be a real Jewel. Lastly, the objectors point out that it is impossible for a disputant to use a Hetu which is 'proved' to him but 'unproved-to-his-opponent', a Hetu which is thus Anyatarāśiddha. For, as soon as such a Hetu (i.e., a Hetu which is 'proved-to-the-disputant' but 'unproved-to-the-opponent') is used by the disputant, the disputant is 'worsted' (*nugrḥīta*), for having used an Asiddha or 'unproved' Hetu. According to the recognised rules of all disputations a party who is thus 'worsted', is not allowed to prove or substantiate his position (i.e., show that the Hetu used by him is at least 'proved' to-him-though-unproved-to-the-opponent' and is on that account, an Anyatarāśiddha Hetu) after he is 'worsted', because a debate terminates as soon as one of the parties to the debate is 'worsted'. It is thus that the objectors contend that there cannot be any Hetu which is Anyatarāśiddha or 'un-proved-to-one-of-the parties'.

The Jainas, on the contrary, urge that an Anyatarāśiddha Hetu is quite conceivable. A disputant may be convinced of the truth of the Hetu used by him but on account of his forgetting the evidence in support of the Hetu or other causes he may fail to substantiate the Hetu before his opponent or enquirers and yet he tenaciously refuses to acknowledge that his Hetu is Unproved: In such a case, the disputant is certainly declared 'worsted', but he is 'worsted', not because his Hetu is Ubhayāśiddha (he himself at least is convinced of the validity of his Hetu) but because it is Anyatarāśiddha (unproved to persons, other than himself). So, here at least is an instance of the Anyatarāśiddha Hetu. Another instance of the Anyatarā-

siddha Hetu will be in the following case. Suppose, a disputant uses a Hetu which he himself does not admit to be true but he uses it, knowing that his opponent acknowledges it to be true. Take for example a debate between a Sāṃkhya philosopher and a Jaina thinker, in which the former puts forward the argument, 'Happiness etc., are unconscious, because like a pitcher they have an origin'. A Jaina believes in the origination of a Phenomenon and consequently, the Hetu in the argument may be 'proved' to him. But a Sāṃkhya thinker is opposed to the doctrine of the real origination of a phenomenon and hence the Hetu used by him in the above argument is Unproved-to-himself. The Hetu is thus Anyatarāśiddha and the Sāṃkhya disputant using this Hetu is sure to be declared 'worsted'.

The Jaina logicians point out in this connection that any argument in which the disputant uses a Hetu which is not admitted by him but which is admitted by his opponent and which leads to a conclusion which contradicts the opponents' position is not necessarily useless. Such a Hetu is called the Prasanga-Sādhana. A Prasanga is a proposition showing the invariable connection between its terms, a proposition supported by the Pramānas which is meant to expose the contradiction involved in one's opponent's position. For example, let us suppose that a Jaina puts forward the argument:—'Whatever is absolutely self-identical cannot inhere in many (i.e., more than one) things; as for instance, an Atom; a Class-essence is such (i.e., absolutely self-identical); how then can a Class-essence inhere in many (i.e., in the various Individuals of the class) (implying thereby that the Class-essence cannot

be absolutely self identical? In this argument, the proposition 'whatever is absolutely self-identical cannot inhere in many' is the Prasamga. There is a necessary connection between 'absolute-self-identity' and 'impossibility-of-the-inhering in-many', which is apparent because of (as it is technically expressed in the language of the Indian logic) the non-observation (*anupalabdhi*) of the 'absolute self-identity' (the *vyāpya*) without 'the negation of inhering in many' (the *vyapaka*). The fact of the 'absolute self-identity' is the Prasamga-sādhana here; it is a Hetu which is not admitted by a Jaina but which is admitted by his opponent; the Jaina logician uses the Hetu (though it is Anyatarāśiddha inasmuch as it is not admitted by him) to show that his opponent who admits this Hetu cannot consistently maintain that the Class-essence inheres in the Individuals of the class. It may be asked: How is the Jaina logician entitled to argue that the Hetu viz., the fact of 'the absolute self-identity' which is not at all admitted by him leads to (*gamaka*) an altogether different fact or phenomenon (*dharmaṁtara*) 'the negation of the inherence in many Individuals'? In other words, the objection is that the theory of the Anyatarāśiddha Hetu makes the Prasamgasādhana inapplicable.

The Jainas contend that the above objection is unreasonable. A Prasamga Hetu is the supposition of a fact which supposition necessarily involves the supposition of another fact;—a Prasamga-Hetu is not a Hetu which deals with real facts of experience. A Hetu which is a matter of real experience and leads to another real fact of experience is the Maula Hetu, otherewise called the Prasamga-viparyaya. Let us analyse the Prasamga Hetu in the argument under

consideration. 'Inherence in many individuals' involves 'man-ness'; a fact or being cannot 'inhere in many individuals' if it is strictly 'self-identical', in technical language, 'man-ness' is thus the Vyāpaka of 'inherence in many'. A class-essence is supposed (by the opponents of the Jaina School) to be 'absolutely self-identical', it can thus be fixed to one Individual by nature so that if the Class-essence is fixed to one Individual, it cannot at the same time participate in the nature of and inhere in another Individual. 'Man-ness' is thus the pre-condition (*vyāpaka*) of 'inherence in many'. Now 'absolute self-identity' is opposed to 'man-ness'. The Class-essence to which the Opponents attribute 'absolute self-identity' cannot have the characteristic of 'inherence in many'; because, as shown above, 'inherence in many' involves ('is pervaded by') 'man-ness' and 'man-ness' (*vyāpaka*) 'receding from' (i.e., being inconsistent with) 'absolute self-identity', 'inherence in many' (*vyāpya*) becomes necessarily impossible for the Class-essence. A Prasamgā Hetu (i.e., 'the absolute self-identity' of the Class essence) however, is not based on experience; it cannot accordingly prove how 'absolute self-identity' is opposed to 'inherence in many'. Here comes in the real experiential Hetu, the Maula or the Prasamga-viparyaya Hetu which consists in the positive experience of some phenomena which 'is pervaded' by something opposed. The argument, based on this Maula Hetu may be put as follows — 'Whatever inheres in many is many; as for instance, the many palm fruits placed in many pots; the Class-essence inheres in many Individuals'. The conclusion follows that it is impossible for the Class-essence to be 'one, absolutely self-identical'. But the

COMMENTARY: In both the arguments, the fact of the possession of the faculty of conception (and of the similar faculties or recognition, of true cognition, of false knowledge etc.) is the Reason.

The first is said to be the argument of the Sāṃkhya thinkers 'The Soul is eternal because it is possessed of the faculty of conception etc.'; The reason, 'the possession of the faculty of conception etc.,' is however a Viruddha Hetu here. For, a Being who is not of an immutable nature, i.e., who is not eternal but is of an ever-varying nature can be possessed of the mental faculties of conception etc. The Reason in the given argument is thus connected with the opposite of the Proven. In the technical language of the Indian logic, the Hetu here is 'pervaded' by (*vyāpta*) what is opposed to the Sādhya and is accordingly a Viruddha Hetu. It may be asked: How is the Hetu, 'the possession of the faculties of conception etc.,' connected with the opposite of the Sādhya, viz., 'an ever-varying nature'? The Jainas point out that if the Soul be supposed to be of an immutable nature, it cannot have the said faculties. For, in an absolutely unchangeable Being, just as in the state of unperturbed deep sleep, there can never be any 'urge-towards outward' (*pravṛtti*), as manifested in our tendency to grasp or appropriate the outside object; so that there cannot be in it any faculty of conception or the like. If, on the otherhand, the faculties of conception etc., are attributed to it, the Soul cannot be said to be of a fixed and unchangeable nature. Nor can the Sāṃkhya thinkers defend their contention by saying that a Soul has different states or conditions (*avasthā*) and that the possession and the non-possession of the different faculties are due to

It has abundantly been shown above that although a Prasamga Hetu which is admittedly a mode of the Anyatarāsiddha Hetu is not useless, the Jainas do nowhere mean to say that the Anyatarāsiddha Hetu can directly lead to (*gamaka* of) the Proven.

साध्यविपर्ययेनैव यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिरध्यवसीयते स

विरुद्धः ॥ ५२ ॥

sādhya-viparyayaṇaiva yasyānyathānupapattiradhyavasīyate sa viruddhaḥ | 52 |

TRANSLATION: That (Reason) is opposed (*viruddha*), the invariable connection of which is known to be with the opposite of the Proven

COMMENTARY The Hetu which is called the Viruddha is described here. It is a Hetu which (instead of being invariably connected with the Sādhya) is invariably connected with what is opposed to the Sādhya but is used in an argument under a mistaken idea that it is invariably connected with the Sādhya

यथा नित्य एव पुरुषोऽनित्य एव वा, प्रत्यभिज्ञानादि-

मत्त्वात् ॥ ५३ ॥

yathā nitya eva puruṣo'nitya eva vā pratyabhijñānādimattvāt | 53 |

TRANSLATION: As for instance. (the Reason in the argument) the Soul is eternal or the Soul is non-eternal because it is possessed of the faculty of conception etc.

In criticism of the Saugata position, it is pointed out that Recollection and conception are not possible in a conscious Being who is absolutely destroyed as soon as it comes into existence, even though this conscious Being may belong to one and the same series (*eka-santāna*) with other such conscious Beings, just as Recollection and Conception of the matters of one mind are not possible in a different mind. Recollection and Conception are possible only in a Being who is both permanent and impermanent. There is no contradiction if a Being is held as such, just as there is no inconsistency in holding a thing to be both general and particular (as we have seen).

Another instance of the Reason-which-is-opposed would be the Reason in the argument; 'That is a Horse; because it has Horns.'

The Viruddha Hetus may be subdivided in the following manner.

In the first group there are the Sapaksas (i.e., Similar Abodes of the Proven) and the Hetu is opposed. In the second group, there are no Sapaksas and the Hetu is opposed. Each of these two modes of the Viruddha Hetu is of four kinds. In all, accordingly, we have eight sub-classes of the Viruddha Hetu. These are illustrated as follows. In the first four of the following sub-classes, there are Sapaksas of the Sādhyā and the Hetu is opposed to the Sādhyā.

1) The Paksa-vipaksa-vyāpaka or the Fallacious Reason of the opposed class, which 'pervades' the Abode as well as the Dissimilar Abode of the Proven. As for instance, take the argument; 'Sound is eternal, because it is a product'. In this argument as well as the following arguments there are 'Similar Abodes'

those states. For, the Jainas ask, do those states pertain to the nature of the Soul or do they not? In the first case, we have the self-same immutable Soul only, different states of it are practically impossible. And in this connection the further difficulty is: How the fact of the difference in the states themselves to be accounted for? If on the other hand states do not form the nature of the Soul, we have the states independent of the Soul and cannot talk of them as states of the Soul.

The second argument, 'The Soul is impermanent because it is possessed of the faculty of conception etc.,' is the argument of the Saugata School. In this argument also, the Hetu is a Viruddha Hetu. For, the faculty of conception etc., is possible only in a Being who is not radically changing every moment but who preserves himself in his varied modifications. The Reason in the given argument is thus connected with the opposite of the Proven, 'is pervaded by what is opposed to the Sādhya'. The Sādhya in the Sāṃkhya argument was an eternally immutable Soul while that in the Saugata argument it is a being who is of momentary existence only. Parināmī Purusa, i.e., a Soul which is undergoing change and modification every moment but which nevertheless preserves its essential nature in spite of those modifications, is obviously opposed to both the Sāṃkhya and the Saugata Sādhya and possession of the mental faculties is possible only in the Parināmī Purusa. Hence the Jainas contend that the Hetu in both the Sāṃkhya and the Saugata arguments is 'pervaded' by the Parināmī Puruṣa, as self-preserving though changing Being, a Being, who, as shown above, is opposed to the Sādhya of the Sāṃkhya and the Saugata arguments.

Now, so far as the argument under consideration is concerned, the Hetu ('the fact of being a product') is present in the Pakṣa (viz., 'Sound' which is attempted to be proved Eternal) and also present in the Vipakṣa (viz., the Pitcher etc., which are admittedly Non-eternal).

2) The Vipakṣaikaadeśa-vṛttih Pakṣavyāpakah or the Fallacious Reason of the opposed class, which is connected with a part of the Dissimilar Abode and which 'pervades' the Abode of the Proven. As for instance, take the argument: 'Sound is eternal, because it being possessed of Class-essence is capable of being grasped by our outward senses'. The Hetu 'Perceptibility' by outer senses here 'pervades' the Abode, its existence in such Dissimilar Abodes as the Pitcher etc., (which are non-eternal but perceptible by outer senses) but not in the Dissimilar Abodes like Pleasure etc., (which are non-eternal but not perceptible by outer senses).

3) The Pakṣa-vipakṣaikaadeśa-vṛttih or the Fallacious Reason of the opposed class which is connected with a part of the Abode and a part of the Dissimilar Abode. As for instance, take the argument. 'Sound is eternal, because it is capable of being modified by one's efforts'. In this argument the Hetu (Modifiability) is present in such Abodes as Sounds made by a man but not present in such Abodes as Sounds of wind; is present in such Dissimilar Abodes as the Pitcher etc., (which are 'modifiable') but not present in such Dissimilar Abodes as Lightning etc., (which are not 'modifiable').

4) The Pakṣaikaadeśa-vṛttih Vipakṣa-vyāpakah or the Fallacious Reason of the opposed class, which is

such as Ether etc, which are all eternal. 'Product' means what is the result of its own group of causes. That which has both a beginning and an end, is 'non-eternal'; well, this is the meaning of 'non-eternal' according to some and only this meaning of 'non-eternal' has application in this argument. 'Prior non-existence' precedes the coming into existence of a thing, has obviously no beginning (although it has a termination) and is eternal on that account. And so it is also a Sapakṣa, 'Prior non-existence' is certainly not a 'product'. Accordingly the Reason, 'the fact of being a product' does not inhere in any Sapakṣas, including 'Prior non-existence'. So, the first condition of a Viruddha Hetu has been fulfilled in this argument; and this has been possible because 'non-eternal' has been taken in the sense, given above

The sense of the word, 'product' has been given above. Now if the given argument is to be an instance where the Hetu is a Viruddha Hetu, that sense of the word 'product' is to be stuck to. Some, however mean by 'product' 'that which has a beginning'. If this meaning be applied to the word 'product', it would be seen that 'Posterior non-existence' or what follows when a thing is destroyed becomes a 'product'. 'Posterior non-existence', however, is eternal; for, although it has a beginning, it has no end. Accordingly, the result of attributing this meaning to the word, 'product' is that some eternal phenomenon (viz., 'Posterior non-existence') becomes a 'product'. The Reason, 'the fact of being a Product' thereby comes to inhere in a Sapakṣa and being inherent in the Vipakṣa, as will presently be shown, becomes an Anaikāntika and not a Viruddha Hetu.

a Pitcher, shows that the given Hetu is related to the Dharmī-Viśesa-viparīta also. As observed already, the Hetu here, would not be valid if the Buddhist contention were sound, in spite of the fact that the Hetu ('that it is a creation') is essentially related to the Sādhya ('that it is non-eternal'). Obviously the Buddhist contention is unreasonable.

यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिः संदिह्यते सोऽनैकान्तिकः ॥ ५४ ॥

yasyānyathānupapattiḥ saṁdihyate so'naikāntikaḥ
| 54 |

TRANSLATION: A Reason, the invariable relationship of which (with the Proven) is Doubted is the Doubtful.

COMMENTARY: The third class of the Fallacious Reason is the Anaikāntika or the Doubtful. A Hetu which is sometimes found to be present on the presence of the Sādhya but which is also sometimes found to be present on the absence of the Sādhya is the Doubtful, inasmuch as its invariable and necessary relationship with the Proven is Doubted.

स द्वेधा, निर्णीतविपक्षवृत्तिकः संदिग्धविपक्षवृत्तिकश्च
॥ ५५ ॥

sa dvedhā, nirṇīta-vipakṣa-vṛttikaḥ saṁdigdhā-vipakṣa-vṛttikaś ca | 55 |

TRANSLATION: It is of two kinds, viz., that of which the connection with the Dissimilar Abode is

connected with a part of the Abode and which 'pervades' the Dissimilar Abode. As for instance, take the argument.—'The Earth is eternal because it is a creation' The Hetu ('the fact of being a creation') is present in such parts of the Earth as the Dvyanuka etc., (molecular combinations of Atoms) but not in such parts of the Earth, the Abode, as the Atoms (which are uncreate), the given Hetu characterises also all the Dissimilar Abodes, e.g., the Pitcher etc., (which are all non-eternal)

The above are the four modes of the Fallacious Reason of the opposed class, in arguments in which there are similar Abodes of the Reason. In the following four modes, the arguments have no Similar Abodes.

5) The Paksa-vipaksa-vyāpakah or the Fallacious Reason of the opposed class which 'pervades' the Abode as well as the Dissimilar Abode. As for instance, take the argument:—'Sound is the Peculiar characteristic of Ether because it is knowable'. It would be noted that there being no other peculiar characteristic of Ether there cannot be any Sapaksa or the Similar Abode of the Proven in this argument or in the following three arguments. Now in the argument under consideration, the Hetu ('knowability') is present in the Paksa ('sound') as well as in the Vipaksa ('material form').

6) The Paksa-vipaksaikadeśa-vṛtti or the Fallacious Reason of the opposed class which is connected with a part of the Abode and a part of the Dissimilar Abode. As for instance, take the argument. 'Sound is the peculiar characteristic of Ether, because it is capable of being modified by one's efforts'. In this argument the Hetu (Modifiability) is present in such Abodes as

consideration would be: 'That mid-part of the hill is fire because it is filled with a grey substance'.

संदिग्धविपक्षवृत्तिको यथा विवादपदापन्नः पुरुषः सर्वज्ञो न
भवति वक्तृत्वात् ॥ ५७ ॥

*saṁdigdha-vipakṣa-vṛttiko yathā vivāda-padāpannah
puruṣaḥ sarvajña na bhavati vaktṛtvāt* | 57 |

TRANSLATION: (The Fallacious Reason of the Doubtful class) of which the connection with the Dissimilar Abode is 'doubted' (is illustrated) as:—"The person in question is not Omniscient because he is a Speaker".

COMMENTARY: In this illustration Speakership is the Reason. An Omniscient Being is the Dissimilar Abode (being opposed to the given Abode viz, non-Omniscient Being). Now Speakership may be 'suspected' to be connected with this Dissimilar Abode; for one may honestly doubt whether an Omniscient Being is a Speaker or not. The Reason in the given argument is thus Fallacious because it is 'suspected' to be connected with the Dissimilar Abode, the Saṁdigdhavipakṣa-vṛttika.

Another illustration of such a Fallacious Reason would be the Hetu in the argument, 'He is green-black because he is the son of Maitra.'

The logicians of the Nyāya School, however, instead of calling the Fallacious Reason in the last argument the Saṁdigdha-vipakṣa-vṛttika, prefer to call it Sopādhī. The Sopādhī means that which involves an Upādhī or condition. The Nyāya logicians describe Upādhī as a phenomenon which does not 'pervade'

The Jaina Commentator points out that the contention is not sound. A Fallacious Hetu may have the characteristics of both an Asiddha and a Viruddha Hetu; that would not prevent it from being regarded as a Viruddha Hetu. The Saugata logicians look upon Dharmī-Svarūpa-viparīta-Sādhana and Dharmī-viśesa-viparīta-sādhana as two other modes of the Hetvābhāsa. The former is a Fallacious Reason which proves or establishes some fact which is opposed to the nature of the Abode (Dharmī) of the Proven and the latter is a Fallacious Reason which proves or establishes a fact which is opposed to a particular mode of the Abode. The Jainas point out that these two are not Hetu-Fallacies at all; a Hetu which is Viruddha is one that proves or establishes a fact which is opposed to the nature of the Proven (Sādhya). A Hetu is essentially related to the Sādhya. If the Hetu were not to be related to Dharmī-Svarūpa-viparīta also and to the Dharmī-viśesa-viparīta, Anumāna or Inference would be impossible. Take for instance, the argument, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a creation'. Here the fact that 'it is a creation' leads to 'non-eternality' and is a valid Hetu on that account. If the Saugata contention were to be accepted, the Hetu however would not be a valid Hetu because it is proved to be related on the one hand to the Dharmī-svarūpa-viparīta and to the Dharmī-viśesa-viparīta, on the other. That the given Hetu (that it is a 'creation') is related to the Dharmī-svarūpa-viparīta, i.e., a fact which is opposed to the nature of the Abode, will appear from the argument, 'Whatever is a creation is not a Sound, as for instance, a Pitcher'. Similarly, the argument, 'Whatever is a creation is not audible, as for instance,

Fallacious. Some logicians, however, attempt to prove the validity of the argument by contending that 'the fact of being the result of a vegetable diet' is not an Upādhi. They point out that as some of the sons of Maitra are found to be connected with a vegetable diet it may be said that 'the fact of being the result of a vegetable diet' is associated with 'the fact of being Maitra's son' and as such, 'pervades' the Reason and is not an Upādhi on that account. The contention is not at all sound. The fact that some of the sons of Maitra are found to be connected with a vegetable diet does not prove that all the sons of Maitra are necessarily and invariably connected with the vegetable diet; that is, 'the fact of being the result of a vegetable diet' pervades the fact of being Maitra's son'. As a matter of fact, there is no essential and unconditional relation-ship between the two facts here. To put it otherwise, it may be said that here also an Upādhi intervenes. For it is not true to say that because one is Maitra's son, he must be the result of a 'vegetable diet'. The true fact is that because some sons of Maitra as the result of a 'vegetable diet' are found to be green-black, those green-black sons of Maitra are to be held as the result of a 'vegetable diet'. There is thus no essential connection between 'the fact of being Maitra's son, and 'the fact of being the result of a vegetable diet'. The fact of being 'the result of a vegetable diet' does not 'prevade' 'the fact of being Maitra's son' (there being the Upādhi of a green-black complexion intervening) and is a real Upādhi on that account. And the argument, 'He is green-black because he is Maitra's son' is invalid, the Reason in it being Sopādhi or vitiated by a condition.

'known' and that of which the connection with the Dissimilar Abode is 'suspected'

COMMENTARY. The above two the Nirṇīta-vipakṣa-vṛttika and the Saṃdigdha-vipakṣa-vṛttika are the two forms of the Anaikāntika. The Anaikāntika is also known as the Saṃdigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttika, Saṃdigdhānyathānupapattika and the Saṃdigdha-vyatiṛeka

निर्णीतविपक्षवृत्तिको यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् ॥५६॥

nirṇīta-vipakṣa-vṛttiko yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ, prameyatvāt । 56 ।

TRANSLATION (The Fallacious Reason of the Doubtful class) of which the connection with the Dissimilar Abode is 'known' (is illustrated) as:—
'Sound is eternal, because it is knowable.

COMMENTARY. In the illustration 'knowability' is the Reason. It is known to be present in the Similar Abodes, e g, Ether etc, which are eternal. It is also known to be present in the Dissimilar Abodes, e g, the Pitcher etc, which are non-eternal. On account of the presence of the Hetu in both the Sapakṣa and the Vipakṣa being equally 'known' there arises naturally a Doubt in one's mind, is knowability necessarily connected with Eternality or is necessarily connected with Non-eternality?. The necessary and the invariable relationship of the Hetu with the Sādhya being thus 'doubted', the Hetu becomes Anaikāntika. Another example of the Fallacious Reason of the mode under

2. The Praksa-vyāpaka-Sapaksa-vipaksaikadeśa-vṛttih, i.e., the Fallacious Mark which pervades the Abode and exists in a part of the Similar Abode and a part of the Dissimilar Abode. For instance, in the argument, 'Sound is non-eternal because it is directly perceptible' the Reason (Direct Perceptibility) 'pervades' the Abode (Sound i.e., all Sounds), it exists in some of the Similar Abodes (Pitcher etc.) but not in other Similar Abodes (Dyads and Molecules), it exists in some of the Dissimilar Abodes (Generality or Class-essence) but not in other Dissimilar Abodes (Ether etc.). It should be noted that by Direct Perceptibility is meant here the Perceptibility by the sense-organs of beings like us. This meaning of the word, Direct Perceptibility would show that the Mark (Direct Perceptibility) in the argument under consideration, cannot be said to 'pervade' the Abode, all the Similar Abodes and all the Dissimilar Abodes, nor a part only of the Abode.

3. The Paksa-sapaksa-vyāpaka-Vipaksaikadeśa-vṛttih, i.e., the Fallacious Mark which pervades the Abode and the Similar Abode and exists in a part of the Dissimilar Abode. For instance, in the argument, 'That is a Cow because it has Horns', the Reason (Possession of Horns) 'pervades' the Abode (the Cow under observation) and exists in the Similar Abodes (Other Cows); it exists in some of the Dissimilar Abodes (a Buffalo etc.) but not in other Dissimilar Abodes (a Horse etc.)

4. The Paksa-vipaksa-vyāpaka-Sapaksaikadeśa-vṛttih, i.e., The Fallacious Mark which 'pervades' the Abode and the Dissimilar Abode and exists in a part of the Similar Abode, for instance, in the argu-

(i.e., is not essentially connected with) the Reason but which is invariably related to the Proven. The Upādhi of the Mark in the given argument would be the fact of the result of a 'vegetable diet'. Who ever is Maitra's son is not necessarily the product of a 'vegetable diet'. Accordingly, the fact of the result of a 'vegetable diet' cannot be said to be necessarily connected with 'the fact of one's being Maitra's son' (The Mark in the argument, under consideration) A green-black complexion on the other hand is dependent on a 'vegetable diet', hence 'the fact of the result of a vegetable diet' is said to be essentially connected with the green-black complexion (the Proven in the illustration under consideration). Accordingly the fact of the result of a 'vegetable diet' which is not essentially connected with the Reason but is a condition precedent to the Proven, is an Upādhi

It is to be noted in this connection that if a phenomenon 'pervades', i.e., is essentially connected with the Reason, it cannot be an Upādhi. In the inference, 'There is Fire because there is Smoke', Smoke is the Reason and the Inference is a valid Inference. 'Wet fuel', however, is connected with Smoke. If what is connected with the Reason were an Upādhi then Wet fuel would have been the Upādhi and the reasoning would have been invalid because the Reason in it, viz., Smoke had the Upādhi of the 'Wet fuel.'

Let us revert to the argument, 'He is green-black because he is Maitra's son'. The argument has been shown to be invalid on the ground that the Upādhi viz., 'the fact of being the result of a vegetable diet' which does not 'pervade' the Reason, viz., 'the fact of being Maitra's son', intervenes and makes the Reason

the Reason (Formlessness) exists in some of the Abodes (Points of Direction and Time) but not in the other Abode (Mind), it exists in some of the Similar Abodes (Ether) but not in the others (Attributes etc.)

7. The Paksa-vipaksaikadeśavṛttih Sapaksa-vyāpakḥ, i.e., the Fallacious Mark which exists in a part of the Abode and a part of the Dissimilar Abode and which 'Pervades' the Similar Abode. For instance, in the argument, 'Points of Direction, Time and Mind are not substances, because they are Formless', the the Reason (Formlessness) exists in some of the Abodes (Points of Direction and Time) but not in the other Abode, Mind); it exists in some of the Dissimilar Abodes (Substances like Ether) but not in the other Dissimilar Abodes (things like Pitcher etc.); it 'pervades' all the Similar Abodes (non-substances like Attributes etc.)

8 The Sapaksa-vipaksa-vyāpakah Paksaikadeśavṛtti, i.e., the Fallacious Mark which 'pervades' the Similar and the Dissimilar Abodes and which exists, in a part of the Abode. For instance, in the argument, 'Ether, Time, Points of Direction, Soul and Mind are not substances, because they are devoid of the attributes peculiar to an impermanent thing' the Reason (Absence of the attributes characterising an impermanent thing) is present in some of the Abodes (Time, Points of Direction and Mind) but not present in other Abodes (Ether and Soul), it 'pervades' the Similar Abode (Attributes) and the Dissimilar Abodes (Elements of Earth, Water, Fire and Air).

As observed already, the above eight modes of the Anaikāntika are included in the Samdigdha-vipaksa-vṛttika form of the Anaikāntika.

It is also to be noted that even if a phenomenon does not 'pervade' the Reason, it is not an Upādhi, if it does not 'pervade' the Proven. An Inference about Fire from the existence of Smoke is not invalid. For, it would not be vitiated by the intervention of a phenomenon which is not invariably connected either with Smoke (Reason) or with Fire (Proven). Such a phenomenon which does not 'pervade' the Proven although it does not 'pervade' the Mark is not an Upādhi. Some logicians call the Fallacious Hetu under consideration the Aprayojaka or the Unconnected. The Aprayojaka is a Hetu which is defined as one which falsely connects itself with a Vyāpti (a proposition of general application which serves as the basis of an Inference), the Vyāpti being really connected with another phenomenon. It is clear that this other phenomenon which is essentially connected with the general proposition upon which the Inference is built is the Upādhi, so that what is a Sopādhi Hetu is but the Aprayojaka.

The Jaina commentator points out that the Sopādhi and the Aprayojaka are but the Saṃdigdhavipaksa-vṛttika in different nomenclature.

There are other Fallacious Marks of the Doubtful mode, which can be conveniently brought under this, i.e., the Saṃdigdhavipaksa-vṛttika. These are as follows:

- 1 The Paksa-sapaksa-vipaksa-vyāpakah, i.e., the Fallacious Mark which pervades the Abode, the Similar Abode and the Dissimilar Abode. For instance in the argument, 'Sound is non-eternal because it is knowable', the Reason (knowability) pervades the Abode (Sound), the Similar Abode (the Pitcher) and the Dissimilar Abode (Ether).

in the two arguments prove that 'Sound is of many-sided (*anekānta*) natures' i.e., that 'it is both Eternal and Non-eternal' and as such, the two Hetus are quite valid Marks if the conclusion be, 'Sound is both eternal and non-eternal', just like the Mark, 'Modifiability', in the case of the same conclusion. But if the two Hetus are put forward as the Reasons for such one-sided and absolute propositions as 'Sound is non-eternal' or 'Sound is Eternal', then they would be Fallacious Marks either of the Viruddha or of the Samdigdha Vipaksa-vrtti Anaikāntika class. Accordingly the Jaina commentator points out that there is no Anaikāntika Fallacy of the alleged mode of The Viruddhāvyabhicāri.

Hence it is that the Hetvābhāsas or the Reason-Fallacies are of three classes only, viz., the Asiddha, the Viruddha and the Anaikāntika (i.e., the Unproved, the Opposed and the Doubtful)

Some logicians contend that besides the above three modes of the Fallacious Reason there is another kind of the Hetvābhāsa which they call the Akimcītkara or the Useless. They point out that the Fallacious Reason of the Useless kind is found in arguments in which the Proven (*sādhya*) is either Already known (*prāpta*) or Falsified-by-perception etc., (Pratyakṣādinirākṛta). Examples of such Akimcītkara Hetus would be the Reasons in the arguments—(1) 'Sound is Audible, because it has the class-essence of Sound, (the Proven, i.e., the Audibility of Sound is well-known fact), Fire is cold, because it is a substance, (the Proven, the coldness of Fire is 'falsified' by perception), (3) 'A saint who practises vows must have intercourse with women', because he is a man (the Proven, the

ment. 'That is not a Cow because it has Horns'. the Reason (possession of Horns) 'pervades' the Abode (the Gavaya which is under observation) and the Dissimilar Abode (a Cow). it exists in some of the Similar Abodes (a Buffalo etc.) but not in other Similar Abodes (a Horse etc.)

5 The Pakṣa-sapakṣa-vipakṣaika-dēśa-vṛttiḥ. i.e.. the Fallacious Mark which exists in a part of the Abode, a part of the Similar Abode and a part of the Dissimilar Abode. For instance. in the argument. 'The Earth is eternal because it is directly perceptible' the Reason (Direct Perceptibility) exists in some part (i.e. modes) of the Abode (e.g.. the Pitcher etc.). but not in the other parts (i.e. forms) of the Abode (Atoms etc.). it exists in some part (i.e., forms) of the Similar Abode (Class-essence etc.) but not in other parts (i.e. forms) of the Similar Abode (Ether etc.): it exists in some part (i.e. mode) of the Dissimilar Abode (Bubbles etc.) but not in other parts (i.e., modes) of the Dissimilar Abode (Water-molecules etc.). It should be noted that by Direct Perceptibility is meant here the Perceptibility by a sense organ which does not come in contact with the object of perception. when perceiving it (We have seen that such a sense-organ, according to the Jainas is the Eye. so that by Direct Perceptibility in the argument, is meant Visibility).

6 The Pakṣa-sapakṣaika-dēśa-vṛttir vipakṣa-vyāpakah. i.e., the Fallacious Mark which exists in a part of the Abode and a part of the Similar Abode and which pervades the Dissimilar Abode. For instance. in the argument. 'Points of Direction. Time and Mind are substances because they are formless.

ous Reason although the argument may be bad on other counts (e.g., *pakṣābhāsa*). If, on the other hand, in any argument, the Reason is not known to be necessarily related to the Proven, you have certainly, the *Hetvābhāsa*, which however on examination will be found, to come under any of the three modes of the Reason-Fallacy recognised by the Jainas. For, ask the Jainas, why is the 'Invariable Relationship' (between the Mark and the Proven in an argument) not known? It is due to either Inattention (*anādhyavasāya*) or Contrary Experience (*viparyaya*) or Doubt (*samśaya*). It cannot be due to anything else. Now, where the 'Invariable Relationship' is not known owing to Inattention, we have the *Asiddha-Fallacy*. Where the 'Invariable Relationship' is not known owing to Contrary Experience, we have the *Viruddha-Fallacy*. Where again the 'Invariable Relationship' is not known owing to Doubt, we have the *Anaikāntika-Fallacy*. The three recognised forms of the *Hetu-Fallacy* (viz., the *Asiddha*, the *Viruddha* and the *Anaikāntika*) thus corresponding to only these sources of Ignorance, the *Akimpitkara*, as a *Hetu-Fallacy* is clearly redundant.

Some, however, admit the *Kālātyayāpadīṣṭa* as a separate form of the *Hetu-fallacy*. It consists in using a *Hetu* to prove a given *Sādhya* at a time when it no longer has 'the necessary connection' with the Proven. The Jaina logician says that in the manner of what has been said above against the admissibility of the *Akimpitkara-Fallacy*, the *Kālātyayāpadīṣṭa* also may be shown to be inadmissible as a separate kind of the *Mark Fallacy*.

Lastly, the *Prakarana-sama* is put forward by some logicians as a mode of the *Reason Fallacy*. It

The logicians of the Saugata School speak of another Fallacious Reason of the Doubtful class, which they call the *Asādhāranāikāntika*. It is illustrated in the argument. 'Sound is Eternal because it is audible'. The Reason (Audibility), as they say, recedes from both the *Sapaksa* (Similar) and the *Vipaksa* (Dissimilar) Abodes and consequently generates Doubt in us; hence it is also a Fallacious Mark of the Doubtful kind, called the *Asādhāranāikāntika* by the Buddhists. The Buddhist argument is not reasonable. The Reason is here 'the fact of Audibility'. If the given Mark is intended for proving the absolute and unconditioned Eternity of Sound, then it is a Fallacious Hetu of the *Viruddha* (opposed) class, as it proves the Non-eternality of Sound in-some-respect. For, there is no Sound which is not non-eternal in this respect at least that before it assumes the nature of Audibility it has to leave its prior nature of Non-audibility. If, on the other hand the given Mark be intended for proving the Eternity-in-some-respects (i.e., if the Eternity of Sound means that it is eternal not absolutely but Eternal-in-some-respects) then the Mark is certainly a valid Mark as it (i.e., Audibility) is invariably concerned with Eternity in some respects. Hence Audibility, put forward as the Reason for proving the Eternity of Sound is never an *Anaikāntika* (Doubtful) Hetu as the Saugatās contend.

The Saugatās speak of another sub-class of the *Anaikāntika*, which they call the *Viruddhāvyaabhicāri*. It is illustrated in the arguments, 'Sound is Non-Eternal, because it is a Product like a Pitcher', 'Sound is Eternal, because it is Audible like the Class-essence of Sound'. The Jāmas point out that the two Hetus

concerned. his contention being that the characteristic of an eternal thing is found in Sound, the Mark in the first argument, i.e., the characteristic of an eternal thing being not found in Sound, becomes necessarily Svarūpāsiddha (i.e., a Fallacious Mark, the nature of which is Unproved).

In the same manner, the Mark in the second argument viz., the non-cognition of the characteristic of a non-eternal thing in Sound, may be examined and it may be shown that the second argument need not imply the validity of the first argument.

Every argument is thus considered on its own merit and the question of the Prakaraṇa-sama as a mode of the Reason Fallacy does not arise.

The Jaina position is thus vindicated that there are three and only modes of the Hetu Fallacy.

साधर्म्येण दृष्टान्ताभासो नवप्रकारः ॥ ५८ ॥

sādharmyena dṛṣṭāntābhāso nava-prakārah 58

TRANSLATION: In respect of Homogeneity, the Fallacy of the Example is of nine modes.

COMMENTARY: It has been said before that an Example is either Homogeneous or Heterogeneous. Hence the Fallacies with regard to Examples come under two broad classes. Of these, Fallacies of the Homogeneous Example are of nine sorts which are considered below.

साध्यधर्मविकलः, साधनधर्मविकलः, उभयधर्मविकलः,
संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मा, संदिग्धसाधनधर्मा, संदिग्धोभयधर्मा, अन-
न्वयोऽप्रदर्शितान्वयो विपरीतान्वयश्चेति ॥ ५९ ॥

Vower's having intercourse with women is opposed to the moral injunctions in the Scripture).

The Jaina logicians do not accept the Akimcītkara as a Hetvābhāsa. They ask: Is the Akimcītkara Hetu known to be essentially connected with the Sādhya or is it not so known? If the Mark is known to be 'essentially connected' with the Proven, then the arguments would be vitiated not by any Hetvābhāsa but by the Paksābhāsa or the Fallacious Abode. In other words the first of the above arguments would be bad because of the Paksābhāsa known as the Pratīta-sādhya-dharma-viśesana or the Abode-Fallacy, in which the Proven phenomenon is an 'Already-known' fact. In the same manner, the second argument is bad because of the Paksābhāsa, known as the Pratyaksa-nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśesana or the Abode-fallacy, in which the Proven-phenomenon is falsified by perception. Lastly, the third argument is bad because of the Paksābhāsa known as the Āgama-nirākṛta-sādhya-dharma-viśesana or the Abode-Fallacy in which the Proven-phenomenon is falsified by the Authoritative Scripturers. And so on. In other words, the arguments are bad, not because the Reason in them is Fallacious but because the Abode in them is Fallacious. It cannot be contended that in arguments where the Paksa or the Abode is Fallacious, the Hetu or the Reason also must be said to be necessarily Fallacious, for, in that case, it may similarly be contended that in arguments where the Paksa or the Abode is Fallacious the Drṣṭānta or the Example also must be said to be necessarily Fallacious. Thus, it is that if in an argument, the Hetu is known to be necessarily connected with the Sādhya, you cannot say that there is any Hetvābhāsa or Fallaci-

thing which is not man-made but as a matter of fact, Misery is always man-made. Hence the Example is opposed-to-the-Proven-phenomenon.

तस्यामेव प्रतिज्ञायां तस्मिन्नेव हेतौ परमाणुवदिति साधन-
धर्मविकलः ॥ ६१ ॥

*tasyām eva pratijñāyāṁ tasminn eva hetau para-
maṇuvad iti sādhana-dharma-vikalaḥ* | 61 |

TRANSLATION: The Proposition being the same as above and the Reason being also the same, (the Homogeneous Example) 'like an Atom' is Opposed-to-the-Reason-phenomenon.

COMMENTARY: Thus let us have the argument: Sound is not man-made because it is formless, like an Atom. Now, in the Atom, there is 'non-man-made-ness', i.e., self-existence, the Proven phenomenon. But 'formlessness', the Reason-phenomenon, cannot be attributed to it, for, as a matter of fact an Atom has a form. Hence the Example is Opposed to-the-Reason-phenomenon.

कलशवदित्युभयधर्मविकलः ॥ ६२ ॥

kalaśavad ity ubhaya-dharma-vikalaḥ | 62 |

TRANSLATION: Like a Pitcher. This is an instance where (the Homogeneous Example) is Opposed-to-Both-the-phenomena.

COMMENTARY. Thus let us have the argument 'Sound is not man-made; because it is formless; like a

may be illustrated in this way, One says: 'Sound is Non-eternal because the characteristic of an eternal thing is not found in it'—upon which his opponent answers: 'If Non-eternity can be proved in this way, let the Eternity of Sounds be proved in the same way, viz, 'Sound is Eternal because the characteristic of a non-eternal thing is not found in it'. It is said that the first argument involves the Mark Fallacy of the Prakaraṇa-sama, because it is established in a mode of reasoning in which its antithesis, i.e., the second argument also can be proved. The Jainas maintain that there is no need for admitting the Prakaraṇa-sama as a separate mode of the Mark-Fallacy. The first argument does not necessarily imply the validity of the second argument. In fact, there can be no question about the second argument after the first argument. For, is the Mark in the first argument definitely known? In other words is it definitely known that the characteristic of an eternal thing is not found in Sound? If so, then the Non-eternity of Sounds is established beyond the possibility of the validity of the second argument. If, on the other hand, the said Reason of the first argument is not so definitely known then it becomes a Fallacious Mark of the Doubtful-Unproved (Samdigdhāsiddha) kind (a Fallacy, already recognised by the Jainas). If again, the simple absence of the characteristic of an eternal thing is attributed to Sound, without considering whether it is possible (in some respects) for a Sound to have that characteristic, then the Mark (the non-cognition of the characteristic, of an eternal thing) in the first argument becomes Vyabhicāri, i.e., inconstant and unreliable for the purposes of a valid argument. Besides, so far as the opponent to the first argument is

(the Homogeneous Example) is Doubtful with regard to the Reason-phenomenon

COMMENTARY. It is Doubtful whether Maitra is full of passions etc.

नायं सर्वदर्शी रागादिमत्त्वात् मुनिविशेषवदिति संदिग्धो-
भयधर्मा ॥ ६५ ॥

*nāyaṁ sarva-darśī rāgādimattvāt muni-viśeṣavad
iti saṁdigdhabhaya-dharmā* । 65 ।

TRANSLATION: That man is not an all-seer, because he has passions etc., like a particular vower, this is an instance where (the Homogeneous Example) is Doubtful with regard to both the phenomena

COMMENTARY: It is Doubtful if the particular vower referred to has omnivision (the Proven-phenomenon) and the passions etc., (the Reason phenomenon); for, no sign or indication is proved in him which is invariably connected with the existence of omnivision or of passions etc

रागादिमान् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वादिष्टपुरुषवदित्य-
न्वयः ॥ ६६ ॥

*rāgādimān vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo vaktṛtvādiṣṭapuruṣavad
ity ananvayaḥ* । 66 ।

TRANSLATION: The person referred to has passions etc. because he is a speaker; like a given person, this is an instance where (the Homogeneous Example)

*sādhya-dharma-vikalah, sādhanā-dharma-vikalah,
ubhaya-dharma-vikalah, samdigdha-sādhya-dharmā,
samdigdha-sādhana-dharmā samdigdhobhaya-dharmā,
ananvayo'pradarśitānvayo viparītānvayaś ceti | 59 |*

TRANSLATION These are. That which is opposed to the Proven-phenomenon, that which is opposed to the Reason-phenomenon, that which is opposed to both the phenomena; that which is Doubtful with regard to the Proven-phenomena, that which is Doubtful with regard to the Mark-phenomena; that which is Doubtful with regard to both the phenomena; that in which 'the two phenomena (of the Reason and the Proven) are Unconnected, that in which the connection between the two phenomena (of the Reason and the Proven) is Unshown, that in which the connection between the two phenomena (of the Reason and the Proven) is shown in an Inverse order

COMMENTARY. These are illustrated below.

तत्रापौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वात् दुःखवदिति साध्यधर्म-

विकलः ॥ ६० ॥

*tatrāpauruṣeyaḥ śabdo'mūrtatvād duḥkhavad iti
sādhya-dharma-vikalah | 60 |*

TRANSLATION. Sound is not man-made, because it is formless; like Misery, this is an instance where (the Homogeneous Example) is opposed to the Proven phenomenon

COMMENTARY. In the given argument, Misery is referred to as an (Homogeneous) Example as some-

or the badness of which depends on the statements, forming the various premises. Here the argument is not bad, but its expression in words is defective.

The same thing may be said about the Fallacies of the Example the Viparītānvaya, the Apradarśita-vyatireka and the Viparīta-vyatireka, to be described presently.

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात्, यदनित्यं तत् कृतकं घटवदिति
विपरीतान्वयः ॥ ६८ ॥

*anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt, yad anityam tat kṛtakaṁ
ghaṭavad iti viparītānvayaḥ । 68 ।*

TRANSLATION: Sound is non-eternal because it is a product; whatever is non-eternal is a product; like a Pitcher: this is an instance where (the Homogeneous Example) states (the invariable relation between the Mark and the Proven) in an Inverse order.

In all statements of 'the ground and consequent', that which is well-known should be stated as 'the ground' and that which is not so well-known but which follows from it should be stated as 'the consequent'. That the pitcher is a product is well-known to all; and this is why 'the fact being a product' is put forward as the Hetu or the Reason in the argument under consideration; the fact of the 'non-eternity' of the Pitcher is not so well-known and this is why it is put forward as 'the fact to be proven' in the given argument. The rule is thus well settled that the well-known should be stated as 'the ground' and what is not so well-known and has got to be proved should be stated as 'the consequent' to it. In the Example premise,

Pitcher. Now, in this argument, the Pitcher is referred to as an (Homogeneous) Example, to which both 'non-man-made-ness' and 'Formlessness' are attributed. But, as a matter of fact, it is man-made and has a form. Hence the Example is Opposed to both-the-Proven-and-the-Reason-phenomena

रागादिमानयं वक्तृत्वाद्देवदत्तवदिति संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मा

॥ ६३ ॥

*ī agādīmān ayaṃ vaktṛtvād Devadattavad iti sandig-
dha-sādhya-dharmā* | 63 |

TRANSLATION That man has passions etc., because he is a speaker, like Devadatta· this is an instance where (the Homogeneous Example) is Doubtful with regard to the Proven-phenomenon.

COMMENTARY: It is Doubtful whether Devadatta has passions etc , or not, for, no one can have a direct first-hand knowledge of another man's minds and because in Devadatta no mark or sign is observed which is invariably connected with the existence of passions etc , in him Hence the Example is Doubtful-with-regard-to-the-Proven phenomenon.

मरणधर्माय रागादिमत्त्वात् मैत्रवदिति संदिग्धसाधन-

धर्मा ॥ ६४ ॥

*marana-dharmāyaṃ ī agādīmattvāt Maitravad iti
sandigdha-sādhana-dharmā* | 64 |

TRANSLATION. That man is mortal; because he has passions etc. like Maitra. this is an instance where

negation of the Reason is Doubtful; that in which the negation of both is Doubtful, that in which there is no negative relation (between the Proven and the Reason), that in which the negative relation (between the Proven and the Reason) is Unshown; that in which the negative relation (between the Proven and the Reason) is shown in an Inverse order.

COMMENTARY: These are illustrated below.

तेषु भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात् यत्पुनर्भ्रान्तं न भवति न तत् प्रमाणं यथा स्वप्नज्ञानमिति असिद्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः, स्वप्न-ज्ञानात् भ्रान्तत्वस्यानिवृत्तेः ॥ ७१ ॥

teṣu bhrāntam anumānaṁ pramāṇatvāt yat punar bhrāntaṁ na bhavati na tat pramāṇaṁ yathā svapna-jñānam iti asiddha-sādhya-vyatirekaḥ svapna-jñānāt bhrāntatvasyānivrteḥ । 71 ।

निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणत्वात् यत्तु सविकल्पकं न तत्प्रमाणं यथा लैङ्गिकमित्यसिद्धसाधनव्यतिरेको लैङ्गिकात्प्रमाणत्वस्यानिवृत्तेः ॥ ७२ ॥

nirvikalpakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇatvāt yattu savikalpakaṁ na tat pramāṇaṁ yathā laṅgikam ity asiddha-sādhana-vyatireko laṅgikāt pramāṇatvasyānivrteḥ । 72 ।

नित्यानित्यः शब्दः सत्त्वात् यस्तु न नित्यानित्यः स न संस्तद्यथा स्तम्भ इत्यसिद्धोभयव्यतिरेकः स्तम्भाभित्यानित्यत्वस्य सत्त्वस्य चाव्यावृत्तेः ॥ ७३ ॥

nityānityaḥ śabdaḥ satvāt yastu na nityānityaḥ sa na samstadyathā stambha ity asiddhobhaya-vyatirekaḥ stambhānnityānityatvasya sattvasya cāvyaṅvṛteḥ । 73 ।

is such that in it (the Reason-phenomenon and the Proven phenomenon) are Unconnected.

COMMENTARY. Although the man of the Example is a speaker and has passions etc., the Vyāpti or the Pervasion is not proved thereby, that speaker-ship and passion are invariably and necessarily connected; Hence the Example is invalid because it does not prove the relationship between the Mark and the Proven

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवदित्यप्रदर्शितान्वयः ॥ ६७ ॥

anityah śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavad ity apradaśītānvayah | 67 |

TRANSLATION: Sound is non-eternal; because it is a product; like a pitcher; this is an instance where (the Homogeneous Example) is such that it does not show the connection (between the Reason-phenomenon and the Proven-phenomenon)

COMMENTARY. Here although there is 'invariable and necessary connection' between 'the fact of being a product' (the Reason-phenomenon) and 'the fact of Non-eternity' (the Proven-phenomenon) the given Example does not state the relation in so many words. Hence the Fallacy.

It is to be observed that this omission to state the invariable connection between the Reason and the Proven in the Example-premise is not fatal to the argument. It is highly desirable, however, to show it in the body of the Example-premise, in an Inference-for-the-sake-of-others (*parārthānumāna*), the goodness

TRANSLATION: Kapila is not Omniscient nor an authority; because he upholds the Doctrine of the absolute unmomentariness; One who is Omniscient or an Authority upholds the doctrine of the absolute momentariness: as for instance, Sugata: this is an instance in which the negation of the Proven (in the Heterogeneous Example) is Doubtful, the non-existence of the Proven-phenomena of in omniscience and non-authoritativeness being Doubtful in Sugata.

COMMENTARY: Strictly speaking, the Example in the above argument is Fallacious in a different way, the Example which is Heterogeneous being one-in-which-the negation-of-the Proven is Unproved. The doctrine of 'the absolute momentariness' is disproved by all modes of valid knowledge, so that Sugata who upholds 'the doctrine of the Absolute momentariness' is unquestionably an in omniscient and unauthoritative person. But one may not know the grounds on which the doctrine of 'the absolute momentariness' may be held to be unacceptable; such a person, instead of speaking of Sugata as a man who is in omniscient and unauthoritative, may speak of him as one whose omniscient and authoritative character are Doubtful. In other words, although the Example-Fallacy here is really one of the mode of the *Asiddha-Sādhyā-Vyatireka*, (Vide Sūtra 71, above) it is put in a different way and described as one of the mode of the *Samdigdha-Sādhyā-vyatireka*

अनादेयवचनः कश्चिद्विद्वक्षितः पुरुषो रागादिमत्त्वाद् यः
पुनरादेयवचनः स वीतरागस्तद्यथा शौद्धोदनिरिति संदिग्धसाधन-
व्यतिरेकः शौद्धोदनौ रागादिमत्त्वस्य निवृत्तेः संशयात् ॥ ७५ ॥

however, in the argument under consideration, 'the fact of non-eternity' (which is not a well-known fact and is the proven in the argument) is put forward first, as if it is 'the ground' and 'the fact of being a product' (which is a well-known fact and which is the Reason in the argument) is stated next as if it is 'the consequent' The Example premise is thus Fallacious here stating the connection between the Reason and the Proven in an Inverse order.

वैधर्म्येणापि दृष्टान्ताभासो नवधा ॥ ६९ ॥

vaidharmyenaṇi drṣṭāntābhāso navadhā । 69 ।

TRANSLATION In respect of Heterogeneity also, the Fallacy of the Example is of nine modes.

असिद्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकोऽसिद्धसाधनव्यतिरेकोऽसिद्धोभयव्यतिरेकः, संदिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः, संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः, संदिग्धोभयव्यतिरेकोऽव्यतिरेकोऽप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेको विपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च ॥ ७० ॥

asiddha-sādhya-vyatireko' siddha-sādhana-vyatireko' siddhobhaya-vyatirekaḥ, saṁdigdha-sādhya-vyatirekaḥ, saṁdigdha-sādhana-vyatirekaḥ, saṁdigdhobhaya-vyatireko' vyatireko' pi adarśita-vyatireko viparīta-vyatirekaś ca । 70 ।

TRANSLATION These are That in which the negation of the Proven is Unproved; that in which the negation of the Reason is Unproved; that in which the negation of both is Unproved; that in which the negation of the Proven is Doubtful; that in which the

spadesv api paramakṛpayānarpita-nija-piṣṭa-sakalatva-sya ca vyāvṛtteḥ saṁdehāt । 76 ।

TRANSLATION: Kapila is not free from passions; because he has not, out of pity, given to beings, who deserve mercy, a piece of flesh from his body, one who is free from passions, gives out of pity a piece of flesh from his body to beings who deserve mercy; as for instance, Tapana-Bandhu; this is an instance in which the negation of Both (the Proven and the Reason) in the Heterogeneous Example is Doubtful, the retrocession of the fact of the want of passionlessness as well as of the fact of giving out of pity, to beings who deserve mercy, pieces of flesh from his body, in Tapana-Bandhu being Doubtful.

COMMENTARY: The Heterogeneous Example in the above argument is Tapana-Bandhu, who is no other than Buddha; it is Doubtful whether Buddha has passions or is free from them; it is also Doubtful whether he out of pity gave to beings who deserve mercy, pieces of flesh from his body or he did not so give, evidences establishing the above facts one way or the other being wanting.

न वीतरागः कश्चिद्विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वाद् यः पुनर्वा-
तरागो न स वक्ता यथोपलक्षणं इत्यव्यतिरेकः ॥ ७७ ॥

*na vītarāgaḥ kaścid vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo vaktṛtvāt yaḥ
punar vītarāgo na sa vaktā yathopala-khaṇḍa ity avyati-
rekaḥ* । 77 ।

TRANSLATION: The person referred to is not one who is free from passions, because he is a speaker; one

TRANSLATION. Of these:—‘Inference is fallacious; because it is valid knowledge; whatever is not fallacious is not valid knowledge; as for instance, the Dream-consciousness’; this is an instance, in which the negation of the Proven (in the Heterogeneous Example) is Unproved, ‘the Fallacious character’ ‘not receding from the ‘Dream consciousness’ (1). Perception is undetermined, because it is valid knowledge; whatever is not undetermined is not valid knowledge; as for instance, Inference: this is an instance in which the negation of the Reason (in the Heterogeneous Example) is Unproved, the character of valid knowledge not receding from Inference (2). Sound is both eternal-and-non-eternal, because it is existent; Whatever is not both-eternal-and-non-eternal is not existent; as for instance, the Pillar, this is an instance in which the negation of both (the Proven and the Reason) in the Heterogeneous Example is Unproved, the fact of both-eternity-and-non-eternity and the fact of existence, not receding from the Pillar (3).

COMMENTARY. The above three aphorisms are clear

असर्वज्ञोऽनाप्तो वा कपिलोऽक्षणिकैकान्तवादित्वात् यः
सर्वज्ञ आप्तो वा स क्षणिकैकान्तवादी यथा सुगत इति संदिग्ध-
साध्यव्यतिरेकः सुगतेऽसर्वज्ञतानाप्तत्वयोः साध्यधर्मयोर्व्यावृत्तेः
संदेहात् ॥ ७४ ॥

*asaṁsarvajña'nāpto vā Kapilo'ksanikaikānta-vāditvād
yah sarvajña āpto vā sa ksanikāikānta-vādi yathā Sugata
iti samdighdha-sādhyav-yatn ekah Sugate'sarvajñātānāpta-
tvayorḥ sādhyadharma mayor vyāvṛttech samdehāt* | 74 |

*anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād yadakṛtakaṃ tan nityam
yathā ākāśam iti viparīta-vyatirekaḥ । 79 ।*

TRANSLATION. Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product; Whatever is not a product is eternal as for instance, Ether; this is an instance in which (in the Heterogenous Example) the negative relation (between the Proven and the Reason) is shown in an Inverse Order.

COMMENTARY: An Heterogeneous Example is to show that the negation of the Proven is consequent on the negation of the Reason. In the given illustration, the relation has been shown in an Inverse order; hence the Fallacy

उक्तलक्षणोल्लङ्घनेनोपनयनिगमनयोर्वचने तदभासौ

॥ ८० ॥

ukta-lakṣaṇollamghanenopanaya-nigamanayor-vacane tadābhāsau । 80 ।

TRANSLATION: Fallacies with regard to Application and Conclusion consist in stating them in contravention of the principles, implied in their definition.

COMMENTARY: It will be remembered that Application has been defined as the process of applying the Mark to the Abode of the Proven and Conclusion as that of establishing the Proven. Fallacies would be committed, if we forget the principles implied in these definitions.

*anādeya-vacanaḥ kaścīd vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo iāgādi-
mattvād yaḥ punarādeya-vacanaḥ sa vītarāgas tad yathā
Śuddhodanir iti samdigdha-sādhana-vyatirekaḥ Śaud-
dhodanau rāgādimattvasya nivr̥tteḥ saṁśayāt* | 75 |

TRANSLATION The person referred to is one whose words are not to be accepted, because he has passions etc ; one whose words are to be accepted is free from passions etc , as for instance, the son of Śuddhodana; this is an instance, in which the negation of the Reason in the Heterogenous Example is Doubtful, the negation of having passions etc , being Doubtful in the son of Śuddhodana.

COMMENTARY: It is true that to persons who are admirers of the philosophy of Buddha (son of Śuddhodana) his words are acceptable. Still it may be said that the fact of Buddha's not having any passions etc , is Doubtful; because evidences for that are wanting.

न वीतरागः कपिलः करुणाऽऽस्पदेष्वपि परमकृपयानर्पित-
निजपिशितशकलत्वात् यस्तु वीतरागः स करुणास्पदेषु परम-
कृपया समर्पितनिजपिशितशकलस्तद्यथा तपनबन्धुरिति संदिग्धो-
भयव्यतिरेक इति तपनबन्धौ वीतरागत्वाभावस्य करुणाऽऽस्पदे-
ष्वपि परमकृपयानर्पितनिजपिशितशकलत्वस्य च व्यावृत्तेः
संदेहात् ॥ ७६ ॥

*na vītarāgaḥ kapilaḥ Karuṇāspadesv api parama-
krpayāna pita-nya-pisita-sakalatvāt yastu vītarāgaḥ sa
karuṇāspadesu parama-krpayā samarpita-nya-pisita-sa-
kalas tad yathā tapanabandhur iti samdigdhobhayavyati-
reka iti tapanabandhau vītarāgatvābhāvasya karuṇā-*

COMMENTARY: In the first of the given cases, the phenomenon of the Mark is predicated of the Abode of the Proven while in the second, the phenomenon of the Proven is predicated of the Abode of the Example. Hence these are fallacious uses of the process of Conclusion. In the light of the Fallacies described above, Fallacies with regard to the remaining five limbs of a Syllogism, viz., the Pakṣa-Śuddha (i.e., the premise consisting in the correction of the Abode) etc., etc, are to be understood.

अनाप्तवचनप्रभवं ज्ञानमागमाभासम् ॥ ८३ ॥

anāpta-vacana-prabhavaṃ jñānam āgama-bhāsam

1 83 1

TRANSLATION: The Fallacy with regard to Authority consists in cognition arising from the words of a false Authority.

COMMENTARY: It will be remembered that an Authority has been defined as a person who knows the true nature of a thing and who describes it according to his knowledge, All other teachers are false Authorities and their teachings are to be rejected as Fallacious.

यथा मेकलकन्यकायाः कूले तालहिन्तालयोर्मूले सुलभाः
पिण्डखर्जुराः सन्ति त्वरितं गच्छत गच्छत शवकाः ॥ ८४ ॥

*yathā mekala-kanyakāyāḥ kūle tāla-hintālayor mūle
sulabhāḥ piṇḍa-kharjūrāḥ santi tvaritaṃ gacchata
gacchata śāvakāḥ* 1 84 1

who is free from passions is not a speaker; as for instance, a piece of stone, this is an instance in which (in the Heterogenous Example) there is no negative relation '(between the Proven and the Reason)'.

COMMENTARY: It is true that both the phenomena, being passionate and being a speaker, are absent in a piece of stone, still the Example of the stone is Fallacious inasmuch as it does not establish the 'invariable and essential relationship' between 'the fact of being free from passions' and 'the fact of not being a Speaker'.

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादाकाशवदित्यप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकः

॥ ७८ ॥

*anityah śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ākāśavadity apradaśita-
vyatirekaḥ* | 78 |

TRANSLATION. Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, as for instance 'Ether'· this is an instance in which (in the Heterogeneous Example) the negative relationship (between the Proven and the Reason) is Unshown.

COMMENTARY: In the above argument the Fallacy consists in this that the arguer does not say in so many words or express in explicit terms the well-known fact, 'whatever is not non-eternal is not a product'.

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् यदकृतकं तन्नित्यं यथाऽऽका-
शमिति विपरीतव्यतिरेकः ॥ ७९ ॥

again Arthāpatti of these four; and Bhatta admits all these five and adds a sixth, viz., Abhāva. The Jaina Lord maintains that the Pramāṇas are two, one is 'clear' and the other is 'not so clear'.

सामान्यमेव, विशेष एव, तद्द्वयं वा स्वतन्त्रमित्यादिस्तस्य
विषयभासः ॥ ८६ ॥

*sāmānyam eva viśeṣa eva tad-dvayam vā svatant-
ram ityādis tasya viśayābhāsaḥ* | 86 |

TRANSLATION: (To regard) the class-essence alone or the particular alone or both of them, isolated from each other (as the object of valid knowledge) would be committing the Fallacy with regard to its Object

COMMENTARY: The Advaita view is that the Common Essence is the only reality. The Saugata view again is that the Particular alone is the real. The view of the Naiyāyikas is that the Universal and the Particular are separable realities. According to the Jainas, all these are one-sided views and as such, fallacious, so far as the Object of valid knowledge is concerned. To say that a thing is eternal or to say that it is non-eternal or to say that the eternal and the non-eternal are two independent and absolutely unconnected aspects of a thing are similarly one-sided and fallacious views.

अभिन्नमेव भिन्नमेव वा प्रमाणात्फलं तस्य तदाभासम्
॥ ८७ ॥

*abhinnameva bhinnameva vā pramāṇāt phalaṁ tasya
tadābhāsam* | 87 |

यथा परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् यः कृतकः स परिणामी
यथा कुम्भ इत्यत्र परिणामी च शब्द इति कृतकश्च कुम्भ
इति च ॥ ८१ ॥

*yathā pariṇāmī śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād yaḥ kṛtakaḥ sa
pariṇāmī yathā kumbhaḥ ity atra pariṇāmī ca śabda itī
kṛtakaś ca kumbha itī ca* । 81 ।

TRANSLATION For instance: Sound is subject to modification; because it is a product; whatever is a product is subject to modification; as for instance, a Pitcher; (To say here) 'Sound is subject to modification' or (to say) 'a Pitcher is a product' (would be committing the Fallacies of Application.

COMMENTARY: In the first of the given cases, the phenomenon of the Proven is applied to the Abode of the Proven while in the second the phenomenon of the Mark is applied to the Abode of the Example. Hence there are Fallacious uses of the process of Application

तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे तस्मात् कृतकः शब्द इति तस्मात्परि-
णामी कुम्भ इति च ॥ ८२ ॥

*tasminneva prayoge tasmāt kṛtakaḥ śabda itī tasmāt
pariṇāmī kumbha itī ca* । 82 ।

Translation In that very instance, (to say) 'So Sound is a Product' or (to say) 'So a Pitcher is subject to modification' (would be committing Fallacies of Conclusion)

CHAPTER VII

The nature of the Pramāna which is one mode of valid knowledge has been described in the foregoing chapters. In the present chapter, the nature of the Naya, the other form of valid knowledge, will be described.

नीयते येन श्रुताख्यप्रमाणविषयीकृतस्यार्थस्यांशस्तद्वितरां-
शौदासीन्यतः स प्रतिपत्तुरभिप्रायविशेषो नयः ॥ १ ॥

*nīyate yena śrutākhyā-pramāna-viṣayīkṛtasyārthasyāṅśastadvitaraṅ-
śāudāsīnyataḥ sa pratipattur abhiprāya-viśeṣo nayaḥ* । १ ।

TRANSLATION. Naya consists in the particular mental tendency of the knower which takes cognisance of a part of an object known through the Pramāna called the Scriptural, ignoring (for the time being) the other parts.

COMMENTARY. By means of the Pramāna, we come to know an object in its entirety and totality. It is Naya which gives us knowledge of a particular aspect or aspects, of a part or parts of an object, already known through the authoritative (Śruta or Scriptural) Pramāna, as a whole, the other parts and the aspects of the object being not taken into consideration for the time being. It should be noted that in Naya, the other parts and aspects of the object are ignored at the time but not denied. If these were

TRANSLATION: For instance. On the bank of the Mekalakanyakā, at the foot of the Tāla and Hintāla, dates are found in abundance; make haste, Go on, Go on, O Ye calves!

COMMENTARY: A person who is given to feeling of attachment and who is unreliable, playfully uses the above words in order to play with young calves, when he has no other way of pleasing himself. His words are unreheable and fallacious

प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यादिसंख्यानं तस्य संख्याऽऽभासम्
॥ ८५ ॥

*pratyaksam evaikaṁ pramāṇam ityādi-saṁkhyānaṁ
tasya saṁkhyābhāsam । 85 ।*

TRANSLATION: The Number Fallacy in respect of the form of valid knowledge consists in such ways of numbering as, e.g., 'Direct Perception is the only form of valid knowledge'.

COMMENTARY: There are two and only two Pramānas the Pratyaksa and the Parokṣa as described by the Jainas. To hold that the Pramānas are more or less than the above two would be falsely numbering them. "Thus the Cārvākas say that the Pratyaksa is the only Pramāna. The Saugata (Buddhist) and the Atom-eater (Vaiśeṣika) say that the Pramānas are two, the Pratyaksa and the Anumāna. These two and Śabda are the three sources of knowledge according to the great sage (Sāṁkhya). Akṣapāda (Nyāya) adds Upamāna and makes Pramānas four. Prabhākara adds

object nor a non-object, just as a part of a sea is but a part of the sea and is neither a non-sea nor the sea. If the part of the sea be looked upon as the sea then the remaining part of the sea becomes a non-sea or the sea itself becomes a conglomerate of countless seas, with the result that it is impossible for one to know a sea (fully)". In explaining the quoted passages, the commentator says that if a part of the sea be regarded as the sea, then either the other parts of the sea are non-seas or we have a countless number of seas (each of the parts being premised to be a sea); that, if on the other hand, the part of the sea be not a sea then the other parts of the sea are non-seas as well and that the result would be that the application of the term sea to a phenomenon becomes impossible. The part of the sea is but a part of the sea and—nothing more nor less. In the same manner, a part of an object which is the subject-matter of the Naya, is but the part of the object. The part of the object is not the object, for, if a particular part of the object were the object, then either the remaining parts of the object are non-objects or the object is but a countless number of objects. Nor is the part of the object a non-object, for, if a part of the object is a non-object, the other parts of the object are also non-objects so that the treatment of anything as an object becomes impossible. What then? A part of an object is but a part of an object; it is perceived as such and it is never perceived as something other than a part of an object. The Naya deals with a part of the object. It yields certain knowledge about a part of an object and as such, it is neither *Pramāṇa* (which is knowledge of an object in its entirety) nor a mode of false knowledge.

TRANSLATION: The Fallacy with regard to the Fruit of valid knowledge consists in thinking that the Fruit is the same as valid knowledge or that the Fruit is different from it

COMMENTARY: The Buddhists hold that the Fruit is identical with the Pramāṇa while according to the Naiyāyikas it is different from it. The Jaina thinker holds that the Buddhist and the Naiyāyika views are one-sided theories and as such, involve the Fallacy with regard to the Fruit of the Pramāṇa. The one-sided nature of these theories has already been proved.

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालङ्कारे फल-प्रमाण-स्वरूपाद्यामासनि-
र्णयो नाम षष्ठः परिच्छेदः ।

*iti pramāṇa-nayatattvālokaṅkāre phala-pramāṇa-
svarūpādyābhāsa-nirṇayo nāma ṣaṣṭhaḥ paricchedaḥ ।*

TRANSLATION: Here ends the Sixth Chapter of the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaṅkāra, Entitled, The Determination of Phala (The Fruit) And of Ābhāsa (Fallacies), e.g., The Nature-Fallacy etc., with Regard To Valid Knowledge.

TRANSLATION: In its Expounded form it is of many sorts.

COMMENTARY: A thing has infinitely many aspects and each observer fixes his attention on any one of these aspects in accordance with his purpose or inclination. Naya which is concerned with the particular aspect of thing corresponding to the particular standpoint of the observer, is accordingly of many sorts, in its Expounded form

समासतस्तु द्विभेदो द्रव्यार्थिकः पर्यायार्थिकश्च ॥ ५ ॥

samāstas tu dvi-bhedo dravyārthikaḥ paryāyārthikaś
ca 1 5 |

TRANSLATION: In its Compounded form it is of two kinds, the Dravyārthika (or the Naya which considers the substantial aspect) and the Paryāyārthika (or the Naya which considers a thing in its modifications).

COMMENTARY: 'Dravya' means the persisting substratum which underlies the Paryāyas or the modifications of a thing. Paryāya again means that which has an origin and a decay. The Dravyārthika Naya, otherwise called the Dravyāstika, Dravyāsthita and Dravyārtha, considers a thing in its substantial aspect. The Paryāyārthika Naya, otherwise called the Paryāyāstika, Paryāyāsthita and Paryāyārtha, considers the thing in its aspect of modifications

It may be asked here why a third kind of the Compounded Naya is not considered here which

altogether denied, we would not have Naya, a form of valid knowledge after all, but a Nayābhāsa or fallacious mode of cognition

It may be contended here that since Naya also gives us valid knowledge, it need not be separately defined but ought to be included in the class of the Pramāṇa which gives certain knowledge about objects. In other words, the contenders point out. The Naya is (a mode of) the Pramāṇa, because it gives us valid knowledge of its object; like the Pramāṇa; if in spite of the fact that the Naya gives us certain knowledge about its object, it be maintained that the Naya is not a Pramāṇa, then there remains no reason why the Pramāṇa should be a Pramāṇa at all. The Jaina commentator urges that the contention is not sound at all. The Naya determines only a part of its object and cannot accordingly be said to yield a valid knowledge about an object. The objectors contend again.—The part of an object which is the subject-matter of the Naya, well, what is it? If the part of an object be an object then the Naya yielding a valid knowledge about a part of the object is a Pramāṇa, for a Pramāṇa consists in rightly determining an object. If, on the other hand, the part of an object be not an object, then the Naya becomes a form of false knowledge; for a false knowledge is knowledge about something which is not an (real) object. The Jaina commentator points out that this contention of the objector is also not sound. The part of an object is but the part of an object, it is neither an object nor a non-object. In this connection, the commentator quotes the stanzas of a poet philosopher —“The wise say that a part of an object is but a part of the object and is neither an

aspects which are outside the scope of the Dravya and the Paryāya. Accordingly these are not sub-classes of the Naya over and above the Dravyārthika and the Paryāyārthika.

आद्यो नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारभेदात् त्रेधा ॥ ६ ॥

ādyo naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahāra-bhedāt tredhā
| 6 |

TRANSLATION: The first is of three kinds, viz, The Naigama, (the Non-distinguished) the Saṅgraha (the Generic) and the Vyavahāra (the Practical)

COMMENTARY: The above are the three subdivisions of the Dravyārthika Naya

धर्मयोर्धर्मिणोर्धर्मघर्मिणोश्च प्रधानोपसर्जनभावेन यद्वि-
वक्षणं स नैकगमो नैगमः ॥ ७ ॥

*dharmayor dharmiṇor dharmagharmiṇoś ca pradhā-
nopasarjana-bhāvena yadvivakṣaṇaṁ sa itaikagamo nai-
gamah* | 7 |

TRANSLATION. The Naigama signifies both of either two characteristics or of two substances or of a Characteristic and a substance holding up one as the chief and the other as its adjunct.

COMMENTARY: The Non-distinguished Naya is the first kind of the Dravyārthika Naya It signifies in an undistinguished way two ideas, one of which is the chief and the other, an adjunct to it It is of three kinds inasmuch as the two ideas may be (i) ideas of

स्वामिप्रेतादंशादितरांशापलापी पुनर्नयाभासः ॥ २ ॥

*svābhipretād aṁśād itarāṁśāpalapī punar nayābhā-
saḥ* | 2 |

TRANSLATION. The Naya-Fallacy again consists in denying the aspects other than the aspect with which one is concerned (for the time being)

COMMENTARY. Naya does not mean to deny absolutely other aspects of a thing. It simply emphasises one or more aspects of a thing, for the time being. Naya-Fallacy consists in such absolute denials. Such absolute statements, as 'a thing is eternal', 'a thing is non-eternal' etc, which we meet with in the philosophical systems of the Tīrthukas (thinkers of the Non-Jaina Schools) are instances of the fallacious Naya.

स व्याससमासान्यां द्विप्रकारः ॥ ३ ॥

sa vyāsa-samāsābhyāṁ dviprakāraḥ | 3 |

TRANSLATION. It is of two kinds—The Expounded (*vyāsa*) and The Compounded (*samāsa*).

COMMENTARY. These two are the primary divisions of the Naya, viz, the Expounded and the Compounded

व्यासतोऽनेकविकल्पः ॥ ४ ॥

vyāsato'neka-vikalpaḥ | 4 |

one wants to say that a 'Substratum modified' which is the 'thing' exists. It is clear that in such a statement the 'Substratum modified' is the chief idea, being used as the substantive Subject, while the 'Thing' is an idea subordinated to it, being used as an adjunct-relative. Or suppose there arises a question of the form:—'Is a thing, Substratum modified'? We find that in the statement embodying the question, the idea of the 'Thing' is the principal one, being put as the subject-substantive while that of the 'substratum modified' is a subordinate idea being used as the adjunct-predicate of the chief idea. The two substances, viz., the 'Thing and the Substratum modified' are in any case conceived in non-distinguished manner. Hence in the given statement we get an instance of the second class of the Naigama Naya

क्षणमेकं सुखी विषयासक्तजीव इति तु धर्मधर्मिणोः ॥१०॥

*kṣaṇam ekaṁ sukhī viṣayāsakta-jīva iti tu dharmadharma-
dharma-miṇoḥ* | 10 |

TRANSLATION: (In the statement) 'A self engrossed in the affairs of the world gets happiness for a moment only' (we have an instance) of a Characteristic 'and' a Substance (being signified in an Undistinguished way, holding up one as the chief and the other as its adjunct)

COMMENTARY: Here 'self engrossed in the affairs of the world' is a Substance and 'Happiness' is a Characteristic or Attribute. Of these, the former being used as the substantive-subject is the chief idea while the latter being used as an adjunct-predicate, appears

might deal with Guna or the Attribute of a thing. The answer is that the Guṇa is included in Paryāya here. The Paryāya is of two kinds, Krama-bhāvi (i.e., Emerging or Evolving) and Sahabhāvi (i.e., co-existent or attendant). Now, a Guna or quality is a property which is co-existent with the substance and is thus included in the Paryāya.

Next it may be asked why Sāmānya (Generality) and Viśeṣa (Particularity) which are also two aspects of a thing are not said here to have two modes of the Naya, corresponding to them. The Jainas point out that the Sāmānya and the Viśeṣa are not aspects which are outside the purview of the Dravya and the Paryāya. The Sāmānya is of two kinds, viz., the Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya (i.e., substratum) and the Tiryak-sāmānya (i.e., class-features). Of these, the Ūrdhvatā-Sāmānya is nothing other than the Dravya. The Tiryak-Sāmānya, on the contrary, consists in the features or points which are similar in the individuals of a class. The Sāmānya comes under the class of the Paryāya, i.e., the Paryāya which is called the Vyañjana Paryāya. Phenomena which are gross (Sthūla), have some persistence (Kālāntarasthāyi) and which are signified by words (Śabdānām samketavisaya) - are Vyañjana-Paryāyas. The Tiryak-sāmānya indicating the features which appear in an individual of a class, in a mode similar to the mode in which they appear in the other individuals of the class is a Vyañjana-paryāya. The Tiryak-sāmānya is thus a Paryāya. And it goes without saying that the viśeṣa indicating the features, which distinguish an individual of a class from the other individuals of the class, comes under the class of the Paryāya. It is thus clear that the Sāmānya and the Viśeṣa are not

यथाऽऽत्मनि सत्त्वचैतन्ये परस्परमत्यन्तपृथग्भूते

इत्यादि ॥ १२ ॥

yathā ātmani sattva-caitanye parasparam atyantapṛthag bhūte ityādi . 12

TRANSLATION: As for instance. (To consider that) In the soul Existence and consciousness are absolutely separate from (i.e., unconnected with) each other etc., etc.. (would be fallacious)

COMMENTARY: To consider that the Attributes (Dharma) of Existence and Consciousness inhere in the Soul unconnected with each other: that the Substance (*dharmi*) of a Thing and Substratum modified are independent of each other: or that the characteristic (*dharma*) of Happiness' and the Being (*dharm*) of self are distinct from each other. would be instances of the Naigamābhāsa.

It is to be noted that it is the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy which commit this fallacy.

सामान्यमात्रग्राही परामर्शः संग्रहः ॥ १३ ॥

sāmānya-mātra-grāhī parāmarśaḥ saṁgrahaḥ . 13 .

TRANSLATION: The Generic or the Saṁgraha-naya takes account of the common or the general aspect only

COMMENTARY. The word. Saṁgraha. literally means the view-point which considers the infinite particularities as one identical aggregated whole, i.e., in

Characteristics, Features or Attributes, (ii) ideas of Substances or of (iii) ideas of a Substance and of an Attribute, Characteristic or Feature These are illustrated below

सच्चैतन्यमात्मनीति धर्मयोः ॥ ८ ॥

sac caitanyam ātmanīti dharmayoh । 8 ।

TRANSLATION (In the statement) "In Soul, there is an ever-existing consciousness", (We have an instance) of two characteristics (being signified in an Undistinguished way, holding up one as the chief and the other as its adjunct)

COMMENTARY Here 'consciousness' and its 'ever-existence' are the two Characteristics (*dharma*) Of these the former being used as a substantive appears as the chief idea and the latter being used as an adjective appears as an adjunct to it. The two Attributes, however, are conceived in a Non-Distinguished manner Hence in the given statement we get an instance of the first Class of the Naigama Naya

वस्तु पर्यायवद् द्रव्यमिति धर्मिणोः ॥ ९ ॥

vastu pariyāyavad dravyam iti dharmiṇoh । 9 ।

TRANSLATION (In the statement) 'A thing is substratum, modified' (we have an instance) of two substances (being signified in an undistinguished way, holding up one as the chief and the other, as its adjunct).

COMMENTARY Here 'thing' and 'substratum modified' are the two Substances (*Dharmī*) Suppose

विश्वमेकं सदविशेषादिति यथा ॥ १६ ॥

viśvam ekaṁ sad-aviśeṣād iti yathā । 16 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance: The universe is one; for there is no difference in the Being (of all things).

COMMENTARY: Every thing is cognised to be Existent in this respect, i.e., from the consideration of the fact of Existence, the infinite number of objects may be said to be but one.

सत्ताद्वैतं स्वीकुर्वाणः सकलविशेषान्निराचक्षणास्तदा-

भासः ॥ १७ ॥

*sattādvaitaṁ svīkurvāṇaḥ sakala-viśeṣān nirāc-
kṣāṇas tadābhāsaḥ* । 17 ।

TRANSLATION: The Fallacy in regard to this (i.e., the Saṃgraha-Naya) consists in maintaining the absolute identity of all beings and denying all the Particularities.

COMMENTARY: The Saṃgraha Naya assumes a spirit of indifference to the Particularities, characterising the individuals, and fixing all attention, for the time being, on their Common Feature. The Saṃgraha Naya Fallacy on the contrary, asserts that the Common Feature is alone real and that Particularities characterising the Individuals are unreal.

यथा सत्तैव तत्त्वं ततः पृथग्भूतानां विशेषाणामदर्श-

नात् ॥ १८ ॥

as the subordinate one The said Substance and the said Characteristic, however, are conceived in a Non-distinguished manner Hence in the given statement, we get an instance of the third class of the Naigama Naya

It should be observed here that in the statement under consideration it is impossible to say that both the Dharma (happiness) and the Dharmī (self) are equally prominent in our thought It is because one of them is conceived as the chief and the other, subordinated to it that we say that we have an instance of the Naigama Naya in the statement Where, however, an Object is perceived in which the Ideas of its Substratum and the Modification (i.e., Characteristic, Aspect or Attribute) are equally prominent, the knowledge that we have is Pramāṇa and not Naya

धर्मद्वयादीनामैकान्तिकपार्यव्याप्तिसंधिर्नैगमाभासः ॥११॥

*dharma-dvayādīnām aikāntika-pāṛthyāvābhī-saṁdhir
naigamābhāsaḥ* । 11 ।

TRANSLATION The Fallacy with regard to the Naigama consists in a tendency to absolutely separate the two Attributes etc

COMMENTARY. To consider the two Attributes in the first example, the two Substances in the second example or the Substance and the Attribute in the third example, as absolutely separate and distinct from each other, would be a Fallacy, so far as the Non-distinguished Naya is concerned

Generalities, the Apra Saṃgraha or the Non-ultimate Naya fixes its attention on these lesser Generalities, neglecting for the time being the various individual modes localising these Generalities

धर्माधर्मकाशकालपुद्गलजीवद्रव्याणामैक्यं द्रव्यत्वाभेदा-
दित्यादिर्यथा ॥ २० ॥

*dharmādharma-kāśa-kāla-pudgala-jīva-dravyāṇām
aikyaṁ dravyatvābhedaḍ ityādīn yathā* । 20 ।

TRANSLATION. For instance. Principles of Motion and Rest (Dharma and Adharma), Space (Ākāśa), Time (Kāla), Matter (Pudgala), Soul (Jīva) all these substances are one, because all of them have Substantiality which is identical and so on

COMMENTARY. All Substances cognised are cognised to be Substances, in this respect, i.e., in view of this cognition of all of them being that of a substance, all the above-named six substances may be considered to be one. In the same manner, a particular being, no matter, whether conscious or unconscious, is known to be a Mode. On this consideration all the various modes, i.e., the particular beings of the world may be said to be one

द्रव्यत्वादिकं प्रतिजानानस्तद्विशेषान्निवृत्तानस्तदाभासः

॥ २१ ॥

*dravyatvādikaṁ pratijānānas tadviśeṣān nīhuvānas
tadābhāsaḥ* । 21 ।

a homogeneous lump, as it were. The Samgrahanaya consists in reconciling the particular aspects of individual things to their underlying common Features and treating the former as a unity. When we have the Samgraha or the Generic view-point we fix upon the Generalities, e.g., Existence, Substantiality etc., the Generalities as devoid of the infinite Particularities, characterising the things.

अयमुभयविकल्पः परोऽपरश्च ॥ १४ ॥

ayam ubhayavikalpaḥ paro'paraś ca | 14 |

TRANSLATION. That is of two kinds, ultimate and Non-ultimate

COMMENTARY. These, i.e., the Para-Samgraha and the Apra-samgraha are described and illustrated below.

अशेषविशेषैर्वादासीन्यं भजमानः शुद्धब्रह्मं सन्मात्रमभि-
मन्यमानः परः संग्रहः ॥ १५ ॥

*aśeṣa-viśeṣesvaudāsīnyam bhajamānaḥ śuddha-
bravyam sanmātram abhimanayamānaḥ paraḥ samgrahaḥ*
| 15 |

TRANSLATION. The Ultimate or the Para-Samgraha consists in assuming an attitude of indifference to the infinite Particularities (of a thing) and fixing solely upon (its) barest substratum which is equal to pure Existence

COMMENTARY: This is illustrated below.

TRANSLATION: The Practical or the Vyavahāra-naya is that view-point by which matters which are the objects of the Saṃgraha-naya are systematically divided.

COMMENTARY: The objects of the Saṃgraha are such Generalities as Substantiality etc. The Practical standpoint, i.e., Vyāvahāra goes on dividing them methodically without denying them

यथा यत्सत्तद् द्रव्यं पर्यायो वेत्यादिः ॥ २४ ॥

yathā yat sat tad dravyaṃ paryāyo vetyādiḥ । 24 ।

TRANSLATION: As for instance: Whatever is Existent is either a Substance (*dravya*) or a Mode (*paryāya*)

COMMENTARY: In the above example, an attempt is made to classify the idea of Existence, which, as we have seen, is the object of the Ultimate, i.e., the Para-Saṃgraha. Instances may also be given of the division of ideas which are the subject matter of the Non-ultimate, i.e., the Apra-Saṃgraha. These may be as follows.—(1) Whatever is a Substance is either a Soul or Matter etc., i.e., any of the six Substances mentioned before. (2) Whatever is a Mode is either Evolving (*Kramabhāvi*) or Co-existent (*Sahabhāvi*). Proceeding further it may be said again. (3) A soul is either Emancipated or Un-emancipated, and (4) Whatever is an Evolving Mode consists either in Activity or in Passivity and so on

यः पुनरपारमार्थिकं द्रव्यपर्यायविभागमभिप्रेति स व्यवहारमासः ॥ २५ ॥

*yathā sattatva tattvaṁ tataḥ prthagbhūtānāṁ viśe-
śānāṁ adaśanāt* | 18 |

TRANSLATION: As for instance, Pure Existence is the only reality, for, Particularities apart from that are not apprehended

COMMENTARY: The above is the position of all the Advaita Schools as well as that of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. The Advaita and the Sāṃkhya systems thus invalue Samgraha-Naya-fallacy. The Advaita position is opposed to the matters of our perception and connative pursuit

*द्रव्यत्वादीनि अवान्तरसामान्यानि मन्वानस्तद्भेदेषु गजनि-
मीलिकामवलम्बमानः पुनरपरसंग्रहः* || १९ ||

*dravyatvādīni avāntara-sāmānyāni manvānas-tad-
bhedeṣu gaja-nimīlikām avalambamānaḥ punaḥ apara-
sangrahaḥ* | 19 |

TRANSLATION: The Non-ultimate or the Aparā-Samgraha consists in taking into consideration such non-ultimate Generalities as Substantiality etc., and assuming an attitude of indifference to their various modes

COMMENTARY: The scope of such Sāmānya or Generality as Sattā or pure Being is the widest possible and accordingly it is called the Mahā-Sāmānya or ultimate Generality. Generalities such as Dravyatva or Substantiality etc., have within their scope individuals lesser in number than those of the Mahā-sāmānya and are called the Avāntara Sāmānya or Non-ultimate

the Subtle (*samabhūūḍha*) and the Such-like (*evam-bhūta*).

COMMENTARY: These are described and illustrated below.

ऋजु वर्तमानक्षणस्थायि पर्यायमात्रं प्राधान्यतः सूत्रयत्नमि-
प्राय ऋजुसूत्रः ॥ २८ ॥

*rju vartamāna-kṣaṇasthāyī-pariāyā-mātrāṁ piā-
dhānyataḥ sūtrayaṁ abhiprāya rjusūtraḥ* ॥ 28 ॥

TRANSLATION: The Straightly-expressed or the Rjusūtra Naya consists in a tendency to fix on or emphasise only the Mode which is Straight, i.e., existent for the present.

COMMENTARY. Rju means straight, i.e., clearly manifest. The aspect of a thing as it is observed at a present given moment is always clear. The aspects of the thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future cannot appear to be so clear. The Rjusūtra is so called because it deals with that aspect of the thing which manifests itself at the present and is consequently Rju or clear. Although the subject-matter of the Straight-expressed is still a Dravya or Substance, it holds up the impermanent modes and aspects as matters of principal interest.

यथा सुखविवर्तः संप्रत्यस्तीत्यादिः ॥ २९ ॥

yathā sukha-vivartḥ sampṛaty astītyādih ॥ 29 ॥

TRANSLATION For instance, Now, there is pleasure.

yah punaḥ apāramāṇīthikaṃ diavya-pariyāya-vibhāgam abhīpīcati sa vyavahārābhāsaḥ । 25 ।

TRANSLATION The Fallacy with regard to the Practical (i.e., the Vyavāhara Naya) consists in a tendency to divide the Substances and the Modes into unreal sub-classes.

COMMENTARY To make imaginary divisions of a class-idea is the Fallacious Vyavahāra.

यथा चार्वाकदर्शनम् ॥ २६ ॥

yathā 'cā'vāka-darśanam । 26 ।

TRANSLATION As for instance, the Cārvāka philosophy

COMMENTARY. The Cārvāka or the Sophist denies the division of Substances into Soul, Matter etc., which is based on the Pramāṇas and calls it imaginary. He follows the way of ordinary men and supports their unreasonable classification of Substances into the four Material Elements. Hence his philosophy is vitiated by the Fallacy in regard to the Vyavahāra Naya.

पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्धा ऋजुसूत्रः शब्दः समभिरूढः

एवंभूतश्च ॥ २७ ॥

pariyāyārthikaś'catuṛdhā rjusūtrāḥ śabdāḥ samabhīrūḍha evambhūtaś'ca । 27 ।

TRANSLATION. The Paryāyārthika is of four kinds: the Straight-expressed (*rjusūtra*), the Verbal (*śabda*),

यथा बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुरित्यादयो भिन्नकालाः
शब्दा भिन्नमेवार्थमभिदधति भिन्नकालशब्दत्वात्तादृक् सिद्धान्य-
शब्दवदित्यादि ॥ ३५ ॥

*yathā babhūva bhavati bhaviṣyati sumeruḥ ityādayo
bhinna-kālāḥ śabdā bhinnam evārtham abhidadhati bhin-
nakāla-śabdāt tādṛk-siddhānya-śabdavad ityādi* । 35 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance, in the expression, 'Sumeru Was, is, will be', the words used in different Tenses refer to essentially different objects, because they are words used in different Tenses, like other words which refer to really different objects well, this way of thinking and similar ways of thinking (involve the Fallacy of the Śabda Naya).

COMMENTARY: Although the Verbs are used in different Tenses they refer to one and the same object so far as the substratum is concerned. To hold that they refer to essentially different objects because they are used in different Tenses is clearly a Fallacy. The ground of the Fallacy, here, again, is its being opposed to the Pramāṇas. Other examples of the Śabda Naya Fallacy with reference to differences in Genders etc, may similarly be conceived.

पर्यायशब्देषु निरुक्तिभेदेन भिन्नमर्थमभिरोहन् सममिच्छः
॥ ३६ ॥

*paryāya-śabdeṣu nirukti-bhedena bhinnam artham
abhirohan samabhīrūdhāḥ* । 36 ।

TRANSLATION: The Subtle or the Samabhirūḍha Naya consists in attributing different meanings to synonyms according to their derivations

COMMENTARY Through the above expression, only an evanescent Mode, viz, Pleasure consisting in momentary satisfaction is mainly indicated while its support or substratum, the soul is not presented or put forward, owing to its indirectness. In other words, in the given instances the substantial Reality is ignored and a mode of it which persists for the present time only is considered. Another instance would be, now there is Pain

सर्वथा द्रव्यापलापी तदाभासः ॥ ३० ॥

saivathā dravyāpalāpī tadābhāsaḥ : 30 | .

TRANSLATION The Fallacy with regard to that (i.e., the Rjusūtra Naya) consists in denying the Substance in toto

COMMENTARY To lay exclusive emphasis on the impermanent and the phenomenal aspect and to deny the substantial reality involve the Fallacy with regard to the Rjusūtra Naya

यथा तथागतमतम् ॥ ३१ ॥

yathā tathāgata-matam : 31 |

TRANSLATION As for instance, the philosophy of the Tathāgata

COMMENTARY The Tathāgata (Buddha) holds the momentary modes as the only reality and denies altogether the reality of the permanent Substance which underlies the Modes and the reality of which is

यथेन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दर इत्यादयः शब्दा भिन्नाभिधेया एव भिन्न-
शब्दत्वात् करिकुरङ्गपुरङ्गशब्दवदित्यादिः ॥ ३९ ॥

*yathendrah śakraḥ purandara ityādayaḥ, śabdā
bhinnābhidheya eva bhinna-śabdātvaāt kari-kuraṅga-pura-
ṅga-śabdavad ityādih* । 39 ।

TRANSLATION: As for instance (to maintain that) the words Indra, Śakra and Purandara etc., signify really different objects, as they are different words, like the words Elephant, Deer, Horse etc

शब्दानां स्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाविष्टमर्थं वाच्यत्वेनाभ्यु-
पगच्छन्नेवंभूतः ॥ ४० ॥

*śabdānāṃ svapravṛtti-nimitta-bhūta-kriyāviṣṭam ar-
than vācyatvenābhyupagacchann evambhūtaḥ* । 40 ।

TRANSLATION: The Such-like or the Evambhūta Naya maintains that words signify those objects which have the activities denoted by them.

COMMENTARY: The 'Subtle' standpoint, as we have seen, calls the Lord of the Gods, Indra, no matter whether he rains or not, and a particular quadruped, 'Go' (Cow), no matter whether it moves or not. The Such-like standpoint, on the other hand, would call the Lord Indra only when he is actually raining. According to this Naya, all words have a dynamic significance. Thus a 'Go' is so called because it goes, an Aśva (Horse) because it moves fast; even the qualitative expressions have a dynamic force, according to the Evambhūta Naya. Thus a Śukla (white) thing is

be admitted where it is used in different Genders as for instance, in the word *Taṭa* (ordinarily meaning a river-bank) which is sometimes used in the masculine Gender (*taṭaḥ*) sometimes in the feminine Gender (*taṭī*) and sometimes in the neuter gender (*taṭam*) The Śabda Naya similarly ascribes different senses to the Sanskrit words, viz, to the word, signifying, a wife, *Dārāḥ* (which is always used in the plural number) and the word *Kalatram* (which is always used in the singular number) 'Come', 'I think you will go in a car', 'You will not go', 'your father is gone': in these expressions there is a difference in the senses of the verbs due to difference in their persons The expressions, '*samtiṣṭhate*' (meaning 'joins') and '*avatiṣṭhate*' (meaning 'resides') illustrate how the different Prefixes '*saṃ*' and '*ava*' cause difference in the meaning of the verb '*sthā*'.

तद्भेदेन तस्य तमेव समर्थयमानस्तदाभासः ॥ ३४ ॥

*tadbhedena tasya tam eva samarthayamānas tadā-
bhāsaḥ* | 34 |

TRANSLATION The Fallacy in regard to it (i.e., the Śabda-Naya) consists in maintaining a real difference in objects in accordance with the difference in Tenses etc

COMMENTARY To conclude that, essentially different objects are implied from the fact of the expressions being used in different Tenses etc., would be committing the Śabda Naya Fallacy.

TRANSLATION: The Fallacy in regard to it, (i.e. the Evambhūta-Naya) consists in refusing to give the object its usual name when it is not functioning.

COMMENTARY: It is one thing to emphasise for the time being the dynamic force of a word and another thing (i.e., a Fallacy) to refuse to call the object by its usual name on the ground that it is not actively discharging the function, indicated by the etymology of the word.

यथा विशिष्टचेष्टाशून्यं घटाख्यं-वस्तु न घटशब्दवाच्यं
घटशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाशून्यत्वात् पटवदित्यादिः ॥ ४३ ॥

yathā viśiṣṭa-ceṣṭā-śūnyaṃ ghaṭākhyaṃ vastu na
ghaṭa-śabda-vācyaṃ ghaṭa-śabda-pravṛtti-nimitta-bhūta-
kriyā-śūnyatvāt paṭavad ityādiḥ । 43 ।

TRANSLATION: For instance: To hold that the thing called the 'pitcher' should not be so called when it is not doing the particular function (indicated by the word, 'pitcher'); because it is then devoid of the function indicated by the word, pitcher; like a cloth, and so on.

COMMENTARY: The above is a fallacy because it refuses to call a pitcher a pitcher when it is inactive. Such a position is opposed to the Pramāṇas or forms of valid knowledge.

एतेषु चत्वारः प्रथमेऽर्थनिरूपणप्रवणत्वादर्थनयाः ॥ ४४ ॥

eteṣu catvāraḥ prathamē'rtha-nirūpaṇa-pravaṇatvād
arthanayāḥ । 44 ।

COMMENTARY: The Śabda Naya indicates that the object remains one and identical although different expressions (synonyms) are used. The Samabhirūḍha holds that different objects are expressed by different expressions (synonyms), neglecting for the time being, the substantial identity.

इन्दनाद्रिन्द्रः शकनाच्छक्रः पुरंदरात्पुरन्दर इत्यादिषु यथा
॥ ३७ ॥

*indanād indraḥ śakanācchakraḥ pūṇḍarāṇāt puran-
dara ityādisu yathā* । 37 ।

TRANSLATION For instance: Indra is one who rains, Śakra is one who is potent: Purandara is one who penetrates into (enemy) city; and so on

COMMENTARY: Although Indra, Śakra and Purandara are but synonyms for the lord of the Gods, different meanings are attributed to those synonyms, regarding to their etymological derivations.

पर्यायध्वनीनामभिधेयानात्वमेव कक्षीकुर्वाणस्तदाभासः

॥ ३८ ॥

*paryāya-dhvanīnām abhidheya-nānātvam eva kakṣī-
kurvāṇas tadābhāsaḥ* । 38 ।

TRANSLATION. The Fallacy in regard to it (i.e., the Samabhirūḍha Naya) consists in maintaining the difference in objects in accordance with the difference in synonyms

COMMENTARY: This is illustrated below

सद्विशेषप्रकाशकाद् व्यवहारतः संग्रहः समस्तसत्समूहोपदर्शक-
त्वाद् बहुविषयः ॥ ४८ ॥

*sadvaiśeṣa-prakāśakād vyavahārataḥ saṅgrahaḥ sam-
astasat-samūhopadarsakatvād bahu-viśayaḥ* ॥ 48 ॥

TRANSLATION: The contents of the Generic which has within its view all the Existents are fuller than those of the Practical which reveals only some modes of the Existents.

वर्तमानविषयादृजुसूत्राद् व्यवहारस्त्रिकालविषयावलम्बि-
त्वादनल्पार्थः ॥ ४९ ॥

*vatamāna-viśayād rjusūtrād vyavahāras trikāla-
viśayāvalambitvād analpārthaḥ* ॥ 49 ॥

TRANSLATION. The scope of the Practical which has for its objects the things of the past, the present and the future is wider than that of the Straight-expressed which considers the things of the present only

कालादिभेदेन भिन्नार्थोपदर्शिनः शब्दादृजुसूत्रस्तद्विपरीत-
वेदकत्वात्महार्थः ॥ ५० ॥

*kālādi-bhedena bhinnārthopadarsinaḥ śabdād rju-
sūtrāś tadviparīta-vedakatvān mahārthāḥ* ॥ 50 ॥

TRANSLATION: The verbal signifies different objects in accordance with the difference in Tense etc, but the 'Straight-Expressed' indicates the opposite: hence, the scope of the latter is wider.

what has become 'Sure' (verified). Even in such random and seemingly meaningless proper names as Devadatta, Yajñadatta, the Evambhūta Naya would pick out the root, 'Dā' (to give) and say that we have a dynamic significance there. Lastly, the Such-like standpoint maintains that in words signifying a combination of two or more things either externally connected (*samyogī*) or intimately related (*samavāyī*) as for example Dandī (one having a club) or Viṣṇī (an animal having horns) the dynamic idea of having or being is prominent.

It should be observed, however, that the Such-like standpoint imputes such dynamic significance to a word, only as a matter of practice (*vyavahāra*) and not as an absolute requirement (*niścaya*).

यथेन्दमनुसवन्निन्द्रः शकनक्रियापरिणतः शक्रः पूदरिण-
प्रवृत्तः पुरन्दर इत्युच्यते ॥ ४१ ॥

*yathendanam anubhavann indīaḥ śakanakriyā-
pariṇataḥ śakīaḥ pūḍāraṇa-pravṛttaḥ purandara ity-
ucyate* | 41 |

TRANSLATION: As for instance; Indra is so called because he rains, Śakra is so called because he exercises power; Purandara is so called because he penetrates into the (enemy) city.

क्रियाज्ञाविष्टं वस्तु शब्दवाच्यतया प्रतिक्षिपंस्तु तदाभासः
॥ ४२ ॥

*kriyā'nāviṣṭam vastu śabda-vācyatayā pratikṣipams
tu tadābhāsaḥ* | 42 |

COMMENTARY: The Pramāṇa considers an object in its entirety; Naya, in its particular aspect and part. Otherwise there is no difference between the Pramāṇa and the Naya. Hence the Naya like the Pramāṇa, makes seven forms of statement regarding its object; and each of these statements begins with 'Syāt', i.e., in some respects.

प्रमाणवदस्य फलं व्यवस्थापनीयम् ॥ ५४ ॥

pramāṇavad asya phalam vyavasthāpanīyam । 54 ।

TRANSLATION: Its fruit also is to be determined in the same way as that of the Pramāṇa.

COMMENTARY: Like that of the Pramāṇa, the immediate Fruit of the Naya is the destruction of ignorance; so far as the particular aspect of a thing is concerned. As regards its indirect Fruit, the Naya also like the Pramāṇa generates a spirit for appropriation or a spirit for avoidance or a spirit of indifference regarding the particular aspect of the thing which is within its scope. Lastly, the Naya and its fruit are to be considered both as distinct (in some respects) from and identical (in some respects) with each other

प्रमाता प्रत्यक्षादिप्रसिद्ध आत्मा ॥ ५५ ॥

pramātā pratyakṣādi-prasiddha ātmā । 55 ।

TRANSLATION: The subject of all forms of valid cognition is the self, as known by Direct Perception etc.

TRANSLATION: Of these the first four are object-Nayas as their nature is to determine objects.

शेषास्तु त्रयः शब्दवाच्यार्थगोचरतया शब्दनयाः ॥ ४५ ॥

śeṣās tu trayah śabda-vācyaṁ tha-gocara-taya śabda-nayāḥ | 45 |

TRANSLATION: The last three are 'word-Nayas' as they reveal the significations of Words.

पूर्वः पूर्वो नयः प्रचुरगोचरः, परः परस्तु परिमितविषयः

॥ ४६ ॥

pūrvah pūrvo nayah pracura-gocarah, parah paras tu parimuta-viśayah | 46 |

TRANSLATION: The contents of each preceding Naya are fuller and fuller and those of each succeeding one are more and more limited.

COMMENTARY: This is explained below.

सन्मात्रगोचरात्संग्रहात्तैगमो भावाभावभूमिकत्वाद्

भूमविषयः ॥ ४७ ॥

sanmātra-gocarāt saṁgrahāt tairgamo bhāvābhāva-bhūmikatvād bhūma-viśayah | 47 |

TRANSLATION: The contents of the Non-distinguished which has within its scope the Existents as well as the Non-existents are fuller than those of the Generic which reveals only the Existents.

argue that consciousness is existent in the material Elements from before. The Pratyaksa or our direct perception does not show the existence of consciousness in the material Elements; because consciousness is something unsensuous and sensuous perception cannot yield anything which is unsensuous. The Cārvākas moreover do not admit any form of perception which is not sensuous. Nor can the Cārvākas say that the existence of consciousness in the material Elements from before, is proved by Anumāna or inference. For, the Cārvākas do not admit the validity of inference as a source of knowledge. The Cārvākas however, contend that they admit inferences which are of practical utility, such as the inference of Fire from Smoke, and deny only those which deal with such supernatural matters as the heaven, the unseen power (*apūrva*) which generates in a next birth fruits of acts done in a present life etc. etc. The Cārvākas thus contend that inference establishes the existence of Consciousness in the material Elements from before they form a body. In criticising this contention of the Cārvākas the Jainas point out that Consciousness, as admitted by the Cārvākas to be existent in the material Elements before they form the animal body must be something supersensuous (*alaukika*) the reality of which the Cārvākas can never admit. The Jainas further point out that if the practical form of inference may prove the reality of such a supersensuous thing as consciousness, why, then the supersensuous thing like the heaven etc., also may be admitted by the Cārvākas to be proved by the practical form of inference. Hence it is that the Cārvāka theory that the material elements when they form a (animal) body reveal or make explicit

प्रतिपर्यायशब्दमर्थभेदमभीप्सतः समभिरूढाच्छब्दस्तद्विपर्ये-
यानुयायित्वात् प्रभूतविषयः ॥ ५१ ॥

*pratī-parīyāya-śabdam artha-bhedam abhīpsataḥ sam-
abhūrūdhāc chabdas tadviparīyayānuyāyitvāt prabhūta-
viśayaḥ* | 51 |

TRANSLATION: The scope of the 'Subtle' which tends to attribute a different meaning to each of the synonyms is smaller than that of the Verbal which does quite the different thing

प्रतिक्रियं विभिन्नमर्थं प्रतिजानानादेवंभूतात्समभिरूढस्तदन्य-
थार्थस्थापकत्वान्महागोचरः ॥ ५२ ॥

*pratīkriyam vibhinnam artham pratijānānād evam-
bhūtāt samabhūrūḥas tadanyathāi thasthāpakatvān mahā-
gocaraḥ* | 52 |

TRANSLATION: The Such-like indicates different objects in accordance with the difference in functioning. The Subtle does quite the different thing and its contents are consequently fuller than those of the former.

नयवाक्यमपि स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानं विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां सप्त-
भङ्गीमनुव्रजति ॥ ५३ ॥

*naya-vākyaṃ api svavīsaye prāvartamānaṃ vidhi-
pratīsedhābhīyāṃ saptabhaṅgīm anuvrajati* | 53 |

TRANSLATION: A Naya statement also in its application to its object, follows the law of the Seven-fold Predication, through affirmation and negation

objects which are already existent; rice, water etc. (even in their combination) cannot be said to reveal the intoxicating power because there is no evidence to show that this intoxicating power is existent in them from before they combine into wine. Intoxicating power cannot thus be said to be explicit or revealed. Hence the example of the intoxicating power is incompetent to show how consciousness becomes explicit.

The Cārvāka may turn round and contend that Consciousness is produced by the Material Elements. It may be urged, however, that if Consciousness is the outcome of the material Elements, it may well be conceived that the material Elements, even though uncombined, would produce Consciousness. The Cārvākas contend, however, that Consciousness is not the direct product of the material Elements but that it is the product of the Body which is a combination of those Elements. In criticism of this Cārvāka contention, it is asked: Does that Body as a whole produce consciousness or do its various parts produce it? The first of the alternative positions is untenable, inasmuch as that would lead to the absurd position that one should lose consciousness and die if a finger only of his is cut off. The Cārvāka cannot avoid the difficulty by saying that the severance of a part of the Body need not cause one's death, for, in that case, his opponent may urge that the severance of one's head from one's Body need not cause his death. Nor can the Cārvāka maintain that each part of the Body produces Consciousness, for, in that case there would be produced many consciousnesses in a Body, and, then the Cārvāka urge that although the Body consists of many parts,

COMMENTARY: The subject of all knowledge is the soul, called the *Ātmā* in Indian Philosophy. It is so called because it always goes through (*aṭati*) one or other of its various modes (*paryāyas*) The existence of the soul is proved by the *Pramāṇas* both *Pratyakṣa* (direct) and *Parokṣa* (indirect) according to the *Jaina* school.

The *Cārvāka* philosophers deny the existence of a permanent conscious soul and argue as follows:—Earth, Water, Fire and Air are the four primordial principles: when these principles combine in a peculiar way, so as to form a (animal) body, they produce consciousness, there is no permanent Soul which persists through the various births and re-births They quote *Bṛhaspati* as saying; “Earth, Water, Fire and Air are the first and fundamental principles: their combinations are the (animal) body, the objects (of the senses) and the senses; consciousness is their outcome” In the said material Elements taken individually no consciousness is found but they reveal or make explicit consciousness in their combination Rice etc, do not show any intoxicating power in them at first, but when they ferment and become wine, they give indication of an intoxicating power, in the same way the above-mentioned Elements reveal consciousness.

The *Jaina* philosophers criticise the *Cārvāka* position in the following way. That which is existent from before can alone be revealed or made explicit If the material Elements when they form a body reveal or make explicit consciousness, consciousness must be supposed to be existent in the material Elements from before The *Cārvākas* however, cannot

that these modifications in the wood do not disappear from it with the disappearance of the fire but persist. The Cārvāka thereby contends that although Phlegm etc., may be harmonised in a dead body, death created by their disturbance does not subside from the dead body. To this contention of the Cārvāka, the Jaina answer is as follows. Experience shows that some disorders are curable; (e.g., the liquidness caused in gold by fire subsides when fire is removed from it) while some are incurable. All disorders caused by Phlegm etc., are curable; otherwise the Medical Service would be useless. Death (and the consequent loss of Consciousness) is due after all to a disorder like weakness etc., caused by the disharmony of Phlegm according to the Cārvākas so that there is no reason why death (and the consequent) loss of Consciousness like any other diseases of the Body should not be curable. The Cārvākas point out that by means of medical treatment disorders like weakness are found to be cured, but that death is never found to be curable; that this shows that death is a disorder which is not curable. The Jainas urge in reply that a disorder in the body is the effect of the disharmony among Phlegm etc., this bodily disharmony by itself is never incurable; so that, after all, disorders are curable, a disorder becomes incurable for various reasons, e.g., when proper medicines are not procured and so on. This is corroborated by the fact that one person dies of one disease while another person is cured of the very same disease, what does this show? This shows that diseases which are disorders caused by the disharmony of Phlegm etc. are curable and that these disorders become incurable when other causes intervene. The

Consciousness, is untenable, i.e., incapable of being proved by the Cārvākas. Nor is the position maintainable that Consciousness which is not found in the material Elements taken individually, may be revealed or made explicit by those Elements when they combine to form a body, just like the intoxicating power which although it is not found in rice etc. may be found in their combination. In criticising the contention of the Cārvākas, the Jainas ask.—What is the intoxicating power? Does it consist in the nature or essence of the thing forming wine which has the intoxicating power or is it some super-sensuous power? The first cannot be the case for if the intoxicating power be the nature of rice, water etc. then these things even when uncombined should possess the intoxicating power. If on the other hand you say that the intoxicating power is something supersensuous, you cannot prove its existence or emergence at any time, because any Pramāṇa which is to prove it and which is not Pratyakṣa is inadmissible according to you (the Cārvāka). The Cārvākas urge that the Jaina objection to their theory is unsound because the Jainas themselves admit that the intoxicating power becomes explicit when rice, water, etc. are combined. The Jaina answer is that all that the Jaina theory implies is that the intoxicating power is something generated by rice etc. at the time of their combination just as a pitcher is something produced by mud, the stick, the potter etc. in their combined activity. The Jainas do not admit that the intoxicating power becomes explicit. To become explicit means to become perceptible, a thing which becomes explicit is accordingly supposed to be existing even before it becomes explicit. A light reveals the

otherwise deeply engrossed in the thought of something else. Unconsciousness etc., however, which follow in persons not so deeply engrossed, are due to nervousness arising from the sight of the blood-flow and not to any derangement in the body, just like the unconsciousness which follows the fearful sight of the blood flowing from another person's body or the apprehension of a tiger nearby. Even if we admit that Unconsciousness is due to a derangement of the Body, it does not follow necessarily that the Body is the Material cause of Consciousness. The fact that a particular state of Consciousness (here unconsciousness) follows a certain state of the Body, proves only that the latter is only an attendant cause (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*) of Consciousness. Fire melts Gold:—this shows not that the Fire is the Material cause of Gold, but that the Fire is only the attendant cause of melting. The modifications in the Body are thus not essentially connected with the modifications in Consciousness. It can be shown similarly that modifications in Consciousness have no corresponding modifications in the Body; Gladness, sorrow, swoon, sleep, fear, grief, erudition etc are states of Consciousness; these have no corresponding changes in the Body. Hence the Body can on no account be looked upon as the Material cause of Consciousness. Another characteristic of a material cause is that the Cause increasing, the effect increases. The quantity of Thread, for example, increasing, the quantity of Cloth increases and hence the former is the Material cause of the latter. But this cannot be said of the Body with regard to Consciousness. Some of the sea fishes have very large bodies; but they have very little intelligence; some of the very lean persons are charac-

there is a unitary principle underlying them and that this unitary principle accounts for the growth of one consciousness in one Body. The Jama thinkers point out that this theory of the unitary Principle underlying the parts of a Body contradicts the Cārvāka standpoint according to which, the body is only a (loose) collection of parts. To admit the unitary principle is to contradict the Carvaka position and to subscribe to the Aksapāda theory of the Avayavī. Further to suppose Consciousness as the product of the Body raises another difficulty. At the time of death, the Body remains intact; why is it, then that there is no Consciousness in a dead body? If it be said that Consciousness is not produced in a dead Body because a disorder is caused in it by the disharmony of Phlegm etc., the answer is that this is not the case. The Phlegm etc., are harmonised in a dead body and hence a dead body is really cured of all diseases and ailments, as is clearly manifest from the (authoritative medical) statement, "the harmonisation of these (Phlegm etc.) is health; their increase or decrease brings about ill health." The fact that Phlegm etc. are harmonised in a dead Body is apparent from the fact that fever etc. are found to have subsided from it. If the Cārvāka position were correct, a dead Body which, as shown above, is free from all disorders ought to have Consciousness. The Cārvākas may urge here. It may be that those factors which cause disorders in a Body subside at the time of death but that does not necessarily show that the disorders caused by those factors subside with the subsidence of those factors; fire, for example, causes many modifications in a log of wood, but it is well known to all

any of these, becoming the Material cause of any of the rest. (But the production of Consciousness which is something immaterial from Material Elements can in no way be proved). Thus it is that Consciousness is not produced by the Elements.

The further contention of the Cārvākas is that knowledge is found to be concomitant with Matter. For example, it is found that when a person has good food and drink, there is good knowledge. When a child's body is purified by Brāhmī Ghee, the child becomes possessed of excellent wisdom. In rainy season, filthy worms are generated by sweat etc. All these facts show that consciousness is generated from Matter. This contention of the Cārvākas also is not sound. The body is the seat of Energy, the senses etc. When the Body is properly nourished, the senses also are nourished thereby and their objects are more clearly perceived and cognised thereby. This explains the goodness of knowledge due to good food and drink and to the application of Brāhmī Ghee. Next, it is to be noted that the Body is but 'the Instrument of experience' (*bhogāyatana*) for the soul. It is the Soul that assumes the Body for the purpose of feeling the effects of its acts. The example of filthy worms does not show that Matter generates Consciousness: it shows how the souls that did bad acts assume filthy bodies to experience the consequences of their bad acts.

Are there any evidences for the existence of the soul? Yes, the soul is directly perceived (*pratyakṣa*) in such forms of self-consciousness as 'I am happy' or 'I am sorry' etc. These forms of self-consciousness are not fallacious; for, there is nothing to contradict them,

Cārvākas attribute death to a disorder arising from the disharmony of Phlegm etc. The position is not correct. The disorder which is death would not have been incurable if it were due to the said physiological disharmony alone. Death is an incurable disorder, because Karma bringing about the termination of the life of the suffering person intervenes. And the intervention of Karma is possible only if there is a soul to which the death-causing Karma attaches itself and which has re-incarnated itself after a pre-existence. Proceeding further with the Cārvāka contention, the question is: Is the body an attendant cause (*sahakāri kāraṇa*) or the material cause (*upādāna*-cause) in the production of consciousness? If the body be said to be an attendant cause (condition), what should be the substratum (the material cause) of consciousness? The Cārvākas do not admit any substance besides the material elements. An effect is never perceived which is without a cause. So, the Cārvākas are bound to admit a cause for consciousness, a cause which is other than the material elements, and this means that a particular mode of consciousness arises from the soul, attended with a Body. Nor can it be contended that the body is the material cause of consciousness. The material cause and its effects are such that one is modified on the modification of the other. Thread and cloth are such a cause and an effect respectively; because on the thread becoming blue the cloth becomes blue, and on the cloth becoming blue the thread becomes blue. Such a relationship does not subsist between the body and consciousness. Such changes on the body as are due to weapon-strokes upon it have no corresponding effects on the flow of consciousness if the person is

their matters are concerned. When we say 'My Body', we do perceive the existence of the Soul presiding over the Body. In the case of the Consciousness, 'My soul', there is no other consciousness besides the consciousness of the soul. The expression 'My' soul really signifies only the self-consciousness, i.e., the consciousness that 'I (The soul) am' and is used for the purpose of distinguishing one's own self from that of the other people and convincing those other people of that distinction. The body which is distinct from the soul may no doubt be often identified with the Soul, but this does not mean that the Body is the Soul. It often appears that a person in referring to his servant who is very intimate with him says 'I'; in the same manner, one may refer to his Body which is undoubtedly very intimate with his self as 'I'. But the Body remains as distinct from one's real self, the soul, as ever. It is thus that if in the consciousness, 'My soul', you isolate 'My' from 'Soul', the isolation or the distinction would be wrong. 'My' and 'Soul' in the apprehension, 'My soul' are inseparable and always to be identified. Even assuming though not admitting, that identification is fallacious, what about the consciousness of the form, 'My Body'? In the case of the consciousness, 'My Body' the two elements, 'My' and 'Body' are always clearly distinguishable, the former refers to the soul which presides over the latter and the latter is perceived as something subservient to it. Hence it is that the Pratyakṣa or direct perception (self-consciousness) proves the reality of the soul. It may be asked. In what form is the soul directly perceived? In answer to this question, the Jaina thinkers ask:—In what form are the internal perceptions, e. g., Pleasure etc. had?

terised by excellent wisdom. In the next place, the Cārvāka may contend that as a child is found to advance in intelligence with the growth and the development of his Body, the Body must be supposed to be the Material cause of Consciousness (intelligence) The Jamas point out that it shows rather that the Body is only the Attendant cause (condition) Pouring of water increases the growth of a shoot, but Water is not for that reason, the Material cause of the Shoot: it is only an Attendant condition. If the Body were the Material cause of Consciousness, every increase in the Body would have been followed by a proportionate increase in Consciousness; but this is nobody's experience Another characteristic of the Material cause is that it emerges into new forms after leaving its old form But this also does not apply in the case of the Body For, while the varied states of Consciousness rise one after the other, the Body continues to remain the self-same Hence the Body cannot be said to be the Material cause of Consciousness The fact is that just as Fire is generated from nothing but Fire latent in fuel etc, Consciousness is generated out of some latent consciousness, and this is admitting the reality and existence of the soul in different words The Cārvākas may contend that Fire is seen to generate from gross fuel (which is a mode of the Earth Element) and not from anything invisible and latent. But such an argument is clearly suicidal For, it shows that the Cārvāka doctrine of the Four (independent) Elements is untenable and that the Jama doctrine of one ultimate Element (*pudgala*) is true According to the Jama theory, Fire, Water, Air and Earth are all essentially but one, viz, Pudgala or Matter and this fact explains

to be the essential characteristic of Body or of a sense-organ or a Material Object; because, a Body, a sense organ or a Material Object is characterised by a form and each of them is made up of Material Elements: accordingly, Consciousness cannot be ascribed to the Body etc. Thus, the given Hetu is not 'unproved' either in its Viśeṣya or in its Viśeṣana. Put in simple language, the argument is this: Units of Consciousness are effects, as they emerge from time to time. All effects must have a substratum or support. What, then is the substratum for the units of Consciousness? Material elements or Bodies cannot be the substratum; for, these are gross and have forms and cannot be essentially connected with Consciousness which has no forms. Accordingly, we are compelled to posit something else, i.e., the soul as the substratum for consciousness. Besides, it recedes from, i.e., is essentially unconnected with the Dissimilar Abode (i.e., phenomena which are located in such Loci as the Body etc.) from Form etc. which are found in Body etc. and from such facts as the fact of being a Body; accordingly, the Hetu is neither Vyabhicāri (variable) nor Viruddha (opposed). All this shows that the Hetu in the given argument is free from all faults and the given argument conclusively shows that the existence of the Soul can be a matter of valid Inference.

The Āgama or the unimpeachable authoritative texts also establish the real existence of the Soul. We have for example such texts as "the Jīva (i.e. the soul) is characterized by the faculty of *upayoga* (i.e. cognition)".

The validity of the Anumāna and the Āgama as correct sources of knowledge has already been proved,

or explain them away. These are direct perceptions (*pratyakṣa*) and are not due to any syllogistic reasoning etc. We do not get these forms of experience through the mediation of any other experience. These are clear and are accordingly *Pratyakṣa*. These direct forms of Self-consciousness point inward and prove the existence of the Soul. It may be contended that Self-consciousness does not prove the reality of the Soul; that it refers to a corporeal substance; that self-consciousness is of the form 'I am fat' or 'I am thin' etc., that the soul of course cannot be said to be fat or thin and that as such, our self-consciousness instead of proving the reality of the soul means really the experience of our Body, which alone is either fat or thin. To this contention of the *Cārvākas* the *Jaina* answer is that even the forms of self-consciousness, 'I am thin' or 'I am fat' do prove the reality of the Soul. These prove the existence of the Soul attended with a Body which is fat or thin etc. If from the Consciousness, 'I am thin' or 'I am fat', the element of self be eliminated the consciousness means nothing and is false. As a matter of fact, we have often the apprehension, 'My body is thin' or 'My body is fat'. The experience 'My' refers to the Soul to which the Body is an adjunct. The *Cārvākas* may contend. We do also say 'My' soul. We do not mean, of course, that the word, 'My' refers to another soul transcending the soul, so consciousness of the form 'My' body does no more prove the existence of a soul than the consciousness, 'My' soul proves the existence of another transcending substance. The answer to the *Cārvāka* contention is that the two forms of consciousness viz. 'My Body' and 'My soul' are clearly distinguishable so far as

two different series (like the two experiences of two different persons) one cannot certainly revive the other because the prior idea in this case is not causally connected with the subsequent idea. On the contrary in the case of two ideas belonging to one and the same series, they are causally connected and hence the revival of the prior idea by the subsequent idea is possible. The Jaina Philosophers contend that the case of the two ideas belonging to the same series is no better than the case of the two ideas belonging to two different series. Two ideas may be causally connected, still they may be different from each other so much so, that the revival of the one, by the other is an impossibility. Further, there is no rule that if two ideas be causally related, the prior idea would be revived by the subsequent. It cannot be said that if one idea is the effect of the other, the former must revive the latter nor that if one idea is not revived by another the latter cannot be caused by the former. In the next place, it should also be noted that if the Effect-idea, although different from the Cause-idea, must revive the Cause-idea, the contents of a disciple's mind should revive the contents of the teacher's mind. The Buddhist thinkers contend that this is impossible because the disciple's knowledge and the teacher's knowledge are two different Series. The Jaina philosophers point out that this Buddhist doctrine of the Series (*saṃtāna*) is weak. Is the Series identical with the Moments (i.e., particular points) of Consciousness? If so, nothing is gained by invoking it, for the so called Series or *Santāna* is but a particular moment of consciousness. If the Series be supposed to be different from the particulars, the question is: Is this difference real or appar-

If you say that a feeling of Joy etc are the characteristic of pleasure etc, we say that the soul as it appears in the direct perception, is the support or substratum of all our internal perceptions. It has been said: Pleasure etc. are not perceived in and by themselves alone, there is the consciousness of the self as the Feeler, always involved in them; and this proves the soul. There is no consciousness of the form, 'this is pleasure' like that of the form, 'this is a pitcher'; such consciousness is always of the form 'I have pleasure' and does consequently reveal the soul.

The Jainas go on showing how Anumāna (Inference) also proves the real existence of the soul. They develop their argument as follows — 'Consciousness has for its substantial locus something which is different from Body etc.; because owing to the contradiction attaching to the supposition of its being there (i.e. in having Body etc as its substantial locus) its character as an effect cannot be otherwise explained.' It is to be observed that the Hetu in this argument has two parts, viz (1) the character of consciousness as an 'Effect,' (this part of the Hetu is called the Viśeṣya or the Substantive) and (2) the supposition that 'consciousness has for its substantial locus Body etc being opposed to facts of experience' (this part of the Hetu is called the Viśeṣana or the Subsidiary). Now in order that the Hetu in the given argument may be a valid one, none of these parts should be unproved. The Jainas show that the Viśeṣya is not unproved. Each unit in the conscious flow, e.g., the cognition of cloth, the cognition of a pot etc etc is an impermanent and emergent mode and as such is an effect. The Viśeṣana also is not unproved. Consciousness cannot be said

they should not agree that the disciple's ideas and the teacher's ideas form but one series. For certainly, the disciple's ideas and the teacher's ideas, being ideas, are of the same class and there is the causal relationship between the two sets of ideas. And the result of the Buddhist Santāna theory would be that just as a particular idea in a disciple's mind, although sundered from another idea is held to be capable of reviving it, because the two ideas are indirectly (causally) connected, in the same manner and for the same reason, the ideas in a disciple's mind must also revive the ideas of the teacher's mind. The meaning is that if by Santāna is meant two phenomena which belong to the same class and which are causally connected and that if as according to the Buddhists, one idea of the Santāna is capable of reviving another idea of it, then we are led to the absurd position, viz., that an idea in a disciple's mind can revive an idea of the teacher's mind (because) the disciple's idea and the teacher's idea belong to the same Santāna, being ideas and being causally connected with each other.

The Jaina's go on showing how the Buddhist theory of the Santāna leads to other absurdities. A Santāna, as pointed out above, is the Effect which arises from a Cause of a class similar to that of the former. In this view of the matter, a Buddhist cannot call a particular mass of smoke or a particular sound, a *santāna* because that particular smoke or that particular sound does not appear to have generated from another mass of smoke or from another sound. And the result is that a particular mass of smoke or a particular sound, perceived at a certain time, must be held to be no Santāna, i.e., must be held to be uncaused,

so that it can safely be said that the soul is a real existent substance

The Buddhist theory on the contrary is that the soul is nothing but the series (*Paramparā*) of the successive moments of consciousness. The Jainas contend that such a theory of the soul makes recollection (*smaraṇa*) and conception (*pratyabhijñā*) impossible. A subsequent experience cannot revive the idea of an object which was experienced before, if the Buddhist theory is accepted for there being no unifying reality underlying and persisting through both (the antecedent and the subsequent) ideas, they are as good as belonging to two different series (*saṃtāna*). An object, perceived by one person cannot be recollected by another person; this is obvious, for, otherwise, if an object is known by one solitary person, it will be remembered by all persons. If the Buddhist theory be correct and one idea be self-complete and self-subsistent without being related to another idea through the soul underlying both, then the two antecedent and subsequent ideas are really two different ideas like the experiences of two different persons and as such it would be impossible for any subsequent idea to revive the antecedent one. Recollection would thus be impossible. And if Recollection be impossible Conception would also be impossible. Conception, as shown before, is dependent on Perception and Recollection. On the subsequent perception of an object, the tendency to recollect (*saṃskāra*) is moved, so to say, and the person conceives 'this is that'. So, if according to the Buddhist doctrine, Recollection is impossible, conception is likewise impossible. In defence of their position, the Buddhists point out. If two ideas belong to

existence be possible in the Buddhist theory, it cannot avoid the difficulties of *akṛtābhīyāgama* (experiencing the fruits of what is done) and of *kṛta-praṇāśa* (not experiencing the fruits of what is done). For, the consciousness with or in which one does something (e.g. worshipping the sacred shrine) is annihilated totally in the next moment, so that the effect of doing that good act is not experienced by the doer: and similarly, when something is experienced, it cannot be said to be experienced by one who did the act, of which that something was the effect. To this charge, the Buddhists reply as follows: The Relationship of Cause and Effect is the all-determining law; the consciousness as of the cause and the consciousness as of the Effect, all these moments of consciousnesses are linked up in a beginningless chain. In that chain or flow of the conscious Series, particular moments of consciousness are bound up as causes and effects of each other. This flow of the conscious Series is called the *Santāna*. All our practical notions regarding some moments of consciousness being the Cause and some moments of consciousness being the Effect are determined by this conscious Series or the *Santāna*. And in this connection the Buddhists point out the difficulties of admitting a permanent Soul. Does this permanent Soul, ask the Buddhists, undergo any change when it experiences pleasure or pain? If it does, then it is impermanent like skin etc. If on the other hand, the Soul is absolutely unaffected by the inflow of pleasure or pain how can we talk of its experiencing the fruits of its actions in the form of pleasure or pain? In other words, if pleasure or pain does not touch the Soul at all, an act becomes devoid of its fruit; for, an Act and its fruit are always with reference to their actual experiences. The Buddhists preach that

ent? If the difference be not real the objection just noted holds good. If, on the other hand, the Series be held to be essentially different from the Particulars, a question arises. Is the series evanescent or is it a permanent Reality? If the Series be said to be momentary, it is as good as the particulars and the case is no way improved thereby. If, on the contrary, You say that the Series is a permanent Reality well, this is admitting the reality of the Soul in different words.

The Buddhists contend that by *Santāna* or Series they mean the Relationship of Cause and Effect (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) in which one of the relate is the *Upādāna* (i.e., material or ground) and the other is the *Upādeya* (i.e., effect or consequent). The Jāmas point out that unless there is the essential and unconditional connection between two phenomena, it is impossible to determine what is the *Upādāna* of what. If the Buddhist attempt to avoid the difficulty by saying that the *Upādāna* is that which produces the *Santāna*, it, may at once be pointed out that their position involves the fallacy of 'Mutual Dependence'. The causality of the *Upādāna* consists in the fact of its producing the *Santāna* and the *Santāna*-hood consists in its being produced by the *Upādāna*. It may be urged in this connection that ordinarily people understand by *Santāna*, something which is caused by another thing similar to or of the same class with it. For example, by a *Brāhmaṇa Santāna*, one means the son (i.e., the begotten) of a *Brāhmaṇa*. Similarly, by a *Śabda-santāna* a sound is meant which arises from another sound, by a *Pradīpa-santāna*, a Light is meant which is produced from another Light. Now if the Buddhists also mean this by *Santāna*, it is difficult to see why

his happiness in the next life? How is it possible for conscious worldly being of momentary duration to be a basis for the happy existence in future which is really the existence of a different and subsequent conscious being? Unhappy Devadatta is never found to work for the happiness of Yajñadatta. Misery of a moment is but momentary, it is annihilated with the termination of that moment; why should then an unhappy being work for securing future pleasure? Lastly, the Jāmas point out that the Santāna has already been shown to be nothing real. They contend that if the Buddhists hold that the Santāna is something real, then this would be admitting the reality of the Soul in different words.

चैतन्यस्वरूपः परिणामी कर्ता साक्षाद्भोक्ता स्वदेहपरिमाणः
प्रतिक्षेत्रं भिन्नः पौद्गलिकादृष्टवाञ्छायम् ॥ ५६ ॥

*caitanya-svaiūpaḥ parināmī kartā sākṣādbhoktā
svadeha-parimāṇaḥ pratikṣetram bhinnmaḥ paudgalikā-
dṛṣṭavāṇs' cāyam* । 56 ।

TRANSLATION: That (i.e., the Soul) is essentially consciousness; undergoes modifications; is a doer (of acts); is the direct enjoyer (of the fruits of its acts); is of the same extent as its body; is different in each individual and being attached to material elements has births and rebirths.

COMMENTARY: The above are the characteristics of the Soul.

The Soul consists in consciousness and consciousness is cognition of all things having forms or no

Proceeding in this line, one may similarly urge that the Buddhists are to hold that the power of cognition in a foetus is an Uncaused phenomenon. These are views which even the Buddhists cannot admit. Accordingly they contend that smoke and sound are not Uncaused phenomena, inasmuch as they have their causes which (may not be of the same class with them but which) are different from them (*vijāṭīya-upādāna*). The Jainas contend that this theory will not help the Buddhists, because one may then hold that the power of cognition in the foetus is generated by the body of the foetus (a purely materialistic position, which the Buddhists do not accept). The Buddhists maintain that the power of cognition in a foetus is a *Santāna* and not an Uncaused phenomena inasmuch as it is caused by the previous ante-natal cognition. The Jainas point out that an Unperceived something cannot be the cause of something perceived. Ante-natal cognition being some Unperceived phenomena cannot be the cause of the cognition in the foetus, for, otherwise, one proceeding in the same line may as well urge that a particular mass of smoke or a particular sound has a beginningless chain of causes behind it (in Unperceived smokes and sounds). Hence it is that the Buddhists cannot say that knowledge or idea is always caused by a previous knowledge or a previous idea. The result of this position for the Buddhists is that they would be unable to consistently explain Recollection or revival of the previous idea by a present one.

It should be noted in this connection that, as indicated above, the Buddhists believe in previous and ante-natal existence. But how is it possible, if there be no Soul which has that existence? Even if ante-natal

attached to the Soul alone and not to the Sky. The Nyāya thinkers defend their position against this criticism in the following way. One has the experience that there is curd in a Pot; this, i.e., the experience of something contained in some container' (*ihedam*) justifies him in holding that the Curd is contained in (*samyoga*, joined with) the Pot and in nothing else, exactly, in the same manner, it may be contended that consciousness is found in me and that this experience (of something contained in some container) '*ihedam*' Justifies us in maintaining that consciousness is intimately connected with the Soul and not with any other Substance e.g. the Sky. The Jainas set aside this Naiyāyika view by urging that considering the fact that the Sky is similar to the Soul in its essential unconsciousness the Naiyāyikas fail to assert any special reason for the Soul (and not the Sky) being joined to consciousness. The Naiyāyikas reply that if the experience of *ihedam* of something contained in some container be not accepted as sufficient proof of there being an intimate relationship, there would be very serious difficulties. A form, for example, is found in a solid matter; does not this experience justify us in holding that a Form is 'intimately connected' with a solid thing alone? Can we say that inspite of this experience one might as well hold that a form is not intimately connected with a solid thing or that a Form is intimately connected with the Sky, just as it is so connected with a solid thing? It is this experience which reveals to us the relationship between phenomena. The Jainas affirm that this is exactly the difficulty in the way of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas' fundamental position is that Form does not constitute the essence of solid things. Once

at the very outset one should give up the belief in a persisting Soul; this would destroy his ideas about 'I' and 'Mine' and would establish him in the beliefs, 'I am not', 'There is nothing mine'. The annihilation of the ideas of 'I' and 'Mine' ultimately bring one to the door of the Nirvāṇa or Absolute Extinction. The Nirvāṇa is the final goal of all persons and a belief in the non-existence of the soul is the way to it. The Jains criticise the above doctrine of the Buddhists in the following way. The Santāna is said to be a flow of Moments related as causes and effects; how can it be a determiner of that relation? Then again, what the Buddhists have urged against the doctrine of the Soul does not really touch the Jain position. The Jains do admit that the soul in some respects is impermanent, so that the Buddhist objection on the ground that if the Soul is affected by pleasure and pain it becomes impermanent like skin, is pointless. The Jains hold that the Soul is permanent not absolutely but only in some respect. The Buddhist contention, that if the Soul be held to be eternal, there would be feelings like, 'this is mine', 'this is mine' which feelings would obstruct the way to the final Release, is also groundless. Persons realising that this world is after all no place for real bliss and treading the way to the final emancipation which consists in transcendental real and boundless bliss, well, these persons although they have a firm belief in an eternal soul, have no attachment even to their own bodies; so that the Buddhist contention is unfounded that a person believing in an eternal Soul must necessarily have attachment and must necessarily deviate from the path of the final liberation. Then again if there is no soul, who would work for

generates in us the idea of its being attached to the Souls only and not to Matter etc. and that the Class essence of Materiality etc. generate in us the ideas of their being attached to Matter etc. and not to Souls? If it be argued that the Samavāya or the intimate relationship between the Souls and Soul-hood that generates the idea, then the Jaina criticism is that the argument involves the fallacy of Mutual Dependence (*anyonya-saṁśīyaya*) in this way: If there be that peculiar idea or experience then there is that intimate relationship between a Class-essence and an object; and if there be that intimate relationship between a class-essence and an object, then there is that peculiar idea or experience. The Naiyāyikas try to avoid this awkward position by urging that peculiar idea or experience of us is due, not to the Samavāya relationship but to a particular form of connection, called the *Pratyāsatti*, between the Class-essence and the object. But what else can this peculiar connection (*pratyāsatti*) be, save and except the relationship of essential identity in some respect' (*kathaṁcit tādātmya*), if it is not Samavāya? Hence it is, the Jainas point out, that this essential identity 'in some respects' of the object and its underlying class-essence, satisfactorily explains the generation in us of that peculiar idea about their connection, that nothing else (except that essential identity, in some respects) can explain that peculiar idea; that it is difficult for the Nyāya thinkers to explain why a particular class essence should attach itself in Samavāya to a particular object only; that this difficulty leads to the further difficulty of classifying the objects (i.e. determining that these are Souls, these are Matters and so on); that it is impossible for one to feel or

forms, the Soul is undergoing modifications every moment. It is active and always does acts which determine its future; It enjoys pleasure etc. directly, i.e., actually (and not figuratively). It pervades and does not extend beyond the body which it has assumed for the time being. A Soul in one body is different from that in another. It (in its mundane state) is bound up with and subjected to the material element called the Karma. The Soul which has been described as the subject of knowledge in the preceding aphorism has these characteristics.

The doctrines that the Soul is a conscious substance in its essence (*caitanya*) and that it undergoes modifications (*parināmi*) go against the theory of the Nyāya School, according to which it is essentially unconscious and absolutely immutable.

In criticism of the first of the above two contentions of the Nyāya thinkers, the Jainas point out that if the Soul be not held to be essentially conscious it would be unable to cognise the objects, just as the Sky which is essentially unconscious cannot know them. The Naiyāyikas contend that the consciousness of the Soul does not mean that consciousness is its very essence but that consciousness comes to be intimately joined to it. In other words the Nyāya philosophers urge that the Soul is unconscious (*jada*) in its essence but that it does not remain always unconscious like the Sky; consciousness becomes attached to the Soul in Samavāya or intimate relationship, so that although essentially unconscious, it becomes conscious and knows the things. The Jainas point out that this Nyāya contention does not improve matters in any way, for, it is not explained why consciousness should be so

pitcher has not the self-consciousness, because Consciousness never comes to be attached to it. The Jainas point out that the question of an essentially unconscious thing becoming conscious by being connected with Consciousness, does not arise at all; for, the position has already been set aside that one has ever the feeling of being essentially unconscious but of being conscious by being joined to consciousness. The Soul, if it be unconscious by nature would be incapable of knowing things and if the soul be admitted to be capable of knowing things, it must be held to be conscious in and by its very nature. In the next place, it is contended that if the Self-consciousness of the form, 'I am conscious', were to signify the identity of the self and consciousness, then the feeling I am wealthy should also prove the identity of the Wealth and the Wealthy Man. The Jainas point out that if the soul were essentially unconscious, it would be impossible for it to have ever the self-consciousness: 'I am conscious', just as it is impossible for a pitcher to be ever self-conscious. The Naiyāyikas contend that there is no inconsistency in the Soul being essentially unconscious and in its having the Self-consciousness of the form, 'I am conscious'. The Jainas set aside this contention by saying that if the soul be essentially unconscious, the Self-consciousness, 'I am conscious', can never be generated in it. The Self-consciousness, 'I am conscious', involves the consciousnesses of (i) the adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*) Consciousness and of (ii) the substantive (*viśeṣya*) the Self, as the Nyāya thinkers themselves suggest by admitting that the idea of the Substantive is impossible without the idea of its Adjunct. The Jainas ask: How then is the Self (the Substantive)

this position is held it is impossible for the Naiyāyikas to assign any special reason for a Form being intimately related to a solid thing only, in other words, to explain why a solid thing and not the Sky is intimately connected with a Form. To defend themselves against this criticism, the Nyāya thinkers put forward the special reason for determining the intimate relationship between the Soul and Consciousness and develop the following argument.—Souls have the consciousness that they have knowledge (i.e., the power of cognition) in them, because they have Soulhood, those that have not that consciousness are not souls as for instance, Sky etc. now, Souls are the objects of self-consciousness (rather subjects) of self consciousness, therefore it is they that alone have soul-hood. Hence it is Soulhood that distinguishes Souls from Sky etc just as Materiality etc distinguish Matter etc from other Elements. Now Matter etc are Matter etc because Materiality etc are joined to them, in the same manner Souls are Souls because Soul-hood is joined to Souls. This argument of the Nyāya School, the Jains point out, is weak. Because no reason is put forward why the Class-essences like Soul-hood etc should attach themselves in intimate relationship' (*samavāya*) to what are souls etc. If it is said that the fact Soul-hood etc attaching themselves to Souls is evidenced by our experience, the Jaina criticism is that, that is exactly the question at issue. For, it is an admitted fact with the Nyāya thinkers that a class-essence and an Object are different from each other, in other words, all Class-essences are similar in this respect that they are different from concrete objects. This being so, the question arises. How is it that the Class-essence soul-hood

ous at one time but modifies itself into a conscious being subsequently?

The Jaina doctrines (i) that the Soul is an active and real doer of acts and (ii) that it directly enjoys the fruits of its actions, are opposed to the views of the philosophers of Kapila's School. According to these thinkers, Activity (*kartr̥tvam*) is possessed by Prakṛti (the Unconscious Cosmic Force) and not by Purusa (the Soul); the Soul is non-agent devoid of all attributes and a (passive) enjoyer. The Jainas point out that this theory is unsound.

The Jaina thinkers urge that if the Soul be held to be a non-agent (i.e. devoid of all Activity) it would not be an enjoyer as well. The Sāṃkhya philosophers turn round and say that if an (passive) Enjoyer (i.e., an absolutely unaffected spectator) were held to be an active Agent, a liberated being would also be an active being. The Jainas ask; Why do you regard the liberated being as inactive? If the answer of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is that a liberated being is inactive because it does not create the earthly pleasures etc. for itself, the further question is: Why does not the liberated being create for itself the earthly pleasures etc.? If the Sāṃkhya philosopher's reply is that the liberated being does not create for itself the earthly pleasures etc. because it no longer does those acts which produce those pleasures etc. the Jaina thinker points out that this involves the admission that at least in its Saṃsāri (unliberated mundane) state, the Soul is an 'enjoyer' only because it is 'an active agent'. In other words the Jaina position is that the Sāṃkhya theory is inconsistent; that if, as the Sāṃkhya school maintain, the Soul is an enjoyer it cannot be said to be absolutely inac-

determine that our experience of 'iha-īdam' (i.e., of Consciousness being in us, the Souls) and not in Sky etc. is due to the fact that Consciousness or the power of cognition is attached to (and not essentially connected with) the Souls. All these show that the Nyāya theory about a Soul's being conscious because of Consciousness being attached to it (ab extra, as it were) and not constituting the very essence of it, is wrong. The philosophers of the Nyāya School appeal to self-consciousness and contend that our self-consciousness is that I am consciousness because Consciousness comes to be intimately attached to my self. The Jainas point out that our self-consciousness proves the fact just the otherwise, viz., that I am conscious not because consciousness is joined to me who am unconscious in my nature but because I am *essentially* conscious. The Nyāya thinkers cannot say that one may feel that he is conscious even though Consciousness may not be his nature just as one may look upon his stick as his own self. The Jaina thinkers point out that one's Consciousness of himself as an essentially conscious being is inexplicable unless Consciousness is in some respects identical with his very nature. The identification of one's self with his nature does not support the Nyāya contention; for, such identification is but figurative and not real. 'I am conscious' this self-consciousness proves the identity-in-some-respects of the Soul with Consciousness. A Pitcher has not that self-consciousness, 'I am conscious', because Consciousness is not its nature. This shows that unless the Soul be held to be essentially conscious, it cannot have that form of self-consciousness. The Nyāya Philosophers defend their position against this argument by saying that a

due to the maturity of the Soul, as held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers but to that of the Pradhāna. The Jains point out that it cannot be said that feelings of Enjoyer-hood are not experienced as involving a sense of egoism (*ahamkāra*) inasmuch as in all such feelings there is the sense, 'I enjoy the sound' etc. If the thinkers of Kapila's school try to explain away this egoistic character of the feelings of Enjoyment by saying that they are all fallacious feelings (i.e., if the Sāṃkhya thinkers argue that although there is that sense of 'I' in the feelings of Enjoyer-hood it is really the Soul that enjoys) one may as well view the Sāṃkhya theory about our feelings of Activity being due directly to Ahamkāra and ultimately to the Pradhāna as fallacious also (i.e. one may say that the feelings of Activity in our experiences 'I hear', 'I smell' etc. show that they are not to be traced to the Unconscious Cosmic Force but to the active nature of the Soul). If the feelings of Activity have their source in Ahamkāra (as Kapila's followers say), the feelings of Enjoyerhood also may be said to emanate from the same source. The Sāṃkhya Philosophers try to distinguish 'the feeling of Enjoyer-hood' from the other 'feelings of active Energising' by saying that the former is Aupādhika and as such, to view them as being due to Ahamkāra would be fallacious. They explain their contention in this way. Ahamkāra which consists in a sense of Egoism cannot be said to be the nature of the Purusa or the Soul; because, when finally liberated, i.e., when the Soul is established in its true and essential nature, it has not that egoistic sense. Hence the egoistic sense involved in our 'feelings of Enjoyerhood' is but Aupādhika or applied and does not show that the feeling of Enjoyer-

cognised and how is its Consciousness (the Adjunct) cognised? The Naiyāyikas cannot say that the Self and Consciousness are self-conscious and self-revealing, because they repudiate the doctrine of the *Sva-samvedana*, i.e., the theory that the Self, and Consciousness (while revealing objects external to them) are conscious in and by themselves. Nor can the Nyāya thinkers explain Self-consciousness by saying that the Self and Consciousness are known (not in and by themselves) but through a cognition different from them (*paratah*). Because this latter Cognition is also a conscious process i.e. is a Substantive, characterised by its Adjunct (Consciousness) and cannot be known without its adjunct (Consciousness) being known, for which, another conscious process is required. To say that the Self and Consciousness are known (not immediately but) mediately through some conscious process, separate from them, thus leads to the fallacy of the *Anavasthā* or Infinite Regress. It is thus impossible for the Naiyāyikas to explain the Self-consciousness, 'I am conscious'. It is thus not reasonable to hold that the Soul is essentially unconscious.

The next contention of the Nyāya philosophers is that the Soul is ever immutable and the Jainas criticise it in the following manner. According to the Naiyāyikas, the Soul, as we have seen, is essentially unconscious and becomes conscious when consciousness comes to be attached to it. The question then arises. If the Soul when cognising, is the same as it was before it cognised, how is it that it comes to cognise? Immutability of a substance (*kautasthya*) consists in strict undeviation from its nature, how then can a Soul be said to be immutable in its nature, which is unconsci-

impossible in a substance, until and unless it undergoes some modifications, corresponding to them. A piece of glass mirror is a thing, only by undergoing some sort of modification. The soul is modified when it enjoys; its enjoyer-hood is direct and real inasmuch as it pertains to its very nature. In the same way it may be said that if the Soul appears, as it no doubt does, to be an active agent, activity belongs to its very nature.

The Jaina theory that the Soul is of the same extent as its Body (*sva-dehāparimāṇa*) contradicts the Nyāya position that the Soul pervades all things (*sarvagata*). The Jainas urge that if the Soul pervades all things, there would be no difference between one soul and another. One Soul which Pervades all things would do all the acts of other Souls and that, in this way there are many Minds (*manas*) and in order that these many Minds' can be simultaneously touched, one ordinarily supposes that there must be many Souls as well. But if a Soul be supposed to pervade all the things, there need not be many Souls. One Soul would be simultaneously joined with all the Minds, just as one and the same expanse of Sky touches the numerous pitchers simultaneously. The Nyāya doctrine of the all pervasive Soul leads also to the conclusion that one Soul is simultaneously joined with many Bodies and varied sense-organs thereof. In short, there need not be many Souls (the doctrine of the multiplicity of Souls is admitted by the Nyāya philosopher himself) if we are to accept the Nyāya doctrine of the all-pervasive Soul. The Naiyāyikas point out that if the multiplicity of the Souls be not admitted, the varied pleasures and pains, felt by different individuals

tive. Kapila's followers may however advance the following syllogistic argument (to show that the Soul is always inactive): 'In its Samsāri state (also) the Soul does not do these acts which produce earthly pleasures etc., because it is conscious like the Soul in its liberated state'. The Jainas contend that this argument is not at all sound, on the ground that an equally good-counter-argument may be developed in the following manner.— 'In its Samsāri state (also) the Soul is not an enjoyer of earthly pleasures etc.; because it is conscious; like the Soul in its liberated state' But this latter argument cannot be accepted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers according to whom, the Soul is 'an enjoyer, though not an active agent'. The Sāṃkhya thinkers may contend that every one knows that the Soul is an enjoyer. The Jaina philosophers also appeal to self-consciousness and point out that the feelings, 'I hear,' 'I smell' etc. show that the active character of the Soul is also a matter of common experience. To meet this difficulty the Sāṃkhya thinkers urge that the feelings of the alleged psychical activity which we have in our experiences e.g. 'I hear,' 'I smell' etc. are but fallacious feelings. These feelings are due to Ahamkāra (a sense of 'I') which evolves from the Pradhāna (the unconscious Cosmic Force), the source and basis of all activity. In other words, the Sāṃkhya contention is that the feelings of Activity which we have in our experiences of 'I hear,' 'I smell' etc. do not show that the Soul is an active agent but that these are to be traced to the active character of the unconscious cosmic Force. The Jaina philosophers set aside this view of Kapila's followers by pointing out that arguing in the same line, one may urge that the feeling of Enjoyer-hood is not

need not prove the multiplicity of Souls, if the Soul be supposed to be all-pervading. The Nyāya thinkers contend that there cannot be only one Soul, as Bondage and Emancipation would be impossible thereby. The Jainas reply. The Sky is one, yet one part of it may be in a pitcher (and thus in Bondage, so to say) while another part may be freed from another pitcher (Emancipated, so to say). The Jainas argue that if the Soul be supposed to be all-pervading there need not be many Souls to explain the phenomena of Bondage and Emancipation of individuals, the supposition of one all-pervasive Soul is enough for the purpose. The Naryāyikas contend that the Sky has many parts, so that, although it is but one, one part of it may be limited while another part may be free from the limitation. The Jainas ask. Why not suppose different parts in one and the same all-pervading Soul, to account for the phenomena of Bondage and Emancipation of individuals? The next argument of the Nyāya philosophers against the Jaina theory is developed in the following manner:—(1) If the Soul be not supposed to be all-pervasive, atoms lying far and distant from one another cannot be joined to it, if the atoms be not joined to the Soul the Body cannot be formed; and if there be no Body, the Emancipation of the Soul (*mokṣa*) becomes something which is effected without the instrumentality and mediation of any means (which is inadmissible because Mokṣa is admittedly attained through means in the shape of bodily efforts) (2) And supposing that the Body is formed somehow, if you hold the Soul to be of the same form as the Body, the Soul must permeate every part and limb of the Body, so that the Soul becomes a thing consisting of parts;

hood has Ahmākāra for its basis. The Jainas criticise this Sāṃkhya view by pointing out that the Sāṃkhya theory about the nature of a Substance is misconceived. The School of Kapila maintains that by the nature (*svabhāva*) of a thing is meant that which never leaves it and which leaving it, the thing becomes unsubstantial. According to the Jainas, this view about the nature of a Substance is wrong. The nature of a thing is of two kinds; in one of its aspects the nature of a thing is 'general' (*sāmānya*) and in its other aspect, it is 'particular' (*viśēṣa*). The general nature of a thing is its permanent (*śāśvatika*) nature while its particular nature is temporary (*kāḍācīka*). This particular nature is no doubt evanescent but all the same is a part or aspect of the real nature of a thing. Accordingly, if Ahmākāra or egoism is found in the Purusa or the Soul (however, temporarily) it must be held to constitute its nature, and if Ahmākāra is thus a part or aspect of the real nature of the Purusa you cannot say that the egoistic sense (the sense of active agency) involved in the feeling of 'Enjoyer-hood' is but Aupādhika and fallacious. Hence the Soul as an 'Enjoyer,' is an active agent, 'Enjoyer-hood' is impossible without activity.

The next contention of the Sāṃkhya school, criticised by the Jainas, is The Enjoyerhood (*bhoktṛtva*) of the Soul is not real, pleasures and pains reflect in the mirror-like Buddhi which is an evolute of Prakṛti and these reflections again reflect in the Purusa which is thus said to be the Enjoyer of pleasures and pains, as a matter of fact the Soul does not really and directly enjoy but the Enjoyer-hood is rather foisted upon it. The Jaina philosophers point out that reflections are

becomes impermanent like the Body, it leaves aside; and the doctrine of future life and reincarnation becomes untenable. If on the contrary, you say that the soul when permeating the subsequent Body does not leave aside but retains its previous form, the position becomes absurd; for it is clearly impossible for the Soul to assume a different form so long as its former form persists, just as it is impossible for a Body to assume a different form, so long as its former form persists. (4) And lastly, the Naiyāyikas urge that if the Soul be supposed to be of the same form as the Body one is thereby led to admit that when a Body is cut, the Soul also must be held to be cut asunder. The Jainas set aside all these contentions of the Nyāya thinkers one by one, (1) They point out that the first contention of the Naiyāyikas is unwarranted. There is no rule that anything to be drawn towards a thing must have been actually attached to the latter. Any piece of iron goes towards a magnet although it was not joined to it. The Nyāya thinkers may contend that if the atoms not in-formed by the Soul be supposed to be drawn towards it in order to form a body, then there would be no principle determining the number of atoms so drawn or rather preventing all of them from being simultaneously drawn and the body would be of indefinite and infinite magnitude. The Jainas reply that this difficulty cannot be avoided by supposing the soul to permeate all the atoms (as done by the Nyāya School). If it be contended that the number of atoms to be drawn to the Soul for the purpose of forming a particular body is determined by the *Adṛṣṭa* (an invisible force, generated by the nature of acts done by one individual), the Jainas reply that the doctrine of

would be impossible. The Jainas urge that this need not be impossible. The one expanse of Sky touches the varied instruments at one and the same time, yet varied sounds from these instruments always come out; in the same manner, there may be but one all-pervading Soul, permeating varied individuals who may nevertheless feel varied pleasures and pains. If the Nyāya philosophers contend that the variedness of sounds depends on the variedness of the causes of these sounds, we may say that the variedness of the feelings also depends on the variedness of their causes. If it be argued that the Souls must be many as there are contradictory phenomena joined with them, the Jainas answer that the same line of argument would lead to the multiplicity of the Sky. The Naiyāyikas urge that the Sky need not be many for this reason that there are parts of the Sky. The Jainas reply, why not admit different parts in the one and the same all-pervading Soul, to account for the varied phenomena connected with the Souls? The thinkers of the Jaina School observe that even the facts, e.g. that one individual is born while another individual dies need not prove that there are different souls (if Souls are supposed to be all-pervasive). The Sky confined in one pitcher is destroyed (with the destruction of that pitcher), at the very same time, it may be that the confinement of the Sky in another pitcher is being generated; while at that identical moment the confined Sky continues in another pitcher. These facts relating to Sky-confinements (*ghaṭākāśa*) at one and the same time do not prove the multiplicity of the Sky and are possible even though there is but one expanse of Sky. This analogy may be applied to the case of the Soul also, to show that the births and deaths of individuals

trine is affirmed. If on the contrary, the Soul having a shape means that it has a definite 'form', the position becomes unwarranted. There is no rule that a substance not pervading all things must necessarily have a definite 'form'. Mind (*manas*) for instance, is non-pervasive, yet it has never a definite 'form'. This shows that it is possible for the Soul (even if it is non-pervasive, as is held by the Jainas) to enter the Body, so that there is no reason why the Body would be soul-less in the case of the Soul being non-pervasive, as apprehended by the Nyāya thinkers. For, Mind is admittedly a non-pervasive substance; so, if it can enter body (as admitted by the Naiyāyikas) there is no reason why the Soul should be incapable of doing so. The Jainas point out that there are cases in which a substance having a definite form is found to enter into another substance. Water, for instance, which has admittedly a form (i.e., which is a corporeal substance) enters into substances like the ashes. Why then, should not the Soul which has no definite form at all enter into the Body? The next contention of the Nyāya philosophers in this connection is criticised by the Jainas in the following way. When the Soul assumes the form of an adult Body, it is to be supposed to have given up the form of the child body. But this does not prove that the Soul is subject to decay and destruction. This rather shows that just as a serpent can at times expand itself by spreading its hood and can contract itself at times by contracting the hood, the Soul may assume varied forms from time to time. The modes or 'aspects' (*pañyāya*) of the Soul change from time to time but the Soul in its 'essence' (*dhavya*) remains eternal. No question of the impossibility of

and this means that the Soul is a product or something which is brought about, effected or built up. Now, if the Soul is held to be a product, the question arises. What is the nature of the causes, producing or bringing it about? Are the causes essentially of the same nature with the Soul or are they essentially different from it? The latter position is impossible as conditions or elements cannot move towards the production of something which is essentially different from them. If again those operative causes be held to be essentially of the same nature with the Soul, they must have Soul-hood as their essence, and this means that it is the Souls which bring about the Soul. But this is impossible as it leads to the absurd position that in one and the same Body there are many Souls, operating for the production of the Souls. Even if the many operating Souls are supposed to work for the production of the Soul, it is not explained how these different and unconnected-with-one-another operating conditions can harmoniously work and unify their operations. And even if such combination be considered to be possible in some way, it is clear that the Soul, so brought about would be destroyed just as a pitcher, as soon as its parts are disintegrated and sundered from each other. (3) Next, if the Soul be of the same extent as the Body, the Soul must have a shape, but if it has a shape, it cannot enter the Body, for, one corporeal substance cannot enter into another corporeal substance, this leads to the position that there cannot be any soul in a Body. And again, if the Soul is of the same form as the Body, how can it now permeate a child Body and then, an adult Body? If you say that when a Soul permeates the adult Body, it leaves aside its smaller form, then the Soul

Soul are found to be manifested in through the particular body only, in which it is encased for the time being. Hence it is to be admitted that the Soul is always of the same extent as that of the Body, in which it is encased for the time being.

The Jaina doctrine that the Soul is 'different in each individual' (*pratikṣetram vibhinna*) goes against the Monistic (Advaita) theory of the Soul. The Advaita position has been, refuted before so that its refutation is not repeated here.

According to the thinkers of the Jaina school, the Soul being attached (i.e., so long as it is attached) to Matter undergoes 'Re-incarnations' (*paudgalikādr̥ṣṭa-vān*). This theory of the Jainas contradicts the contention of the Nihilists (Nāstikas) according to whom there is no Adr̥ṣṭa or law leading the Soul to its re-incarnation in accordance with the acts, done by it in its present life. In criticism of this doctrine of the Nihilists, the Jainas ask why do you deny the Adr̥ṣṭa? (1) Is it because there is no Subject (of Re-incarnation) which is the Āśraya or abode (place of functioning for the Adr̥ṣṭa)? (2) Or, because the Adr̥ṣṭa is not an object of direct Perception? (3) Or, because the reality of the Adr̥ṣṭa is not warranted by Reason? (4) Or, lastly because there is no positive proof for the Adr̥ṣṭa? The Jainas proceed to examine the objections on these counts in the following manner—

(1) The first of the above objections is untenable as the reality of the Soul, the Subject of Re-incarnations, which is the field for the operation of the law of Adr̥ṣṭa, has already been proved.

(2) As regards the second objection, it may be asked; To whose perception is the Adr̥ṣṭa or the law

Adṛṣṭa is quite consistent with their theory as well. (2) The second argument of the Naiyāyikas has not much force. The Jainas admit that the soul has, in some sense, parts and that it is the product or effect also, in some sense. But this does not mean that parts which are of the same nature with the Soul generate it, as in the case of a pitcher. Even in the case of a pitcher it is not quite correct to say that the Pitcher is produced by its parts, i.e., the pieces of the pitcher. The Pitcher, in its complete form, comes out (i.e., is the product or effect) of a thing having a round and thick shape which thing again, in the turn comes out of a lump of clay, attended with the efforts and operations of the potter etc. The nature of what is a product consists in the assumption of a new form on the renunciation of the former form. This is a matter of experience and is true of the internal facts as of the external. It is true of course, that when its parts (i.e., threads) are joined together, we have the experience of the cloth as the effect or product, but this would not justify us in holding that in all cases an effect is but the conjunction of its parts. Even if we hold that the effect is but the union of its parts, the unification of the Soul-parts need not be impossible, the unification of the Soul-parts does not require that the Soul is absolutely impermanent, the unification of the Soul-parts is possible if the Soul be supposed to be impermanent in some respects only. (3) Thirdly the Nyāya objection based on the contention that if the Soul be of the extent of the Body, it would have 'shape', is also groundless, for what is meant by having a 'shape'? if the Soul having a Shape means that it does not permeate all the things of the universe (*asarvagata*) then the Jaina doc-

our acts and their Fruitions, inasmuch as, that is, we do not find that a certain act is sure to be followed by a fixed fruit. No doubt, the rule has been laid down,—that a virtuous act yields prosperity, while a vicious Act brings about misery. But a vicious man is not unoften found to be prosperous while a pious man is found to suffer. There is thus no fixed rule governing the acts and their Fruitions. In reply to these objections, the Jainas point out that all the three alternative positions are to some extent admissible. It is admitted that a Soul, led by the *Adṛṣṭa* or the law of the Act and its Fruition, does acts of Injury etc., to others, blinded by the Emotions of attachment, envy etc. *Adṛṣṭa* thus underlies the acts and the consequent psychical re-incarnations. Admittedly, the law of *Adṛṣṭa*, as the first alternative position points out, involves Infinite Regression but the Infinite Regression in this case as in the case of the seed-and-the shoot (the seed preceding the shoot, the shoot preceding the seed and so on) creates no difficulty. The second alternative position taken as it is, may imply that it is impossible for a Soul to free itself from the Karma at any time whatsoever but it undoubtedly proves the law of re-incarnation. It will, however be shown at the proper place, that the final Emancipation is possible for a soul. The third position does not really disprove the law of the psychical Rebirth. A Soul's Rebirth is due to its Act and an act is sure to be followed by its fixed Fruit; this is the principle of *Adṛṣṭa*. An Act and its Fruit are unavoidably fixed and determined. The instances of the pious man suffering and the vicious man prospering do not invalidate the fixed rule of conduct. The fact is that the prosperity of the vicious man is not due to his

Reincarnation of the Soul, as raised by the Naiyāyikas thus arises in this connection. (4) As regards the Nyāya objection based on the contention of the possibility of the Soul being cut into two parts when the Body is cut. the Jainas point out that when the body is cut into two, the Soul also is, in some sense, cut into two parts. The Soul is in the Body, when the Body is cut into two parts, some parts or particles (*pradesa*) of the Soul remain in one part of the body and the rest remain in the other. If it were not so the tremors found in the sundered part of the Body are unexplained. It cannot be seriously argued that it is impossible for one and the same Soul to permeate the two parts of the sundered Body. The Jainas point out that it is quite possible for one and the same Soul to permeate two sundered parts of the same Body, just as it is possible for one and the same Soul to underlie the varied Psychological experiences. Here a question may arise in this way:— If the Body is cut in two, the Soul is also cut in two: how then can the Soul be unified subsequently? The reply of the Jaina Philosophers is that when the Body is cut into two parts, the Soul also is, in some sense, cut into two but that this division of the Soul is not absolute. The division of the Soul not being absolute, it can be unified once more through the determining influence of the *Adṛṣṭa*. It is thus that the Jaina philosophers establish that the Soul is of the same extent as that of the Body and as not all-pervasive. They put forth the following syllogism. “The soul is not all-pervasive, because it is conscious; that which is not so (i.e., that which is not all-pervasive) is not conscious. as for instance, the Sky: the Soul is conscious hence it is not all-pervasive.” The attributes of a particular

explain the phenomenal varieties, such as one is a king and the other is a pauper, although the two persons are twins, born of the same mother at the same time? The Elements here are similar (the two persons are twins); then, why is the difference in the Phenomena, i.e., in the respective lots of the persons? It is apparant that nothing but the Adrṣta (the effective force of the actions done in their previous lives of the two persons which is obviously different in the case of each of them) can explain this. Those who deny the reality of the invisible Adrṣta contend that the Body of a child is consequent on another (previous) Body and no Adrṣta need intervene between the two Bodies. The body of a young man which has the sense-organs is clearly known to be consequent upon the Body of the tender age having the same set of sense-organs and no Adrṣta is found to intervene here. In the same manner, it may be said that a child Body having the sense-organs is consequent upon the Body of the previous Incarnation having the similar set of the sense-organs and that no Adrṣta need intervene here. In setting aside this contention, the Jainas point out that the Body of the previous Incarnation is annihilated with the termination of that Incarnation, how then can the Body of the previous Incarnation be said to determine the (present) Body of the child? The Body of the previous Incarnation is no more, when the period of that Incarnation ends and there being no body then, the Body of the foetus in the womb cannot be accounted for by that Body of the previous Incarnation. What, then, is it that determines the definite character of a child Body? We have seen how it is meaningless to say that it is nature (Svabhāva) which determines the definite chara-

for the psychical rebirth, unmanifest? To the perception of the nihilist objector or to the perception of all beings? If the law of Re-incarnation is denied by the Nihilist on the ground that it is not manifest to his perception, then, he is bound to deny real existence of his forefathers too, and mark the logical consequence. If the forefathers of the Nihilist were non-existent, the Nihilist himself becomes non-existent too, nor can it be said that the *Adṛṣṭa* is unmanifest to all men's Perception. For, the Jainas believe in the Omniscient Kevalins to whose perception all matters here and hereafter are manifest (including the principle of the *Adṛṣṭa*).

(3) The Nihilists develop their third objection in the following manner:—Has the next world or incarnation of the Soul a cause? Or, is it uncaused something? The second cannot be the case, for this would make the next world either eternally existent or eternally non-existent for the Soul. If then, it is maintained that the next incarnation is an effect, consistently following from a cause, the question arises to what is it due? Is the next Incarnation (*Adṛṣṭa*) due to another (Previous or present) Incarnation (*Adṛṣṭa*)? or, is it due to emotions (*kaṣāya*) e g., of attachment, envy etc. Or, is it due to acts e g., Injuring others etc.? The first of these positions involves the fallacy of the Infinite Regressions (*anavasthā*). As regards the Second alternative position, it may be said that as no worldly (*Sam-sāri*) man is ever free from the Emotions, it would always be impossible for a soul to be free from the Karmas which are introduced in and through the Emotions. The third alternative is also anomalous inasmuch as our experience furnishes no fixed rule about

the Adṛṣṭa is but a modification of the Prakṛti or the Cosmic Force, (iii) the contention of the Saugatas (Buddhists) that the Adṛṣṭa is but Vāsanā or the accumulated effect of our actions and tendencies and to (iv) the contention of the Brahmavādins (Vedāntists) that the Adṛṣṭa is essentially the Avidyā or Nescience

तस्योपात्तपुंस्त्रीशरीरस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रियाम्नां कृत्स्नकर्म-
क्षयस्वरूपा सिद्धिः ॥ ५७ ॥

*tasyopātta-puṁstrī-śarīrasya samyag-jñāna-kriyā-
bhyāṁ kṛtsna-karma-kṣaya-svarūpā siddhiḥ* | 57 |

TRANSLATION: That (i.e., the Soul) which has assumed a male or female Body attains through Right knowledge and Right conduct its Emancipation which consists in the annihilation of all the Karmas.

COMMENTARY: The above doctrine that even a female can attain salvation (Moksa) is opposed to the theory of the Dīgambara School of the Jains.

Right knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*) consists in an understanding of things exactly as they are and Right conduct (*samyak-kriyā*) in such acts as the practice of penances etc. One attains the Moksa through Right knowledge and Right-conduct.

It may be urged here that Right Faith (*samyak-darśana*) also leads to Emancipation as it is distinctly said Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct constitute the way to Salvation. How is it then that in the above aphorism, Right Faith is not mentioned? The answer is that Right Faith is not separately mentioned because it is implied in the mention of

vicious acts but to his good act, done previously; he will experience the Fruits of his present day vicious acts in a future existence Similarly, the misery of a virtuous man is not the Fruition of the Virtuous Acts, it is due to his vicious acts, done previously, his present day virtue will bear enjoyable Fruits in a future life Hence the law of Adṛṣṭa, i e , the law of Acts and the consequent psychical re-incarnations, is but inviolably fixed.

(4) Lastly, the Jainas point out how the Nāstika contention that there is no proof for the Adṛṣṭa (or, the law of the Act and its Fruition) is wrong According to the thinkers of the Jaina School, the Āgama or the authoritative sayings and the Anumāna or inference prove the reality of the Adṛṣṭa Such sayings as "Good fruits for good Acts Bad fruits for bad Acts " are met with in the Āgama Inference also shows that given the same usual conditions, if of the two phenomena, one differs from the others in some respects, the variations in the effects calls for a variation in the causes Take for instance, the case of twin sons of a virtuous lady One of the sons is better off than the other in respect of health, wealth, power, knowledge etc. You cannot explain this difference without referring to the respective acts in the previous lives of the two brothers The Nihilists attempt to explain this difference away by saying that his difference is due to the Nature (*svabhāva*) (of the embodied beings), just as it is Nature (*svabhāva*) that accounts for the straightness (in some) or the crookedness (in some) or other peculiarities in the thorns, found in the thorny Fruits growing in one and the same place, or just as it is Nature that makes in one and the same pond, blue,

Some philosophers contend that Right Knowledge alone is competent to bring about Emancipation and that Right Conduct is not essential. They argue that it is Right knowledge that yields the result and not the Action. If it were not so, action would have yielded the desired result although the Action proceeded from wrong knowledge. It is said Knowledge yields a man the desired fruit and not the Act: a man of false knowledge is never found to meet with the desired fruit. It has further been said:—"It produces fortune, wards off misfortune, brings fame, wipes off stain and purifies one by cleaning him thoroughly." There are other philosophers again who hold that it is Action alone that produces good results and not Knowledge. One may know the nature of palatable foods etc.: but unless he does (i.e., actually eats the foods) he cannot have the pleasant tastes etc. It has been said: "Action yields a man the desired fruit and not the knowledge: a person cannot have pleasure with the mere Knowledge about a woman, a food etc.. (without actively enjoying them)". It has further been said:—"Persons may be fools, even though they have studied the scriptures: a really wise man is he who does (good) Acts: mere thought or knowledge about the medicine would not heal a sick man. The Jainas criticise the above two positions in the following way. The argument that knowledge alone produces a desired result is amply refuted by the counter argument, put forward by the other School, that "a person cannot have the pleasure with the mere knowledge about a woman, a food etc. "The correct theory, however, according to the Jainas is that Right knowledge attended with Right conduct yields the desired result and not the Right knowledge

ence of any essential Nature or Self or Soul that may serve as a cause and supposing that such a nature or Self is really existent how can it which has its existence, be the effect of itself? (3) If, thirdly, by Nature is meant the Attribute attributable to a thing, the question is: Is this Attribute visible or invisible? As regards the first alternative, it would suffice to say that an attribute is never visible. If then the attribute be supposed to be invisible, it can be said to be something real and existent, only if its reality and existence can be a matter of Inference. Now, if the attachment of something invisible i.e., an attribute to a thing is to be inferred, it is better to infer the attachment of *Adṛṣṭa* to the thing (4) Lastly, if Nature means the Particularity or the peculiar aspect of a thing, it may be asked: does this Particularity consist in the element (Constituting the thing) or is it something other than the Element? If you say that the Particularity in the Thing is something other than its Elements, it is further asked: Has this particularity other than the Element of the thing a (corporeal) Form or has it no Form? You cannot say that such a particularity has a visible Form, because no such form is ever seen. If then the Particularity is to be supposed to be of invisible form, you are practically admitting the *Adṛṣṭa* by giving a different name to it. Next let us consider the contention that the Particularity attached to a thing and other than the Element of the thing has no Form. It is again needless to point out that if Particularity attached to a thing is other than the element of the thing it is nothing other than the *Adṛṣṭa*. Lastly, let us examine the contention that the Particularity in the thing is identical with the Element of the thing. How are we to

treme rationalistic contention may be put forward in similar manner, that the example of the man having the mere Knowledge about a woman, a food etc., does not show that Knowledge does not yield the pleasurable result; because strictly speaking, the Knowledge of such a man is no real Knowledge at all, the real Knowledge being that which is inseparably connected with its (well-known pleasurable) result. The fact is, as is urged by the Jainas, that it is the result that determines the reality of both an Action and a Knowledge, so that both Knowledge and Action must be held to combine and co-operate with each other, in the matter of producing a desirable result.

According to some thinkers, the Soul has nine attributes peculiar to itself viz., Buddhi etc. Mokṣa does not mean the annihilation of all the Karmas only as maintained by the Jainas but the absolute extinction of these psychical attributes. In support of their theory, they develop the following argument. "The Series (*saṃtāna*) of nine psychical attributes is absolutely destroyed; because it is a series, that which is a Series is absolutely destroyed; as for example, the series (i.e., a Flare) of lamp-light; that is so; hence it is absolutely destroyed." There are such sayings as, "As long as there is the Body, there cannot be the destruction of the feelings of pleasure and pain and the feelings of pleasure and pain do not touch one who is disembodied." These doctrines of the Vedānta School also lend support to the above doctrine of Mokṣa. These thinkers (evidently of the Nyāya School) explain their theory by quoting: 'As long as the psychical qualities e.g., Vāsanā etc., are not rooted out, the final annihilation of Misery is not possible. The origin of

cteristics of a child Body. Accordingly one is led to conclude that what precedes and determines the child Body, consists in Karma. The Jainas maintain that the Adṛṣṭa is this Karma determining the Body and is material (*paudgalika*) in nature. That Adṛṣṭa is Material will be evident from the fact that it, like the (gross material) fetters (*niṣāda*) makes the Soul un-free and bound down. Here some objectors contend that in order that the Soul may be bound down and made un-free, there need not be any Adṛṣṭa which is material in nature. They point out that Anger etc., do admittedly modify the nature of the Soul but are not material. The Jainas reply that Anger etc., are Phenomenal modifications of the Soul and are dependent and unfree in their nature, what then is the cause of these-phenomenal modifications which are essentially dependent and unfree? It would be seen that it is Karma which causes them and Karma is Paudgalika or material in nature. The objectors point out that mental derangements sometimes modify the Soul but that these derangements are not material. The Jainas urge in reply that the psychical modifications consisting in derangements may not be material in themselves; but these derangements are caused by certain kinds of foods. Hence it may safely be said that all modifications of the Soul which consist in its dependence and loss of freedom (*pāṭantrya*) are caused by Matter. This means that Adṛṣṭa which is responsible for the dependent and unfree states of the Soul is material. This Jaina theory of the Adṛṣṭa (that the Adṛṣṭa is material) is evidently opposed to (1) the theory of the Yauga School, that the Adṛṣṭa is a peculiar attribute of the Soul, (ii) the doctrine of the followers of Kapila that

nine psychical attributes, one forms the basis or the ground from which another arises or evolves. For, this involves the Fallacies of the unproved Locus (*āśīyāsiddhi*) and of the Unproved-in-itself (*svatūpāsiddhatā*). Because it is the Saugata who maintains that the Psychical phenomena including the Buddha etc., form a series or Samtāna, because one of those psychical moments is the material basis for the other, following it. But the philosophers (apparently, of the Nyāya-vaīśeṣika School) whose view is being considered here cannot subscribe to this Saugata view: for, according to them the psychical attributes and phenomena do not arise or evolve from each other but from the Soul as their ground or basis on account of various reasons e.g., the Adrṣṭa etc., the attributes and the various psychical phenomena being related to the Soul sometimes in 'intimate', sometimes in 'non-intimate' connection. This also shows how the second of the above three conceptions of the Samtāna (so far as the psychical attributes and phenomena are concerned) is unacceptable to these philosophers; for, these philosophers do not maintain that the psychical phenomena of the Buddha etc., are related as the cause and the effect, of each other: they hold on the contrary that when one moment or span of operation of the Buddha etc. comes to an end in the underlying Soul, it is from that Soul (and not from the previous moment of the Buddha etc.,) that the subsequent moment of the Buddha etc., arises; can it then be said that the Psychical Phenomena of Buddha etc., are to be looked upon as a series (the third of the above three views of the Samtāna) because they simply follow each other? The Jamas point out that even this theory of the psychical attri-

Right knowledge, the two being generally found together.

It should be observed that there is a purpose in mentioning Right-knowledge and Right-conduct separately. The author means to say that only the species of Right conduct which is preceded by (i.e., attended with) Right knowledge, is a means to Salvation and not the conduct accompanied by False knowledge such as feeding on root-fruits, mosses etc.

The mention of 'all' in the annihilation of all Karmas shows that the Emancipation, referred to here, is not Emancipation-while-in-the-spans-of-mundane-existence (*jīvan-mukti*) but the final Emancipation which involves the radical destruction of all the eight forms of the Karma (otherwise called the *Adṛṣṭa*) such as the knowledge-enveloping etc. It will be seen that this Jaina doctrine of the Mokṣa is opposed to that of the Naiyāyikas and of the Saugatas. According to the philosophers of the Nyāya School, salvation involves the extinction of the Attributes (*Guṇas*) of the Soul, viz., Intelligence (*buddhi*) etc. The Buddhists, on the other hand, contend that Emancipation means the annihilation of the Conscious Series (*jñāna-saṃtāna*). The Jainas oppose both the views and maintain that the destruction (*kṣaya*) which is necessary for attaining the Mokṣa, is not of the essential attributes of the Soul (as according to the Naiyāyikas) nor of Consciousness (as according to the Saugatas) but of the eight kinds of the Karma which is opposed to the nature of the Soul. It is to be stated also that for the purpose of salvation, the annihilation of the Karma must be on the one hand, final, total and perfect and on the other, of all the modes of it and not of some of them only.

mānas. Fourthly, the Hetu (*saṁtānatva*) is fallacious on the ground of its being Viruddha or opposed to what is to be proved (i.e., annihilability). Sound, lightning, consciousness, light-flare etc., which are alleged to be Saṁtānas or Series, absolutely terminable or annihilable, are not really so. They are eternal, so far as their substances (Dravya) are concerned, although as Modes (Paryāya) they are non-eternal, perishing as they do after giving rise to the succeeding Modes. The Series of modes are nevertheless essentially connected with the imperishable substance underlying them and as such cannot be looked upon as absolute annihilables. Origination (*utpāda*), Annihilation (*vyaya*) and Persistence (*dhrauvya*) constitute the nature of a thing and these three are inseparably connected. This being so, you cannot abstract a phenomenon and talk of it as absolutely annihilable because its very aspect of Annihilability (*vyaya*) is essentially connected with its permanence (*dhrauvya*). Origination, Annihilation and Persistence, the-three-in-one, constituents of a thing or phenomena, are unreal like the horns in an ass, if they are absolutely separated from each other and considered as facts absolutely independent of each other. Viewed in this light, the Jaina criticism (of the doctrine that a Saṁtāna or Series is absolutely annihilable) may be shortly expressed in the Syllogism:—"There is no absolute Annihilation; because such an absolute Annihilation would be unconnected with Origination and Persistence (which is impossible) like the horns in an ass." As regards the Nyāya argument for the extinction of all psychical attributes in Mokṣa based on the authoritative saying (quoted above, such as, 'As long as there is the Body etc.,') the Jains urge that those

alone and in its exclusiveness. The other position about the exclusive efficacy of Action is also mistaken, according to the Jainas. They point out that the contention that a person cannot have pleasure with the mere knowledge about a woman, a food etc., may be effective against the view of the extreme rationalistic school but does not affect the Jaina theory in any way. The Jainas maintain that a desired and pleasurable result is obtained by Right knowledge and Right conduct mutually relying on (and not excluding) each other. You cannot say that an Action alone is the cause of the pleasure derived from a woman or a tasteful food. You cannot say that at the basis of the pleasure, there is no knowledge about the woman or the food. It is only when the knowledge about their nature is combined with the activity towards them (i.e., the woman or the palatable food) that the pleasurable feeling is experienced. If it were not so, then, the same pleasurable feeling would have been found in an insane or unconscious person when in actual physical contact with an attractive woman. The extreme activist disputant may here urge that (in the case of the insane or unconscious man) there is no real action (in his contact with the woman) (and hence the absence of pleasurable feeling in him). Real Action according to him, is that which is inseparably connected with its (well-known pleasurable) result. Such a real Action is absent in the insane or the unconscious man and accordingly the example of such a man does not show that to produce the desired result, Action is useless but that there must be knowledge regarding the pleasant objects. The Jainas point out that against the extreme activist view, the ex-

ation, well, the Samsāra or the series of mundane existences is much more desirable than the Moksa; because however undesirable the Samsāra may be, there are still some moments of pleasure in it, though mixed with pain. Consider, which is more desirable, Feelings of limited happiness or Annihilation of all sense of happiness? The Philosophers of the Nyāya School however, contend: Carefully considered, the Moksa (as understood by them) is preferable. It is impossible to have an enjoyment of eternal happiness which is free from all touches of pain. Pain, again, is admittedly something which is to be avoided at all costs. The two, pleasure and pain, cannot be separated like poison and honey in one and the same pot, thoroughly mixed up. What then is to be done, for the purpose of avoiding the pains of life? The Naiyāyikas advise: Avoid both pleasure and pain; and Moksa or liberation is preferable because it consists in an absolute absence of pain, pain which is essentially intolerable. It is better to avoid the occasional little moments of pleasure than to bear the heavy burden of pain. This view is criticised by the Jainas in this way. What do you mean by 'eternal' in your expression 'eternal happiness'? Does it mean both beginning-less and endless? or, does it mean endless though having a beginning? Now, if by 'eternal happiness', you mean happiness which has no beginning and no end in time, then such happiness can not be an object of pursuit; for, being beginningless and endless, it is something already and always (automatically) attained and realised. How then, can you talk of the absence of such an eternal happiness that should lead a person not to strive after the attainment of eternal happiness? The meaning is that if eternal

pleasure and pain is due to virtue and vice, these are the pillars and the mainstay of the saṃsāra-house (i.e., the series of mundane existences) When these are up-rooted their effects viz. Body etc. cannot be produced and consequently the Soul cannot have pleasure and pain. Thus the Soul becomes Free. Desire, envy, effort etc., are what bind the soul to the Instrument of Enjoyment; when this Instrument is destroyed the Soul is not bound by those of its attributes. Hence Apavarga or Emancipation results when all the nine attributes of the Soul are rooted out. It may be asked. In what condition does the Soul exist then? The Soul in that state exists in its own pure essence: it is then devoid of all attributes: the wise say that the essence of the Soul is absolutely beyond the six waves and is not tainted with the Pain and the Misery etc., due to its bondage to the saṃsāra. The waves refer to the six passions, viz., Lust, Anger, Conceit, Pride, Greed and Vanity. It is further quoted from the Purāṇa "Hunger and Thirst are what trouble the Life-principle, Grief and Dullness trouble the Mind and Old Age and Death trouble the Body. The Soul realises its true state, when it is devoid of these six."

To the above arguments, the Jainas reply as follows:—What do you mean by the Series (*sarīrāṇa*) of the psychological attributes? Do you call them a Series, because they are related as the material basis or ground and the consequent or evolute (*upādāna-upādeya*) of each other? Or, because they are related as the cause and the effect (*kārya-kāraṇa*) of each other? Or lastly because they are related as the precedent and the subsequent (*aparotpatti-mātra*) to each other? You cannot take up the first position and say that of the

the pleasures of life (which are inseparably mixed up, with pains) and one in striving for Liberation really strives after such an eternal happiness. As a matter of fact, worldly pleasures are really pains (in disguise) just like honey mixed up with poison and one in trying to give up the worldly pleasures, really wants to secure unmixed happiness. The motive of one who shuns a cup of honey mixed up with poison, is not only to avoid pain but to get pleasure also. In their life, all animals want pleasure and try to avoid pain. Following this psychological fact, it may safely be said that if Liberation is a state to be striven after, it is because in Liberation there is not only the cessation of all pains but the enjoyment of positive happiness also. If it be said that in Liberation there is the cessation of all feelings of happiness also then, this would make Liberation a state, to strive after the attainment of which, is psychologically impossible. Hence it is: If Liberation be such as it is conceived by the Nyāya thinkers (i.e., if in the state of Liberation, there is the cessation of all feelings of joy) no one would have striven after its attainment; but, as a matter of fact, Liberation is found to be striven after; therefore it is established that Liberation consists in a feeling of joy; for, otherwise the fact of one's striving after Liberation becomes impossible.

To the above argument of the Jaina School, the Nyāya thinkers object as follows: A person having any feeling of attachment (Rāga i.e., having any liking for anything) cannot have Liberation. If then Liberation be a state of joy, one striving after it, is guided by a craving i.e., a feeling of attachment and thereby Liberation becomes in-attainable for him. Those who

butes as a series is not maintainable. A Series, constituted of moments of individual phenomena which rise one after the other, need not necessarily be terminable. The thinkers of the opposite (i.e., the Nyāya) school may urge here that the Series which they have in their contemplation is such that its individuals (do not simply follow one another but) have one and the same substance as their) stable basis and go on rising one after the other, they contend that such a Series is not interminable. In criticism of this theory (about the annihilability of a *Samtāna*) the Jāmas point out that if a *Samtāna* be taken in this sense, the argument of the Naiyāyikas, as put forth in the Syllogistic form (given before) becomes fallacious. Because in that argument the Example of the *Samtāna* that was cited to prove its annihilability was 'the flare of a lamp-light'. But the flare of light is not a *Samtāna* in the sense, just now put upon the term. Therefore, the syllogistic argument of the Nyāya School under consideration becomes fallacious in the ground of its Hetu being wrong (*vikalā*) because of the Example being incompetent. Secondly, if a *Samtāna* be taken in this sense, it is not necessarily terminable, there may be such Series which may nevertheless be everlasting, so that the Hetu in the Naiyāyika syllogism under consideration (because it is a Series) becomes a *Vyabhicāri* or Inconstant) one. Thirdly, it may be pointed out that the Hetu (*samtānatva*) in the argument is *Anaikāntika* i.e., of Doubtful validity, because its retrocession (*vyāvṛtti*) from the Opposite of the Proven (*vipakṣa* i.e., absolute non-annihilability) is Doubtful, because, in other words, the fact that a phenomenon may be a series, yet not be absolutely terminable is not necessarily contradicted by the Pra-

and Dvesa; that the saint avoids both of them, and that it is not accordingly proper to say that such a saint has the feeling of Dvesa, on the ground that he wants to avoid the pains of the world. The Jaina philosophers reply to this Nyāya contention is that the same line of argument would show that a saint on the way to Liberation cannot similarly be said to be bound down by the feeling of Rāga.

Hence the Jaina theory is finally established that the Moksa or the state of Liberation consists in eternal and absolute joy arising from a destruction of all Karmas and that it does not consist in the effacement of the psychical attributes of Buddha etc., as contended by the Naiyāyikas.

The aphorism under comments contemplates the capacity in Women to attain the final Liberation. The Śvetāmbara (literally, the white-robed philosophers) doctrine of female Emancipation is opposed by the philosophers of the Dikpata (literally, the Naked) school. Prabhācandra of the latter School, for example, develops the following argument "There is no Liberation for the Females, because they are inferior to Males, like the eunuchs etc." The Śvetāmbara School of the Jainas set aside the Digambara argument in the following way:—If Females who are the Dharmis in the argument are taken to mean Females in general (*sāmānyena*) then the argument is bad, because it wants to prove something which is admitted to be true in respect of a part of the *pakṣa*. The Śvetāmbaras do admit that numerous Females who are Abhavya (i.e., incapable by their nature to attain Salvation), who are born in the Time Cycles of Dussamā etc., who are goddesses, or subhuman beings etc., can-

sayings refer to mundane pleasures and pains which are intermixed and which are the effects of good and bad Acts to be experienced in succeeding worldly existences (births and re-births), these sayings have no connection with the absolute Pure Pleasure attainable at the state of the final Liberation as the result of the absolute destruction of all the effects of all Acts. Accordingly those sayings do not mean that the final Liberation involves the extinction of all psychical attributes and the consequent absence of all feelings of pleasure in the Soul. The Jainas point out that this is the correct meaning of those authoritative sayings will appear from the following extract of the Moral Code (*smṛti*) "Know the final Liberation to be the state in which there is the absolute (*ātyantika*) pleasure (*sukha*) which is intellectual (*buddhi-grāhya*) and unsensuous (*atīndriya*), a state inattainable by persons who have not realised their selves." It would be seen that the word pleasure (*sukha*) in that extract is not to be understood as meaning only the absence of Pain, for, there is no reason why the plain meaning of the word pleasure is not to be accepted.

In the next place, the Jainas point out that the state of the final Liberation, as understood by the thinkers of the Nyāya school, is never a desirable one. For, who would like to be insensible to all-feelings of pleasure like a piece of stone? The wise look upon the fourth object of the human desire (*Puruṣārtha*, i.e., Mokṣa) as a state of ever-untarnished and natural bliss in which there is joy which is incomparably superior to the limited and the terminable pleasures of the heavens. If, however, the Soul is to become like a piece of unconscious stone at the state of its Emancip-

(b) Nor can it be contended that although cloth may not be essential to the nature of woman, even a Female saint is bound to wear it, having been enjoined to do so by the teacher and thereby her Right Conduct is bound to be vitiated. It is true that the Great Teacher laid down the strict injunction that a Female saint shall never be without her covering cloth. But the Great Lord laid this down because so far as a Female was concerned, the wearing of cloth according to him, was an *upakāraṇa* or *upakāra* to her *Saṁyama* (practice of Restraint) and not an *Adhikaraṇa*. It has been said, 'what helps the practice of Restraint is an *Upakaraṇa* which is thus a means for doing good Acts (*dharma*); what is other than this *Upakaraṇa* has been called by the Venerable Lord, an *Adhikaraṇa*', which is thus what is used for the purpose of injuring animals. Now, if the Lord meant the wearing of cloth by a Female to be a help to her practice of Restraint, how can you say that cloth is an impediment to a woman's Right Conduct? It cannot be said that the Lord enjoined simply that a woman should wear a cloth and that He nowhere asserted that it is a help to her practice of Restraint. The wearing of cloth is, as a matter of fact, a help to a woman's practice and preservation of her Restraint and the all-knowing Lord must have meant this in His injunction. The sight of the naked limbs and parts of a woman's body excites a man's mind whereupon the passion-overpowered man overwhelms the naked woman, just as a horse falls upon a mare. This is a well-known fact, which shows how the character and the conduct of a naked woman is sure to be jeopardised in this world. A woman is naturally weak and the wearing of cloth is necessary

happiness means happiness which is both beginningless and endless in time then it is something which is ever present and interminable, it is thus meaningless to talk of its absence and to ask a man to terminate or avoid it. The Jainas point out in the next place, that the eternal happiness in its second sense, i.e., in the sense that it is endless though it has a beginning, is something which one certainly strives after. You cannot say that such a happiness is impossible, for, there is nothing to oppose the view that such happiness is possible. Such a happiness is interminable because there is nothing to terminate it and it is in this way. What terminates or destroys happiness is Karma, in the state of Liberation, there is no Karma because Liberation presupposes the radical rooting out, of the Karma, and because in Liberation, there are no wrong Belief (*mithyātva*) unrestraint (*avirati*) Passion (*kaśāya*) and Psychical torpor (*yoga*), their effect i.e., Karma cannot reappear and be re-active and re-effective. The Nyāya philosophers cannot contend that such an eternal (in the sense of endless) happiness cannot arise in the Soul in Liberation, as there cannot be any cause for it, for, in Liberation there is the annihilation of all Karmas and it is this absolute cessation of all Karma-activities, which is the cause of that never-ending joy. As regards the Naiyāyika argument based on the inseparable mixture of pleasure and pain, the Jainas point out that they are inseparably mixed up, so far as the worldly pleasures and pains are concerned. The Jainas further admit that for that reason it is right for one who wants Liberation, to avoid not only the pains but the pleasures of the world also. But the joy in liberation is absolute and is essentially different from

has not the least feeling of attachment to it, just as a (Male) saint has not the least liking for a house or a place of living although he lives in a village, in a house or in a forest. The fact is that those who have controlled themselves successfully have never a feeling of attachment (*mūrcchā*) for anything whatsoever. It is well said: "How can those women who have the intense liking for that absolute joy which arises from the beatitude of Liberation, have feeling of attachment for anything of the world, those women whose heart is never troubled or perturbed at (coming across) an enjoyable thing, at a disease, at a lonely place, at a crowded spot, at (the company of) a good man or a bad man?" It is distinctly said in the Authoritative Scripture, "Even in respect of their bodies (these saintly women) never feel that they are their own."

(c) The foregoing argument shows also the unmaintainability of the contention that cloth is a constant thing for a woman because of her liking for or attachment (*mūrcchā*) to it. A woman on the way to Liberation can have no real feeling of attachment to her cloth: she has no attachment ever to her body; she is absolutely free from the feeling of attachment.

Accordingly it can on no account be contended that because a woman puts on a cloth, she is wanting in Right Conduct and thereby in the Three Jewels. This goes to show that a woman cannot be said to be inferior to a male person on the ground that she is wanting in the Three Jewels.

(2) It is argued that a Female is inferior to a Male because she is wanting in a particular (i.e., proper) capacity (for attaining Mokṣa).

are acquainted with the nature of Liberation agree in this that it is impossible for one who has any feeling of attachment or craving, to attain Liberation, because such a feeling is the cause of bondage. This argument is not sound according to the Jainas. The feeling of attachment or craving, which is connected with worldly matters of pleasures like sound etc., is the cause of bondage, because such a feeling leading, as it does, a man to earn, protect etc., objects of the world, fastens him to the Samsāra. The craving for the eternal joy of Liberation is no doubt a feeling of attachment (*rāga*). But it leads one to refrain from earning etc., all worldly objects and to work on the ways to Liberation. Without this *Rāga* or feeling, the eternal joy of Liberation is inattainable. Worldly objects cannot yield such eternal joy and such an eternal joy is never, after its realisation diminished or destroyed, so that as in the case of the worldly pleasures, it is never necessary to engage oneself in violent acts to regain or re-attain that lost eternal happiness. Hence the craving for Liberation, although *Rāga* is no cause of bondage to the person striving after Liberation. It is just a desire (*sprhā-mātra*) which again is negated when the person reaches that ultimate state of Liberation. This is corroborated in the authoritative saying,—“The best of the saints is devoid of all forms of desire, whether in the world or in the state of Liberation”. It must be admitted that such a colourless desire cannot bind a man. For, otherwise one may think that a saint of the Naiyāyika school would be unable to attain liberation in as much as his activities towards it are guided by a Desire to avoid (*dvesa*) pain. The Nyāya thinker contends that the cause of one's bondage to the world consists in *Rāga*

Will not a similar line of argument lead to the position that because a person is incapable of doing the acts which secure the best of the blissful states (i.e., the Moksa) he is to be thought to be incapable of doing the extremely sinful acts which yield the worst of states (i.e., the fall into the nether-most Hell)? But this position is admittedly not correct; for, this would lead one to hold that any Abhavya (a Being who is constitutionally incapable of attaining the final Liberation at any time) would never have to visit the Seventh Hell

(11) In the next place, a woman is judged to be wanting in 'the particular capacity,' because, as is alleged by the Digambara philosophers, she is found not to attain the Labdhis (i.e., extreme proficiencies in certain matters); this shows that she is incapable of practising self-restraint etc., which bring about those attainments. It is contended that if the Females are incapable of such minor forms of self-restraint etc. as bring about the Labdhis which are after all but mundane matters, they must be held to be incapable of practising the extreme forms of self-restraint etc., which yield the super-mundane Moksa. The Śvetāmbara commentator points out that this contention is not sound. The fact that the Females do not attain the Labdhis does not show that they are essentially incapable of attaining anything great. Then again, the scriptures do not say what the Labdhis are attainable only by the practice of self-restraint etc. According to the scriptures, these "Labdhis are due to the rise, the annihilation, the mitigation, the partial mitigation and annihilation of Karma." The status of a Cakravarti (imperial con- Male), of a Baladeva (the elder brother of a Vāsu- proper) , of a Vāsudeva (A good king with supernatural

not attain Salvation The Śvetāmbara commentator asks In what respects are the Females inferior to the Males?

(1) It is said that Females cannot have the Three Jewels of Right faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct which are necessary for the attainment of Liberation and that therefore they are inferior to the Males As regards the question why the Females cannot have the Three Jewels, it is said that as they put on cloth, they are wanting in Right conduct. The contention is wrong Why should the wearing of cloth by Females be against the Rightness of their conduct?

(i) You cannot say that simply because cloth is in contact with their Body, the Right Conduct in the Females is impossible. The Earth etc, are in contact with the person of every one but the practice of Right Conduct is not impossible for any one on that account.

(ii) Nor can you say that cloth is a constant thing with a Female and therefore Right Conduct is impossible in her

(a) You cannot say that a woman is essentially or constitutionally incapable of doing away with the covering cloth. Women are not unoften found to sacrifice even their lives so that it is unreasonable to hold that a woman is unable to do away with the covering cloth, especially the woman who strives after the attainment of the absolute and the infinite joy of Liberation Even in these present days, Female mendicants are actually found who are totally naked This goes to show that it is not impossible for a woman to do away with the covering cloth. Cloth is thus not essential to the nature of a woman and as such, its wearing need not interfere with her Right conduct.

ledge does not necessarily prove any inherent 'Incapacity' in a Female for getting Liberation.

(iv) Lastly, it is urged that that a Female is wanting in the proper 'Capacity' is evident from the fact that many forms of penances and austerities are forbidden to her. The Śvetāmbara reply on this point is that this does not prove a Female's 'Incapacity' for attaining Liberation. It shows only that the Scriptures have prescribed for the Females those practices which are suitable to their nature. It has been said, "In the sacred writings, there are various forms of penances effecting the Saṁvara (the stoppage of the inflow of the Karma in the soul) and the Nirjarā (the partial annihilation of the Karma) just as there are varied forms of the treatment of a disease, of which some are efficacious to some people (and others, to others)"

So the Females cannot be said to be 'inferior to men' (and as such, incapable of attaining Mokṣa) either on the ground that they cannot be fully possessed of the 'Three Jewels' or that they are wanting in the 'proper capacity' (for attaining Liberation).

(3) It is contended by the thinkers of the Digambara School that the Females are to be considered as 'inferior to the Males,' as they are never saluted by the latter. The Śvetāmbara commentator points out that this contention is weak. Is it the case that the Females, as a rule, are never saluted by the Males? You cannot say this, for the mothers of the Tīrthaṅkaras are saluted even by the foremost of the gods, not to speak of the ordinary males. Nor can it be said that the Females are to be Judged as inferior to the males because they are not saluted by the male persons of superior qualifications. The Śvetāmbara thinker points

for the safety of her character and conduct. It cannot be said again that the compulsory wearing of cloth shows that a woman is constitutionally weak and is liable to be overpowered and that accordingly Liberation which involves the tremendous exertion for destroying the huge mass of the Karma, overpowering the beings of the three regions, is inattainable by such a frail being as a woman. Because there is no such rule that only those who are possessed of a great physical strength can attain Liberation. There are paralytics, dwarfs and actually diseased persons who can easily be overpowered ever by a woman, they are Males no doubt, but are weak. If physical weakness were a hindrance to the attainment of Mokṣa these men, although Male persons they are, must be held to be debarred from attaining Liberation. This is, however, neither party's case, so that the conclusion must be that just as a physically weak man can attain Liberation, a woman, although wearing a cloth, is capable of attaining it. The objector may ask. If it is possible for a woman wearing cloth to attain Liberation, why should not a house-holder also who wears cloth attain it? The Śvetāmbara's reply is that a householder wearing cloth would not attain Liberation because he has a love or liking (*mamatva* literally a feeling of ownership) for his cloth. This feeling of ownership (*mamatva*) is a mode of the feeling of attachment (*parigraha*). If one has the feeling of ownership, he is not absolutely free from the feeling of attachment, even though he may remain naked, for, even a naked Man has a feeling of attachment to his body. A Female saint, on the contrary, is absolutely free from the feeling of attachment; she no doubt wears a cloth, but

Jewels' e.g., Right Faith etc. As regards the external acquisitions, it is pointed out that the Gaṇadharas (the leaders of the divine religious assemblies) were not possessed of these external greatness of the Tīrthaṃkaras and that the ordinary Kṣatriyas were lacking in the external belongings of the Cakradharas. But were the Gaṇadharas and the Ksatriya followers of the Tīrthaṃkaras debarred from attaining Liberation because of their non-possession of those external acquisitions? The Digambaras state here that by non-possession of the 'Excellent Wealth (*maharddhi*)' they mean that no Female can be a Tīrthaṃkara. The Śvetāmbaras challenge the truth of this contention and say that the above Digambara proposition is unproved. They urge that there is nothing inconsistent in a Female's attaining the status of a Tīrthaṃkara. It is rather reasonable to hold that if a Female is duly pious and so on she may be a Tīrthaṃkara.) As a matter of fact, the Digambara contention that a Female cannot be a Tīrthaṃkara has always been stoutly challenged by the Śvetāmbaras who maintain that there is absolutely no reason why we should conclude that a Female cannot be a Tīrthaṃkara.

(6) The last argument in support of the proposition that a Female is inferior to a Man, is that the feeling of decency (*māyā*) etc. are found in an increased degree in the former. The Śvetāmbara thinker points out that these feelings are found in both males and Females in all and equal degrees. The Scripture also says so. It is said that such failings sometimes predominate even in the Cārama-śārīrins (Persons who are in their last mundane incarnation i.e., who would

(1) A woman cannot go down to the Seventh Hell and is accordingly judged to be wanting in 'a particular capacity' The Śvetāmbara thinker criticises this contention by asking; Is a woman unable to go down to the Seventh Hell in that birth of hers in which she is to attain Liberation or is she, as a general rule, unable to go there? If you say that a woman is wanting in 'the particular capacity' (and is therefore inferior to a male and incapable of attaining Mokṣa on that account) because she is unable to go down to the Seventh Hell in that birth in which she is to attain Liberation, well, this may apply in the case of a male also; a male person about to attain Liberation cannot go down to that Hell; but nobody thinks that he would be unable to attain Liberation on that account. The objectors explain their second alternative position in this way. As a general rule a woman is unable to go down to the Seventh Hell; this shows that she has not the capacity to do acts which would take her to that hell, by analogy it may also be argued that she has similarly not the capacity to do acts which would yield Liberation to her. Male persons, on the other hand, like Prasannacandra and other Royal Sages who have attained Liberation had both the capacities viz., the capacity to do the extremely wrongful acts and the capacity to do the extremely good acts which yield Liberation, accordingly a Female is inferior to a Male and is unable to attain Liberation. The Śvetāmbara thinker sets aside this contention by saying that the proposition in the general form is not at all true that because a person has not the capacity to do the extremely wrongful acts, the person must be judged to be wanting in the capacity to do the extremely good acts

(sometimes) attains Liberation; because such a Female develops in her the exact cause of the liberation; just like a Male person. The exact or the unfailing cause of liberation just consists in the possession of the 'Three Jewels' of Right Faith etc., in their absolute purity. That these Three Jewels may be possessed by a Woman has already been stated, so that the Reason in the argument for the Female salvation cannot be said to be 'unproved' (*asiddha*). This Reason, the possession of the Three Jewels is not present in the Eunuchs (who do not attain Liberation and who are thus Vipaksas in the argument) and it, thus receding from the Dissimilar Abodes like Eunuchs, as it does, is neither 'opposed' (*viruddha*) nor 'doubtful' (*anaikāntika*). The Śvetāmbara argument for the doctrine of the Female Salvation may also be put in this way:— 'Some Females, of the human species on account of their having the exact cause of Liberation, do attain Liberation; because they have the right to take to the state of a homeless wandering recluse; like a male person'. The reason in this argument, viz., 'a female's having the right to adopt the order of the wandering mendicants' is not 'unproved' (*asiddha*). The Scriptures lay down, "a pregnant woman or a Woman who has an infant to maintain, should not enter the order of homelessness". This clearly lays down that a woman has the right to enter the order of the homeless saints. It excludes certain classes of women from the order and by implication upholds the right of the rest. Even now are found Females who have plucked off their hair and who carry with them the Kamaṇḍalu (Wooden waterpot) and other belongings of a Yati or homeless ascetic, which shows that Women have certainly the

powers and weapons) are also Labdhis, but these are not necessarily due to the practice of self-restraint. Even if we suppose that the Labdhis are due to the practice of self-restraint, the question is: Are the Females incapable of attaining any Labdhi at all or are some particular Labdhis only denied to them? The first position is not maintainable; because it is only some of the Labdhis e.g., the status of a Cakravartī etc., which are denied to the Females, while there are many Labdhis of which they are found to be possessed. Now if the Second alternative i.e., the position that some Labdhis are denied to the Females, be accepted this would not show that they are wanting in 'the particular (i.e., proper) capacity (for attaining the Mokṣa)'. There are admittedly Male persons who are not Keśavas (i.e., Vāsudevas) and who are certainly wanting in the Labdhis peculiar to the Vāsudevas, all the same, these persons are nevertheless, held to have 'the particular capacity' (for attaining Liberation). Moreover, it is also an admitted fact that a person, although he is neither a Tīrthmakara nor a Cakravartī and is wanting in the attainments peculiar to them has nevertheless 'the particular capacity' (for attaining the Mokṣa). Why then should a Female, because she is wanting in certain Labdhis be held not to have the particular (Proper) 'Capacity' (for attaining Liberation) and to be 'inferior to a Male' on that account?

(iii) It is contended that a Female is to be judged to be incapable (of attaining Liberation), because she never acquires the complete Scriptural knowledge. The Śvetāmbara contention, on the contrary, is that the non-attainment of the complete Scriptural know-

CHAPTER VIII

विरुद्धयोर्धर्मयोरेकधर्मव्यवच्छेदेन स्वीकृततदन्यधर्मव्यव-
स्थापनार्थं साधनदूषणवचनं वादः ॥ १ ॥

*viruddhayoḥ dharmayoḥ eka-dharma-vyavacchedena
svīkṛtataḍ-anya-dharma-vyavasthāpanārthaṁ sādhana-
dūṣaṇa-vacanam vādaḥ* | 1 |

TRANSLATION: A Debate consists in the system of argumentative statements, *pro-et-contra*, for establishing the subject-matter of one proposition (which is maintained by a party) by refuting the subject-matter of the other, the two subject-matters being opposed to each other.

COMMENTARY: The nature of the Pramāṇa and the Naya has been described. A Vāda or Debate consists in the application of propositions based on the Pramāṇa and the Naya for determining the nature of an object. The word, 'opposed' in the text signifies that the subject-matters of the two propositions have not been finally determined by the Pramāṇas before the Vāda begins. An instance of two such mutually opposed matters, expressed in two propositions would be, (1) 'A thing is absolutely eternal' and (2) 'A thing is eternal in some respects only'. But the two propositions (1) 'A thing has qualities' (Guna) and (2) 'A thing has modes (Paryāyas)' are not mutually opposed. 'Two phenomena, in order that they may be opposed must be attributed to one and the same Locus (*adhi-karaṇa*) and to one and the same Time (*kāla*). The

out that a disciple is not saluted by the preceptor, are we to judge from this that the disciple is necessarily inferior to the preceptor and is debarred from attaining Liberation on that account? The scriptures say otherwise; for, we find in them instances of many disciples like Caṇḍarudra etc., attaining Liberation. Accordingly the alleged fact of the Female not being saluted by a male person does not necessarily show that the former is inferior to the latter and is incapable of attaining Liberation.

(4) It is said that a Female is not found to effect *smāraṇa* and similar Teaching acts and is to be consequently Judged as inferior to a Male. The Śvetāmbara commentator points out that this fact like the fact discussed in (3) above, does not prove the inferiority of a woman to a Man. The Dīgambara objector attempts to improve his position by saying that a Female may be capable of effecting Smāraṇa and similar teaching acts but so far as a Male person is concerned, she does never do them and is consequently to be held as inferior to him. This contention also of the Dīgambara School is unfounded, inasmuch as there is no inconsistency if one holds that a woman well-versed in the authoritative Scriptures would on fit occasions effect Smāraṇa and similar acts in connection with a Male person who is just on the way to a religious life but is still subject to unrestrained impulses.

(5) The next argument is that the Females are inferior to Man as they are lacking in 'Excellent Wealth' etc (*mahāddhī*). The objection is met by the question, what are these Excellent Wealth etc., psychological or external? The former cannot be the case, as it has been shown that the Females can attain 'the Three

at least his own position thoroughly. Then again, the matters in a Debate regarding even the Vītarāga, referred to above, may be undetermined at the time the Debate begins but they may not be *thoroughly* undetermined; for, such a Debate may arise when one of the parties to the Debate has a reasonable doubt or but a hazy conception about these matters. In a debate where one of the parties wants simply to gain a victory over his opponent, he is, as already pointed out, thoroughly acquainted with the nature of his own stand-point. The Disputant (*vādī*) in such a case is from the very start convinced of the validity of his own contention through the Pramāṇas e.g., of the proposition that 'Sound is eternal,' and advances the arguments in support (*sādhana*) of his contention to set aside the possible counter contention of his Opponent. The Opponent (*prativādī*) again may similarly be convinced from the very start of the Debate, of the validity of his own theory, e.g., the proposition that 'Sound is non-eternal,' and put forward his arguments in reputation (*dūṣaṇa*) of the Disputant's contention. This is the way in which the victory-seeking Debates are carried on. In such debates, it cannot be said that the matters in dispute i.e., the respective positions of the parties are thoroughly unknown to the parties at the start of the Debates.

The meaning of the Sūtra under consideration is thus as follows:—The two respective positions of the two contending parties to a Debate should be such that when attributed to one and the same object at one and the same time the two positions would oppose each other. An instance of two such mutually opposed positions, as already referred to, would be, 'An object

attain salvation as soon as they leave their existing bodies) Like Nārada etc.

Hence the reasoning that Females cannot attain Salvation, as they are inferior to men, is not sound. The arguments against the Śvetāmbara doctrine of the Female salvation may thus be shortly put:—‘Salvation involves the fullest possible development of any psychical capacity is impossible in a woman, which is evidenced by the fact of a woman’s incapacity to go down to the Seventh Hell, which involves the fullest possible development of the vicious tendency. This position has already been examined. It may be pointed out in this connection that the contention that the fullest development of any psychical capacity is impossible in a Woman, is sufficiently contradicted by the admitted fact that when the deluding (*mohanīya*) Karma exists in a woman in its extreme form she has the Female cravings (*strīveda*) etc., in their extreme form. Another argument against the doctrine of the Female salvation, viz., ‘A Female cannot have emancipation; because she has the spirit of appropriation (*parigraha*) like a House-holder’ has been considered. It has been shown how the cloth worn by a Woman, far from being an article of her liking, is only a thing to the development of the virtue and as such, is never a thing to which she may be said to be attached. These are in short respectively the arguments against (*bādhaka*) the doctrine of the Female salvation and the Śvetāmbara counter arguments (*uddhāra*) setting them aside.

The Śvetāmbara argument in support of (*sādhaka*) the doctrine of the Female salvation may thus be short by put:—‘A Female of the Human species

course of the Debate, there is nothing inconsistent in its continuation.

प्रारम्भकश्चात्र जिगीषुः, तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुश्च ॥ २ ॥

piārambhakas' cātra jigīṣuḥ, tattva-nirṇinīṣuś' ca

| 2 |

TRANSLATION: In a Debate, the party who begins is either one-who-wants-a-victory (*jigīṣu*) or one-who-wants-to-determine-a-truth (*tattvanirṇinīṣu*).

COMMENTARY: The party who begins the Debate and whose object in opening the Debate is simply to defeat his opponents, is called the Jigīṣu. He generally begins with proud and pompous challenges, such as "O weak animals, at once leave this forest; for the Lion is come". "O you, thinker of the Sitapaṭa (white-robed) School: Why do you delude these innocent disciples of yours by a display of your false bearing?" "There is no Soul: Adṛṣṭa (the law that every act is sure to be followed by its fruit) is not proved. Future life is impossible". The Jigīṣu may also begin the Debate by exciting the king in the following way, without challenging his opponents directly: "In your council, there is no one who is truly learned". As stated above, one who wants to determine truth (*tattvanirṇinīṣu*) may also begin the Debate. He begins in this way: "Well, fellow pupil! Is sound eternal in some respects only or is it eternal absolutely?" Instead of beginning in a doubting mood, he may also begin as a potential truth-determiner in the following manner: "Sound is eternal in some respects".

right to adopt the status of a religious wanderer. It follows from this that the final Liberation is possible for a Woman

Thus the reality and the existence of the Soul with the nature and characteristics, as described above is firmly established.

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकारे नयात्मस्वरूपनिर्णयो नाम
सप्तमः परिच्छेदः ॥

*iti pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāre nayātma-sva-
rūpa-nirṇayo nāma saptamaḥ paricchedaḥ* .

TRANSLATION. Here ends the Seventh Chapter of the *Pramāṇanaya-Tattvālokāṅkāra*, entitled, the determination of The Nature of Naya (or the Partial Knowledge) and of Ātmā (The Soul)

तथैव तत्त्वं प्रतितिष्ठापयिषुस्तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुः ॥ ४ ॥

tathaiya tattvaṃ pratitiṣṭhāpayiṣus tattva-nirṇinīṣuḥ
 | 4 |

TRANSLATION: A seeker-of truth (*tattva-nirṇinīṣu*) is one who wants to establish truth in those ways.

COMMENTARY: The second class of Debaters are persons who are seekers of truth and who try to establish truths, e.g., 'Sound is in some respects eternal' in the very same ways as a Jigīṣu, i.e., by advancing arguments of proof and refutation.

अयं च द्वेधा स्वात्मनि परत्र च ॥ ५ ॥

ayaṃ ca dvedhā svātmani paratra ca | 5 |

TRANSLATION: That is of two classes, viz., 'In himself', and 'In-others'.

COMMENTARY: A Debater who is a *Tattva-nirṇinīṣu* enters into a debate either for determining a truth when his mind might have been in doubt or for making others understand the truth out of kindness for them. A seeker-of-truth may thus belong to one of the two classes.

It may be said, however, that a Debater who wants to convince others of some truth (a *Tattva-nirṇinīṣu* of the second Class) is but a Jigīṣu; for the Members (*sabhya*) present in the hall of the debate would declare his victory as soon as he convinces his Opponent of the truth of his position. But the thing is that the *Tattva-nirṇinīṣu* is never desirous of obtaining a

proposition 'Intelligence (*buddhi*) is non-eternal' and the proposition 'Soul (*ātmā*) is eternal' are not opposed to each other, because they refer to different substances (Adhikaranas or Loci) And similarly the propositions, 'This thing was formerly inactive' and, 'This thing is now active' are not mutually opposed, as they refer to different Times (*kālas*).

In this connection the Jaina commentator criticises the view of the Nyāya Commentator, according to whom "the two subject-matters in dispute in a debate (1) should have the one and the same Locus (2) should be mutually 'Opposed' to each other, (3) should be of one and the same 'Time' and (4) should be thoroughly 'Unknown (*anavasita*) at the time the Debate commences". The Jaina commentator points out that the third requirement viz., that the two subject-matters in a Debate should be 'Opposed to each other' involves the first two requirements so that the separate statements of the first two requirements either involve tautology or carry no sense. As regards the fourth requirement viz., that the nature of the two subject matters must be 'thoroughly unknown at the time the Debate commences the Jaina thinker's view is that this is not an invariable requirement. He admits that when the subject-matter in a Debate is something about the One-completely-devoid-of-all-forms-of-attachment (*Vī-tarāga*, the supramundane Liberated Being), it is true that the debated matters are not fully understood at the time the discussion begins. But in a Debate where one party's aim is simply to gain a victory over his Opponent it cannot be said that the subject-matters in dispute are thoroughly unknown; for, such a disputant would never enter into a debate unless he understood

TRANSLATION: The preceptors etc., belong to the second Class.

COMMENTARY: These debaters of the second class of the Tattvanirṇinīsu, try to convince others of the truths they know.

अयं द्विविधः क्षायोपशमिकज्ञानशाली केवली च ॥ ८ ॥

ayaṃ dvividhaḥ kṣāyopasaṃika-jñāna-sālī kevalī
ca | 8 |

TRANSLATION: The second class has two groups viz., persons who are possessed of knowledge, arising from the partial annihilation and mitigation (of Karma-forces) and persons who have the Pure Knowledge.

COMMENTARY: As said already, Teachers etc., are the Tattva-nirṇinīsu Debaters of the second class. Teachers are persons who are possessed of knowledge and as knowledge may be of two kinds so far as its genesis is concerned, Teachers also are of two kinds. Thus knowledge may be due to the partial annihilation and mitigation (*kṣāyopasaṃa*) of the knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) Karma. Sensuous cognition (*matī*) Scriptural knowledge (*śruti*) Clairvoyance (*avadhi*) Telepathic knowledge (*manah-paryāya*) are modes of such knowledge. The first groups of Teachers are possessed of any or all of these modes of imperfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge, on the contrary, the Kevala, is due to the complete annihilation of the knowledge—obscuring Karma and the Teachers who are possessed of such knowledge are Omniscient Beings.

is absolutely eternal', 'the very same object at the very time when it is said to be absolutely eternal is in some respects only eternal'. In a Debate, the Disputant maintains one of these two mutually opposed positions viz, either that 'An object is absolutely eternal' or that 'An object is in some respects only eternal' and his Opponent holds the other view. Each party goes on putting forward arguments which support his own position and which refute the position of the other party. A Debate is constituted of such argumentative propositions, constructive (*sādhana*) on the one hand and destructive (*dūšana*) on the other.

The argumentative propositions, both when constructive and when destructive, must always be correct, i.e., based on the *Pramānas*. They should never be fallacious. An argumentative proposition, when constructive, establishes a debater's own theory, and when destructive, it refutes his Opponent's position. It is obvious that a fallacious argument is incapable of either supporting one's own theory or setting aside the view of his adversary.

It may be asked, however: How can the Opponent bring forward an argument against a doctrine which is established by the arguments of the Disputant? How can one and the same doctrine be established and refuted? The answer is that the establishment of a theory by the Disputant is provisional only and its refutation by the Opponent is similarly not final, while the Debate goes on. The Disputant advances arguments in his own way and in accordance with a particular intention and so does the Opponent. As there is no finality (unassailable determination or unassailable refutation of either of the theories) during the

एतेन प्रत्यारम्भकोऽपि व्याख्यातः ॥ ९ ॥

etena pratyārambhako' pi vyākhyātaḥ । 9 ।

TRANSLATION By this, is also explained the nature of the person 'who answers'.

COMMENTARY: The person who opens the Debate is the Ārambhaka (one who begins) and the person who opposes him is the Pratyārambhaka one who answers. These are figuratively described as two contending Elephants. The Pratyārambhaka has exactly those four sub-groups which the Ārambhaka, as shown above, has. Now, the Ārambhaka and the Pratyārambhaka being of four classes each, there may be sixteen forms of the Vāda or debate, so far as the nature of the contending parties is concerned. Really, however, there are only twelve kinds of the Vāda inasmuch as (i) a Debate with a Jigīsu as the Disputant and a Tattvanirṇinīsu-in-himself as the Opponent (ii) a Debate with a Tattvanirṇinīsu-in-himself as the Disputant and a Jigīsu as the Opponent (iii) a Debate with a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself as the Disputant and a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself as the Opponent and (iv) a Debate between two Kevalins are impossible. Thus where the Disputant is a Jigīsu, the Opponent may be either (1) a Jigīsu, or (2) a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge or (3) a Kevalī, but never a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself. Secondly, where the Disputant is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself, the Opponent is either (4) a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others, who is possessed of imperfect knowledge or (5) a Kevalī, but never a Jigīsu or a Tattva-

It may be that the Opponent is a highly cultured man and the Debate goes on with that wise and erudite Opponent who argues with a collection of Disputants on the other side. These Disputants arguing with that single wise Opponent may be simple seekers of victory (*jigīṣu*) or seekers-of-truth (*tattva-nirṇmīsu*). The wise Opponent though alone meets the Disputants and through his knowledge and learning set aside the views of the *Jigīṣu* Disputants or explains the truth to the *Tattva-nirṇmīsu* Disputants, as the case may be. On some occasions again, the Opponent may be one who is a seeker of truth and may be met by a number of Disputants. In this way, in a debate there may be often-times more than one Disputant beginning the *Vāda*.

स्वीकृतधर्मव्यवस्थापनार्थं साधनदूषणाम्यां परं पराजेतु
मिच्छुर्जिगीषुः ॥ ३ ॥

*svīkṛta-dharma-vyavasthāpanārthaṁ sādhanadūṣa-
ṇābhyāṁ paraṁ parājetum icchur jigīṣuḥ* | 3 |

TRANSLATION: A seeker-of-victory (*jigīṣu*) is one who wants to defeat another by advancing arguments of proof and refutation in order to establish his own contention.

COMMENTARY: A debater who is a *Jigīṣu*, puts forward, for instance, his contention that 'Sound is eternal in some respects'. He would try to establish his contention by advancing arguments which would support his own proposition and arguments which would go against the theory of his Opponent.

of imperfect knowledge or a Kevalī. In such a debate, there must be four Parties (literally, Limbs). There must be the two Parties viz. the Disputant and the Opponent. This goes without saying; for no Debate is possible without them. The other two Limbs of a Debate, to be described later on, are also indispensable in such a debate, where the Disputant is a Jigīsu. In a Debate where the Opponent is a Jigīsu like the Disputant, the presence of the other two Limbs or Parties is necessary for preventing the obstruction of the decision about victory or defeat caused by the fraud, wrangling etc., of the two contending Debaters as also for awarding rewards etc., Even in a Debate in which the Opponent is either a Tattva-Nirninīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge or a Kevalī, the two Limbs other than the debating Parties are necessary, if the Disputant be a Jigīsu. These two Limbs are necessary for preventing the commission of fraud and wrangling etc., by the Jigīsu Disputant. The Jigīsu Disputant himself also insists on the presence of those two Limbs in order that he, when victorious may be duly honoured and awarded the rewards. Thus it is that in a Debate of the kind under consideration, there must be the four Limbs or Parties.

It should be observed in this connection that if one of the debating Parties is a Tattva-nirninīsu-in-himself there cannot be a Jigīsu either as the Disputant or as the Opponent. One not knowing the truth in himself would not feel tempted to teach his Jigīsu anti-party; nor would he be able to determine the truth for himself by entering into a Debate with a Jigīsu. For similar reasons, if one of the debating Parties is a Tattva-nirninīsu-in-himself, there cannot be a Tattva-

spectacular victory; he enters into the Debate simply out of kindness for others whom he wants to teach some truth. As the desire for victory is absent in him, he cannot be called a Jigīsu, although he actually gains a victory and people call him victorious. There is nothing inconsistent in his being victorious and being not a victory-seeker. It is often found that a person may not desire a thing; but owing to favourable or unfavourable decrees of fate, hundreds of such things are forced upon him and felt and enjoyed by him. The fact is that the direct motive of a Jigīsu in entering into a Debate is to gain a victory while that of Tattvanirṇinīṣu is to convince others of some truth. Incidentally of course, the latter gains a victory but as it was not the direct object of his entering into the debate, a Tattvanirṇinīṣu cannot be regarded as a Jigīsu.

आद्यः शिष्यादिः ॥ ६ ॥

ādyah śiṣyādiḥ । 6 ।

TRANSLATION: The Disciples etc., belong to the first class

COMMENTARY: The Debaters who are after discovering the truth themselves, the Tattva-nirṇinīṣus of the first Class are the Disciples, Fellow-students, Friends etc.

द्वितीयो गुर्वदिः ॥ ७ ॥

dvitīyo gurvādiḥ । 7 ।

the Opponent in spite of his best efforts is unable to determine the truth, Members are required to determine it and the debate becomes thereby three-limbed. It should be observed that as there is no chance of quarrel etc., between the debating Parties and no desire for getting any reward in any of the debating Parties, there need not be any President in such a Debate, although the two debating Parties may want the presence of Members; the debate in such a case is three-limbed and not four-limbed.

तत्रैव द्व्यङ्गस्तुरीयस्य ॥ १२ ॥

tatraiva dvyāṅgas tūrīyasya । 12 ।

TRANSLATION: (The translation is not literal but it correctly represents the meaning of the Sūtra). Where again the Disputant is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself and his Opponent is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of perfect knowledge, the Debate has two Limbs.

COMMENTARY: In such a Debate, the Omniscient Teacher is fully competent to determine the truth, so that the Vāda has two limbs viz., the Disputant and the Opponent only; there need not be any President or Members here.

तृतीये प्रथमादीनां यथायोगं पूर्ववत् ॥ १३ ॥

tṛtīye prathamādīnāṃ yathā-yogaṃ pūrvavat । 13 ।

TRANSLATION: (The translation is not literal but it correctly represents the meaning of the Sūtra). Where

It thus appears that in a Debate, the person who opens it, may be one of these fours: (1) A Jigīsu (2) A Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself (3) A Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others, who is possessed of imperfect knowledge and (4) A Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who has Pure Knowledge. It should be observed that the class of Jigīsu-disputants has not all the sub-classes which the class of Tattva-nirṇinīsu-disputants has. Thus, for instance, a Jigīsu would never attempt to gain a victory over himself, so that he cannot be a Jigīsu-in-himself. The Kevalī i.e., the Omniscient Being, again, is a Vītarāga (devoid of all earthly desires and inclinations) and never has the urge for defeating another, a Jigīsu cannot accordingly be a Kevalī. Gauḍa, Drāviḍa etc., are names of countries, it would be unscientific to class the Disputants as Gauḍa Disputants, Drāviḍa Disputants. Such a principle of classifying the Disputants would not be consistent with the principle of distinguishing the respective Limbs or parties to a Debate (to be presently described) and the sub-classes under such a classification would be endless.

A Jigīsu is thus of one class only. He is a man possessed of imperfect (*ksāyopasāmika*) knowledge, wanting to gain a victory over another.

Then again, a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself has not the two subgroups which a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others has. For, a Kevalī, the Omniscient Being, who has already known all the truths, can never be under a necessity to determine a truth for himself. A Tattva-nirṇinīsu of the first class, i.e., in-himself is thus always a person who has imperfect (*ksāyopasāmika*) knowledge.

COMMENTARY: The reasons for the respective numbers of the Limbs in the two cases of the Debate as contemplated in the Sūtra will be found in the commentaries of the previous Sūtras.

वादिप्रतिवादिसभ्यसभापतयश्चत्वार्यङ्गानि ॥ १५ ॥

vādi-prativādi-sabhya-sabhāpatayaś catvāry aṅgāni
15

TRANSLATION: (The translation is not literal but it correctly represents the meaning of the Sūtra). The Disputant, the Opponent, the Members and the President are the four Limbs (i.e., Parties) in a Debate.

COMMENTARY: This is clear.

प्रारम्भकप्रत्यारम्भकावेव मल्लप्रतिमल्लन्यायेन वादिप्रति-
वादिनौ ॥ १६ ॥

*prārambhaka-pratyārambhakāv eva malla-prati-
mallanyāyena vādi-prativādinau* 16

TRANSLATION: The Disputant and the Opponent are like two wrestlers, the first begins and the other answers.

COMMENTARY: The Vādi (Disputant) and the Prativādi (Opponent) are like two contending fighters.

प्रमाणतः स्वपक्षस्थापनप्रतिपक्षप्रतिक्षेपावनयोः

कर्म ॥ १७ ॥

*pramāṇataḥ sva-pakṣa-sthāpana-pratipakṣa-prati-
kṣepāvanayoh karma* 17

nirṇinīsu-in-himself. Thirdly, where the Disputant is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge, the Opponent is either (6) a Jigīsu or (7) a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself or (8) a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge or (9) a Kevalī. Lastly, where the Disputant is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is a Kevalī the Opponent may be either (10) a Jigīsu or (11) a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge or (12) a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself, but never a Kevalī.

Thus so far as the respective parties to a Debate are concerned, it may be one of the twelve forms

तत्र प्रथमे प्रथमतृतीयतुरीयाणां चतुरङ्ग एव, अन्यतमस्या-
स्यङ्गस्यापाये जयपराजयव्यवस्थादिबौःस्थ्यापत्तेः ॥ १० ॥

*tatra prathame prathama-tīrtiya-turīyāṇāṃ catu-
ranga eva, anyatamasyāpy aṅgasyāpāye jaya-parājaya-
vyavasthādi-dauḥsthyāpatteḥ* । 10 ।

TRANSLATION. (The translation is not literal but it correctly represents the meaning of the Sūtra) Where the Disputant is a Jigīsu and his Opponent is either a Jigīsu or a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge or a Kevalī, the Debate must have four limbs, for, in the absence of any one of these Limbs, the decision about victory, defeat etc., becomes impossible

COMMENTARY. It has been said above that where the Disputant is a Jigīsu, his Opponent is either a Jigīsu or a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed

and are well aware of the nature of the positions of the Disputant and the Opponent, have the power of retention, are erudite (intellectually) brilliant, forgiving and strictly impartial

COMMENTARY: Preferably, the Sabhyas (Members who are to manage the debate, should be three, four or more in number. Where so many Members are not available, one or two may do. The Members ought to fulfil the following six requirements:—1. First of all, they should be fully conversant with the nature of the theories of the contending Parties. One may be very erudite, yet not conversant with the nature of the contending Parties' respective theories. Unless the Members are fully aware of the nature of the Debaters' theories, they are incompetent to determine whether a Party's arguments are right or wrong. 2. Again, mere knowledge in the Members is useless so far as their judgement about the rightness or the wrongness of the Parties, arguments are concerned unless they have the power of fully understanding and mentally retaining the arguments, advanced by the contending Parties. 3. Sometimes, the Debating Parties may, in order to make a parade of their knowledge, incidentally talk of matters which are not strictly relevant; the Members must be well-versed enough to judge the value of these. 4. The Members must themselves be intellectually brilliant; otherwise they would be unable to decide the soundness or otherwise of the arguments, evolved by the Parties in accordance with their respective intellectual brilliance. 5. A contending Party may sometimes use harsh words; even in such a case, the Members must maintain an equable temper and be forgiving.

the Disputant is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge, (i) the Debate has four limbs, if his opponent is a Jigīsu, (ii) the Debate has sometimes two Limbs and sometimes three Limbs, if the Opponent is either a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself or a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge; (iii) the Debate has two Limbs if the Opponent is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of perfect knowledge

COMMENTARY: The reasons for the respective numbers of the Limbs in the three cases of the Debate as contemplated in the Sūtra, will be found in the Commentaries of the Sūtras preceding it.

Such is the wonderful nature of human ignorance that an ignorant man would consider himself a wise teacher and would go so far as to enter into a Debate with the Omniscient Lord to teach him some truth! Yet such is the infinite mercy of the Lord that he would tolerate the impertinence of such a man and teach him the truths which he ought to learn!

तुरीये प्रथमादीनामेवम् ॥ १४ ॥

turīye prathamādīnām evam | 14 |

TRANSLATION: (The translation is not literal but it correctly represents the meaning of the Sūtra) Where the Disputant is a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of perfect knowledge, (i) the debate has four Limbs, if his Opponent is a Jigīsu; (ii) the Debate has two Limbs if his Opponent is either a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-himself or a Tattva-nirṇinīsu-in-others who is possessed of imperfect knowledge

viz., that they are to indicate the points at issue unambiguously etc. The Members are to determine which of the parties is to begin and which, to reply. They are to measure the relevancy and the irrelevancy of the arguments, advanced by the Debaters and to decide which arguments support the theory of a party and which go against it. Where one of the parties, on account of dullness or obstinacy does not accept the theory of his opponent although well-established by him and not stop from further arguing, or where both the parties go astray from truth and continue arguing pointlessly, it is the Members who stop them, by themselves revealing the truth. And finally the Members declare the victory of or the defeat of the parties in their Debate which is thus set at rest by their declaration. These are the duties of the Members.

प्रज्ञाज्ञैश्वर्यक्षमामाध्यस्थ्यसंपन्नः सभापतिः ॥ २० ॥

*prajāñāiśvarya-kṣamā-mādhyasthya-saṁpannaḥ
sabhāpatiḥ* | 20 |

TRANSLATION: The President (*sabhāpati*) is to be a man of knowledge, of commanding authority, of forgiveness and of impartiality.

COMMENTARY: The Members, as described above, are themselves incapable of any fraudulent dealing, but a Disputant or an Opponent, if he is a Jigīsu, may often act deceitfully, so much so that at times even the Members are imposed upon and confounded. Hence in such a Debate, an intelligent President is indispensably necessary, to detect the fraudulent dealings of

TRANSLATION: What each of them is to do is both to establish his own position and to refute that of the other in accordance with the *Pramāṇas*.

COMMENTARY: Each of the Disputant and the Opponent must do both the things on the one hand, each of them must establish his own position and on the other, refute the theory of his adversary. The simple establishment of one's own position without the refutation of the objector's theory or the simple refutation of the adverse theories without the positive establishment of one's position is valueless, inasmuch as no truth is firmly and convincingly established thereby. It is not uncommon, however, that when the first Party has stated and supported his position and it is time for the second Party to refute the first Party's contention, the Second Party being unable to do so keeps silence; in such cases, the first Party's theory is established and this establishment of the first Party's theory is by itself the refutation of the Second Party's case. Similarly, when one Party shows that the contention of his adversary involves contradiction or fallacies like that, this refutation of his adversary's theory is by itself the establishment of the Party's own position.

वादिप्रतिवादिसिद्धान्ततत्त्वनदीष्णत्वधारणाबाहुश्रुत्यप्रति-
भाक्षान्तिमाध्यस्थैरुभयाभिमतः सम्याः ॥ १८ ॥

*vādi-prativādi-siddhānta-tattva-nadīṣṇatva-dhāraṇā-
bāhuśrūtya-pratibhā-kṣānti-mādhyasthyair ubhayābhi-
matāḥ sabhyāḥ* । 18 ।

TRANSLATION: The Members are such as are approved by both (the Disputant and the Opponent)

सजिगीषुकेऽस्मिन् यावत्सभ्यापेक्षं स्फूर्तौ वक्तव्यम् ॥ २२ ॥

sajigīṣuke'smin yāvat-sabhyāpkeṣaṁ sphūrtau vaktavyam | 22 |

TRANSLATION. In a debate, which has one or more Jigīṣus Parties may talk as many times as they can, provided the Members suffer them to do so

COMMENTARY. A Debate may have one or more Jigīṣus on one or both sides. A Jigīṣu wants to have victory by establishing his own position and refuting his opponent's theory. In such a Debate, there is no fixed rule as to the times, the victory-seeker is to speak. The Members watch his power and skill regarding his establishment of his own theory and his refutation of his Opponent's contention, so that a Debate in which there is a Jigīṣu, the Jigīṣu may go on speaking as many times as he can, until he is stopped by the Members. The Members allow the speaker to go on, so long as he talks relevantly but when his talks are irrelevant, they stop him

A Disputant may be an aggressive Jigīṣu, so much so, that he directly enters into the Debate-struggle by attacking his Opponent's theory. In such a Debate, the aggressive Disputant has the right to begin. If the Disputant do not take an aggressive attitude like that, the Members may ask him to take an aggressive attitude, in which case also, he has the right to begin. Thereupon, the Disputant in the presence of the Members and the President, must state before the Opponent, the arguments in support of his theory, to the best of his intelligence, unreservedly. If, for some

They should on no occasion get angry or lose temper, for, this would prevent the determination of the truth as the upshot of the debate. 6. Partiality in Members would lead them to decide the rightness or the wrongness of the arguments advanced by the contending parties, in an untrue manner, accordingly, the Members must be strictly impartial

Lastly, the Members in a Debate ought to be persons whom both the Disputant and the Opponent have faith.

वादिप्रतिवादिनोर्यथायोगं वादस्थानककथाविशेषाङ्गीकार-
णप्रवादोत्तरवादिर्देशः, साधकबाधकोक्तिगुणदोषावधारणम्,
यथावसरं तत्त्वप्रकाशनेन कथाविरमणम्, यथासंभवं सभायां
कथाफलकथनं चैषां कर्माणि ॥ १९ ॥

*vādi-prativādinor yathāyogaṃ vāda-sthānaka-kathā-
viśeṣāṅgikāraṇāgravādottarā-vāda-ni-deśaḥ sādha-
kā-bādhakokti-guṇa-doṣāvadhāraṇam yathāvasaṃ tattva-
prakāśanena kathā-viramaṇam yathā-sambhavaṃ sabhā-
yām kathā-phalakathanam caiṣāṃ karmāṇi* । 19 ।

TRANSLATION: Their businesses are to make the debating parties accept the usual prescribed forms in regard to the points at issue, to determine their right to the priority or the posteriority of speech, to find out the merits and the demerits of the supporting and the contradicting arguments, to stop where necessary the Debate by revealing the truth and to declare truly the result of the Debate before the assembly.

COMMENTARY: The Members are to make the parties to the Debate agree to the prescribed formula,

as possible. It is true that the introduction of irrelevant matters does not always render impossible the establishment of one's own theory or the refutation of his adversary's position and thereby does not always stop a debate. Still it is to be remembered that in a Parārthā-numāna or 'argument-intended-for-others' the speaker's merits and faults are also taken into consideration, so that a Debater should always try to leave no scope for adverse criticism and should always talk of that much as is clear (*avadāta*).

Take for instance the case of a Debater who wants to prove the 'Impermanence of Sound'. He goes on saying: 'At the outset the Air which is called Prāṇa is pushed upwards from the navel. This Air is then located in one of such places as the Heart etc., by efforts. The Air thus located, affects that locus. From that place, Sound is generated.' Thus making an elaborate statement about the place of the genesis of Sound, as described in the *Śikṣā-sūtra* and a further statement about the manner in which the Sound enters one's Ears, he puts forward the Reason (for his theory), viz., that 'such a Sound is impermanent because it is the result of the effort'. And thereafter, he introduces his Examples of Clothing i.e., Cloth etc., are produced. He thus cannot finish his opening arguments within a reasonable time. How will his Opponent then have an opportunity to speak? This manner of arguing is certainly to be avoided.

Then again, the rule is not to be forgotten that 'one is to use words just to convince others'. Accordingly, a Debater is to talk of that much only, as is desired by others. It is often found that of two Debaters, one who talks of his own lineage etc., is disregarded by

known as the *Neyārtha*, i.e., Something, the significance of which is not apparent but is to be gathered. Take, for instance, the argument: 'Sound is impermanent; because it is that which has two 'Ka's in it.' The Debater means to say that a Sound is impermanent because it is a product, 'Kṛtaka', an expression which has two 'Ka's as its component letters. (5) Another defect in an argument is to use expressions which are grammatically wrong (*vyākāraṇa-saṃskāra-hīna*). (6) An argument should always be cogent and must not contain a statement which is 'incapable' (*asamartha*) of proving the point at issue. This defect is illustrated in the argument: 'That Reason does not establish the given Proven; hence that Reason contradicts the given Proven'. (7) Another defect in an argument would be to use Indecent (*asūta*) expressions. (8) Redundant and meaningless expressions (*nirarthaka*) should be avoided in arguments. (9) Lastly, the Debater should see that his argument does not present the important part of a proposition in an improper manner or assign to it a secondary place (*aparāmrṣṭa-vidheyāṃśa*). For example his argument should not be like this: 'Non-eternal-Sound, because of its being a product'. Here 'non-eternity' is to be established about 'Sound'; accordingly, 'non-eternity' is to be predicated in a distinct manner and not jumbled together with 'Sound' in a compound expression like 'Non-eternal-Sound'. The substantive i.e., Sound about which the predication is made, should also be stated first. Thus, the argument should have been put in the form, 'Sound is non-eternal; because of its being a product'.

The above are some of the defects which a Disputant should always try to avoid; otherwise he would

reasons, the Disputant be unable to open the Debate in the above manner, then the Members who are strictly just and impartial, are to ask the other side to begin the Debate, in order that the respective powers and skill of both the Disputant and the Opponent, in establishing and refuting theories may be tested.

It may be said that as the Disputant instead of beginning the Debate keeps silence in the above case, he should be taken as one vanquished so that the Opponent should not be called upon to begin the Debate (as stated above). The view, however, is not correct. Because the Opponent has his own theory and if he too, like the Disputant, does not support his theory, he cannot be said to be victorious, or in other words, the position becomes this that the Opponent is neither victorious nor defeated. In such a case, it is accordingly creditable for the Opponent to begin the Debate, when the Members call upon him to do so.

Where, however, both the Parties viz., the Disputant and the Opponent refrain from opening the Debate, they do practically avoid it and are to be ordered out from the debating hall by the Members.

A Disputant should put forward his Reason in such a way that thereby either his own theory is positively established or his adversary's theory is negated. An example of the former manner of arguing is, 'A living Body has a soul; because the phenomenon of having life etc., is otherwise un-obtained', an example of the latter manner of arguing would be, 'This living Body is not without a soul, because (of the Reason, stated above)'.

While putting forward his arguments, a debater should avoid irrelevant matters (*arīhāntara*), as much

a Reason which is 'unproved' so that it is incumbent on a Debater to begin by purging the Reason of 'faults'. The objection is unfounded. For, in whom is the Doubt raised, in the Disputant, in the Opponent or in the Members? The Doubt cannot be in the mind of the Disputant, for he enters into the Debate with firm faith in the competency of his Reason, even if it has not the competency. In the case then, where the Reason has the competency, is the Disputant to establish that competency of the Reason by adequate proofs for the purpose of removing the Doubts in the minds of the Opponent or of the Members? Now, if the competency of the Reason is thus to be established by adequate proofs, the adequacy of the proofs, again, are to be established by further proofs; if this is not done, there would again arise doubt. And if this is attempted to be done, further proofs of these proofs will be called for, and so on, involving Anavasthā or Infinite Regression. The objectors may contend that the attempt to show the competency of the Reason need not involve Infinite Regression. The reasoning of a Disputant is Parārthānumāna or 'reasoning intended for others' in the case contemplated here. In Svārthānumāna or 'reasoning by and for one's own self', the Sādhya or what is to be proved follows from the Hetu or the Reason and the Hetu is known for certain, by perception etc. In such a reasoning, there is thus no Anavasthā. The objector states that like the Svārthānumāna, the Parārthānumāna also in the case under consideration need not involve any Anavasthā. This contention of the objector is not serious. In the Svārthānumāna, as stated above, the Hetu is known by perception etc; where there is a sufficient repetition

the audience who insist on arguing on the point at issue only.

What then is meant by *avadāta* (i.e., clear) the matter in which a Debater is to confine his talks? A matter is *Avadāta* i.e., clear and relevant, which when talked of by a Debater does not give rise to the least trouble or difficulty in the minds of his attentive audience. A debater should remember that the intelligent persons who are listening to him attentively are extremely tender-hearted because of their constant attachment to real wisdom and are hurt as soon as any obstacles are put in the way of their determining the point at issue in the Debate by the introduction of irrelevant matters etc., by the Debater. Accordingly a Debater's arguments in support of his own proposition or in refutation of his adversary's theory should always be free from the faults of introducing irrelevant matters (*ai thāntara*), of being insufficient (*nyūnatā*), of being painful (*kḥṣṭatā*) and of other faults.

(1) The first of the above-mentioned faults (*ai thāntara*) has already been described (2) The defect of Insufficiency (*nyūnatā*) arises in a Debate where a lesser number of statements are made than are prescribed. A Naiyāyika maintains that a syllogism should have five limbs; hence, his argument would be wrong, if he states e.g. four of those limbs only. (3) An argument again becomes Painful (*kḥṣṭa*), when the parts of it which are related or stated out of their orders. Take for example, the argument; 'Whatever is a product And that is a product Like a Pitcher. Is accordingly impermanent. Is impermanent: Because of being a product; Sound is impermanent'. (4) In the next place, an argument should be free from the defect

his own intelligence guess the competency of the Hetu and need not expect an explicit establishment of it from the Disputant at the very outset. If the objector contends that the other party may want to examine the Disputant's capacity to establish the competency of his Hetu and may not, for that reason, presume that competency, it may similarly be urged in reply that the Disputant also may want to test the other party's capacity in objecting to the competency of his Hetu and may not, for that reason, presume a Doubt in him. The objector points out that the other party may choose not to state his Doubt at the very outset but may choose to state it when his turn to 'argue' (i.e., to refute) comes, when he may put it forward as a part of his argument to criticise the theory of the Disputant. It may be urged in reply that when the Opponent has stated his Doubt explicitly it would then be for the Disputant in his next turn to reply (and not, until then) to support his Reason and to remove that Doubt in explicit language as a part of his argument for refuting the refutation of his theory by his opponents. Besides, it should also be considered that Doubt may arise on various grounds; one of these grounds may be removed by the Disputant by guessing it and by supporting his Reason, at the outset; but may arise in the other party on another and still another further ground; how will the Disputant be able to guess all of them by and from himself and remove them all at the outset? In fact, if he attempts to do like that, he will never be able to begin the formal formulation of his theory at all. Even if the Disputant shows the competency of his Hetu at the outset, his Opponent on account of his extreme partiality to his

be considered as not worthy of being respected. The Opponent, in order to establish his respectability should expose the above defects, if any, in the argument of the Disputant and at the same time be careful about putting forward reasons in support of his own theory and in refutation of that of the Disputant. The Opponent would not be declared victorious if he does nothing more than exposing the above Defects in the argument of the Disputant; for, as Akalaṅka has said, if any and every defect in one's argument were to establish his defeat, repetitions and rhetorical inaccuracies also in one's argument would then ensure his defeat in a debate.

A question arises as to whether a Disputant, while stating his Reason in his opening argument should at the same time also 'purge it of faults (*kaṇṭakoddhāra*, literally, 'rooting out the thorns')'. The answer is that it may be left to his option. If he does not do it, there is neither any merit nor any wrong, attributable to his act. If he does not 'root out the thorn' he misses an opportunity of showing his skill; accordingly, not 'to root out the thorn' cannot be said to be a merit in his argumentation. At the same time, it cannot be looked upon as a defect. For, an argument becomes defective, only when it does not refute the charge of being fallacious, actually levelled against it by the objector; so long, however, as that charge is not actually levelled against it by the objector, it is under no necessity of refuting the charge and does not become defective, for not refuting it. It may be objected that although the Reason put forward by the Debater may be a competent one, he, by not proving its competency, allows a Doubt to appear regarding it and thereby begins with

which is well-established is useless and should not be done by a Debater.

At the same time, the Debater should see that in order to prove his theory (*sādhya*), the Reason that he puts forward should be stated as something which is already well-established. If the Reason be not presented as something which is already well established the argument comes to appear as an attempt to prove 'an unproved something by an unproved something'. Where, however, the Hetu, although presented by the Disputant as something already well established appears to be of doubtful or of disputed validity, it is in such cases that the supporting of the Hetu becomes necessary. It is thus manifest that a matter should not be proved to one who knows it to be already well established. Consider, for instance, the case of a Buddhist Debater who contends before a Mīmāṃsaka, 'Sound is non-eternal because it is existent'. Now, suppose the Buddhist Disputant takes pains to prove that Sound is 'existing' because of its being possessed of 'practical utility' (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*). The Buddhist argumentation is valueless and of no credit to the Debater, inasmuch as the Mīmāṃsaka agrees with the Buddhist in maintaining that 'existence' implies 'practical Utility'. The Buddhist's supporting the Hetu in his argument amounts to proving what is already proved.

A Disputant is on the other hand admired by the members if he purges at the outset, his Hetu, of any grounds of Doubt which he apprehends to be possibly involved in it.

Thus it is that a Disputant may be compared with a physician. Some physician may treat a disease, the presence of which in the patient be from his previous

of the experiences of the Hetu in the arguer, the Hetu is self-proved and becomes competent to prove the Sādhya, without the necessity of its competency being shown to the arguer. In the same manner, in the Parārthānumāna also, there need not be any necessity of the competency of the Hetu being shown by the Disputant; the Hetu may appear to be self-proved to the Opponent and the Members, when there is a sufficient repetition of the experiences of the Hetu in them. The objector, however, argues that in a Parārthānumāna, where there is no repetition of the experiences about the Hetu, the Hetu is not self-proved but depends on extraneous considerations for a belief in its competency; in such a case, the objector contends, the competency of the Hetu is to be shown by the Disputant in his argument for enlightening the Opponent and the Members about that competency. In answering this contention of the objector, the commentator asks: What, if the competency of the Hetu is not shown? The objector answers, of course, that in that case, Doubt arises, as said already. The commentator meets this objection in this way: Where there is competency in the Hetu and the competency is not shown to the other party, you say that the other party fails in understanding the competency, can it not be said similarly that even if there is doubt in the mind of the other party, the Disputant, unless the Doubt is expressly communicated to him, will fail to know its existence there, and as such, will be under no obligation to dispel it in his opening argument? If the objector says that the Disputant should by his own intelligence guess the presence of that Doubt in the mind of the other party, it may be urged that the other party should by

The Opponent may point out that the Reason in this argument is a 'contradictory' (*viruddha*) one; that, in other words, the fact of Sound being a Product proves that Sound is 'non-eternal'. If the Opponent succeeds in this his contention, he thereby in and through his this one argument (1) sets aside the Disputant's theory that 'Sound is eternal' and at the same time (2) establishes his own theory that 'Sound is non-eternal'. And not only does the Opponent win the victory in this way but he wins it *with considerable credit* (*prauḍhatā*). In such a case, the Opponent's mode of reasoning may be compared with a combatant's killing his adversary, with the adversary's own weapon and at the same time, saving his (i.e., the combatant's) own life thereby. If on the other hand, the Opponent shows that 'the Reason in the Disputant's argument is 'unproved' (*asiddha*) or 'doubtful' (*anaikāntika*) and at the same time substantiates the counter-argument of his, 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is existent', he wins the victory only. If lastly, the Opponent is satisfied with merely pointing out that the Reason in the Disputant's argument is Unproved or Doubtful and does not attempt to establish his own theory that 'Sound is non-eternal', he does not win any victory but is entitled to *respect* and honour. In this connection, one should note what Udayana has said viz., that the Opponent should clearly understand the contention of the Disputant and refute it and then positively establish his own theory; if the opponent does not establish his own position but remains content with simply criticising the Disputant's theory, he cannot be said to be victorious, although he may be looked upon as a praiseworthy (*ślāghya*) hero, who, though not defending himself

own view may refuse to be convinced and allow the Disputant to begin the statement of his theory. It is often found that an Opponent misinterprets not only the Disputant's Reason but also the proofs that support that Reason. Accordingly, it may safely be said that no fault attaches to the argument of a Disputant, if he states his Reason and does not go on stating at the outset the proof supporting that Reason.

There is thus no merit neither any wrong in the Disputant, if does not "root out the thorns" at the outset

If the Disputant chooses to 'root out the thorns' at the outset, he should confine his discourse only to these points about which there may be a reasonable Doubt or a real Dispute; if he proceeds in this way, he is accepted as an intelligent man. This does not mean that he is at the outset to deal with all the points which are capable of being doubted or disputed. Points of Doubt or Dispute are numerous, who can ascertain or set aside all of them at the outset? Accordingly a Disputant is to deal with those points which are prominent or which his intelligence may enable him to guess at the outset. An opening argument attempting to do more than this is vitiated by 'faults' like 'the statement consisting in proving what is already proved'. If the Disputant goes on re-establishing what is already well established, people not knowing when he would stop, naturally become impatient. For, the Disputant after supporting the Hetu by one set of proofs may choose to support it by another set of proofs; he may do the same thing with respect to the Sādhya also. The result would be that there would not be any end to his opening address. Hence it is that to support that

is otherwise fallacious also or to establish the Opponent's own theory.

Suppose however, that in the fourth term, the Opponent does not act in the above way i.e. does not confine himself to supporting his criticism that the Disputant's Reason is contradictory. Suppose, the Opponent instead of criticising in the fourth term the Disputant's criticism in the third term of the Opponent's criticism in the second term attempts to refute the validity of the Disputant's Reason on fresh grounds and to establish his own theory on other Reasons. What will be the result? The Disputant will criticise these fresh grounds and Reasons of the Opponent; thereafter the Opponent will have recourse to other supporting Reasons; and in this way, Anavasthā or endless Regress will be inevitable.

The Reason in the Disputant's argument viz., 'the fact of being a product' is at first criticised by the Opponent as Contradictory, inasmuch as it proves 'the fact of being non-eternal'. If, however, the Opponent gives up this criticism at the next term and instead of basing the Contradictoriness of the Disputant's Hetu on 'the fact of being a Product' bases it on such other grounds as the fact of being Existent:—well, then, the Disputant will be at liberty to give up, in his next turn, 'his original Reason 'the fact of being a Product' and put forward fresh Reason e.g., 'the fact of being recognised etc.,' for supporting his theory about the eternity of Sounds. And in this way, again, another endless Regress becomes inevitable.

Thus the fundamental rule for every Debater is that he should never give up his position about the

experience, guesses to be possible; some physician again treats the actual disease which he finds in the patient; lastly, there may be a physician who treats a disease, the presence of which in the patient is not a fact because of its impossibility or of its actual absence. The first of these physicians is the best of their class, the second is next to him, the third is bad. In the same manner, one Disputant who is considered to be the best begins his argument by clearing his Reason of all faults that may possibly be urged against it, the next best Disputant is he who in his opening argument clears his Hetu of the faults that are actually urged against it by others; and the Disputant who in his argument tries to clear the Hetu of the faults that are neither actually urged against it by others nor can possibly be urged by them is bad

The rule in the debate has thus been stated by the author of the Samgraha Śloka:—

“A Disputant should state his Reason at the outset in order to establish his theory. If he wants to show his intelligence (and thereby to win the admiration of the persons present) he should clear the Reason of the faults”

When the second turn, i e , the turn for the Opponent comes, the Opponent also like the Disputant, for the purpose of showing his theory to be faultless, should state his Reason and present it as something well established. He is to do two things viz., setting aside his adversary's theory and establishing his own theory. There are cases in which both of these two things may be effected in one and the same argument. Suppose, for instance, a Disputant puts forward the argument, ‘Sound is eternal, because it is a product’.

fallacy. As Akalaṅka has said, "The Opponent gains the victory over the Disputant by showing that the latter's Reason is Contradictory; but if he urged any other fallacy instead, he is to establish his own theory by fresh proof".

A Debater, criticising his adversary's theory should name (*anuvāda*) the fallacy (*doṣa*) involved in it; for, without stating it, it is impossible to convince others that the adversary's theory is faulty.

The Debater should take care, however, not to state the fallacies all at once; for, it is impossible to substantive (*abhidhāna*) all the fallacies simultaneously. Hence it is that a Debater should state the fallacies involved in his adversary's theory, one at a time and substantiate them one after the other. After proving one fallacy, the Debater should once more state the fallacy finally which has been substantiated. Thereby the Debater is to name and point out the fallacy twice. This rule to be observed by a Debater shows also that the naming of all the fallacies simultaneously at the outset, is but useless and redundant.

The Anuvāda or the naming of fallacy should be in the following manner. Suppose a Debater's argument is; 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is a Product'. The Anuvāda of his adversary, wanting to criticise his theory would be of any of the forms viz., "The Reason 'because it is a product' is a Reason Unproved." 'The fact of being a Product is Unproved.' 'The Reason is Unproved'.

A question may be asked:—Should the criticism in a Debate be based on a substantiation of one fallacy in the adversary's theory or should it deal with more than one such fallacy? The answer is that if the

himself nevertheless strikes at his adversary. Hence it is that an Opponent wishing to have a victory with credit, should state that the Reason in the Disputant's argument is a Contradictory one and should substantiate this as best as he can. If the Opponent succeeds in showing that the Disputant's Reason is a Contradictory one, he is under no necessity of bringing forward any fresh argument for establishing his own theory, for, it is then redundant.

In the third turn, the Disputant may set aside the Opponent's criticism that the Disputant's Reason is a Contradictory one. In that case, when the fourth turn i.e., the next term for the Opponent comes, what the Opponent is to do, is to support his own previous refutation of the Disputant's Reason on the ground of its being Contradictory. The Opponent is not to criticise the Disputant's Reason on any other ground and establish his own theory in any other way. The Opponent is to stick to his opening criticism that the Disputant's Reason is Contradictory; for, otherwise there would be no end to the Debate. Let us take up the argument of the Disputant, 'Sound is eternal; because it is a product'. The Opponent raises the objection that the Reason (i.e., the fact of being a product) in the disputant's argument is Contradictory. Now, the Opponent is to stick to this his criticism that the Disputant's Reason is Contradictory, throughout the Debate; in other words, all his arguments are to be directed to this point and to this point only, that 'the fact of being a product' leads to 'the fact of being non-eternal'; the Opponent should not develop any other argument to show that the Disputant's Reason

A Debater is not entitled to give up his first-stated Reason, when it is found fault with by his adversary and for proving his theory, to rely on a fresh Reason even after setting aside the Reasons of the adversary, for his own theory; for, as has already been pointed out, in such a case, there would be no end of the Debate. Hence it is that a Debater's victory in a Debate is impossible, unless and until he sets aside the objections to his own Reason, raised by his adversary even though he succeeds in showing that his adversary's Reason is Contradicted. That victory is assured when the Debater refutes his adversary's criticism of his Reason and points out that the adversary's Reason is Contradicted. Of all victories that is the most glorious, which is won by one, setting aside the theory of the adversary and establishing one's own position.

In the third term, thus, the Disputant is to criticise the Opponent's criticism of his theory and to re-establish it by supporting his first-stated Reason. The duties of the Debaters in the fourth, the fifth and other terms, are to be determined in a similar manner.

उभयोस्तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुत्ये यावत् तत्त्वनिर्णयं यावत्स्फूर्तिं च
वाच्यम् ॥ २३ ॥

*ubhayos tattva-nirṇīṇīṣutve yāvat tattva-nirṇayaṃ
yāvat sphūrṭi ca vācyaṃ* । 23 ।

TRANSLATION: Where both the Debaters are Tattvanirṇīṇīṣu i.e. desirous of determining the truth, the Debaters are to argue, so long as the truth is not determined and so long as argument is possible.

Reason once taken by him either about its affirmation or about its refutation and take up another.

As in the case of the Disputant's Reason being a Contradictory one, so when the Pakṣa or 'the Abode of what is to be proved' in the Disputant's argument is shown to be falsified by Pratyakṣa or direct perception, the Opponent succeeds in setting aside the Disputant's theory and establishing his own theory in one and the same effort i.e., through one single argument. Sometimes however, the refutation of the Disputant's theory and the establishment of the Opponent's own theory require two distinct efforts from the Opponent. In such cases, the order is that the Opponent is to set aside the Disputant's theory first and then to establish his own theory. Suppose, for instance, the Disputant contends, 'Sound is eternal, because it is visible' or 'because it is knowable'. Here the Opponent is first to refute the Disputant's argument by showing that the Disputant's contention is 'unproved' and 'doubtful' and thereafter, the Opponent is to establish his own theory by supporting it by such argument, as 'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product'.

Here it may be said that when the Disputant's theory has been successfully demolished by the Opponent it is not proper for the Opponent to adduce arguments for the establishment of his own theory, for, there can no more be any dispute with one who is already vanquished "a further fight with one who has entered the devouring mouth of Death, is neither seen nor ever heard". This is true if in the Disputant's Reason, the fallacy of Contradictoriness has been successfully urged, but not in the case of any other

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Members of the Assembly do not say or want to ask anything, the substantiation of one such fallacy is sufficient; for, thereby the position of the adversary of the Debater is set aside and the proving of other fallacies in his argument becomes redundant. If, however the Assembly so want, the Debater should go on substantiating more than one fallacy there. indeed, as long and as many as he can: his fame as a skilful Debater would also be established thereby

The Commentator here quotes the couplet from the Samgraha Śloka:—"The Opponent is to do two things by different or (where possible) by one single effort, firstly, to set aside the other party's theory and then, to establish his own position"

In the third turn, the Disputant is to set aside the objections raised against his theory by the Opponent in the second turn and to support the Reasons put forward in opening the Debate. The Disputant must do both of these two things. for, if he fails to do one of these things, his debate becomes fallacious. Udayana too has said, "the first Reason (i.e.. the Reason put forward by the Disputant in opening the Debate) cannot be held to be established without a refutation of the Opponent's Reason; for unless and until the Opponent's Reason is refuted the validity of the Disputant's Reason is doubted because of the possible validity of the opposite Reason; if a Debater does not set aside criticism of his theory by his adversary, he cannot be said to be victorious, even though he has supported his own Reason. Such a Debater though not deemed as victorious is, however entitled to respect, like a combatant who avoids the stroke of his opponent and who desists from striking the Opponent".

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COMMENTARY. As observed already one of the Parties in a debate may be a "Seeker of the truth in and for himself" and the other, a "seeker after convincing others of the truth", or both the Debaters may be *Tattvanirṇāṇīsu-in-others* i.e. they must be after convincing their other side of the truth. In such a Debate, the Debate is to continue until the Truth is finally determined provided the Parties be able to carry on the Debate until the Truth is determined. If the Parties are unable to determine the truth finally, the Debate is to continue, so long as they can argue honestly.

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालङ्कारे वादस्वरूपनिर्णयो

नामाष्टमः परिच्छेदः ॥

iti pramāna-naya-tattvālokāṅkārāḥ vāda-svarūpa-
nirṇayo nāmāṣṭamah paścchedaḥ ।

TRANSLATION Here ends the Eighth Chapter of the *Pramāna-Naya-tattvālokāṅkārā*, entitled The Determination of The Nature Of The Vāda (or the Debate).

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			to	273	18	Tīthakara	Tīthakara
173	32	cow	a Cow	280	1	-doubtful-	-doubtful-
174	30	"	"				with-
175	1	"	Cow	"	23	extent	extant
"	11	"	"	"	27	or	of
"	19	"	"	282	12	time	time
178	21	not	no			shortly	Shortly
178	22	mistaken	to be taken	282	31	speaker	speaker,
"	22	for	like			Speakers,	speakers,
180	2	idea	ideas	284	8	Self-	Self-
"	18	Jainas	the Jainas			existence	existent
182	2	this is	this is'	285	11	systema-	systema-
"	6	tarka	is tarka			tised	tised
"	7	ūhā	ūhā	"	22	like	like
"	28	such class	such a	287	29	potter	potter
			class	"	31	'implicit'	'implicit',
"	32	ūhā	ūhā				ic
183	16	impression	impressions	290	4	Sabda	Śabda
193	1	that	what	"	6	Dhvani	Dhvani,
194	3	Visibility	Visibility	291	23	intendify	identify
"	29	sound	Sound	292	31	proven	Proven
"	30	Knowledge	Knowable	296	19	jihma	Jihma
198	10	if	if,	"	25	soft	Soft
200	6	logic	logic,	297	11	G	Go
214	2	therefore	therefore	"	18	G words	Go-words
224	17	Hetero-	Hetero-	"	19	"	"
		genous	geneous	"	22	successively	successively
228	26	knowledge-	knowledge-	301	16	thing	things
		or-form	of-form	302	27	object	Object
230	10	but in	in other	303	29	essence	essence
		other words	words	307	10	way	way
238	26	potter	Potter	"	30	Nagation	Negation
240	19	subsequent	Subsequent	310	28	son?	Son?
249	28	Virudha	Viruddha	311	5	"	"
254	3	immediate-	mediately	312	9	the Abhāva	Abhāva
		ly		"	25	some thing-	Something-
255	5	through	though			of	of-
257	7	Antecedent	Antecedent,	313	8	Fire-	Fire-
						existence	essence "
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264	25	tapa	tāpa			absence-	
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425	7	by himself	himself	445	17-18	Mark	Mark-
	23	who	who-			which is	which-is-
427	15	unkown	unknown			unproved	unproved-
"	27	fact	facts			because	because-
428	8	etc	etc ,	447	10	from	form
429	2	opposed	opposed'	"	32	parties	parties,
		is	is	448	1	Vyadhi- karana	Vyadhi- karana
"	10	Proven	Proven- phenome- non	"	20	does not,	does not
				450	11	Vyadhi- karana	Vyadhi- karana
430	10	Proven- pheno- menon	Proven- pheno- menon	451	1	of its	of-its-
"	12	Occasions	occasions			Locus	Locus
"	27	product	product,	452	26	imperma- nent'	imperma- nent'
432	15	percep- tion	percep- tion	"	28	then ature	the nature
				453	30	more	mere
433	10	matter,	matter	459	7	Anyatarā- siddha)	Anyatarā- siddha(
"	16	owns	own	"	12	being un- proved	being-un- proved
"	30	Abode	Abode-			class)	class
"	30	-the	-the-	461	31	class (im- plying	class, im- plying
"	31	the exis- tence of	-the-exis- tence-of-	"	33	self	self-
		the Proven- phenomena	the-Proven- phenome- na-in-the-	462	1	identical	identical
		in the	na-in-the-	"	5	inhering	inhering-
		Abode	Abode			in	in
434	9	the Abode	the-Abode	"	9	Vyapaka	Vyāpaka
435	17	in which	in-which	"	24	Prasanga	Prasanga-
"	17	the Proven	the-Proven			sādhana	sādhana
437	25	insepara- tely	insepara- bly	463	4	maniness	mani-ness
443	5	as because	because	"	7	self-	self-
443	12	a part-of-	-a-part-of-	"	8	identical	identical,
		its locus-	its-locus-	"	13	nature	nature,
"	29	a Mark	a Mark-	"	17	maniness	mani-ness
		which is	which-is-	"		"	"
		unproved	unproved-	"		"	"
		because of-	because-of-	"	7	"	"
		a part-of-	a-part-of-	466	3	or	of
		its Locus-	its-Locus-	467	5	How	How is
444	16	-the Locus	the-Locus	"	26	also pre- sent	also pre- sent and
"	30	possessed	possessed				

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5	27	book	a book			sion	sions
7	26	have Signi-	have the	47	5	Prābhā-	Prābhā-
		-ficat	Signifier		9	Prābhā-	Prābhā-
10	14	arguments	argument's			karas	karas
19	30	Bharani	Bharani	51	19	fore	for
21	28	unproved	unproved,		31	becoms	becomes
"	30	"	"	55	11	casualty	causality
"	31	"	"	60	14	experie	experience
"	33	doubtful	doubtful,		17	they are	they are
22	1	"	"			so	so
25	20	port	here	61	15	metaem-	metaem-
26	4	a	an			pical	pical
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		transfe-	transfe-			kara	kara
		rence	rence	70	6	object	the object
29	25	atन्द्रिया-	न्द्रिया-	"	28	it is so	it is so
		pratyakṣa	pratyakṣa	72	16	than it	than it
"	33	is	in	96	29	is	its
35	17	object	object,	100	29	or	of
"	28	of	by	120	2	my	may
"	33	object	objects	125	29	is deter-	being deter-
36	9	either with	with			mined	mined
39	20	as	at	128	17	black lotus	black lotus
41	8	pitcher	a pitcher	128	26	develop	develop
"	10	when the	then the	136	21	person's	persons
		subsequent	previous	138	23	dharma	dharma
43	10	Bheda-	Bheda-		25	inseparate-	inseparably
		khyāti	khyāti			ly	
"	11	preception	perception	139	1, 14	dharma	dharma
"	21	an		140	20	inseparate-	inseparably
44	10	Prābhā-	Prābhā-			ly	
		karas	karas	143	21, 23	Dharma	Dharma
"	28	"	"	144	6	of	or
45	1	"	"	149	5	so far	so far as
45	7	"	"		23	admitted	admitted
46	1	"	"	158	31	antecedent	antecedent
"	16	"	"	160	7	my	may
"	21	"	"	163	1	predicted	predicated
"	27	"	"	169	26	why	why,—

Page	Line	For	Read	Page	Line	For	Read
581	23	or	Or	612	18	Tirtham-	Tirtham-
"	27	Second	second			kara)	kara
582	8	acts	Acts	612	29	males	Males
"		act	Act	613	2	Like	like
583	1	acts	Acts	"	6	Salvation	Salvation
"	8	re-incarna-	Reincarna-				which
		tion	tion	"	6	to	for
"	27	his	this	"	33	Short by	Shortly
584	22	It is	Is it	614	3	person	person'
585	2	nature	Nature	617	23	commences	commen-
588	12	female	a female				ces'
590	18	knowledge	Knowledge	618	20	reputation	refutation
"	19	more	mere	621	8	set aside	sets aside
"	25	man	man'	623	24	Class	class
"	30	food etc	food etc "	625	2	fours	four
"	31	"	"	633	16	Second	second
592	21	series	Series	"	19	"	"
"	23	"	"	634	3	erudite	erudite,
"	28	There	These	"	5	(Members	(Members)
593	18	Viz	viz	"	19	Parties,	Parties'
594	30	series	Series	640	24	Clothing	Clothing
595	1		"			i e, Cloth	i e, that
"	20	in	on			etc are	'Cloth etc
"		(because it	('because it			produced	are pro-
		is a Series)	is a Series')				duced'
595	32	series	Series	643	3	worthly	worthy
597	11	that	that that	644	15	are	is
599	16	wrong	Wrong	646	26	may arise	it may
"	32	joy	Joy				arise
602	11	"	"	647	12	'o'	'to
603	5	faith	Faith	648	33	be	he
604	29	over-	over-	651	1	himself	he
		whelms	whelms	"	26	Disputant	Disputant
605	12	ever	even	653	29	vanquished	vanquished,
606	22	"	"	654	12	substan-	substan-
608	27	what	that			tive	tiate
"	33	A	a	"	15	substantiate	"
610	31	Judged	judged	655	28	criticism	the criti-
"	13	"	"				cism

Page	Line	For	Read	Page	Line	For	Read
315	18	be said to	be said to be	359	11	to Jāmas	to the Jāmas
316	11	Burning	Burning	360	12	being	beings
		can	Can	"	23	Cow For	Cow? For
"	27	posterior	Posterior	361	13	think	think of a
317	30	sell	well	362	6	being	beings
"	19	of the word	to the word	366	31	example	example
"	27	Particu- larly	Particu- larity	370	18	ideal	idea
322	11	generally	Generally	371	18	recede	recede
324	3	to rise ' there	to rise," there	"	33	espectives	respective
"	23	inas	in as	372	13	their own	their own
326	17	Buddists	Buddhists	373	23	Existent	Existent,
"	18	first,	first	375	24	Things	Thing
327	5	by the idea	of the idea	376	3	Alkrama	the Alkrama
"	7	Cap	Cup	"	28	productive	Productive
329-				377	13	smoke	Smoke
330	33-1	Individu- ally	Individu- ality	"	22	successive	successive
335	1	this way in	this-way, in	378	10	now	how
"	2	existent	Existent	"	29	doing	going
"	11	if	in	380	31	substantial	Substantial
"	12	Kūnya- kūja	Kūnya- kūja	381	21	(savikalpa)	(savikalpa),
336	4	substance	Substance	383	21	Argument	argument
"	30	had	has	"	24	dependable	dependent
337	1	in-the	in-the-	384	6	destroy	destroy,
"	5	that	that the	"	21	becomes	become
"	12	Reason	Reason	386	29	a Thing,	a Thing
"	13	Non exis- tential	Non-exis- tential	"	30	nature)	nature,
"	14	extension	exclusion	388	3	World	world
"	28	extension	exclusion	"	4	that,	that
"	30	extension	Existent	390	19	in it	it
340	11	respect	respects	392	18	matter	manner
341	3	statements	statement	393	7	being thing	being a thing
344	17	is, referred	is referred	"			
348	24	thing	Thing	395	13	(though	(though
350	13	animal	Animal	"			
352	9	than	but	399	31	parāśattva	parasattva
353	9	connected	Connected	400	19	thing	things
"	21	substantial	Substantial	401	8	(ghaṭā- bhāva)	(ghaṭā- bhāva),
"	28	indicate	indicate,-	"	17	from the	from the
				"		other	other
				412	16	etc.,	etc
				417	7	to be real	to the real
				"	18	position	position

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Page	Line	For	Read	Page	Line	For	Read
469	10	Sapak-sa	Sapak-sa	532	25	fact	fact
470	15	existence	existent	536	22	verbal	Verbal
472	8	Abode	Abode,	538	19	fruit	Fruit
475	23	is	Is	542	32	can	Can
477	4	Who ever	Whoever	544	11	Service	Service
478	14	diet,	diet	548	13	conscious-	Conscious-
481	11	perceptible	perceptible,			ness	ness
	24	perceiving	perceiving	549	27	so	so that
		it	it	550	26	distinguish-	distinguish-
482	24	thing	thing			able,	able
483	3	Asādhā-	Asādhā-	552	19	from	from
		rana-	aran-	553	10	accepted	accepted,
		āikāntika	ānakāntika		31	conception	Conception
	9	"	"		33	Budhists	Buddhists
484	2	bother	both	554	12	so much	so much
"	29	is well-	is a well-				
		known	known		23	Budhist	Buddhist
494	22	the fact	the fact of	555	7	You	you
498	22	unathorta-	unanthor-		8	Reality	Reality,
		tive	tative		12	relate	related
502	6	Hetero-	Hetero-	558	32	fruit	Fruit
		genous	geneous	561	6	timebeing	time being
503	17	there	these	562	10	Justifies	justifies
504	8	Pak-sa-	Pak-sa-	563	13	etc	etc,
		sudda	suddhi		24	in intimate	in intimate
512	7	thing	a thing			relation-	relation-
518	6	conscious-	Conscious-			ship'	ship
		ness	ness		29	esse-	esse-
	15	self	Self			essence	essence
521	9	involve	involve	564	5	that th.	that it is
"	11	connative	connative				
522	1	Generali-	Generali-		15	urging that	urging that it
		ties,	ties				th
523	3	substanti-	Substantia-		21	in some	in some
		lity	lity			respect	respect'
527	8	now	Now	570	1	mutually	mutually
528	20	an	an	571	11	vice	vice
"	24	cases	Cases	572	3	mirror is	mirror is
529	4	tatah	taajh		15	Perceive	perceive
"	13	persons	Persons		25	all per-	all per-
"	25	conclude,	conclude			ceive	ceive
		that	that	576	21	not in-	not in-
530	28	n	in			formed	formed
531	17	regarding	regarding	579	32	conceals	conceals
		to		581	23	Pre-ious	pre-ious

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with a Preface by

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